[Cite as In re F.B., 2025-Ohio-5528.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE F.B., ET AL. : : No. 115271 Minor Children : : [Appeal by A.C., Mother] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 11, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD23906987 and AD23906988
Appearances:
Caitlin E. Monter, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
Appellant mother A.C. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s decision
terminating her parental rights and awarding permanent custody of her children,
F.B. (dob: 8/27/2012) and H.C. (dob: 10/13/2014) (collectively known as “the
children”) to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). Mother claims that the juvenile court’s decision to
grant permanent custody to the agency is not supported by sufficient evidence and
is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Our review of the record reflects that sufficient evidence exists to
support the juvenile court’s findings and order granting permanent custody to the
agency. We further find that the juvenile court’s decision is not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
I. Procedural History and Relevant Facts
A. Previous Cases With the Agency
In April 2015, the agency filed a complaint with juvenile court for
dependency and protective supervision of one of Mother’s children, H.C. The
complaint alleged that at the time of birth Mother’s child, H.C. tested positive for
opiates and benzodiazepines. At the same time, Mother also tested positive for
benzodiazepine. H.C. was adjudicated dependent, and the agency was granted
protective supervision. In August 2016, juvenile court awarded legal custody of H.C.
back to Mother.
B. This Case
In June 2023, the agency filed another complaint with the juvenile
court alleging the children, along with the children’s two younger siblings, were neglected and dependent.1 The agency also requested that the agency be granted
temporary custody.
The complaint noted that (1) Mother has a substance-abuse problem
related to amphetamine and methamphetamine that she had failed to adequately
address, (2) Mother lacks the judgment and parenting skills necessary to provide
safe and adequate care for the children, (3) Mother has mental-health issues for
which she does not consistently participate in recommended services or take
prescribed medication, and (4) J.P., the father of one of the younger siblings and
alleged father of another, is a convicted Tier II sex offender and Mother allows him
to have unsupervised access to the children. The complaint further noted that the
father of F.B. is currently incarcerated for a conviction of drug possession. The
father of H.C. is unknown. The agency also filed a request for Juv.R. 13(B)
temporary orders requesting an order granting predispositional temporary custody
of the children to the agency pending a resolution of the agency’s request for
A hearing was held on June 26, 2023. Afterward, the magistrate issued
an order finding probable cause for the removal of the children from the home and
committed the children to predispositional emergency temporary custody to the
agency. The children have remained in the custody of the agency since that time.
1 The two younger siblings were later placed into the custody of their father, J.P.Mother also has a fifth child that tested positive for amphetamines when born in April 2025 while this case was pending. The youngest child is currently in the custody of the agency and not subject to this appeal. After a dispositional hearing held on October 20, 2023, the magistrate issued an
order terminating predispositional emergency custody and granting temporary
custody to the agency.
C. Permanent Custody Hearing and Appeal
On April 10, 2024, the agency filed a motion to modify temporary
custody of the children and requested permanent custody be given to the agency. A
permanent-custody hearing was held on May 16, 2025. Mother and her counsel
were present, along with the children’s guardian ad litem Cynthia Ernst (“GAL
Ernst”), the children’s counsel, social worker for the agency Deja Arthur (“Arthur”),
and counsel for the agency.
The agency’s extended services worker, Deja Arthur, testified on behalf
of the agency. GAL Ernst also filed a report with her recommendation to the court.
Mother did not present any witnesses.
The relevant testimony will be summarized below.
1. Deja Arthur
Deja Arthur is an extended services worker in the START department
within the agency. The START department is a unit within the agency that deals
with cases that involve parents that use drugs while pregnant and the children that
are exposed to those drugs in utero. Arthur stated that she works with a partner and
that together they work with the parents to make referrals to various treatment
programs. Arthur was assigned to this case in May 2023. Arthur testified that
paternity was established for F.B. and that the biological father of H.C. is currently
unknown.
Arthur advised that Mother had a history with the agency prior to this
case. She stated that the agency had received a total of ten referrals since 2012
concerning Mother, the majority of which involved substance abuse. The children
were never removed from her custody pertaining to those prior referrals.
