In re Estate of Stotz v. Stotz

2023 Ohio 663

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 3, 2023
• Docket: S-22-014
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re Estate of Stotz v. Stotz, 2023-Ohio-663.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SANDUSKY COUNTY

In re Estate of David P. Stotz Court of Appeals No. S-22-014

Thomas Stotz, et al. Trial Court No. 201901196A

Appellees

v.

Jane D. Stotz DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: March 3, 2023

*****

Andrew R. Mayle, Benjamin G. Padanilam, and Ronald J. Mayle, for appellees.

Jonathan D. Balcerzak, Kevin A. Heban, and John P. Lewandowski, for appellant.

ZMUDA, J.

I. Introduction

{¶ 1} Appellant, Jane Stotz, appeals the judgment of the Sandusky County Court

of Common Pleas, Probate Division, finding that appellant’s filing of a complaint in the

general division of the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas triggered the in terrorem clause in her late husband’s, David Stotz, last will and testament, and

consequently denying her motion for summary judgment and granting the motion for

partial summary judgment filed by David’s children, Thomas Stotz, Amy Forgatsch,

Jennifer Huntley, and Matthew Stotz (hereinafter referred to as “appellees”).

A. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} Prior to their marriage, on September 25, 2007, appellant and David entered

into a prenuptial agreement. Under section 8 of the agreement, David was identified as

the owner of the marital residence located at 105 Wisteria Drive, Fremont, Ohio 43420.

As to the marital residence, the agreement provided that “[i]n the event of the demise

during the marriage of [David] or [appellant], the survivor may continue to reside in the

home under the same terms as she or he would if a life tenant, so long as the parties

remain married and living together at the time of the demise of the first party’s death.”

Further, the agreement provides that the marital residence shall be sold upon the death of

the surviving spouse, and the proceeds from the sale “divided equally among the five (5)

children of the parties,” four of whom were David’s children and one of whom was

appellant’s child.

{¶ 3} In addition to the foregoing provisions, the prenuptial agreement addressed

the couple’s interest in a Motorists life insurance policy. Concerning the policy, the

agreement identifies David as the owner and directs that the policy “will have a primary

beneficiary of [appellant] and a secondary beneficiary of the [couple’s] five (5) children *

* * and their issue, per stirpes.”

2. {¶ 4} On October 13, 2007, David and appellant were married. Thereafter, on

April 3, 2008, David executed a last will and testament naming appellant as the executor,

in which appellant and appellees are the named beneficiaries. Similar to the terms of the

prenuptial agreement, David’s last will and testament permitted appellant to remain in the

marital residence on Wisteria Drive without paying rent for the duration of her lifetime,

and specified that the residence would be sold upon David’s death if appellant

predeceased him, and the proceeds from the sale divided among the couple’s five

children, “share and share alike, per stirpes.” The last will and testament does not

reference David’s Motorists life insurance policy.

{¶ 5} In addition to the foregoing, David’s last will and testament includes an in

terrorem clause, which provides:

Every heir, legatee, devisee or beneficiary under this Will who shall contest

in any court any provision of this instrument, shall not be entitled to any

devise, legacy or benefit under this will or any codicil hereto or any trust

created hereby and any and all devises, legacies and portions of the income

or corpus of my estate or trust shall lapse and shall be given, distributed and

pass as though such person had died prior to my death, leaving no living

lawful descendants. My executor herein named and the trustee herein

named and any successor fiduciaries are specifically authorized to defend at

the expense of my estate any contest or attack of any nature upon this will

or any codicil hereto or upon any paragraph or provision hereof.

3. {¶ 6} On June 29, 2019, approximately 11 years after he executed his last will and

testament, David died. At the time of his death, David continued to reside with appellant

in the martial residence on Wisteria Drive.

{¶ 7} On April 1, 2021, appellant filed a complaint in the general division of the

Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas, asserting claims against appellees for unjust

enrichment, civil conversion, fraud, and intentional interference with inheritance.

According to her complaint, appellant was not listed as the primary beneficiary under

David’s Motorists life insurance policy at the time of David’s death. Consequently, and

in contravention of the terms of the couple’s prenuptial agreement, appellant claimed she

“only received $18,000 from the Policy rather than the entire $90,000.”

