In re Ferguson's Estate

139 P. 438, 44 Utah 234, 1914 Utah LEXIS 20
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 7, 1914
DocketNo. 2549
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 139 P. 438 (In re Ferguson's Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Ferguson's Estate, 139 P. 438, 44 Utah 234, 1914 Utah LEXIS 20 (Utah 1914).

Opinion

FRICK, J.

Tbis is an appeal from a decree of final distribution and partition made in tbe probate division of tbe district court of Salt Lake County. Tbe facts necessary to an understanding of tbe questions involved are very simple.

Tbe administrator of tbe estate, after fully administering tbe same, made bis final report to tbe court as provided by our statute, and asked tbat tbe estate be distributed to tbe parties named in and in tbe proportions set forth in bis petition. It appeared from tbe report tbat tbe deceased died seised of a parcel of land in Salt Lake County seventy-nine by sixty-two rods, less eight by ten rods out of tbe southwest comer, which be bad sold. The parcel of which be died seised contained a trifle oyer thirty acres, and there were certain water rights appurtenant thereto. It also appeared tbat tbe deceased left surviving him bis widow, who, under our statute was entitled to one-third in value of said land. It also appeared tbat tbe other -two-thirds were to be divided into thirteen shares; tbat being tbe number of children who survived tbe decedent. Some of tbe children, however bad disposed of their shares. For tbat reason, when tbe petition for final distribution came on for bearing, tbe land in question was to be divided into seven parts, including the part going to tbe widow. It was shown in tbe report tbat tbe parcel of land aforesaid was of a character, and was so situated, tbat it could be partitioned among tbe seven claimants aforesaid. Being unable to make partition without tbe aid of commissioners, tbe court, pursuant to Comp. Laws 1907, section 3958, appointed three commissioners, and they were directed to make partition, and to report their acts in tbe premises to tbe court. Tbe commissioners apportioned tbe shares as directed by tbe court, and reported tbe allotments made by them. From their report, it appears tbat they apportioned tbe estate as follows: One-third thereof in value to tbe widow. This left twenty-six thirty-ninths to be divided into six parts. Tbis was done by allotting to each one of four of tbe heirs two thirty-ninths, aggregating eight thirty-ninths. To Isaac Ferguson, another heir, and [236]*236wbo was entitled to two interests, there was apportioned four thirty-ninths. To Alice E. Moyle, who had purchased and thus succeeded to seven interests, there was apportioned fourteen thirty-ninths of the estate.

In quantity the land was divided thus: To the widow five acres in the southeast corner of the parcel, which constituted the old homestead. To three of the heirs 1.628 acres each. These three parcels were taken along the south side of the estate fronting on Eighteenth South Street. To another heir was allotted 3.443 acres in the southwest corner of the estate. This share was made-larger than the other three because of the bad quality of the land. To Isaac Ferguson was allotted 3.95 acres, which gave him a strip all along the north side of the parcel of land belonging to the estate eight rods wide by seventy-nine rods in length. To Alice E. Moyle was allotted 12.834 acres, which gave her a strip' 24.5 rods wdde by seventy-nine rods long along and immediately south of the long strip allotted to Mr. Ferguson. In addition to the foregoing, she was also given a small strip fronting on Eighteenth South Street four rods, and extending back to her larger strip, a distance of 29.5 rods, which gave her access to Eighteenth South Street. After the commissioners’ report was filed in the district court, the same was approved by it and confirmed, without notice to the interested parties. Immediately after the report was confirmed, Mrs. Moyle made an application to the court, in which she alleged that she felt aggrieved by the allotment made' to her by the commissioners; that the same was in certain respects unfair and inequitable; that she had not received any notice respecting the time when the report of the commissioners would be considered by the court, or when it was filed, and therefore she had not been given an opportunity to file her objections thereto. Upon this application she asked that the order or decree confirming the report of the commissioners be vacated, that she be permitted to file her objections to the partition as made, and to produce evidence to sustain her objections. The court granted her application, and a time for hearing was fixed, at which time it heard all the evidence produced [237]*237by her in support of her objection to the partition as made, and also heard the evidence offered in support of the partition. After hearing the evidence, the court again confirmed the report of the commissioners, and entered a decree of final distribution and partition as outlined above. Mrs. Moyle, who, fpr convenience, will be. designated appellant, alone appeals.

The controversy arises entirely between her and Isaac Ferguson, and the cause thereof,- briefly stated, is as follows: The appellant owns the land lying immediately to the east of the lands that were apportioned as aforesaid, and Ferguson owns the land lying immediately to the north. The appellant, it seems, uses most, if not all, of her land as a suburban home; while Ferguson uses at. least a portion of his for fish culture. There is a creek or stream of pure mountain water which runs westerly through appellant’s land, and as it leaves her land it enters the east end of the long strip, which, by the commissioners, was allotted to Ferguson, and continues on said strip for a distance of 393 feet, at which point, in turning northerly, it enters the land originally owned by Mr. Ferguson, and then continues to flow in a northwester Indirection through the whole length of his land. This stream of water is approximately twelve feet wide, and flowed a distance of 393 feet on the land belonging to the estate, and the whole of which stream was allotted to Ferguson. Appellant insists that equitably she was entitled to a portion of the stream in question. He counsel have suggested that, in view that she was allotted seven-ninths of two-thirds and Ferguson two-ninths of two-thirds.of the estate, she equitably is- entitled to at least seven-ninths of that part of the stream which was subject to partition, namely, seven-ninths of the 393 feet.

We shall not set forth the evidence adduced at the hearing. It is all incorporated in the bill of exceptions, and we have carefully read all of it. It must suffice to say that the evidence makes clear that the property which was partitioned is so situated that it-could be subdivided into parcels or lots suitable for suburban homes; that it is more valuable for that [238]*238purpose than for ordinary farming or fruit production; that a stream of fresh, clear mountain water adds very materially to the value of land through which it flows when such land is used for suburban homes; that no sufficient reason is shown why appellant should not have had allotted to her some portion of the stream, while there were a number of reasons adduced by the witnesses why she should be allotted at least her proportionate share thereof. Practically the only reason given by the commissioners why Ferguson was allotted all of the stream was because he was engaged in fish raising, and that he had fish ponds on the land originally owned by him lying immediately north of the strip which was allotted to him, and through a portion of which the stream in question flows. It was assumed by the commissioners that, if any one else was given access to the stream, such person might in some way interfere with the water flowing in the stream, which interference might detrimentally affect the fish ponds and the fish therein. Why any one would be permitted to interfere with Mr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Blonquist v. Frandsen
694 P.2d 595 (Utah Supreme Court, 1984)
Gillmor v. Gillmor
657 P.2d 736 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
139 P. 438, 44 Utah 234, 1914 Utah LEXIS 20, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-fergusons-estate-utah-1914.