[Cite as In re F.I., 2014-Ohio-2350.]
COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: : JUDGES: F.I. : J.I. : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : : Case No. 14-CA-1 : : : : : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County Juvenile Court Case Nos. 2013-AB- 0021 and 2013-AB-0258
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 29, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Appellee: For Mother-Appellant:
GREGG MARX KRISTI R. MCANAUL FAIRFIELD CO. PROSECUTOR 660 Hill Road N., P.O. Box 220 Zoe A. Lamberson Pickerington, OH 43147 Andrea K. Green 239 W. Main St., Ste. 101 Lancaster, OH 43130 Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant J. I. (“Mother”) appeals from the December 18, 2013 Entries of
the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division terminating her parental
rights and granting permanent custody of F.I. (d.o.b. 6/21/2013) and J.I. (d.o.b.
2/4/2011) to Fairfield County Child Protective Services (“CPS”). Appellee is the state of
Ohio.
{¶2} This case comes to us on the expedited calendar and shall be considered
in compliance with App. R. 11.2(C).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶3} J.I. was born on February 4, 2011 to Mother and J.D.I. (“Father”), who is
deceased. F.I. was born on June 21, 2013 to Mother and an undetermined father.
Mother Surrenders Permanent Custody of Three Older Children
{¶4} Mother surrendered permanent custody of three older children prior to the
births of the minor children at issue in the instant case: J.I. (d.o.b. 5/7/00), J.I. (d.o.b.
7/23/02), and J.I. (d.o.b. 12/11/03). The three older children were initially removed by
C.P.S. due to allegations of abuse and/or neglect. Mother did not contest the motions
for permanent custody.
Mother’s Troubled Relationship History
{¶5} Mother’s prior involvement with CPS was due in part to her history of
relationships with sex offenders. Mother’s boyfriend at age 16 was convicted of
corruption of a minor; another boyfriend was convicted of gross sexual imposition
against a 3-year-old Mother babysat; and her husband (“Father”) was found in
possession of child pornography and was convicted of pandering sexually-oriented Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 3
matter involving a juvenile. Mother cooperated in the prosecution of Father, voluntarily
gave up custody of one of their children together, and then reunited with Father, who
died in 2010.
{¶6} Mother, age 30, then became involved with R.A., age 57, one of the
putative fathers of F.I. (d.o.b. 6/21/2013), who knew her “all her life.” R.A. was
reportedly violent with Mother and one of her children. Mother also still maintains
contact with her mother’s boyfriend who sexually abused her from the age of 5 until the
age of 13. Mother testified she forgives people and believes they can change.
The Drano Incident and J.I.’s (d.o.b. 2/4/2011) Ongoing Medical Needs
{¶7} Mother frequently allowed J.I. to drink Lipton’s “sweet tea” because it was
his favorite beverage, to the extent his front teeth became so decayed they had to be
removed.
{¶8} On November 7, 2012, J.I. ingested Drano drain cleaner which Mother put
in a Lipton’s “sweet tea” bottle and left unattended. J.I. suffered internal and external
third-degree burns and was placed on life support. His esophagus was eventually
replaced and at the time of trial he was still hospitalized due to complications. J.I. faces
significant ongoing medical issues; his medical care requires twice-daily dressing
changes, pressure garments, and a feeding tube.
{¶9} Mother acknowledges she does not know how to provide the specific care
J.I. requires. She was told scratching J.I.’s burn scars reinforces behavior that will
jeopardize healing but was observed scratching scars during visitation and was
redirected with difficulty. She told an evaluator she is not prepared for J.I. to come
home and is afraid of injuring him further. Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 4
Mother’s Mental Health
{¶10} Dr. Bradley Hedges testified as an expert witness about his psychological
evaluation of Mother based upon her referral by CPS. He testified his assessment of
Mother is based upon the entire clinical record available to him, including evaluations
compiled in 2005, 2007, and 2013 from earlier CPS referrals. His expert opinion is
Mother has difficulty meeting her own needs independently, let alone the needs of her
children, because she consistently relies upon others for help in meeting those needs.
