In re Frankle

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Frankle

241 A.D. 767

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 15, 1934

StatusPublished

This text of 241 A.D. 767 (In re Frankle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Frankle, 241 A.D. 767 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1934).

Pincite

Opinion

Order reversed on the law and the facts, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion denied, without prejudice to an application to the County Court of Nassau county to vacate the order discharging the receiver, and for leave to sue the receiver. The receiver was appointed in an action in the County Court of Nassau county, and it is to that court, and not to the Supreme Court, that an application for leave to sue the receiver should have been made. The receiver having been discharged, it was not proper to make an order granting leave to sue him. An application should have been made to vacate the order discharging the receiver, which, in view of the facts, probably would have been granted. Lazansky, P. J., Seudder, Tompkins and Davis, JJ., concur; Hagarty, J., concurs in result.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order reversed on the law and the facts, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion denied, without prejudice to an application to the County Court of Nassau county to vacate the order discharging the receiver, and for leave to sue the receiver. The receiver was appointed in an action in the County Court of Nassau county, and it is to that court, and not to the Supreme Court, that an application for leave to sue the receiver should have been made. The receiver having been discharged, it was not proper to make an order granting leave to sue him. An application should have been made to vacate the order discharging the receiver, which, in view of the facts, probably would have been granted. Lazansky, P. J., Seudder, Tompkins and Davis, JJ., concur; Hagarty, J., concurs in result.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

241 A.D. 767, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-frankle-nyappdiv-1934.