In Re Fc Stone, LLC

348 S.W.3d 548, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7035, 2011 WL 3805548
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 30, 2011
Docket05-11-01037-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 348 S.W.3d 548 (In Re Fc Stone, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Fc Stone, LLC, 348 S.W.3d 548, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7035, 2011 WL 3805548 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION

Opinion by

Justice FILLMORE.

Relators FC Stone, LLC (“Stone”) and Gene Sikora filed this mandamus proceeding after the trial court denied their motion to dismiss real party in interest Stace *550 Williams’s claims based on a forum-selection clause in an agreement between Stone and Williams. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to enforce the forum-selection clause and relators have no adequate remedy by appeal. We therefore conditionally grant the writ of mandamus.

Stone provides execution and clearing services for customers who wish to place orders on registered futures exchanges, and maintains its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. Sikora is a resident of Illinois and is employed by Stone in Chicago as its Vice President, FD Sales. In 2003, Williams and Stone entered into an account agreement through which Williams established a Managed Futures Account with Stone. Williams gave Dana Bonik, a defendant in the case below, full power of attorney to execute trades on Williams’s account with Stone. The account agreement Williams signed to establish the Managed Futures Account with Stone provides:

Customer hereby expressly acknowledges that this Agreement is made in the State of Illinois ... and further, that by virtue of trading commodity futures or options in the account established hereby, Customer is transacting business in the State of Illinois; accordingly, Customer hereby submits and consents to jurisdiction of his person in the Courts of the State of Illinois.... This agreement’s validity, construction and enforcement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Illinois. Customer hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of such courts, and expressly waives the right to the adjudication or enforcement of such controversies by any court or any other tribunal sitting in any other jurisdiction....
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CUSTOMER AGREES THAT ANY CONTROVERSY BETWEEN BROKER AND CUSTOMER ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT, REGARDLESS OF THE MANNER OF RESOLUTION, SHALL BE ARBITRATED, LITIGATED (TRIED IN A COURT OF LAW), OR OTHERWISE RESOLVED BY A TRIBUNAL LOCATED IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

Despite the express language of this agreement, Williams and another plaintiff 1 filed suit against Stone, Sikora, Bonik, and others in the 134th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, alleging that Bonik made negligent and grossly negligent trades and that all defendants were in breach of contract and had committed deceptive trade practices act violations. The petition did not mention the account agreement signed by Williams.

Based on the forum-selection clause in the account agreement, defendants Stone and Sikora moved to dismiss Williams’s claims against them. Williams opposed the motion, arguing that the account agreement was not enforceable due to fraud in the inducement. Williams also argued that it would be unduly burdensome for him to litigate his claims against Stone and Sikora in Illinois because the causes of action against them were intertwined with the claims against the other defendants, who might not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts.

On July 26, 2011, the trial court denied Stone and Sikora’s “Second Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration and Plea in Abatement/Motion to Stay, or in the Alter *551 native, Motion to Dismiss” as to Williams. On August 9, 2011, Stone and Sikora filed this original proceeding, alleging the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion and they have no adequate remedy at law. We agree with relators and conditionally grant the petition. 2

“Forum-selection clauses are generally enforceable and presumptively valid.” In re Cornerstone Healthcare Holding Grp., Inc., 348 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding)). Moreover, a trial court’s refusal to enforce a valid forum-selection clause is properly addressed by mandamus, because a relator has no adequate remedy by appeal in this situation. See In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 117 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding). If the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss, mandamus relief is appropriate. Cornerstone, 348 S.W.3d at 540.

Williams does not deny that he signed the agreement containing the forum-selection clause. Nor does he dispute that the forum-selection clause, on its face, requires his lawsuit to be brought in Chicago, Illinois, and not in Dallas, Texas. Instead, Williams argued below that: (1) the forum-selection clause could not be enforced because the account agreement was procured by fraud on the part of relators, and (2) it would be unfair to enforce the forum-selection clause because this case involves other defendants whose wrongdoing is “intertwined” with that of relators, and those defendants may not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts.

Williams claims that he was induced to sign the account agreement by Stone and Sikora’s fraud. According to Williams, Bo-nik was required to register with regulatory authorities as a “commodity trading advisor” or a “commodity pool operator” and Stone and Sikora knew of this requirement, but they affirmatively represented that Bonik was not required to register. Williams also claims that Stone and Sikora knew of Bonik’s prior criminal history and failed to reveal it, and that he would not have entered into the account agreement if he had known of Bonik’s criminal record.

Williams has failed to point to any evidence in the record demonstrating these alleged fraudulent representations or omissions. Even if he had done so, such allegations are insufficient to avoid enforcement of the forum-selection clause. “ [Fraudulent inducement to sign an agreement containing a dispute resolution agreement such as an arbitration clause or forum-selection clause will not bar enforcement of the clause unless the specific clause was the product of fraud or coercion.” In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding); see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 134 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding) (any provision relating to resolution of future disputes, included as part of a larger agreement, would rarely be enforced if the provision could be avoided by a general allegation of fraud directed at entire agreement). Because Williams did not allege fraud in the inducement of the forum-selection clause in the trial court, that court could not have properly refused enforcement of the forum-selection clause on the ground of fraud.

*552

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
348 S.W.3d 548, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7035, 2011 WL 3805548, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-fc-stone-llc-texapp-2011.