In re Estate of Whitelaw

133 So. 2d 118
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedSeptember 22, 1961
DocketNo. 2233
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 133 So. 2d 118 (In re Estate of Whitelaw) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Estate of Whitelaw, 133 So. 2d 118 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961).

Opinion

ALLEN, Acting Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the county judge dismissing a petition for revocation of probate because it had not been filed within six months from the date of the first publication of the notice of probate, pursuant to the provisions of Florida Statutes 732.28, F.S.A.

On August 26, 1959, letters testamentary were issued to Cyrus Edson Manierre and Palmer First National Bank and Trust Company as executors of the estate of Wilhelmina Manierre Whitelaw. On the same day a motion for notice of probate was filed in the estate proceeding pursuant to F.S. § 732.28, F.S.A.; naming, among others, the appellant, Harold Lee Manierre, as an heir at law of the decedent.

[119]*119Thereafter, a copy of said notice was sent to appellant by registered mail and was received by him in Woodstock, N. Y., on August 29, 1959. Thereafter, publication of the notice was commenced on September 1, 1959, weekly until September 22, 1959.

On June 10, 1960, appellant filed a petition to revoke probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity. The executors filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that appellant was barred since the petition was not filed within 6 months from the date of the first publication of notice of probate as provided by F.S. § 732.28, F.S.A.

The county judge entered an order granting the motion to dismiss the petition for revocation of probate, finding that no petition for revocation had been filed within 6 months from the date of first publication; that petitioner (appellant) was barred by the provisions of F.S. § 732.28, F.S.A.; and that the provisions of F.S. § 732.30, F.S.A., did not apply to the appellant’s petition.

The appellant presents this point:

“Is an heir precluded from contesting probate of a will where his petition was filed more than six (6) months after first publication of notice of probate but before final discharge of the personal representative?”

Appellant contends that if the legislature had intended for persons who receive notice under F.S. § 732.28, F.S.A., to be foreclosed from the operation of F.S. § 732.30, F.S.A., it would have inserted an exception to that effect into the language of the latter provision.

The critical portions of the two statutes are set out as follows:

“732.28 Notice of Probate
‡ ‡ * * * *
(6) If no petition for revocation of probate is filed within the time limited aforesaid [6 mo.], the order admitting such will to probate shall be conclusive without further order, upon proof of publication of notice of probate’s being filed and recorded in the office of the county judge. No petition for revocation of probate may be maintained unless filed within said six-month period.” (Emphasis supplied.)
“732.30 Revocation of probate
“(1) Any heir or distributee of the estate of a decedent, including legatees or devisees under a prior will, except those who have been served with citation before probate or who are barred under § 732.29, may, at any time before final discharge of the personal representative, make application by petition to the court in which the probate of any will may have been granted, for revocation of such probate. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)

Appellant further contends that since he has not been served with a citation before probate, nor is he barred because of any contest proceedings under F.S. § 732.29, F.S.A. (Caveat; proceedings) he is not covered by the two exceptions contained in § 732.30 and can proceed thereunder in spite of the apparent conflict with § 732.28.

Appellee contends that since appellant was served outside of Florida, a citation served under § 732.09 would have been served in precisely the same manner as the notice of probate actually served in the instant case under § 732.28.

An examination of the transcript shows that the petition for the probate of the will in question was filed and letters testamentary issued to Cyrus Edson Manierre and Palmer First National Bank and Trust Company of Sarasota on the 26th day of August, 1959; that the motion for notice of probate was filed on the 26th day of August, 1959, which included the list of the names and residences of each legatee or devisee named in the will of Wilhelmina Manierre Whitelaw, deceased, and each heir at law of the decedent, including the appellant; a certificate of mailing a copy of the notice of [120]*120probate was entered by the county judge together with receipts for the certified mail signed by appellant and others; a notice of probate showing publication dates, which said notice notified the parties that the will had been admitted to probate and commanding them, within six calendar months from the date of the first publication, to appear and show cause why the action of the court in admitting the said will to probate should not stand unrevoked; and the petition to revoke the probate of will filed by the appellant, Harold Lee Manierre, filed the 10th day of June, I960.

The record thus discloses the strict compliance with the provisions of Florida Statute, § 732.28, F.S.A.

The lower court, in his order granting the motion to dismiss petition to revoke the probate of will, stated:

“ * * * and the Court finding that Notice of Probate was duly and properly given by the co-executors under the provisions of Chapter 732.28, Florida Statutes; that the said Harold Lee Manierre received actual notice thereof by mail on August 29, 1959, under the provisions of said law as evidenced by the return receipt thereof; that no petition for revocation of probate was filed within the six-month period provided for in said law, the Petition to Revoke the Probate of Will to which said Motion to Dismiss was filed having been filed on June 10, 1960, which was 100 days after the expiration of the six-month period provided by law; that the provisions of Chapter 732.30, Florida Statutes, do not apply to the Petition filed by the Petitioner; and the Court being otherwise advised in the premises, it is
“Ordered and adjudged that the co-executors’ Motion to Dismiss Petition to Revoke the Probate of Will be and the same is hereby granted.”

It is the contention of the appellant that while he received the notice of the probate as provided for in § 732.28, that he was not served with citation and therefore he would be excepted under the provision of Florida Statutes, § 732.30, F.S.A., which provides that any heir or distributee of the estate of a decedent, except those who have been, served with citation before probate or who are barred under § 732.29, may petition for probate at any time before the closing of the estate.

If the contention of the appellant is correct, the effect would be to nullify the provisions of § 732.28, which precludes a petition for revocation after six months.

We find no Florida case, nor has any-been cited by the briefs of the parties in this; cause, passing upon the identical question before us today. However, Redfearn in his Third Edition of Wills and Administration of Estates in Florida, Vol. 1, pp. 176„ 177 and 178, states:

“1.

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Related

State Ex Rel. Ashby v. Haddock
149 So. 2d 552 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1962)
State ex rel. Ashby v. Haddock
140 So. 2d 631 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1962)

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Bluebook (online)
133 So. 2d 118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-estate-of-whitelaw-fladistctapp-1961.