in Re Estate of Thomas Edward Grant
This text of in Re Estate of Thomas Edward Grant (in Re Estate of Thomas Edward Grant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
11th Court of Appeals
Eastland, Texas
Memorandum Opinion
In re Estate of Thomas Edward
Grant, Deceased
No. 11-03-00141-CV -- Appeal from Dallas County
The probate court admitted Thomas Edward Grant=s will to probate. Anne Trevino was Grant=s granddaughter as well as a beneficiary under the will.[1] Trevino=s children, Brendon Bibb and Nichole Bibb, were also beneficiaries under the will. Trevino filed a declaratory judgment action in which she asked the probate court to construe certain provisions of the will, but she did not make her children parties to the lawsuit. Because the probate court found that the children were necessary parties to the declaratory judgment action, it dismissed Trevino=s lawsuit. We affirm.
In Trevino=s first issue on appeal, she argues that, because there was no verified pleading raising an objection regarding necessary parties, the probate court erred when it dismissed the suit upon that ground. In Trevino=s second issue on appeal, she argues that her children, Brendon and Nichole, were not necessary parties. First, we will discuss Trevino=s second issue.
Trevino asked the trial court to construe the following paragraphs of Grant=s will:
2.1 I give and bequeath to my granddaughter, ANNE BIBB and to her children, BRENDON BIBB and NICHOLE BIBB, any insurance that is due to my said granddaughter and her children.
2.2 I give and bequeath to my granddaughter, ANNE BIBB, any benefits that are due to me, my estate or my survivors under my retirement plan with the State Highway Department.
Grant was employed by the State of Texas with the highway department. As far as is relative to our discussion, appellee, Clemmie R. Murdock, independent executrix of Grant=s estate, received net death benefits in the amount of $4,500 from the Employees Retirement System of Texas. That amount represents Aa lump sum death benefit@ of $5,000 less 10 percent that was withheld by the ERS. Out of that balance, Murdock paid taxes and then paid Trevino the balance of $4,339. Murdock also received Alife insurance proceeds@ in the amount of $12,500 from Group Life and Health Insurance Company, an independent licensee of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association. ERS serviced the life insurance policy, but it did not issue it. Murdock refused to pay Trevino the proceeds from the life insurance policy.
In Trevino=s lawsuit, she claims that she is entitled to the Alife insurance proceeds@ under Paragraph 2.2 of Grant=s will. It is her position that the life insurance claim is a benefit under Grant=s Aretirement plan.@ As a part of that claim, it is Trevino=s position that Brendon and Nichole have no claim to the funds under Paragraph 2.1 of the will. Trevino named Murdock as the defendant in her capacity as independent executrix of Grant=s estate. There were no other parties named. Trevino asked the probate court to construe Grant=s will in such a manner that she would receive the entire proceeds from the life insurance policy issued by Group Life and Health. The trial court held that Brendon and Nichole were necessary parties to the declaratory judgment suit, and it dismissed Trevino=s lawsuit for failure to include them as parties. We will remember that this appeal is not about whether the life insurance is a benefit of the retirement plan; the question on this appeal is one solely related to necessary parties.
We review a trial court=s decision to proceed or not to proceed in the absence of necessary parties under an abuse of discretion standard. Clear Lake City Water Authority v. Clear Lake Utilities Company, 549 S.W.2d 385, 389-90 (Tex.1977). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1998).
In her second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed the petition for declaratory relief because Brendon and Nichole were not Anecessary@ parties under TEX.R. CIV.P. 39(a), which provides in part:
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if...(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
Because Trevino sought relief under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 37 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004-2005)(the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act), we must also consider, in addition to Rule 39(a), the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. In a declaratory judgment action, all persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration sought must be made parties. Section 37.006(a). This joinder requirement is mandatory. Clear Lake City Water Authority v. Clear Lake Utilities Company, supra. All beneficiaries under a will with an interest in the estate such that their interest in estate property will be affected by the construction are persons needed for just adjudication. Estate of Bean,
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