In January 2023, the agency became involved in this case because of
Mother and her newborn child testing positive for amphetamines. Mother initially
claimed that she had mistakenly taken one of her sister’s Adderall pills. Mother later
admitted she lied and that her “whole family uses.” To prevent the removal of
Mother’s children at that time, the agency referred Mother to services, provided her
with a sponsor and peer support, and recommended meetings for her to attend.
Arthur testified that Mother kept testing positive for drugs,
particularly amphetamine and methamphetamine. The children were eventually
removed from Mother’s custody in June 2023. Arthur testified that when the
children were removed, the agency also had mental-health concerns regarding
Mother as well. She was also living with her younger children’s father, J.P., at the
time. Arthur described Mother’s relationship with J.P. as volatile.
A case plan was developed with a goal for reunification. Arthur
testified that F.B.’s father was not included in the case plan because he was
incarcerated for drug-related offenses when F.B. entered the agency’s custody. F.B.’s father was still incarcerated at the time of the permanent custody hearing,
with a possible release date of October 2025. There was no father included in the
case plan for H.C.
The case plan included services for Mother for substance abuse,
mental health, housing, parenting, domestic violence, and codependency. With
respect to Mother’s substance-abuse and mental-health issues, Arthur stated that
Mother had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, ADHD, and
depression and that she was first referred to New Visions early in 2023 after Mother
tested positive for drugs when she gave birth to her newborn child in January of that
year. Mother participated in “IOP” through New Visions but did not complete the
program because she was discharged for continuing to test positive for drugs.
After being discharged from New Visions, Mother was referred to
Ethan’s Crossing in the partial hospitalization program that is a higher level of care
than at New Visions. Arthur testified that all the referrals made were for both
substance-abuse and mental-health issues. Mother did not complete the program
at Ethan’s Crossing and was discharged because of absences.
Following her discharge from Ethan’s Crossing, Mother was referred
to Moore’s Counseling. Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from Moore’s
Counseling as well.
After being discharged from Moore’s Counseling, Mother was referred
to another treatment program, Nora’s, for mental-health and substance-abuse treatment. This referral took place sometime in 2024. Arthur testified that Mother
completed this program in the summer of 2024.
Following the completion of the program at Nora’s, Mother was
recommended for aftercare and to participate in drug testing with the agency, which
Mother did not do. Arthur testified that Mother stopped drug testing for the agency
in June 2024. As a result, the agency was unable to determine if Mother was sober.
Arthur stated that Mother disclosed to one of the workers that she knew when not
to test so that it would not “come up positive.” Arthur believed that Mother was
trying to manipulate the testing procedure.
In October 2024, Mother relapsed. She admitted to taking a THC
gummy. THC was a drug of choice for Mother in the past. As a result, Mother was
referred to a new treatment program at Signature Health, which she did not follow
through with. She was subsequently referred to Women’s Recovery, which she also
did not follow through with.
Mother was eventually referred to Matt Talbot, which she began
attending in January 2025. Upon entering the Matt Talbot program, she was
screened and tested positive for cocaine, THC, and benzodiazepines. Mother
completed the program in March 2025. After release from Matt Talbot, Mother was
required to continue urine screens once a week with the agency. Mother did not
comply with any urine screens. It was also recommended Mother engage in IOP,
get an assessment, and enter residential sober living. Mother was not willing to comply with the residential-sober-living recommendation. With respect to IOP,
Mother went to one class and did not complete an assessment.
Arthur testified that Mother relapsed after she had been discharged
from Matt Talbot. The day before the birth of her youngest child in April 2025,
Mother tested positive for multiple drugs including THC, cocaine, suboxone,
benzodiazepines, and amphetamines. After the child was born, Mother was again
referred for treatment at Signature Health. Mother did not comply with that
referral. Arthur stated that as of the date of the permanent custody hearing Mother
had not reengaged with any substance-abuse or mental-health treatment.
With respect to the medication Mother was taking for her mental
health, Arthur stated that Mother was not consistent in taking her medication.