The individuals Mother relies upon expose her children to a high risk of victimization.
Mother requires a significant degree of intervention and intense supervision to ensure
the long-term safety of her children. Her ability to parent has not improved significantly
over the time Hedges has evaluated her. Mother’s borderline intellectual functioning,
maladaptive personality dynamics and history demonstrate she has consistently failed
to apply her knowledge to her parenting, resulting in significant harm to her children.
Procedural History
{¶11} After the Drano incident, CPS sought ex parte emergency custody of J.I.,
which was granted on December 7, 2012 in Fairfield County Juvenile Court Case
Number 2012 AB 0187. On December 10, 2012, CPS filed a dependency complaint on
behalf of J.I. under the same case number and that day J.I. was placed in temporary
shelter custody.
{¶12} On January 29, 2013, Fairfield County Juvenile Court Case No. 2012 AB
0187 was dismissed without prejudice and a dependency complaint was re-filed under
Case No. 2013 AB 0021. J.I. was again placed into the temporary shelter custody of
CPS. Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 5
{¶13} A case plan was developed for Mother on December 20, 2012 and filed in
Case No. 2013 AB 0021 on February 5, 2013. This case plan was later amended to
include F.I. (d.o.b. 6/21/2013). A caseworker testified at trial that Mother is in
compliance with her case plan, the terms of which include compliance with mental
health recommendations and compliance with criminal court orders. Mother has
participated in her case plan and has made progress but still needs mental health and
parenting support.
{¶14} On March 4, 2013, Mother was convicted of one count of attempted child
endangering, a felony of the fourth degree, for the Drano incident. She was placed on
felony probation for five years and is presently in compliance with the terms of her
criminal probation.
{¶15} On March 28, 2013, J.I. was found to be neglected and was placed in the
temporary custody of CPS and has remained in the custody of CPS since that date.
{¶16} On June 21, 2013, CPS was granted ex parte emergency custody of F.I.
in Fairfield County Juvenile Court Case No. 2013 AB 153. A dependency complaint
was filed on June 24, 2013 under Case No. 2013 AB 153 and F.I. was placed in the
temporary shelter custody of CPS.
{¶17} On September 19, 2013, CPS filed a motion for permanent custody of J.I.
The same day, F.I.’s case under Fairfield County Juvenile Case No. 2013 AB 153 was
dismissed without prejudice and a dependency complaint was filed on behalf of F.I.
under Case No. 2013 AB 0258. CPS requested the trial court consider disposition of
permanent custody of F.I. to CPS and F.I. was placed in the temporary shelter care of
CPS. Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 6
{¶18} Both children were placed with the same foster family and are both doing
well. They have two older foster brothers. The children are “extremely bonded” with
their foster family, who have demonstrated unconditional love and support for both
children. The foster family has demonstrated willingness and ability to provide for J.I.’s
medical needs throughout “many” procedures and daily care.
{¶19} One trial was held in both cases on November 25, 2013. The trial court
filed its Entries terminating Mother’s parental rights to both J.I. and F.I., placing the
minor children in the permanent custody of C.P.S., on December 18, 2013.
{¶20} Mother now appeals from the trial court’s Entries of December 18, 2013.
Note on Appellate Case History
{¶21} The two permanent custody cases were appealed under the instant single
appellate case number. Mother filed two appellate briefs with separate assignments of
error, and appellee moved to strike the second brief. Mother responded with a “Motion
of Appellant for an Order Allowing Both Briefs to Stand under Consolidated Case
Number 2014-CA-0001 or the Alternative Motion of Appellant for Leave to Plead to
Consolidate Briefs.” We denied the motion to strike and ruled we would allow both
briefs to stand under a single case number “and will consider both underlying cases
simultaneously for the purposes of merit review.” Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 7
{¶22} Mother raises eight assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶23} “I. ALL TESTIMONY AND OTHER EVIDENCE RELATED TO
[MOTHER’S] PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS WITH DR. BRADLEY A. HEDGES
AND DR. CHRISTOPHER RAY, PRIOR TO 2013 SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ADMISSIBLE.”
{¶24} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT J.I. CANNOT BE PLACED
WITH [MOTHER] WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME OR SHOULD NOT BE PLACED
WITH [MOTHER].”
{¶25} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE
BEST INTEREST OF J.I. FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY TO BE GRANTED TO
FAIRFIELD COUNTY CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES.”
{¶26} “[IV.] ALL TESTIMONY AND OTHER EVIDENCE RELATED TO
[MOTHER’S] PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND INTELLIGENCE TESTING
CONDUCTED BY PSYCHOLOGIST’S (sic) BRADLEY A. HEDGES AND ERIN DAVIS
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE.”
{¶27} “[V.] EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATION OF 2013 IS ADMISSABLE (sic), ALL TESTIMONY AND OTHER
EVIDENCE RELATED TO [MOTHER’S] PREVIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS AND INTELLIENCE TESTING CONDUCTED BY PSYCHOLOGIST’S Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 8
(sic) BRADLEY A. HEDGES AND CHRISTOPHER RAY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
{¶28} “[VI.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT F.I. CANNOT BE PLACED
WITH [MOTHER] WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME OR SHOULD NOT BE PLACED
WITH [MOTHER.]
{¶29} “[VII.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE
BEST INTEREST OF F.I. FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY TO BE GRANTED TO
{¶30} “[VIII.] THE APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICIALLY DEPRIVED OF HER
OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO THE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.”
ANALYSIS
I., IV., V.
{¶31} Mother’s first, fourth, and fifth assignments of error are related; she
contends the trial court should not have considered testimony and other evidence
related to psychological evaluations performed in compliance with her case plans,
including those case plans in previous cases. We disagree.
{¶32} Evidence such as that provided by Dr. Hedges in the instant case falls
within an exception to the physician-patient privilege. In In re Wieland, the Ohio
Supreme Court held the physician-patient privilege applied to communications between
a parent and a therapist in court-ordered treatment as part of a reunification plan in a Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 9
dependency and neglect proceeding. 89 Ohio St.3d 535, 2000-Ohio-233, 733 N.E.2d
1127, syllabus. In reaction to Wieland, the General Assembly amended the statutory
physician-patient privilege in 2000 to add section (B)(1)(b), which states in pertinent
part:
The testimonial privilege established under this division does
not apply, and a physician or dentist may testify or may be
compelled to testify, in any of the following circumstances:
In any civil action concerning court-ordered treatment or
services received by a patient, if the court-ordered treatment or
services were ordered as part of a case plan journalized under
section 2151.412 of the Revised Code or the court-ordered
treatment or services are necessary or relevant to dependency,
neglect, or abuse or temporary or permanent custody proceedings
under Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code.
{¶33} Mother acknowledges the above would typically defeat a claim of privilege
in a permanent custody case, but argues here the exception does not apply because no
case plan applicable to F.I. (d.o.b. 6/21/2013) was in effect when the earlier evaluations
Hedges took into account were performed. She therefore concludes the information
obtained in those evaluations could not be part of the comprehensive evaluation. We
find no such limitation in the statutory exception. Hedges has personally repeatedly
evaluated Mother, for past CPS referrals and due to the case plan in J.I.’s case, later
amended to include F.I. To expect a mental health professional to exclude his prior Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 10
knowledge of her history from his assessment to the court would defeat the purpose of
the statutory exception altogether.
{¶34} Mother further argues the opinion of Dr. Hedges was inadmissible
because it was based on a history of testing and evaluation for which Mother did not
waive the physician-patient privilege. She refers to herself as a “client” of the evaluating
psychologists. Mother’s evaluations which resulted from CPS referrals, however, do
not require waiver to be admissible. In In re Jones, the Ohio Supreme Court
interpreted its holding in Wieland, supra, to specify “[a] psychological examination is
considered to be for forensic purposes when it is ordered to assist the court in
determining facts or making conclusions of law. Individuals interacting with a
professional in such an examination are not clients of the professional for purposes of
the privilege statutes.” 99 Ohio St.3d 203, 2003-Ohio-3182, 790 N.E.2d 321, ¶ 13.
{¶35} We find Mother’s psychological evaluations, present and past, to be
forensic in nature because the examinations were for the specific purpose of
determining her psychological fitness as a parent, not for the purpose of treatment in a
therapeutic relationship. The past evaluations were relevant to Hedges in making a
comprehensive recommendation to the trial court.
{¶36} Finally, we note even if any of the challenged communication was
privileged, we find any arguable error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Patfield, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-007, 2005-Ohio-3769, ¶ 35. Mother’s mental
health was only one facet of the trial court’s decision; as we discuss infra, absent the
mental health testimony, the record is replete with clear and convincing evidence
supporting the judgment of the trial court. Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 11
{¶37} Mother’s first, fourth, and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
II., III., VI., VII.
{¶38} Mother argues in her second, third, sixth, and seventh assignments of
error the trial court erred in granting permanent custody of J.I. and F.I. to C.P.S. We
disagree.
{¶39} “[T]he right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re
Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). An award of permanent custody must
be based on clear and convincing evidence. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). Clear and convincing
evidence is that evidence “which will provide in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief
or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St.
469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954). “Where the degree of proof required to sustain an issue
must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine
whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree
of proof.” Id. at 477.
{¶40} If some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements
of the case supports the trial court's judgment, an appellate court must affirm the
judgment and not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. C.E. Morris Co. v.
Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978).
{¶41} Issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to
the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. Seasons Coal v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d
77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). Deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is
“crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evidence in the parties' Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 12
demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77
Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997).
{¶42} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the guidelines a trial court must follow when
deciding a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court
schedule a hearing and provide notice upon the filing of a motion for permanent custody
of a child by a public children services agency.
{¶43} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B) authorizes the juvenile court to
grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court
determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to
grant permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply: (a) the child
is not abandoned or orphaned, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's
parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents; (b) the
child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who
are able to take permanent custody; or (d) the child has been in the temporary custody
of one or more public children services agencies or private child placement agencies for
twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after
March 18, 1999.
{¶44} R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must
apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, a trial court will
usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding
the best interest of the child. Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 13
{¶45} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody
hearing, R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors,
including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the
child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of
the child as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with
due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; and (4) the
child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of
placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody.
R.C. 2151.414(E) Factors: Clear and Convincing Evidence
{¶46} The trial court found J.I. and F.I. could not be placed with Mother within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with Mother. If the child is not abandoned or
orphaned, the focus turns to whether the child cannot be placed with either parent within
a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents. Under R.C.
2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this
determination. The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear
and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated in R.C.
2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the child's parents.1
{¶47} The trial court found that notwithstanding the reasonable case planning
and diligent efforts of CPS to assist Mother to remedy the problems that initially caused
the children to be placed outside the home, Mother failed continuously and repeatedly
1 With respect to F.I. (d.o.b. 6/21/2013), the trial court also found F.I. (d.o.b. 6/21/2013) could not be placed with the putative fathers within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the putative fathers within a reasonable time. The putative fathers’ rights were also terminated in the underlying proceeding and are not parties to this appeal. Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 14
to substantially remedy the conditions causing the children to be placed outside of the
home. R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). Mother argues she “has addressed each and every
concern of [C.P.S.].” The evidence shows Mother substantially complied with the case
plan requirements, but the statute provides that she substantially remedy the conditions
that caused her child to be placed outside of the home. Mother has attended parenting
classes and is compliant with court orders, but she is admittedly unprepared, and
unwilling, to deal with J.I.’s substantial medical needs. She has not shown improvement
in her parenting skills over the 13 years of CPS involvement and has exhausted all of
the options; in Hedges’ terms, she is doing as well as she ever will. This still exposes
her children to danger. She created the conditions that led to J.I.’s severe and
irreparable injuries. In the ensuing time, Mother was instructed not to scratch J.I.’s
scars and not to encourage him to do so, but removed a pressure garment and was
observed scratching his scars during a visit.
