In Re Flowers

734 A.2d 69, 1999 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 531
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 16, 1999
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 734 A.2d 69 (In Re Flowers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Flowers, 734 A.2d 69, 1999 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 531 (Pa. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

The Westmoreland County Airport Authority (Authority) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of West-moreland County (trial court) dismissing its preliminary objections to Robert F. Flowers’ and Martha Flowers’ (collectively, Landowners) Petition for Appointment of a Board of Viewers (Petition) alleging that the Authority’s operation of Latrobe Airport with regard to their property constituted a de facto taking under Section 502(e) of the Eminent Domain Code (Code). 1

In 1960, Landowners purchased their property located at 1502 Beech Drive in Unity Township, Westmoreland County (property). In the vicinity of their property was and continues to be Latrobe Airport. The Authority owns Latrobe Airport and is responsible for its maintenance and operation. Latrobe Airport is composed of two runways: Runway %3 2 and Runway 3/21. In 1968, Runway % measured 5,000 feet and in May 1986, it was extended to 7,001 feet in a southwesterly direction. The centerline extension of Runway % is 167.08 feet from Landowners’ property line and 223.16 feet from their house.

In February 1996, Landowners filed the Petition asserting that the Authority had effectuated a de facto taking of their property. In their Petition, Landowners alleged that the Authority had deprived them of the beneficial use and enjoyment of the air space immediately above their property when it allowed increased usage of Runway 5/23. They also alleged that they suffered property damage as a result of the increased use. The Authority filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer asserting, inter alia, that Landowners’ Petition was time barred. A hearing was then held before the trial court.

Before the trial court, Landowners 3 testified that at the time they purchased their property in 1960, there was neither any significant amount of aircraft flying over their house nor was there any problem with respect to noise emanating from those aircraft. They stated that they noticed aircraft flying over their house in 1975, but the noise did not become bothersome until approximately 1992 or 1993 when they noticed a gradual increase in the amount of noise from aircraft at Latrobe Airport. Landowners indicated that they believed the noise had increased because Latrobe Airport began servicing a greater number of larger aircraft, which they identified as jets. They testified that the noise was so loud that it prohibited them from engaging in telephone or face-to-face conversations both inside and outside of their house, watching television or listening to the radio. Landowners further testified that the noise from the aircraft created vibrations two to four times per month that caused their house to “shake, rattle and roll” and to make rumbling sounds. They also indicated that at night, the lights from these aircraft would often shine through their bedroom windows and disturb their sleep. Landowners further indicated that they *71 had to clean their back porch and car windows more often because it “gets black from ... airplane fuel.” 4

The Authority presented the testimony of Eugene Lakin (Lakin), executive director for the Authority, who testified that Latrobe Airport was classified by the Federal Aviation Administration as a non-hub primary commercial service airport, i.e., the airport had at least 10,000 passenger enplanements each year. Lakin stated that there were approximately 233 aircraft based at Latrobe Airport. He further stated that the airport had grown dramatically within the past ten years due to the number of people using the airport, Runway 5/23’s extension and the increased number of services offered at the terminal; however, the number of “operations”, i.e., either a landing or a takeoff, had decreased. Lakin conceded that the amount of aircraft jet activity had increased over the same time period.

Charles W. Green (Green), chief of air traffic control at Latrobe Airport, also testified on behalf of the Authority. He stated that Runway % was the most used runway because of its prevailing winds from the southwest. With respect to the total number of operations for aircraft at Latrobe Airport, Green testified as follows:

Year Total Operations
1969 26,350
1979 75,828
1989 55,889
1997 48,671 5

He further testified that of all the operations listed above, between 85% and 90% occurred on Runway %, such that at the least, aircraft would take off in the direction of Landowners’ house. Green stated that the decline in operations at Latrobe Airport was a reflection of the increasing costs of general aviation and a decline in the number of people attempting to obtain or maintain a pilot’s license. With respect to air carrier operations, 6 Green indicated that those figures had increased over the years. 7

Based upon the testimony and the evidence presented, the trial court held that Landowners had sustained their burden to show that the Authority’s activities at Latrobe Airport deprived them of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property and constituted a de facto taking. Regarding the Authority’s claim that Landowners’ Petition was time barred, the trial court held that the 21-year statute of limitations of Section 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(3) was applicable to Landowners’ Petition because the Authority’s actions did not deprive Landowners of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property until “four to six years” before they *72 filed their Petition, i.e., approximately 1990 to 1992. This appeal by the Authority followed. 8

Not disputing the trial court’s finding that Landowners lost the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property as a result of the activities at Latrobe Airport, the Authority contends that the trial court erred in applying the 21-year statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(3) rather than the five-year statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5526(4). The five-year statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5526(4) applies if “property has been injured but no part thereof has been taken”, while the 21-year statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(3) applies if the property “has been taken and the con-demnor has not made payment in accordance with section 407(a) or (b)” 9 of the Code. It argues that Landowners’ property was merely “injured” and not taken as a result of the aircraft activity at Latrobe Airport, so that their Petition is governed by the five-year statute of limitations.

The applicable time limitation is then determined by whether Landowners’ property was “taken” by the Authority.

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792 A.2d 669 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
734 A.2d 69, 1999 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 531, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-flowers-pacommwct-1999.