{¶ 8} Moreover, appellant asserted that she was entitled to a life estate in the

marital residence under the terms of the prenuptial agreement and David’s last will and

testament, and further alleged that the prenuptial agreement “clearly implies that [she]

has an equitable (one fifth) interest in the marital residence.” Thus, appellant sought, in

part, an order “demanding that [appellees] return the assets they received from the

[Motorists] Policy,” and permitting her to “keep a life estate in the marital residence and

be deemed to own a twenty percent (20%) equitable interest in the marital residence.”

{¶ 9} In response to appellant’s complaint, appellees filed their own complaint for

a declaratory judgment in the probate court on May 24, 2021. According to appellees’

complaint, appellant’s request for an order granting her a 20 percent equitable interest in

the marital residence triggered the in terrorem clause in David’s last will and testament,

4. because neither the prenuptial agreement nor the last will and testament provides

appellant with such an interest in the marital residence. Therefore, appellees sought an

order from the probate court declaring that appellant “is entitled to nothing from the

estate, including no right to reside in the marital residence.”

{¶ 10} Appellant filed her answer to appellees’ complaint on July 28, 2021. In her

answer, she denied appellees’ allegations that the filing of her complaint in the general

division triggered the in terrorem clause in David’s last will and testament.

{¶ 11} Thereafter, on August 5, 2021, appellees filed a motion for partial summary

judgment, seeking a declaration from the probate court that the in terrorem clause in

David’s last will and testament was valid, that appellant triggered the clause by filing her

complaint, and that therefore David’s estate must be administered as though appellant

died prior to David leaving no living lawful descendants. Appellees contended that

appellant, in filing her complaint, sought “to gain through general-division litigation

more than she’d inherit through probate-court administration.” As such, appellees

asserted that the broad language contained in the in terrorem clause was triggered and

precluded appellant from inheriting anything under David’s last will and testament.

{¶ 12} On August 13, 2021, appellant responded by filing a competing motion for

summary judgment, in which she insisted that her complaint did not seek to challenge

any provision of David’s last will and testament and her claim for an equitable interest in

the marital residence “relates only to [her] already-existing interest in the marital home,

and does not contravene the terms of the Decedent’s Will.”

5. {¶ 13} Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the probate court’s

magistrate issued a decision on May 4, 2022. In her decision, the magistrate found that

the in terrorem clause in David’s last will and testament is enforceable, that appellant

triggered the clause “[b]y bringing suit in the General Division seeking a 20% equitable

interest in the marital residence,” and that the remedy under the clause is the prohibition

of appellant “from taking under the will, or against the will.” In her analysis, the

magistrate explained that appellant’s filing of her complaint in the general division

constituted an effort to receive more than appellant was entitled to under the will. The

magistrate explained that “by seeking more than she is entitled to, [appellant] is asking

the General Division to change the plain language of the will.”

{¶ 14} On the same day the magistrate’s decision was issued, the trial court issued

its judgment entry adopting the magistrate’s decision, granting appellees’ motion for

partial summary judgment, denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment, and ruling

that David’s last will and testament “shall be administered as if [appellant] had died prior

to David P. Stotz, leaving no living lawful descendants.” Thereafter, on May 27, 2022,

appellant filed her timely notice of appeal. Notably, appellant filed no objections to the

magistrate’s decision.

B. Assignment of Error

{¶ 15} On appeal, appellant assigns the following error for our review:

Assignment of Error No. 1: The trial court erred by granting

Appellees’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

6. II. Analysis

{¶ 16} In her sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court

erroneously granted appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment.

{¶ 17} Before addressing the merits of appellant’s arguments, we must first

identify the standard of review that governs this appeal. Under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i),

“[a] party may file written objections to a magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of

the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that

fourteen-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i).” (Emphasis added).

Moreover, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) provides that “[e]xcept for a claim of plain error, a

party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or

legal conclusion * * * unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as

required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).”

{¶ 18} As noted above, appellant did not object to the magistrate’s decision in this

case, opting instead to directly appeal the trial court’s decision adopting the magistrate’s

decision. Consequently, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) applies, and appellant’s arguments are

reviewable only for plain error. See Lake Twp. V. Walbridge, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-

21-008, 2021-Ohio-3761, ¶ 31 (“If an appellant does not file timely objections to the

magistrate’s decision as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b), that party cannot assert any error

on appeal related to that decision ‘[e]xcept for a claim of plain error * * *.’ Civ.R.

53(D)(3)(b)(iv).”).

