In re Fox Corporation Derivative Litigation
This text of In re Fox Corporation Derivative Litigation (In re Fox Corporation Derivative Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE BONNIE W. DAVID COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE VICE CHANCELLOR 34 THE CIRCLE GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
Date Submitted: April 25, 2025 Date Decided: April 28, 2025
Joel Friedlander, Esquire Blake Rohrbacher, Esquire Jeffrey M. Gorris, Esquire Kevin M. Gallagher, Esquire Christopher M. Foulds, Esquire Kyle H. Lachmund, Esquire Friedlander & Gorris, P.A. Sandy Xu, Esquire 1201 N. Market Street, Suite 2200 Elizabeth Freud, Esquire Wilmington, DE 19801 Benjamin O. Allen, Esquire Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. A. Thompson Bayliss, Esquire 920 North King Street John M. Seaman, Esquire Wilmington, DE 19801 Christopher Fitzpatrick Cannataro, Esquire Nicholas F. Mastria, Esquire Abrams & Bayliss LLP 20 Montchanin Road, Suite 200 Wilmington, DE 19807
RE: In re Fox Corporation Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2023-0418-BWD
Dear Counsel:
This letter resolves Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Move for Summary
Judgment (the “Motion”). Defs.’ Mot. for Leave to Move for Summ. J. [hereinafter
Mot.], Dkt. 108. The Motion is granted.
As you know, Defendants previously moved to dismiss the complaint in this
derivative action under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1. “A cardinal precept” of In re Fox Corporation Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2023-0418-BWD April 28, 2025 Page 2 of 6
Delaware law is “that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and
affairs of the corporation.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (citing
8 Del. C. § 141(a)), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000). “The board’s authority to govern corporate affairs extends to decisions
about what actions the corporation should take after being harmed, including
whether the corporation should sue its present or former fiduciaries.” In re Fox
Corp. Deriv. Litig., 2024 WL 5233229, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2024) [hereinafter
Mem. Op.]. “In order for a stockholder to divest the directors of their authority to
control the litigation asset and bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation,
the stockholder must” (1) make a demand on the company’s board of directors or
(2) show that demand would be futile. Lenois v. Lawal, 2017 WL 5289611, at *9
(Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 2017) (first citing Ct. Ch. R. 23.1(a); and then citing Kaplan v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988)).
When evaluating allegations of demand futility, our Court considers, on a
director-by-director basis,
(i) whether the director received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand; (ii) whether the director faces a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that would be the subject of the litigation demand; and (iii) whether the director lacks independence from someone who received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that would be the subject of the litigation demand or who would face a In re Fox Corporation Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2023-0418-BWD April 28, 2025 Page 3 of 6
substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the litigation demand. United Food & Com. Workers Union & Participating Food Indus. Emps. Tri-State
Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d 1034, 1059 (Del. 2021). “If the answer to
any of the questions is ‘yes’ for at least half of the members of the demand board,
then demand is excused as futile.” Id.
On December 27, 2024, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion Denying
the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (the “Memorandum Opinion”). The
Memorandum Opinion explained that to adequately plead demand futility, “the
plaintiff must raise a reasonable doubt about the disinterestedness or independence
of at least four” of Fox Corporation’s (“Fox”) eight directors. Mem. Op. at *2. The
Memorandum Opinion concluded that the complaint alleges particularized facts
sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Fox director K. Rupert Murdoch
“faces a substantial risk of liability for breaching his duty of loyalty by deciding in
bad faith to have the Company violate the law.” Id. It further concluded that the
complaint alleges sufficient facts to support an inference that at least three other
directors—Lachlan K. Murdoch, Chase Carey, and Jacques Nasser—lack
independence from Murdoch, based on allegations of “close and longstanding
business and personal ties.” Id. The Memorandum Opinion therefore denied the
motion to dismiss under Rule 23.1. In re Fox Corporation Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2023-0418-BWD April 28, 2025 Page 4 of 6
Through the pending Motion, “Defendants seek leave to move for summary
judgment on a narrow and clear issue: whether there exists evidence to support the
conclusion that Jacques Nasser is not independent of Rupert Murdoch and so cannot
impartially evaluate the claims against him in this lawsuit.” Mot. ¶ 1. Defendants
hope “[t]he motion [for summary judgment], if granted, will dispose of the case and
save the parties millions of dollars in litigation expense.” Id. Plaintiffs oppose the
Motion, arguing that permitting targeted discovery in advance of a summary
judgment motion would be inefficient and inconsistent with the law of the case. Pls.’
Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. “for Leave to Move for Summ. J.” [hereinafter Opp’n] ¶¶ 5,
18–21, Dkt. 115.
Whether to stage discovery and to permit briefing on summary judgment are
matters of judicial discretion.1 I am convinced that granting the Motion is the most
1 After a motion to dismiss under Rule 23.1 is denied, the Court retains the “discretion to entertain a motion for summary judgment on the demand futility issue.” In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 291 A.3d 652, 700 (Del. Ch. 2023); see id. at 697 (“Nothing prevents a court from analyzing demand futility on a motion for summary judgment.”); In re BGC P’rs, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 2021 WL 4271788, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 2021) (considering demand futility on summary judgment). The Court likewise may stage discovery in its discretion. See, e.g., Anchorage Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Adolf, 2025 WL 1000153, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2025) (explaining “it seems imprudent to allow the plaintiffs full-blown discovery into the sale process if the plaintiffs cannot prove the facts underlying their one viable disclosure theory”); McDonald’s, 291 A.3d at 700 (explaining that in connection with an early-stage motion for summary judgment on demand futility, “full merits discovery would not be warranted”); Caravias v. Interpath Commc’ns, Inc., 2008 WL 2268355, at *5 (Del. Ch. In re Fox Corporation Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2023-0418-BWD April 28, 2025 Page 5 of 6
efficient path forward here. Doing so will not encourage seriatim motions; the
parties should understand that the Court is disinclined to consider multiple
dispositive motions before trial. Nor does the Motion implicate the law of the case
doctrine. Defendants do not “ask[] this Court to re-adjudicate the sufficiency of the
particularized allegations respecting Nasser’s relationship with Rupert Murdoch[,]”
as Plaintiffs suggest. Opp’n ¶ 19. Allegations are not evidence, and the law of the
case doctrine does not foreclose a potential offramp if the theories pled in the
complaint do not hold up. 2
The Motion is granted.
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