In Re Figueroa

376 B.R. 627, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3517, 2007 WL 2990764
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio·Decided October 10, 2007·No. 19-40102·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

MARY ANN WHIPPLE, Bankruptcy Judge.

This case is before the court on the United States Trustee’s (“the UST”) motion to dismiss Debtors’ Chapter 7 case for abuse under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) [Doc. #20] and Debtors’ response [Doc. #23], A hearing was held that Debtors, their counsel and counsel for the UST attended in person and at which the parties had the opportunity to present testimony and other evidence in support of their respective positions.

The court has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the general order of reference entered in this district. Proceedings to determine a motion to dismiss a case under § 707(b) are core proceedings that the court may hear and decide. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A). Having considered the briefs and arguments of counsel and having reviewed the record in this case, for the reasons that follow, the court will deny the UST’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Debtors are married and have three dependent children. George Figueroa is employed as a truck driver at Swift Transportation Inc., where he has worked for the past three years, and Ana Figueroa is employed as a day care provider at Calvary Assembly of God, where she has worked for approximately five and one-half years. On May 1, 2007, Debtors filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Their Schedule D shows total secured debt in the amount of *629 $128,232, unsecured nonpriority debt, consisting primarily of credit card debt, in the amount of $56,502, and no unsecured priority debt.

Debtors are below the applicable median income for a family of five for purposes of the means test under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). Their Schedule I shows total monthly gross income of $5,570, and total monthly income after payroll deductions in the amount of $4,391. A review of George Figueroa’s prepetition pay advices filed in this case shows that his weekly income after payroll deductions was variable from a low of $361 to a high of $918, with an average of $653 per week. The court credits his testimony that since filing, his income has decreased to and average of $500 per week. Although he did not specify whether this figure was his average gross or net income, the court assumes it is a weekly average of his income after payroll deductions. Mr. Figueroa testified that the decrease in income is due to the fact that he is being assigned fewer miles and, as a truck driver, is paid on a per mile basis. He does not know the length of time this apparent downturn in business will continue.

Debtors’ Schedule J filed with their petition shows total monthly expenses in the amount of $3,909, which includes a mortgage expense of $900, which in turn includes expenses for property taxes and insurance. At the hearing, George Figueroa testified that, since filing their petition, Debtors’ monthly mortgage expense has increased by approximately $300 and that the increase is due to the interest rate of their adjustable rate mortgage being increased from approximately 7.0% to approximately 10.0%. 1

The UST filed a timely motion to dismiss for abuse under § 707(b)(3), arguing that the totality of the circumstances are such that Debtors have the ability to repay at least a portion of their unsecured debt.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

This case must be decided under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, (“BAPCPA” or “the Act”) as it was filed on May 1, 2007, after the effective date of the Act. Where debts are primarily consumer debts, the court may, after notice and a hearing, dismiss a Chapter 7 petition “if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of [Chapter 7].” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). Before BAPCPA, courts considered whether to dismiss a case for “substantial abuse” under § 707(b) based on the “totality of the circumstances.” See, e.g., In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir.1989); In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir.2004). The Sixth Circuit explained that “substantial abuse” could be predicated upon either a lack of honesty or want of need, to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Krohn, 886 F.2d at 126. Congress incorporated this judicially created construct in § 707(b)(3) by requiring a court to consider “(A) whether the debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or (B) the totality of the circumstances ... of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A) and (B). Although pre-BAPCPA case law applying these concepts is still helpful in determining abuse under § 707(b)(3), under BAPCPA, Congress has clearly lowered the standard for dismissal in changing the test from “substantial *630 abuse” to “abuse.” In re Mestemaker, 359 B.R. 849, 856 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2007).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In Re Figueroa, 376 B.R. 627, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3517, 2007 WL 2990764 (Ohio 2007).

376 B.R. 627 (In Re Figueroa) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

In Re Parada
391 B.R. 492 (S.D. Florida, 2008)