In re Fallon

135 A.D. 195, 119 N.Y.S. 1061, 1909 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3939
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedDecember 17, 1909
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 135 A.D. 195 (In re Fallon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Fallon, 135 A.D. 195, 119 N.Y.S. 1061, 1909 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3939 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1909).

Opinion

Laughlin, J.:

The' petitioner was a candidate for the office of justice of the Municipal Court for the eighth municipal district of the city of Mew York at the last general election. The certified original statements of the result of the canvass' in some of the election districts showed that a certain number of the ballots counted were protested as marked for identification, and this proceeding was instituted pursuant to the provisions of section 381 of the Election Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 1Y; Laws of 1909, chap. 22) for a Writ of mandamus requiring a recount of the votes on .such ballots and also of the ballots rejected by the inspectors as Void. That section of the Election Law authorizes the proceeding, and it is therein expressly provided that if the court shall determine that- any ballot protested as marked, for identification “ was marked for the purpose of identification,” it shall order the ballot and the votes thereon to be excluded upon a recount, and that if the court shall determine that the votes upon any ballot rejected by the inspectors- as -void shall be counted,” it shall order such ballot and the votes thereon to be counted. On the return of the application, the respondent Dwyer, who .was a candidate for the same office, and who, on the face of the returns, as we are informed by counsel, had an apparent plurality of thirty-six votes over the petitioner, intervened. .Counsel for the respective parties have only-. [197]*197requested a decision by the court with respect to one hundred and seventy ballots, which, on the proceeding at Special Term, were marked as exhibits from 1 to 170 inclusive. Of these, eighty-four were rejected as void by the inspectors and not counted ; eighty-two were declared valid by the inspectors and sixty-four of them counted for Dwyer arid eighteen counted for the petitioner; two of the remaining number were not voted and, evidently by mistake, were put in the envelope with void and protested ballots, and two were deemed blank ballots, and those four were not counted. . The learned justice at Special Term made a decision on an inspection of the ballots, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which the action of the inspectors with respect to the various ballots is stated with the exception that ballot marked Exhibit Ho. 41, is not enumerated in the findings of fact with respect to the action of the inspectors, although it is considered in the conclusions of law. That ballot appears, on inspection, to have been deemed by the inspectors a valid ballot and to have been counted for the petitioner. We are of opinion that it is void and should not have been counted for the reason that it contains pencil marks other than the cross in the voting space in front of the petitioner’s name. The 5th finding of fact is, therefore, erroneous, in. that ballot Exhibit Ho. 41 should have been enumerated therein. In the conclusions of law, the learned court has decided that some of the ballots which the inspectors rejected as void were valid, and has also decided that some of those which were counted, but protested as having been marked for identification, should not have been counted. Although there is no provision requiring a formal decision containing findings of fact arid conclusions of law as a basis for an order for a peremptory- writ of mandamus, in the circumstances we have deemed it proper to let our decision take the form of an amendment both of the final order and of the decision in accordance with the conclusion at which we have arrived with respect to each ballot.

It is not practicable to describe in an opinion the various marks on the ballots which it is claimed renders them void. The ballots have all been examined and tested in the light of the statutory provisions with respect thereto as authoritatively construed by the courts. If the statute be construed strictly, very few of these ballots would be valid. In some instances the questions presented are [198]*198not difficult. They merely require the application of the plain provisions of the statute as, for instance, where the voting mark, being the cross, is placed outside the circle or voting space. In other instances the inspectors erroneously rejected ballots where the voter placed a cross in more than oiie circle at the head of the tickets, and where the name of the same candidate for the office of justice of the Municipal Court in this district appeared on each of such tickets. Those ballots should have been counted for this office by virtue of the provisions of rule Ho.. 6 of section 368 of the Election Law, which are as follows: £i If the voter shall have made a voting mark in more than one circle .at the head of the tickets, and if on either of such tickets there shall, be one or more candidates for. office for which no other candidate or candidates is or are named on such other ticket or tickets so marked in the circle, his vote shall be counted for such candidate or candidates.”.

In some instances, where there was a cross mark in .more than one circle, one of the tickets was blank with respect to this office,' and in one instance there was a cross in three circles and the same candidate was on each ticlcét. There was no difficulty in those instances in determining the intention of the voter, under the rules therefor prescribed by the Legislature. The fact that he manifested his intention .three times to vote for the same candidate did not invalidate his efforts.. Inasmuch as there was “ no other candidate or candidates ” on either ticket for this office, there is no legal objection to counting the ballot for a candidate who happens to be on all of the tickets so marked. In other instances evidently the inspectors rejected ballots on account of there being a cross mark in more than one circle at the head of the ticket. Such marking, by virtue of the same rule, is permitted, and does not render the ballot void. In most instances, however, the question arises over the pencil marks made by the voter in the circle' or voting space. In some instances, instead of forming a single cross by two lines crossing’ at any angle as prescribed by the statute, the voter has made several lines, and in some instances has connected the ends of’ these lines, and on others has evidently run the. pencil back and forth moistened forming wide, solid lines, and in other instances the pencil has evidently been run back and forth and lifted from the paper leaving many points, presenting the appearance of the end of a line, [199]*199some straight, but in most instances quite irregular, projecting from the ends of the main cross lines, and in some instances the lines forming the cross are quite irregular and enlarged very much at the points, and others indicate that the pencil probably struck the paper before the voter was ready to make the cross, and others that he did not lift it from the paper when he had completed the cross mark. Section 3pS of the Election Law prescribes, among other things, how the ballot shall be marked, and prohibits other marking^ thereof, and provides that if a voter shall deface or tear a ballot, or wrongly mark the same, he may successively obtain others from the ballot clerks until he shall have obtained three sets.

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Related

In re Mahoney
267 A.D. 478 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1944)
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164 Misc. 665 (New York Supreme Court, 1937)
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188 A.D. 834 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1919)
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176 A.D. 330 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1917)
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
135 A.D. 195, 119 N.Y.S. 1061, 1909 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3939, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-fallon-nyappdiv-1909.