In Re Firestone

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

In Re Firestone

824 A.2d 47, 2003 D.C. App. LEXIS 289, 2003 WL 21202694

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedMay 22, 2003

Docket02-BG-513

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 824 A.2d 47 (In Re Firestone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In Re Firestone, 824 A.2d 47, 2003 D.C. App. LEXIS 289, 2003 WL 21202694 (D.C. 2003).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

On April 29, 2002, respondent S. Edward Firestone entered a plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to eighteen counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002). After Bar Counsel reported respondent’s convictions to this court, we suspended respondent pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 10(c). We directed the Board on Professional Responsibility (“the Board”) to institute a formal proceeding to determine the nature of the final discipline to be imposed and, specifically, to decide whether respondent’s crimes involved moral turpitude. The Board has concluded that respondent’s convictions involve moral turpitude per se and recommends disbarment pursuant to D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) (2001). '

Bar Counsel has informed the court that she takes no exception to the Board’s report and recommendation. Respondent has not filed any exceptions to the Board’s report and recommendation. In such circumstances, our review of the Board’s recommendation is especially deferential. In re Delaney, 697 A.2d 1212, 1214 (D.C.1997) (citation omitted). See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g)(2). It is well settled in this jurisdiction that mail fraud is a crime of moral turpitude per se. See, e.g., In re Dunbar, 810 A.2d 917 (D.C.2002). Thus, D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) mandates respondent’s disbarment. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that S. Edward Firestone is disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia.

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PER CURIAM:

On April 29, 2002, respondent S. Edward Firestone entered a plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to eighteen counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002). After Bar Counsel reported respondent’s convictions to this court, we suspended respondent pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 10(c). We directed the Board on Professional Responsibility (“the Board”) to institute a formal proceeding to determine the nature of the final discipline to be imposed and, specifically, to decide whether respondent’s crimes involved moral turpitude. The Board has concluded that respondent’s convictions involve moral turpitude per se and recommends disbarment pursuant to D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) (2001). '

Bar Counsel has informed the court that she takes no exception to the Board’s report and recommendation. Respondent has not filed any exceptions to the Board’s report and recommendation. In such circumstances, our review of the Board’s recommendation is especially deferential. In re Delaney, 697 A.2d 1212, 1214 (D.C.1997) (citation omitted). See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g)(2). It is well settled in this jurisdiction that mail fraud is a crime of moral turpitude per se. See, e.g., In re Dunbar, 810 A.2d 917 (D.C.2002). Thus, D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) mandates respondent’s disbarment. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that S. Edward Firestone is disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia.

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824 A.2d 47, 2003 D.C. App. LEXIS 289, 2003 WL 21202694, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-firestone-dc-2003.

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