{¶48} The trial court also noted “[a]ny other factor the court considers relevant”
pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(16). The trial court did not make a finding pursuant to
R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), but did note in its findings of fact Mother had her parental rights
involuntarily terminated with respect to three siblings of the children.
{¶49} We find the trial court’s decision is supported by the evidence presented
under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1).
Best Interests of the Minor Children
{¶50} We next turn to the issue of best interests. We have frequently noted “[t]he
discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order of permanent
custody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the utmost respect, given Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 15
the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court's determination will have on the
lives of the parties concerned.” In re Mauzy Children, 5th Dist. Stark No.2000CA00244,
2000 WL 1700073 (Nov. 13, 2000), citing In re Awkal, 85 Ohio App.3d 309, 316, 642
N.E.2d 424 (8th Dist.1994). The trial court determined it was in the best interest of the
children to be placed in the permanent custody of C.P.S. pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)
and we agree.
{¶51} J.I. and F.I. deserve safety and stability. J.I. in particular has unique
medical needs that require constant care and attention that Mother is not able to
provide. His foster family has been attentive to his needs throughout numerous medical
procedures. J.I. and F.I. are very bonded with their foster family, which has provided
them with unconditional love and support. We note the guardian ad litem recommended
permanent custody of both children should be granted to C.P.S.
{¶52} We find the trial court did not err in finding J.I. and F.I. could not or should
not be placed with Mother within a reasonable period of time and the grant of
permanent custody to C.P.S. is in the children’s best interest.
{¶53} Mother’s second, third, sixth, and seventh assignments of error are
overruled.
VIII.
{¶54} In her eighth assignment of error, Mother argues she was denied effective
assistance of counsel in the permanent custody proceeding. We disagree.
{¶55} We have recognized “ineffective assistance” claims in permanent custody
appeals. See, e.g., In re Utt Children, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2003CA00196, 2003–Ohio–
4576. Where the proceeding contemplates the loss of parents' ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 16
civil rights to raise their children, “ * * * the test for ineffective assistance of counsel used
in criminal cases is equally applicable to actions seeking to force the permanent,
involuntary termination of parental custody.” In re Wingo, 143 Ohio App.3d 652, 666,
758 N.E.2d 780 (4th Dist.2001), quoting In re Heston, 129 Ohio App.3d 825, 827, 719
N.E.2d 93 (1st Dist.1998). Our standard of review for an ineffective assistance claim is
thus set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984). In re Fell, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 05 CA 8, 2005–Ohio–5790, ¶ 11.
{¶56} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, an appellant must satisfy a two-
prong test. Initially, an appellant must show that trial counsel acted incompetently. See,
Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 668. In assessing such claims, “a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered
sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689, citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct.
158 (1955). “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in
the same way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The question is whether counsel acted
“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690.
{¶57} Even if an appellant shows that counsel was incompetent, the appellant
must then satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Under this “actual prejudice”
prong, the appellant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The United States Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 17
Court have held a reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel's performance
was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of
the alleged deficiencies.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143, 538 N.E.2d 373
538 N.E.2d 373, quoting Strickland at 697. Accordingly, we will direct our attention to
the second prong of the Strickland test. In re Huffman, 5th Dist. Stark No.2005–CA–
00107, 2005–Ohio–4725, ¶ 22.
{¶58} Mother summarily contends she received ineffective assistance of counsel
because counsel failed to object to the admissibility of the psychological evaluation for
the reasons discussed supra in assignments of error I., IV., and V. In light of our
disposition of those assignments of error, we conclude counsel did not err in failing to
object to the admissibility of the evaluation.
{¶59} Mother’s eighth assignment of error is overruled. Fairfield County, Case No. 14-CA-1 18
CONCLUSION
{¶60} Mother’s eight assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the
Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J. and
Gwin, P.J.
Farmer, J., concur.