7. {¶ 19} In their brief to this court, appellees urge us to summarily affirm the

decision of the probate court without examining the merits of appellant’s argument based

upon appellant’s failure to object to the magistrate’s decision. However, notwithstanding

appellant’s failure to object to the magistrate’s decision, the judgment of the probate

court is still reviewable for plain error. See State ex rel. Anderson v. Chambers-Smith,

168 Ohio St.3d 283, 2022-Ohio-2844, 198 NE.3d 97, ¶ 7, citing Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv)

and State ex rel. Hunley v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 156 Ohio St.3d 354, 2019-Ohio-933,

126 N.E.3d 1122, ¶ 5 (stating that the appellant waived any challenge to the lower court’s

adoption of the magistrate’s decision on appeal by failing to file timely objections, but

indicating that “[w]e therefore review the court of appeals’ judgment only for plain

error”); State ex rel. Neguse v. McIntosh, 161 Ohio St.3d 125, 2020-Ohio-3533, 161

N.E.3d 571, ¶ 9, citing Hunley at ¶ 5 (“Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), Neguse’s

failure to object to the magistrate’s decision bars him from “assign[ing] as error on appeal

the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion” of the magistrate.

Accordingly, we limit our review to plain error.”); Wilson v. Wilson, 2018-Ohio-3820,

111 N.E.3d 110, ¶ 27 (6th Dist.) (“Pursuant to Civ.R . 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), Neguse’s failure

to object to the magistrate’s decision bars him from ‘assign[ing] as error on appeal the

court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion’ of the magistrate.

Accordingly, we limit our review to plain error.”). Therefore, we will proceed to review

the judgment of the probate court for plain error.

8. {¶ 20} “[I]n order for a court to find plain error in a civil case, an appellant must

establish (1) a deviation from a legal rule, (2) that the error was obvious, and (3) that the

error affected the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process and

therefore challenged the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process.” State v. Morgan,

153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 40. We “must proceed with the

utmost caution, limiting the doctrine strictly to those extremely rare cases where

exceptional circumstances require its application to prevent a manifest miscarriage of

justice, and where the error complained of, if left uncorrected, would have a material

adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings.”

Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997).

{¶ 21} Here, we do not find that the trial court deviated from any legal rule or

committed any obvious errors. In her brief to this court, appellant asserts that the trial

court’s judgment in favor of appellees was erroneous because the claims she raised in her

complaint in the general trial division of the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas

should not have triggered the in terrorem clause in David’s last will and testament.

According to appellant, her complaint did not seek to contest the will, but merely sought

a “clarification on specific provisions in the Will. The validity of David’s Will was not,

and never has been, challenged.” Appellant goes on to state that her complaint “sought

only the proceeds she was rightfully entitled to from David’s life insurance policy.”

{¶ 22} We find that appellant’s argument is belied by the express language she

used in the complaint she filed in general trial division. The in terrorem clause in

9. David’s last will and testament is triggered whenever any beneficiary contests “in any

court any provision” of the will. While the majority of appellant’s complaint focused on

her entitlement to all of the proceeds from David’s Motorists life insurance policy, the

life insurance policy was not the sole subject of the relief appellant requested. Appellant

also alleged in her complaint that the prenuptial agreement “clearly implies that [she] has

an equitable (one fifth) interest in the marital residence,” and appellant expressly sought a

determination from the court that she was the owner of a 20 percent equitable interest in

the marital residence.

{¶ 23} Under David’s last will and testament (as well as the prenuptial

agreement), appellant is merely granted a life estate in the marital residence upon David’s

death. She is not entitled to any ownership interest in the marital residence. Thus, in

seeking an order from the general trial division that she is a partial owner of the marital

residence, appellant sought to alter David’s last will and testament, not simply clarify it.

{¶ 24} In short, the trial court did not deviate from any legal rule or commit an

obvious error when it adopted the magistrate’s decision finding that appellant’s filing of

her complaint triggered the application of the broadly worded in terrorem clause in

David’s last will and testament. Consequently, we find no plain error in this case, and

appellant’s sole assignment of error is not well-taken.

10. III. Conclusion

{¶ 25} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Sandusky County Court of

Common Pleas, Probate Division, is affirmed. The costs of this appeal are assessed to

appellant under App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Stephen W. Powell, J. ____________________________ Robert A. Hendrickson, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

Judges Stephen W. Powell and Robert A. Hendrickson, Twelfth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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