In re Florjancic

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 116030
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re Florjancic, 2026-Ohio-2328.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE DAWN MARIE FLORJANCIC : : No. 116030 [Appeal by Dawn Marie Florjancic] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 18, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Probate Division Case No. 2025MSC303370

Appearances:

Amanda M. Bizub, for appellant.

LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:

This appeal is before the court on the accelerated docket pursuant to

App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. “The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow

this court to render a brief and conclusory opinion.” State v. Priest, 2014-Ohio-1735,

¶ 1.

Dawn Marie Florjancic (“Florjancic”) appeals the judgment denying

her application for change of name. After a thorough review of the facts and the law,

we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background and Procedural History

On December 10, 2025, Florjancic filed an application to change her

last name to Barna, for the following reason: “Ms. Florjancic has been in a long term

relationship with her current partner and functions as a second mother to her

teenage step daughter. The family wishes to present themselves as one unit with the

same last name. The adults do not wish to marry.”

On December 15, 2025, the court issued a journal entry denying the

name-change application. Pertinent to this appeal, the court found that the

application “should be denied under the doctrine of res judicata which prevents the

same issue from being relitigated once it has been judged on the merits.” The court

further provided, “This Application seeks to change the Applicant’s name from

Dawn Marie Florjancic to Dawn Marie Barna . . . . On March 26, 2025, the Applicant

filed the exact same name change application,” which the court apparently denied.

Florjancic appealed, raising the following assignments of error:

I. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied Appellant’s re- filed application for a name change on res judicata grounds, despite the limited evidentiary record in the original proceeding, and the materially expanded evidence contemplated in the subsequent application.

II. The trial court violated Appellant’s right to Due Process when it denied the re-filed name-change application without notice, a hearing, or any opportunity to present evidence, thereby resolving factual and legal issues without an evidentiary record. II. Law and Analysis

With her first assignment of error, Florjancic asserts that the court

erred in denying her name-change application, finding it barred by res judicata. We

agree.

R.C. Ch. 2717 establishes requirements concerning applications for a

change of name. “A person desiring to change the person’s name may file an

application in the probate court of the county in which the person resides.”

R.C. 2717.02. Pertinent here, a name-change application must set forth the “reason

for which the change of name is sought” and “the new requested name.”

R.C. 2717.03(B)-(C). A court “may order” a name change “upon proof that the facts

set forth in the application show reasonable and proper cause” for doing so.

R.C. 2717.09.

“‘Res judicata ensures the finality of decisions.’” AJZ’s Hauling,

L.L.C. v. Trunorth Warranty Programs of N. Am., 2023-Ohio-3097, ¶ 15, quoting

Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979). Res judicata bars a party “from

relitigating the same issue or claim that has already been decided in a final,

appealable order or a valid, final judgment in a prior proceeding and could have

been raised on appeal in that prior proceeding.” Id. at ¶ 16. We review de novo a

trial court’s application of res judicata. Kobal v. Kobal, 2022-Ohio-812, ¶ 8 (8th

Dist.), citing Hempstead v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 2008-Ohio-5350, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.).

“‘De novo review encompasses an independent examination of the record and law

without deference to the underlying decision.’” Torres v. Concrete Designs, Inc., 2019-Ohio-1342, ¶ 48 (8th Dist.), quoting Gateway Consultants Group, Inc. v.

Premier Physicians Ctrs., Inc., 2017-Ohio-1443, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).

The trial court dismissed this case sua sponte, on a record devoid of

information regarding any prior name change that Florjancic sought, without giving

her notice and an opportunity to address the court’s concern that res judicata barred

her present application. We find that it erred in doing so.

A. Sua Sponte Dismissal

This court has warned that sua sponte dismissal of an action without

notice to the parties is “generally not countenanced.” Melling v. Scott, 2016-Ohio-

112, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.) (concerning dismissal of a declaratory-judgment action).

“Dismissals without notice are fundamentally unfair to the parties and should be

reserved for the plainly frivolous case.” Id. See also X-S Merchandise, Inc. v. Wynne

Pro, L.L.C., 2012-Ohio-2315, at ¶ 16 (Trial court erred by sua sponte dismissing

complaint without notice to plaintiff on the basis that plaintiff failed to prosecute a

claim under Civ.R. 41(B)(1).). Where a court dismisses a complaint sua sponte

under Civ.R. 41(B)(1), which requires notice, “[t]he purpose of notice is ‘to provide

the party [bringing the action] an opportunity to . . . explain why the case should not

be dismissed with prejudice.’” Id. at ¶ 17, quoting Dresher v. Summers, 30 Ohio

App.3d 271 (8th Dist. 1986).

