In Re Ford

221 B.R. 749, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 748, 1998 WL 351840
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedJune 24, 1998
Docket19-21567
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 221 B.R. 749 (In Re Ford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Ford, 221 B.R. 749, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 748, 1998 WL 351840 (Tenn. 1998).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE TRUSTEE’S OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION

G. HARVEY BOSWELL, Bankruptcy Judge.

The plan of reorganization submitted in this ease classifies the debtor’s unsecured obligation to Shelter Insurance as a long term debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). The Chapter 13 Trustee has filed an Objection to Confirmation in response to this classification, alleging that such classification unfairly discriminates against the debtor’s other unsecured creditors and, thus, violates 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1).

The Court conducted a hearing on the Trustee’s Objection to Confirmation on May 5, 1998. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9014. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), this is a core proceeding. The following shall serve as the Court’s findings, of facts and conclusions of law. Fed. R.BankrP. 7052.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

The facts in this ease are few and undisputed. Sometime prior to filing his Chapter 13 petition, the debtor, Anthony Ford (“Ford”), was involved in an automobile accident. Ford did not have insurance at the time of the accident and, as a result, his driver’s license was revoked. The victim in the accident suffered $9818.00 in damages. Because Ford had no insurance, the victim’s insurance, company, Shelter Insurance (“Shelter”), paid for the damages.

In order to regain his driving privileges,. Ford entered into an agreement with Shelter whereby the debtor agreed to reimburse Shelter the $9819 in damages the insurance company had paid to its insured, the accident victim. On April 15,1997, the debtor executed a promissory note in favor of Shelter in the amount of $9819.001 The note set forth a down-payment of $150.00 and monthly installments of $50.00. The initial payment was due on April 8, 1997, with the monthly installments due on the 30th of each month thereafter. Under this payment plan, Ford was obligated to make on e-hundred-ninety-four (194) monthly payments of $50.00. The last payment under the note would be due in April 2012.

On January 28,1998, Ford filed a Chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy relief. The Chapter 13 plan submitted in this case calls for a repayment period of sixty (60) months. The proposed plan payments are $215.00 weekly. The filing fee, the Trustee’s fee and the debtor’s attorney’s fee are all to be paid by the plan. The plan lists two special priority debts to Juvenile Court for current child support, two secured home mortgage debts (one is to be paid directly by the debtor), four secured creditors (one is to be paid directly by the debtor), and eleven unsecured creditors.

As a result of the lengthy nature of the promissory note to Shelter, the debtor’s plan classifies the obligation as a long-term debt under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). The debtor’s plan lists Shelter as a secured creditor with a *752 claim of $9818.00 and calls for monthly payments to Shelter of $164.00.

On March 17, 1998, the Chapter 13 Trustee objected to the debtor’s classification of Shelter, alleging that the promissory note is not the type of long-term debt Congress contemplated when drafting § 1322(b)(5). The Trustee also alleged that Shelter’s classification as a secured creditor and its high monthly payment under the plan unfairly discriminates against Ford’s other unsecured creditors and, as a result, the debtor’s plan should not be confirmed.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In order to determine whether or not the Trustee’s objection to confirmation should be sustained, the Court must answer several questions. First, whether or not the debtor is entitled to classify his obligation to Shelter as a “long-term debt” under § 1322(b)(5). Second, if the debtor is so entitled, whether or not the manner in which he has classified the Shelter debt is in accordance with § 1322(b)(5). Third, whether or not such classification unfairly discriminates against Ford’s other unsecured creditors in violation of § 1322(b)(1). If the debtor is either not entitled to classify the debt as a long-term one or the classification unfairly discriminates, the Court must rule for the Trustee. If, on the other hand, the debtor may classify this debt under § 1322(b)(5), he has done so properly and such classification does not violate § 1322(b)(1), the Court must'overrule the Trustee’s objection.

A. The Entitlement to the § 1322(b)(5) Classification

Section 1322(b)(5) of Title 11 allows a Chapter 13 plan to: 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). This section is allows a debtor to cure any defaults and maintain the regular monthly payments on any contractual debt which has a longer repayment period than the duration of the Chapter 13 plan. Section 1328(a)(1) of Title 11 excepts a debt so designated from the debtor’s Chapter 13 discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1).

... provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due;

Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the legislative history of § 1322(b)(5) offers much guidance as to what exactly qualifies as a “long-term debt” under § 1322(b)(5)! It is not a concept which is defined in the Code and the legislative history simply states that the section is meant to encompass long-term debt, “such as mortgages.” H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess 429 (1977). In the realm of case law, the section has been applied to unsecured student loans, In re Chandler, 210 B.R. 898 (Bankr.D.N.H.1997); In re Cox, 186 B.R. 744 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1995); In re Anderson, 173 B.R. 226 (Bankr.D.Col. 1993); In re Benner, 156 B.R. 631 (Bankr.D.Minn.1993); In re Saulter, 133 B.R. 148 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1991), mortgages, In re Bradley, 109 B.R. 182 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1990); In re Hayes, 101 B.R. 569 (Bankr.E.D.Ark. 1989), and retail installment contracts for automobiles, In re Delauder, 189 B.R. 639 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1995). In discussing (b)(5)’s breadth, a leading treatise on bankruptcy has stated:

... [T]he section is not limited to home mortgages. It permits the curing of default and maintenance of payments on any secured or unsecured claim, as long as the last payment is due after the last payment under the plan.

5 Norton Bankr.L. & Practice 2d § 121:8. 1

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
221 B.R. 749, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 748, 1998 WL 351840, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-ford-tnwb-1998.