Mother stated that she did not like the way the medication made her feel. Mother
eventually stopped taking her medication altogether, without her doctor’s
permission. Arthur testified that she does not know whether Arthur was taking her
medication at the time of the hearing.
Parenting was also part of the case plan. Arthur testified that the
agency had observed Mother having inappropriate conversations with the children
in the past. The agency believed that Mother could benefit from parenting classes.
Mother completed a parenting program. Notwithstanding Mother having
completed a parenting program, Arthur testified that she continues to have some
concerns pertaining to Mother’s judgment. Arthur stated that she has recently observed Mother having inappropriate conversations in front of the children
concerning J.P. and his new girlfriend.
Domestic violence was also included in the case plan because Mother
had stated that there was emotional abuse occurring in the home. The children also
disclosed that domestic violence had occurred in the home between Mother and J.P.
Specifically, the children mentioned that they had seen J.P. punch Mother in the
mouth.
While Mother completed a domestic-violence program, Arthur
testified that she still has concerns about domestic violence. Arthur explained that
the concerns relate to Mother’s continued relationship with J.P. In September 2024,
the police were called to J.P.’s home because she refused to leave. In November,
Mother had to call the police because J.P. was at her home harassing her and refused
to leave.
Around January 2025, a temporary no-contact order was issued
between Mother and J.P. Arthur testified that the no-contact order has been
violated since it has been in place. Arthur stated that at the birth of Mother’s
youngest child, J.P. was at the hospital in the room with Mother multiple times.
Codependency counseling was also included in the case plan because
of Mother’s heavy reliance on her relationship with J.P. Mother was referred for
services to address her codependency issues with Signature Health. Mother did not
participate in that service. Arthur testified that as of the time of the permanent
custody hearing, Mother’s relationship with J.P. was still a problem. Arthur explained that J.P. is still paying her rent and they continue to have back and forth
disputes with each other through text messages.
Arthur stated that the children have expressed to her that they want
to live with their Mother. However, Arthur stated that she believes that the children
are beginning to understand that Mother may not be able to parent them in the
future.
2. GAL Ernst’s Recommendation
GAL Ernst filed a report with the juvenile court on May 13, 2025. In
the report, GAL Ernst recommended that permanent custody of the children be
granted to the agency. She explained that Mother has been unable to maintain
sobriety for significant periods of time. She concluded that granting permanent
custody of the children to the agency was in the children’s best interests.
3. Order and Appeal
On June 18, 2025, the juvenile court issued an order granting
permanent custody of the children to the agency. It is from this order that Mother
appeals, raising the following assignment of error:
The trial court erred by granting permanent custody of [the children] to the agency against the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.
II. Law and Argument
As always, we begin our discussion by recognizing that “‘[a]ll children
have the right, if possible, to parenting from either biological or adoptive parents
which provides support, care, discipline, protection and motivation.’” In re L.W., 2017-Ohio-657, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.).
And that a parent’s right to raise their children is an essential basic civil right. In re
Z.L., 2025-Ohio-4852, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.); In re L.W. at ¶ 21. In determining whether
“to terminate an individual’s parental rights to their children, the goal is to ensure a
more stable life for the children and to facilitate adoption to foster permanency for
the children.” In re Z.L. at ¶ 32, quoting In re U.B., 2025-Ohio-1265, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).
In doing, “it must only be done as an ‘“alternative of last resort.”’” Id. at ¶ 33, quoting
L.W. at ¶ 21, quoting In re Gill, 2002-Ohio-3242, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).
Mother presents one assignment of error for our review consisting of
two separate issues alleging that the trial court’s decision (1) was not supported by
sufficient evidence, and (2) was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Since
these issues overlap with respect to the arguments and evidence presented, we will
address them together.
A. Standard of Review
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim that the
lower court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence are two distinct
concepts that are “‘“both quantitatively and qualitatively different.”’” In re Z.C.,
2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 13, quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, quoting State
v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. The Ohio
Supreme Court has explained that “sufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Thompkins at
386. While a manifest-weight challenge concerns “‘the inclination of the greater
amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis in original.) Thompkins at 387, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). “When applying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard,
a court of appeals should affirm a trial court when the evidence is legally sufficient
to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” (Cleaned up.) Z.L. at ¶ 39.
