In re Finn

223 A.D.2d 333, 647 N.Y.S.2d 39, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9264

This text of 223 A.D.2d 333 (In re Finn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Finn, 223 A.D.2d 333, 647 N.Y.S.2d 39, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9264 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

In this proceeding, the respondent was served with a petition containing 12 charges of professional misconduct against him. The Special Referee sustained all 12 charges. The Grievance Committee now moves to confirm the Special Referee’s report. The respondent cross-moves to confirm in part, and disaffirm to the extent that he did not act in a venal manner or commit any conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation.

Charge One alleged that the respondent engaged in conduct that adversely reflects upon his fitness to practice law.

The respondent was retained in or about April 1985 to represent Joseph Scozzafava, a person of limited intellectual capacity, in his purchase of real property on Staten Island. In or about June 1985, Mr. Scozzafava contracted to purchase the property for $109,000 and left a $10,800 down payment. When Mr. Scozzafava expressed reservations about proceeding with the purchase, the respondent offered to purchase the property if Mr. Scozzafava would lend him $99,000. In or about July 1985, Mr. Scozzafava paid $90,000 directly to the seller and the respondent delivered to Mr. Scozzafava a 24-year mortgage in the amount of $99,000, at an annual interest rate of 8%. That rate was below prevailing interest rates.

The respondent retained the original mortgage but failed to record it. He also failed to advise his client of the necessity and purpose of recording the mortgage. The respondent, moreover, failed to advise Mr. Scozzafava to seek independent counsel.

In or about November 1986 the respondent borrowed $75,000 from Beneficial Mortgage Corporation, secured by a recorded mortgage in that amount on the subject real property. The respondent was named agent for the title insurance company at the Beneficial mortgage closing. The respondent failed to disclose to Beneficial the existence of the unrecorded Scozzafava mortgage. The respondent failed to advise Mr. Scozzafava that he was using the Staten Island property to obtain another mortgage. The respondent only recorded the Scozzafava mortgage in July 1987 after Mr. Scozzafava’s cousin inquired about it.

By reason of the foregoing, the respondent violated Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (A) (8) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [8]).

[335]*335Charge Two alleged that the respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (A) (4) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [4]), based on the facts alleged in Charge One.

Charge Three alleged that the respondent engaged in an impermissible conflict of interest in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-104 (A) (22 NYCRR 1200.23 [a]), based on the facts set forth in Charge One.

Charge Four alleged that the respondent engaged in conduct adversely reflecting upon his fitness to practice law, in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (A) (8) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [8]).

The respondent improperly attempted to condition the settlement of Mr. Scozzafava’s civil claim against him upon an assurance that no complaint of professional misconduct against him would be made to the Grievance Committee.

Charge Five alleged that the respondent engaged in conduct adversely reflecting upon his fitness to practice law.

The respondent was retained by Carlos Izquierdo in or about July 1990 to commence a foreclosure proceeding with respect to real property in Queens. The property was conveyed to Mr. Izquierdo at the closing, on or about July 17, 1992. The respondent retained the deed after the closing, without his client’s consent. The respondent was aware of the requirement that a deed be recorded within 30 days in order to avoid penalties. The respondent refused to release the deed to his client until he received payment of his fees for legal services.

The Grievance Committee received a complaint from Mr. Izquierdo on or about October 20,1992, based on the respondent’s improper refusal to release the deed. The Grievance Committee forwarded the complaint to the respondent, on or about October 26, 1992, along with a request for the respondent’s written answer. The respondent mailed the deed to Mr. Izquierdo on or about October 29, 1992.

By reason of the foregoing, the respondent violated Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (A) (8) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [8]).

Charge Six alleged that the respondent engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law, in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (A) (8) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [8]).

The respondent improperly sought to condition the settlement of a civil suit against Mr. Izquierdo upon the latter’s [336]*336withdrawal of his complaint. In connection with the settlement of the respondent’s civil suit against Mr. Izquierdo, the respondent requested that he sign a letter addressed to the Grievance Committee withdrawing his complaint.

Charge Seven alleged that the respondent improperly converted to his own use funds entrusted to him as fiduciary.

The respondent was retained in or about January 1989 to commence a foreclosure action on behalf of Henry Reich and Alex Silberberg with respect to real property in Queens. At an auction on May 1990, an $8,000 down payment was held by Referee Lee A. Mayersohn. After the purchaser sought to set aside the sale, a stipulation of settlement was executed in or about March 1991 whereby it was agreed that $5,350 would be paid to the respondent "as attorney” for Messrs. Reich and Silberberg. Pursuant to the stipulation of settlement, Mr. Mayersohn issued a check payable to the respondent "as attorney”, in the amount of $5,350. The respondent deposited that check into his business account in or about April 1991 without the prior consent of either Messrs. Reich or Silberberg.

By reason of the foregoing, the respondent violated Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102 (B) (22 NYCRR 1200.46 [b]).

Charge Eight alleged that the respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

After having made the $5,350 deposit into his business account, the respondent represented to Messrs. Reich and Silberberg that he was holding those funds in his attorney escrow account. In or about February 1993 the Grievance Committee received a complaint from Messrs. Reich and Silberberg alleging that the respondent had refused to return funds that he was holding in escrow. The Grievance Committee thereafter mailed the respondent a copy of the complaint with a request for his written answer. The respondent submitted an answer which contained the false representation that the $5,350 entrusted to him was being held in his attorney escrow account.

By reason of the foregoing, the respondent violated Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (A) (4) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [4]).

Charge Nine alleged that the respondent engaged in conduct adversely reflecting upon his fitness to practice law, in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (A) (8) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [8]), based on the facts alleged in Charges Seven and Eight.

[337]*337Charge Ten alleged that the respondent engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law.

In or about April 1993, the respondent requested that Messrs.

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Bluebook (online)
223 A.D.2d 333, 647 N.Y.S.2d 39, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9264, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-finn-nyappdiv-1996.