In re Flint

150 F.2d 126, 32 C.C.P.A. 1116, 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121, 1945 CCPA LEXIS 449
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 22, 1945
DocketNo. 5021
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 150 F.2d 126 (In re Flint) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Flint, 150 F.2d 126, 32 C.C.P.A. 1116, 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121, 1945 CCPA LEXIS 449 (ccpa 1945).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirmed the decision of the Primary Examiner in finally rejecting, upon the disclosure of a prior art patent, claims 1, 2, 6, and 7 of appellant’s application for a patent relating to a median device, and appeal has been taken here from the board’s decision.

Fifteen claims covering the device have been allowed, but the instant claims are broader in scope than those allowed. Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter of the appealed claims, and it reads as follows:

1. A device for determining the median of a group of quantitative measurements comprising operating means movable for making said measurements, movable indicating means operatively connected to said operating means and seriately movable thereby in accordance with movement thereof in making each measurement of the group, said indicating means being constructed and arranged to-indicate independently the value of each measurement of said group, and means for determining the median value of the group of measurements indicated hy the relative positions of said indicating means. [Italics ours.]

The invention relates to a calculating mechanism or device for obtaining the median value of a group of quantitative measurements. In his specification, appellant states that his device may be used with many types of measuring instruments, or may even be used separately from any instrument. The particular embodiment disclosed, however, shows the device adapted to a navigational instrument, such as a bubble octant or bubble sextant. Instruments of that character are used in the art of navigation to determine the altitude of some celestial body. As pointed out in the specification, the customary practice is to make a number of altitude observations or measurements and to determine the median value of the group of measurements, which value is employed in computing latitude and longitude. It is clear from the specification that a device which determines the median value of a group of quantitative measurements performs a function wholly different from any device which merely ascertains the average of such a group. . .

We have before us one of the commercial instruments built in accordance with the application. Its label states that it is an “Aircraft Octant.” It weighs 4 or 5 pounds, has various reflectors, lenses, numeral charts, and a series of disks, all of which function together when used with a battery to determine the median of a group of figures. It is emphasized in the application that for the purposes for which the device is to be used, the ascertainment of the average of a group tof [1118]*1118figures would be useless, whereas the ascertainment of the median value leads to satisfactory results.

The appealed claims were rejected by the examiner upon the disclosure of the Walker patent, No. 1,638,973, issued August 16, 1927. The examiner was of the opinion that the claims did not distinguish over that patent because, in his view, they depend for patentability upon “functions vaguely implied in the word ‘seriately.’ ” He was also of the opinion that the word “seriately” did not define structure and was therefore indefinite.

The board did not expressly disagree with the examiner, but it went into the whole question, discussed the invention of appellant and the Walker reference in more detail, and showed a thorough knowledge of appellant’s contentions and the difference in meaning between the terms “median” and “average.” However, it agreed with the examiner that the claims were broad enough to read upon Walker.

The Walker patent relates to an apparatus to be used to measure distances traveled by ships. We deem it advisable here to set out Fig. 1 of that patent and Fig. 9 of appellant’s application. [See p. 1119.]

It will be observed that Walker has two sets of three dials each, an upper set and a lower set. These sets operate alternately at intervals of one minute. The pointers of the left-hand dials are electrically connected to tire port propeller of the ship, and those of the right-hand dials are similarly connected to the starboard propeller. In each set, the pointer of the center dial is connected with those of the left-hand nad right-hand dials through a differential mechanism, so that it indicates the average of their movements. At the bottom of Fig. 1 three registers are shown. That at the left indicates the revolutions of the port propeller; that at the right, the revolutions of the starboard propeller; and that at the center, the average. The two sets of dials are operated alternately so as to permit the conversion of propeller rotation .indication to an indication of actual distance traveled by the ship.

Walker was interested only in ascertaining the average of two measurements or indications, namely, those of the revolutions of the two propellers. The device of appellant works upon a wholly different principle. Appellant does not seek to ascertain the average between two movements or measurements. For reasons presently stated, we are of the opinion that the record as a whole shows that the whole purpose of appellant’s device is to ascertain the median value of more than two measurements.

The Board o.f Appeals, in affirming the action of the examiner, stated:

Appellant argues that the device of Walker operates on an entirely different principle than applicant’s device and gains a different end result and that the

[1119]*1119APPELLANT’S DEVICE.

THE WALKER REFERENCE.

[1120]*1120device of the reference does not provide the median value of the two propeller speeds of a ship but the average of the two speeds as determined by a differential mechanism.
It is not apparent that there is a difference in so far as the claims are concerned in this attemx>t to distinguish between median value and average. The Walker patent seems to disclose means for making measurements, that is, for counting the number of revolutions and other means for counting another number of revolutions made in the same length of time as the first but different in number and the means for indicating the average of the two is shown in Fig. 1 of the patent. There is also means for indicating the number of revolutions made by each measurement and it is not apparent that merely stating that these means are movable in series or seriately amounts to a patentable structural distinction. The claims do not seem to be limited to any particular number of measurements so that two different measurements as made by the Walker patent and the mean average of these two as shown by the mechanism disclosed in Walker appears to satisfy the terms of the claims.

In support of the decision of the board, the Solicitor for the Patent Office in this court states, in substance, that the Walker patent does determine a median and is not confined solely to determining an average; He states that one of the definitions of the word “median” given by Webster is “being in the middle; occupying an intermediate position.” Then he points to Walker and states that the average reading on the Walker device occupies the middle and therefore is the median.

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150 F.2d 126, 32 C.C.P.A. 1116, 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121, 1945 CCPA LEXIS 449, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-flint-ccpa-1945.