However, “even if a trial court judgment is sustained by sufficient
evidence, an appellate court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against
the manifest weight of the evidence.” Eastley at ¶ 12.
When reviewing for manifest weight in permanent custody cases, we “must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
In re Z.L., 2025-Ohio-4852, at ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Z.C. at ¶ 14.
“‘When weighing the evidence, we must always be mindful of the
presumption in favor of the finder of fact.’” In re Z.L. at ¶ 41, quoting In re L.A.,
2024-Ohio-5103, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing In re Z.C. at ¶ 14. The Ohio Supreme Court
has noted that the “‘underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the
trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the
witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these
observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.’” In re Z.C. at
¶ 14, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). “‘“If
the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is
bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.”’” In re G.J.,
2025-Ohio-4854 (8th Dist.), quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. at 80, fn. 3, quoting 5
Ohio Jur.3d, Appellate Review, § 603, at 191-192 (1978).
B. Permanent Custody Under R.C. 2151.414
“R.C. 2151.414 governs permanent-custody determinations in Ohio
and sets forth a two-prong analysis.” In re G.J. at ¶ 22. A juvenile court is authorized
to grant permanent custody if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that
(1) one or more of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) exist, and
(2) the grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)/(2).
Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as “‘that measure or
degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not
to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal
cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or
conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825,
¶ 42, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954). “‘“We will not reverse a
juvenile court’s termination of parental rights and award of permanent custody to
an agency unless the judgment is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.’””
In re Z.L. 2025-Ohio-4852, at ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), quoting In re U.B., 2025-Ohio-1265,
at ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting L.A. at ¶ 17. C. Analysis
First Prong – R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)
Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the juvenile court found that the
children “cannot be placed with either of the child[ren’s] parents within a reasonable
time or should not be placed with the child[ren’s] parents.” The trial court made
this finding utilizing the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E), which provides that
“[i]f the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence . . . that one or more of
the following [factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)] exist as to each of the child’s
parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either
parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent[.]”
Here, the trial court determined that multiple factors set forth in
subsection (E) of R.C. 2151.414 exist, including (1) the parents’ failure to remedy the
problems that caused the children to be placed outside the home under subsection
(E)(1); (2) the chronic mental illness or chemical dependency of the parent is so
severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for
the children under subsection (E)(2); and (3) that the parent has demonstrated a
lack of commitment towards the children by failing to regularly support, visit, or
communicate with the children when able to do so under subsection (E)(4).
Only one of these factors is required to be met for the court to make
the determination that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent, thereby
satisfying R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). In re A.E., 2025-Ohio-1466, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing In re L.V., 2024-Ohio-5917, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.). As such, we are not required to address
each factor, so long as one of the factors set for in subsection (E) is met. Id.
R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) Factor
With respect to subsection (E)(1), the court found “the parent has
failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing
the child[ren] to be placed outside the child[ren’s] home.” There is credible evidence
in the record demonstrating that Mother has failed to remedy the conditions that
caused the children to be removed from the home.
It must first be noted that F.B.’s father was not included in the case
plan because he was incarcerated for drug-related offenses when F.B. entered the
agency’s custody. He was still incarcerated at the time of the permanent-custody
hearing, with a possible release date of October 2025. There was no father included
in the case plan for H.C., since H.C.’s father is currently unknown.
After the children were removed and placed into the temporary
custody of the agency, a permanency plan was put in place with the goal of reunifying
the children with Mother. The case plan included services for Mother for substance
abuse, mental health, housing, parenting, domestic violence, and codependency. As
discussed above, Arthur testified that Mother has been referred to multiple
programs to remedy these issues. Mother has failed to complete a number of these
programs. And with the programs Mother has completed, she has failed to
adequately allay the agency’s concerns. Concerning Mother’s substance-abuse issues, Arthur testified that on
the day before the birth of her youngest child in April 2025, which was a month prior
to the permanent-custody hearing, Mother tested positive for multiple drugs,
including THC, cocaine, suboxone, benzodiazepines, and amphetamines. After the
child was born, Mother was again referred for treatment at Signature Health.
