In Re Estate of Torrance

991 S.W.2d 98, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 725, 1999 WL 50075
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 4, 1999
Docket08-98-00013-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 991 S.W.2d 98 (In Re Estate of Torrance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Estate of Torrance, 991 S.W.2d 98, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 725, 1999 WL 50075 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice.

The State of Texas (the State) appeals from a judgment rendered in favor of Jess E. Forrest, independent administrator of the estate of Eugene Ivory, Sr. (the Ivory Estate), awarding certain real and personal property to the Ivory Estate and Eugene Ivory, Sr.’s four children. Because we find the evidence legally insufficient to prove that Eugene Ivory, Sr. is the son and sole heir of E. Marie Torrance, we reverse and render a take-nothing judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

E. Marie Torrance (Torrance) died intestate in Manhattan, New York City, New York on May 23, 1959. Thomas I. Fitzgerald, the public administrator of New York County, handled the administration of Torrance’s principal estate in New York. Torrance owned producing mineral interests in Ector County, Texas, and the operator of those interests, Gulf Oil Corporation, held all accrued royalties in suspense after her death. In 1972, Fitzgerald instituted ancillary administration in the County Court of Ector County. 1 After Gulf Oil refused to correspond with Fitzgerald or pay the royalty proceeds to him, Fitzgerald filed a suit for accounting against Gulf Oil in the 161st District Court of Ector County in early 1974. 2 The State intervened in the same suit and, alleging that Torrance had no heirs, filed a petition for escheat of the oil and gas interests and royalties. Due to the existence of competing claims for the accrued royalties, Gulf Oil deposited the accrued royalty payments into the registry of the district court.

Over the next several years, numerous persons came forward claiming to be heirs of Torrance. Following a bench trial in 1979, the district court found that those claimants remaining before the court 3 had failed to prove themselves to be heirs of Torrance, and consequently, her entire estate comprised of mineral interests and accrued royalties escheated to the State on the date of Torrance’s death. No party to the district court action appealed that judgment.

No further proceedings took place in the ancillary administration action until a group of claimants filed an application for determination of heirship in 1988. After the State filed its answer and a plea to the jurisdiction, the constitutional county court transferred the case to County Court at Law No. 2 of Ector County. A second group of claimants then filed their application for determination of heirship in 1990. Subsequently, the county court at law granted the State’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed both sets of claims. One group of claimants appealed the dismissal. In In re Estate of E. Marie Torrance v. State, 812 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, no writ)(Torrance I), we held that the 161st District Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the issue of heirship because the county court sitting in probate had acquired exclusive jurisdiction of that issue. Id. at 396-97. We further held that heirship must be determined by the probate court before a judgment of escheat could be properly rendered by the 161st *100 District Court, and therefore, the county court at law erred in granting the State’s plea to the jurisdiction. Id. Consequently, we reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to the county court at law for determination of heirship. Id. at 397. The State did not appeal our decision. However, the claimants who had been successful on appeal later dismissed their claim with prejudice, agreeing that they were not relatives or heirs of Torrance.

No further action occurred in the administration case until January 27, 1993, when Eugene Ivory, Sr.’s four children, Thelma Viola McDonald, Elizabeth Belcher, Eugenia Burger, and Eugene Ivory, Jr. (collectively referred to as the Ivorys), filed an application for heirship. They asserted that Eugene Ivory, Sr., who had died on March 7, 1967, was Torrance’s son. Still maintaining ownership of the property by virtue of the escheat judgment, the State objected to the Ivorys’ application on the ground that their failure to seek ownership of the property within the two-year statute of limitations barred their claim to the property. Subsequently, Jess E. Forrest, administrator of the estate of Eugene Ivory, Sr., filed an amended application for heirship to include the Ivory Estate in the claim.

Following a bench trial in October of 1997, the trial court found that:

• E. Marie Torrance died intestate while owning or entitled to real or personal property in Texas, including the mineral interests located in Ector County and the royalty proceeds;
• Eugene Ivory, Sr. was the only child of E. Marie Torrance;
• Eugene Ivory, Sr. died intestate on March 7,1967; and
• the four children of Eugene Ivory, Sr. are his sole heirs so that each of them has an equal undivided twenty-five percent interest in his estate.

Consequently, the trial court ordered that all assets of the estate of E. Marie Torrance be delivered to Jess E. Forrest in his capacity as the duly qualified administrator of the estate of Eugene Ivory, Sr. for the benefit of the named heirs. At the State’s request, the trial court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In its third issue for review, the State challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Eugene Ivory, Sr. is the son of E. Marie Torrance. 4 Although the State acknowledges that the parties stipulated at trial that “preponderance of the evidence” is the proper burden of proof in an heirship determination, the State maintains on appeal that the correct standard is “clear and convincing evidence,” and therefore, we should review sufficiency of the evidence under the heightened standard articulated in Edwards v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 946 S.W.2d 130, 137 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no writ). 5 *101 Because we find that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish the Ivory Estate’s heirship claim even under the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard, it would also be insufficient were we to apply the more stringent clear and convincing evidence standard. Accordingly, we need not decide the issue.

Standard of Review

In considering a legal sufficiency or “no evidence” point, an appellate court considers only the evidence which tends to support the jury’s findings and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.1965); Parallax Corp., N.V. v. City of El Paso,

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Bluebook (online)
991 S.W.2d 98, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 725, 1999 WL 50075, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-estate-of-torrance-texapp-1999.