Though this case does not involve dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(1),

informed by the above precedent, we find that the court’s handling of this matter

was “fundamentally unfair” under the circumstances and constituted reversible error. It is not clear from Florjancic’s application that this is a “plainly frivolous

case,” in which sua sponte dismissal without notice might be permissible. Florjancic

provided the court the reason she sought to change her name — to share a surname

with her partner and stepdaughter — and her new requested name, which is what

R.C. 2717.03(B)-(C) required a name-change application to set forth. We note also

that R.C. Ch. 2717 does not prohibit successive name-change applications. Further,

“‘It is universally recognized that a person may adopt any name he may choose so

long as such change is not made for fraudulent purposes.’” In re Bicknell, 2002-

Ohio-3615, ¶ 8, quoting Pierce v. Brushart, 153 Ohio St. 372, 380 (1950). In

Bicknell, the Court held that a name change application was reasonable and proper

under R.C. 2717.01 where a same-sex couple sought to combine their surnames to

“add to the level of commitment they have for each other, as well as that of their

unborn child.” Id. at ¶ 1, 4.

In light of the foregoing, we find that the court erred in dismissing

Florjancic’s application sua sponte, without providing notice and an opportunity to

be heard.

B. Dismissal Based on Res Judicata

Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has found that a trial court errs

by dismissing a complaint on the basis of res judicata where such dismissal requires

consideration of matters outside the four corners of the complaint. Jefferson v.

Bunting, 2014-Ohio-3074, ¶ 10 (regarding grant of a motion to dismiss under

Civ.R. 12(B)(6)). This court, likewise, has recognized that courts “cannot rely on evidence or allegations outside the complaint to decide a . . . motion to dismiss.”

Siniscalchi v. K Hovnanian Meadow Lakes, LLC, 2026-Ohio-177, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).

Consequently, “[i]t is well-established that res judicata is not a proper basis for

dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).” Id. at ¶ 16. Application of res judicata generally

entails “‘comparing the facts of the present case with the facts of the previous case,’”

which often requires considering information “outside the four corners of the

complaint.” Bykova v. Cleveland, 2025-Ohio-3285, ¶ 17-18 (8th Dist.), quoting

Pfalzgraf v. Miley, 2019-Ohio-4920, ¶ 12-14 (7th Dist.).

We find that the court erred in determining that res judicata applied

at this stage of the case. We note that this case does not involve an adversarial

proceeding where either party filed a complaint or a motion to dismiss under

Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Nonetheless, we cannot say from the face of Florjancic’s application

that the requested name change before us concerns facts and issues that the trial

court adjudicated in a prior matter. The record in this case does not contain any

prior name-change application that Florjancic may have filed or any evidence that

she may have provided to support it.

Accordingly, assignment of error No. 1 is sustained. Consequently,

Florjancic’s second assignment of error is moot, and we render no opinion on

whether this case necessitates an evidentiary hearing.

Judgment reversed. Case remanded. If, on remand, the court seeks

to dismiss this case sua sponte, it is instructed to provide Florjancic prior notice of

its intent to do so and an opportunity to be heard. It is ordered that costs are waived.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

probate court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE

DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCURS; SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURRING:

I fully concur with the majority’s analysis and conclusion, although I

understand the quandary the probate court found itself in after the second petition

for name change was filed.

This appeal asks the question whether a court can sua sponte raise

and apply the doctrine of res judicata in uncontested proceedings. The majority

rightfully addresses the concerns raised by a trial court doing so. Notwithstanding,

I do acknowledge that courts wrestle with this question based in part on precedent

suggesting that a court may sua sponte raise and then apply the doctrine. See, e.g.,

Wells v. Hudson, 2007-Ohio-1955, ¶ 6 (no error in sua sponte dismissing complaint

based on res judicata); Potts v. Rose, 2003-Ohio-5102, ¶ 4 (sua sponte dismissal of

habeas petition affirmed); see also King v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2002-Ohio-5860, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.). It is questionable whether those decisions allowing

courts to sua sponte apply the affirmative defense survive the renewed scrutiny on

the party-presentation principle. Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-

1875, ¶ 4; In re J.D., 2026-Ohio-1310, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.) (noting that the propriety of

raising res judicata when not preserved by a party was questionable). Cases such as

Hudson and Rose complicate the procedural landscape, especially in consideration

of the contrary authority as noted by the majority.

For this reason, I fully concur.