Mother did not comply with this referral. Arthur stated that as of the date of the
permanent-custody hearing, Mother had not reengaged with any substance-abuse
or mental-health treatment. The juvenile court noted that “[M]other has been in
five different treatment programs but does not have a sobriety date.”
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient not only to satisfy the
2151.414(E)(1) factor, that Mother has failed to remedy the conditions that were the
cause for removal, the evidence was also sufficient to satisfy the court’s finding that
Mother’s chronic chemical dependency makes Mother unable to provide an
adequate permanent home for the children under (E)(2).
Mother directs us to several programs she completed while working
with the agency. However, this fact is not dispositive. Even if Mother had completed
the case plan, or even programs within the plan, we have recognized that “such a
plan is ‘a means to a goal, but not the goal itself.’” In re T.B., 2025-Ohio-2075, ¶ 56
(8th Dist.), quoting In re C.C., 2010-Ohio-780, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). Nor would it
“preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency.” In re C.C. at
¶ 25, citing In re J.L., 2004-Ohio-6024, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). “‘“The issue is not whether
the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal.”’” In re M.T.,
2024-Ohio-3111, ¶ 51 (8th Dist.), quoting In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, at ¶ 90 (8th
Dist.), quoting In re McKenzie, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4618 (9th Dist. Oct. 18, 1995).
Here, Arthur testified with respect to several referrals to different
programs offered by the agency during this case. Some of these programs Mother
participated in and completed; others Mother either refused to participate or failed
to complete. Nonetheless, Arthur testified that over the previous two years, there is
nothing she has seen to lead her to believe that Mother is able to parent the children
safely in the foreseeable future. And Mother was testing positive for drugs as
recently as April 2025.
For these reasons, there exists sufficient evidence in the record to
support the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) that Mother failed to
remedy the conditions that caused removal of the children from the home,
particularly with respect to Mother’s chemical-dependency issues.
Nonetheless, Mother claims that the court’s finding is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. As with any manifest-weight analysis, we are
reminded that “‘[i]f the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with
the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’”
In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc., 10 Ohio St.3d at
80, fn. 3. The juvenile court was in the best position to weigh the proffered
testimony of the evidence presented. See id. at ¶ 14. The agency presented sufficient evidence in support of the finding that Mother has failed to remedy the conditions
that led to the removal of the children, and there is nothing in the record that would
urge us to substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court.
Since only one of the factors set forth under subsection (E) of 2151.414
is required to be met in order to determine that a child cannot or should not be
placed with a parent, we decline to address the remaining (E) factors that the court
found. See In re A.E., 2025-Ohio-1466, at ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).
As such, the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), that
the children cannot be placed with either of the children’s parents within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with the children’s parents, is supported by
the record.
Second Prong – Best Interests of the Children – R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and/or (D)(2)
“‘The best interests of the child are paramount in any custody case,’
and courts are to liberally interpret the statutes under R.C. 2151 ‘to provide for the
care and protection of the child . . . .’” In re A.E. at ¶ 15, quoting In re A.B., 2006-
Ohio-4359, ¶ 32. In determining whether permanent custody is in the best interests
of a child, the juvenile court must consider the relevant factors set forth in either
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or (D)(2). Here, the juvenile considered the factors set forth in
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Mother disputes the juvenile court’s determination that
granting permanent custody of the children to the agency is in the children’s best
interests. We must first note that when considering the factors set forth in
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court is not required “to expressly discuss each of
the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).” In re A.M., 2020-
Ohio-5102, ¶ 31. Rather, “[c]onsideration is all the statute requires.” Id.
Nonetheless, the Ohio Supreme Court has noted that even though juvenile courts
are not required to expressly discuss each factor, the Court has encouraged juvenile
courts to address each factor in order to help aid in appellate review. In re A.M. at
¶ 32.
After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence was
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody with
the agency is in the best interests of the children. In doing so, the juvenile court’s
judgment entry expressly indicates that it considered all relevant factors set forth in
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), as discussed below.
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) Factor
The first factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) requires the juvenile
court to consider “[t]he interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home provides, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child[.]” The juvenile court found that
this factor weighed in favor of permanent custody.
Arthur testified that despite Mother’s participation in multiple
services over the previous two years, she continues to have concerns about whether
Mother can safely parent the children. Arthur explained that Mother does well during the visits with the children and “interacts very well with [them.]” Arthur
stated Mother brings food, snacks, and crafts to the scheduled visits. Arthur also
indicated that the children are very bonded with Mother. With that said, we have
cautioned that “‘the mere existence of a good relationship is insufficient. Overall,
we are concerned with the best interest of the child, not the mere existence of a
relationship.’” In re K.M., 2011-Ohio-349, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting In re R.N., 2004-
Ohio-2560 (8th Dist.). “‘[A] child’s best interests require permanency and a safe
and secure environment.’” Id., quoting In re Holyak, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3105
(8th Dist. July 12, 2001). Arthur noted that the scheduled visits between Mother
and the children have not increased because of Mother continuing to use substances
and her failure to complete case-plan services. As such, Arthur indicated that she
continues to have concerns about whether Mother can safely parent the children.
Arthur also stated that the children have remained in the same foster
home for approximately the last two years. The children do well in the foster home
and have bonded. The foster family has indicated that they would be willing to
provide a permanent home for the children through adoption.
In her report to the court, GAL Ernst provided that in the past, the
children have witnessed Mother and J.P. yelling and fighting with each other. The
children had also observed Mother when she was under the influence of drugs.
In this case, the juvenile court found that this factor weighed in favor
of permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) Factor
The second factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires the
juvenile court to consider “[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child
or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child[.]” The juvenile court noted that “[i]n an In-Camera interview, the children
expressed a wish to be reunified, but their GAL recommends permanent custody as
being in their best interest.”
At the permanent custody hearing, Arthur testified that while the
children have expressed a desire to be reunified with Mother, the children are
starting to become discouraged and they are beginning to realize that Mother is not
able to parent them in the future.
In her report, GAL Ernst noted that the children have lived in their
current placement for two years where they have felt safe and cared for. And the
children are “happily” involved in a number of extracurricular activities.
Here, the juvenile court found that this fact weighed heavily in favor
of permanent custody.
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) Factor
The third factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) requires the
juvenile court to consider
[t]he custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state[.]
The juvenile court found that this factor weighed heavily in favor of permanent
custody.
Mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s finding on this factor.
Here, the children were removed from Mother’s custody in June 2023 and have been
in custody of the agency since that time.
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) Factor
The fourth factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires the
juvenile court to consider “[t]he child’s need for a legally secure permanent
placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency[.]” The juvenile court found that this factor
weighed heavily in favor of permanent custody.
As discussed in the first prong of the analysis, the juvenile court found
that the children “cannot be placed with either of the child[ren’s] parents within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with the child[ren’s] parents.” Such a
finding “precludes the court from considering returning the child[ren] to Mother’s
custody.” In re T.S., 2024-Ohio-827, ¶ 61 (8th Dist.), citing In re E.J.,
2023-Ohio-1376, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.). Thus, the trial court’s finding precludes the court
from determining that the children could be returned to Mother. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) Factor
The fifth factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) requires the juvenile
court to consider “[w]hether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this
section apply in relation to the parents and child.” The juvenile court determined
that this factor was not applicable. Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s
decision on this factor.
In determining that permanent custody to the agency was in the best
interests of the children, the juvenile court’s judgment entry expressly indicates that
it considered all relevant factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). After a thorough
review of the record, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile
court’s determination that permanent custody to the agency is in the best interests
of the children. Nor was the court’s decision against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the
juvenile court granting permanent custody of the children to the agency is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR