NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250510-U FILED This Order was filed under February 10, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0510 Carla Bender not precedent except in the th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re ESTATE OF ARTHUR H. RIEKENA, Deceased ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (W.C. Brooks III, ) Peoria County Petitioner-Appellant, ) No. 23PR25 v. ) Dennis M. Riekena, ) Honorable Respondent-Appellee). ) Sean W. Donahue, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Grischow and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when finding petitioner had waived arguments presented for the first time in his motion to reconsider and (2) petitioner failed to show any property was conveyed from decedent to respondent to raise a presumption of fraud.
¶2 In November 2024, the trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by respondent,
Dennis M. Riekena, regarding a complaint filed in probate court by petitioner, W.C. Brooks III.
Brooks had sued the estate for a breach of contract arising from an “Option Receipt Agreement”
(Option Agreement) between him and decedent, Arthur H. Riekena (Dennis’s uncle). Brooks
filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. On appeal, Brooks argues the court abused
its discretion when denying his motion to reconsider. We disagree and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In April 2024, Brooks filed an amended complaint, alleging two counts of breach of contract for Riekena’s estate’s failure to sell two parcels of land to him. Count I of the
complaint sought damages, whereas count II sought specific performance. The following are
facts as alleged in Brooks’s complaint. Brooks, decedent’s neighbor since 1992, had provided
various “neighborly services” to decedent, which increased in scope and frequency as decedent
aged. In 2018, decedent offered to sell to Brooks two land parcels for $2,500 per acre. On
August 18, 2018, Brooks gave decedent $8,000 in earnest money in response to the offer. Shortly
after learning of the earnest money payment, Riekena, decedent’s nephew, went to decedent’s
home, and an argument ensued. Riekena told decedent he could not sell the parcels because it
was Riekena’s “ ‘inheritance.’ ” Decedent told Riekena he was already going to receive parcels
worth “over a million dollars” and accused him of being “ ‘greedy.’ ” Following the argument,
Riekena told Brooks he was interfering with his inheritance. Brooks informed Riekena that
decedent had approached him about selling the property. During a discussion, Brooks suggested
Riekena could purchase the property. Riekena replied, “ ‘I don’t know why I have to buy my
inheritance.’ ”
¶5 Decedent subsequently approached Brooks about purchasing different parcels.
This agreement was memorialized as an Option Agreement. The Option Agreement incorporated
the $8,000 of earnest money previously paid by Brooks. The Option Agreement, attached to the
complaint, provided Brooks with the “exclusive and irrevocable option” to purchase the different
parcels for $512,000 (minus the $8,000 option money already paid) by January 1, 2038. Because
Brooks was unable to execute the Option Agreement with decedent’s estate, Brooks filed this
breach of contract action.
¶6 In April 2024, Riekena filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. In July
2024, the trial court denied the motion.
-2- ¶7 In November 2024, Riekena filed another motion to dismiss pursuant to section
2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2024)),
arguing a lease between decedent and Riekena granted Riekena a right of first refusal to the
parcels in the Option Agreement and affirmatively barred Brooks’s claims. The attached lease
listed decedent as the landlord and Riekena as the tenant. The lease was executed on November
13, 2018. The term of the lease was “March 1st 2019 to February 28th 2019 [sic],” and it
contained a provision that it would automatically renew “from year to year under the same terms
and conditions” unless either party gave written notice prior to September 1 of each year that
they did not intend to renew or extend the lease. The lease specifically stated, “[i]n the event
[decedent] decides to sell all or a portion of property, [Riekena] has rights to first refusal.”
¶8 In January 2025, Brooks responded to the motion to dismiss by arguing (1) the
lease had expired upon decedent’s death and (2) Riekena, who owed a fiduciary duty to decedent
as his power of attorney, benefited from the lease, which raised a presumption of fraud and
constituted a conflict of interest, which arguably invalidated the lease.
¶9 In March 2025, following a hearing, the trial court entered a written order
granting Riekena’s motion to dismiss. The court found the term period of the lease of March 1,
2019, to February 28, 2019, was a scrivener’s error. The court noted the lease automatically
renewed year after year unless either party gave written notice and the tenant, Riekena, yielded
possession of the property. The court stated neither party gave written notice to terminate the
lease and Riekena never yielded possession of the property. The court disagreed with Brooks that
decedent’s death terminated the lease and explained it could find no case law supporting
Brooks’s proposition. Rather, the court found Riekena, as executor of decedent’s estate, stepped
into decedent’s shoes pertaining to the obligations set forth in the lease. The court also noted
-3- decedent’s will specifically addressed the issue of self-dealing and waived any claims related
thereto. The court supported this finding by stating Brooks’s complaint pleaded Riekena’s life
estate rental of the property was intended to dovetail with decedent’s will and decedent’s will
was executed freely, fairly, and without undue influence.
¶ 10 Regarding Riekena’s fiduciary duties as executor and any presumption of fraud,
the trial court found Riekena’s duties as a power of attorney to decedent since 2002 created a
fiduciary duty. The court also found the lease only granted Riekena a right of first refusal, as it
did not convey or transfer any property interest to him. Rather, the right of first refusal only gave
Riekena an opportunity to purchase the property at issue if decedent wished to sell it. The court
concluded, as a matter of law, there was no presumption of fraud where no actual conveyance or
transfer of property interest occurred. Additionally, the court stated that if the presumption of
fraud were assumed, Riekena could rebut the presumption. The court stated Riekena’s
involvement with the lease only afforded him the opportunity to purchase the property, even
though, according to Brooks, Riekena believed he should have inherited the property rather than
having to purchase it. The court explained:
“Through the Will [Riekena] did in fact inherit a portion of the
farm ground and was granted lifetime farming rights to the
property subject to the Option [Agreement]. If the Option
[Agreement] is exercised, he has the right to purchase the farm
from [decedent’s] Estate and the Estate receives the same benefit.
If he does not have the finances available, Brooks completes the
Option [Agreement], and the Estate receives the same benefit and
[Riekena] is able to farm the property for his lifetime. This is fair
-4- and equitable.”
¶ 11 Brooks subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, contending (1) Riekena’s right
of first refusal was personal and, therefore, expired upon decedent’s death, (2) the trial court’s
ruling created an unreasonable result, effectively nullifying the Option Agreement, and (3) the
court erred when finding a fiduciary duty did not attach to the lease.
¶ 12 In April 2025, following a hearing, the trial court entered a written order denying
the motion to reconsider. The court first noted Brooks made two arguments at the hearing on the
motion to dismiss: (1) the lease terminated upon decedent’s death and (2) Riekena’s right of first
refusal was presumptively fraudulent based upon Riekena being decedent’s power of attorney at
the time the lease was executed. The court then noted during the hearing on the motion to
reconsider, Brooks conceded he had “missed arguing about or raising the issue of the personal
nature of the right of first refusal.” The court recounted that Brooks referenced a case cited in
Riekena’s motion to dismiss that discussed the issue of a right of first refusal being personal in
nature. The court stated it had considered the cases cited by the parties “for the propositions for
which they were argued/cited.” The court concluded it would not consider legal theories that
were not raised by the parties at the time of argument and it was not opposing counsel’s
obligation to raise issues on Brooks’s behalf. The court found Brooks had waived the issue that
Riekena’s right of first refusal was personal in nature.
¶ 13 The trial court said Brooks’s argument that Riekena had not provided proof he
would be able to exercise his right of first refusal was also being argued for the first time. The
court noted both parties had indicated their intentions to exercise the Option Agreement or lease,
respectively. The court opined Brooks had provided no proof he was financially able to exercise
the Option Agreement. The court stated this issue was likely waived and it did not preclude it
-5- from ruling on the legal issues presented.
¶ 14 Regarding the issue of the trial court’s order creating an unreasonable result, the
court said the issue had been addressed in its previous ruling. The court reiterated neither the
Option Agreement nor the lease created a mechanism that would compel either party to exercise
their rights under either agreement. The court proposed a hypothetical scenario where Brooks
exercised his option under the Option Agreement and, despite Riekena’s right of first refusal,
Brooks was unable to secure the funds to purchase the property. The court concluded, “There is
nothing unreasonable in [decedent] offering [Riekena,] who has farmed this property for 20
years[,] the right to be first in line for its purchase, and if he is unable to purchase[, then]
allowing [Brooks] the option to purchase the property at a significant discount.”
¶ 15 Lastly, regarding fiduciary duty, the trial court stated it had found a fiduciary duty
existed at the time the lease was entered. The court explained that its prior ruling found
Riekena’s right-of-first-refusal provision within the lease was not presumptively fraudulent. The
court denied Brooks’s motion to reconsider.
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, Brooks argues the trial court erred denying his motion to reconsider
dismissing his lawsuit when (1) Riekena’s right of first refusal did not expire upon decedent’s
death, (2) the waiver-of-self-dealing provision in decedent’s will retroactively applied to the
lease, and (3) Brooks’s argument Riekena had not exercised his right of first refusal was waived.
We address each claim in turn.
¶ 19 Section 2-619 of the Code permits a party to file a motion to dismiss where “the
claim asserted *** is barred by *** affirmative matter avoiding legal effect of or defeating the
-6- claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2024). An “affirmative matter” is “something in the
nature of a defense that negates the cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of
law or conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.” Glisson v. City
of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999). “The question on appeal from an order granting dismissal
under section 2-619 is ‘whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have
precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter
of law.’ ” Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital, 186 Ill. 2d 104, 109-10 (1999) (quoting Kedzie & 103rd
Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116-17 (1993)). We accept all well-pleaded
facts as true and “construe the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 55. Our review of a dismissal
pursuant to 2-619 is de novo. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221.
¶ 20 Ordinarily, we would apply a de novo standard of review when “reviewing a
motion to reconsider that was based only on the trial court’s application (or purported
misapplication) of existing law.” People v. $280,020 United States Currency, 372 Ill. App. 3d
785, 791 (2007). However, “where the motion was based on new matters, such as additional
facts or new arguments or legal theories not presented during the course of the proceedings
leading to the order being challenged, the abuse-of-discretion standard applies.” Spencer v.
Strenger Wayne, 2017 IL App (2d) 160801, ¶ 25. In this case, Brooks’s motion to reconsider was
based on new arguments and legal theories that he had not presented to the trial court prior to its
granting of Riekena’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Brooks concedes his legal theories were
“not presented in prior proceedings.” As such, the parties agree the standard of review is abuse of
discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful,
unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. In re
-7- Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 24.
¶ 21 A. Whether Riekena’s Right of First Refusal
Expired Upon Decedent’s Death
¶ 22 Brooks first argues Riekena’s right of first refusal as stated in the lease terminated
upon decedent’s death. He contends the right of first refusal provision was silent as to price and
duration. Citing Folsom v. Harr, 218 Ill. 369 (1905), and Universal Scrap Metals, Inc. v. J.
Sandman & Sons, Inc., 337 Ill. App. 3d 501 (2003), he argues the lack of a price makes it
uncertain and incomplete, and therefore, unenforceable. Citing this court in Kellner v. Bartman,
250 Ill. App. 3d 1030 (1993), he argues the lack of duration makes it personal in nature and,
therefore, it terminated upon decedent’s death.
¶ 23 In Folsom, the parties entered into a lease agreement that included a
right-of-first-refusal provision, which stated, “ ‘Should [the defendant] conclude to sell this
property, then [the plaintiff] is to have the first chance to buy the same.’ ” Folsom, 218 Ill. at
370. The defendant subsequently sold the property without first offering the plaintiff an
opportunity to purchase it. Id. at 370-71. The Folsom court held the contract was unenforceable
because it was “uncertain and indefinite.” Id. at 372. The court noted it was “uncertain, in that it
state[d] no price for which the land [was] to be sold and state[d] no method for the determination
of such a price.” Id. The court noted, however, had the contract provided the plaintiff could have
purchased the property under the terms offered by a third party, it would have been enforceable.
Id. at 373.
¶ 24 Universal Scrap Metals similarly contained a right-of-first-refusal provision,
which stated, “ ‘If at some future time [the defendant] decide[s] to sell, relinquish or limit
participation in the business, it is agreed that [the plaintiff] will have the “right of first refusal” to
-8- purchase, manage, or otherwise operate [the defendant’s] business under mutually agreed upon
conditions.’ ” Universal Scrap Metals, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 503. The defendant subsequently sold
its assets to a third party without offering the plaintiff an opportunity to purchase, manage, or
otherwise operate the business. Id. The appellate court followed Folsom and noted, “Had the
parties intended to expressly base their selling price on a third-party offer, they could have
provided so in the agreement.” Id. at 506. The court found the agreement “was not sufficiently
definite” and, thus, unenforceable. Id. at 508.
¶ 25 Kellner involved a real estate contract with a right-of-first-refusal provision that
provided: “ ‘In the event [the defendant] shall decide to sell his remaining farm land ***, he shall
first offer the farm land to [the plaintiff] for the price and on the terms of the intended sale, by an
instrument in writing, delivered or mailed to [the plaintiff].’ ” Kellner, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1032.
The defendant subsequently sold the property to a third party without offering the plaintiff an
opportunity to purchase it. Id. The court noted a “right of first refusal need not specify the price
and terms, as long as it provides a method whereby the price and terms may be ascertained.” Id.
at 1035. The court also noted the terms and conditions of sale “may be supplied by implication or
custom.” Id. The court found the provision provided a method by which the price and terms
could be ascertained and, thus, was enforceable. Id. at 1036. The court went further and
explained a right-of-first-refusal provision, unlike an option, “is not ordinarily void for
indefiniteness.” Id. Because the provision was “silent as to duration,” however, the court
concluded it was personal in nature and “terminated on the death of either party to the
agreement.” Id. at 1037.
¶ 26 Riekena contends Brooks waived these arguments by failing to raise them in
response to his motion to dismiss. He cites Liceaga v. Baez, 2019 IL App (1st) 181170, in
-9- support.
¶ 27 Liceaga involved an action for replevin, wherein the plaintiff sought possession of
a diamond engagement ring he had given to the defendant in contemplation of their marriage. Id.
¶ 3. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, citing the plaintiff’s verified
complaint, which unequivocally alleged he ended the engagement, thereby showing he could not
maintain his action for replevin. Id. ¶ 16. The plaintiff retained new counsel and filed a motion to
reconsider. Id. ¶ 17. The motion disregarded the case law the parties had previously agreed was
controlling and contended, for the first time, the trial court should consider newly enacted
legislation, case law from other states, and new policy arguments. Id. The trial court held the
plaintiff’s new arguments could not be raised on a motion to reconsider. Id. ¶ 21. Alternatively,
the court found the legislation the plaintiff had relied on was not new and did not pertain to
actions for replevin. Id.
¶ 28 On review, the appellate court in Liceaga stated:
“The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to a
[trial] court’s attention: (1) newly discovered evidence, (2) changes
in the law, or (3) errors in the court’s previous application of
existing law. [Citations.] A reconsideration motion is not the place
to raise a new legal theory or factual argument. [Citations.] Trial
courts should not allow litigants to stand mute, lose a motion, and
then frantically gather new material to show that the court erred in
its ruling. [Citations.] As a result, legal theories and factual
arguments not previously made are subject to waiver.” Id. ¶ 25.
The appellate court found the trial court did not err and the plaintiff had waived his arguments by
- 10 - failing to raise them to the court before it ruled on the motion to dismiss. Id. ¶ 29.
¶ 29 We agree with Riekena. Brooks’s argument to the trial court prior to the motion to
dismiss was that the lease itself had expired upon decedent’s death. After the court granted
Riekena’s motion, Brooks contended, for the first time, in his motion to reconsider that the
right-of-first-refusal provision was personal in nature and, thus, it alone expired upon decedent’s
death. This was an entirely new argument and legal theory that was not presented to the trial
court prior to it granting the motion to dismiss. The court noted Brooks’s new legal theory and
arguments and found they had been waived. “[A] trial court is well within its discretion to deny
such a motion [to reconsider] and ignore its contents when it contains material that was available
prior to the hearing at issue but never presented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 27.
Similar to Liceaga, this court has held that arguments presented for the first time in a motion to
reconsider are forfeited. Vantage Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Q Ill Development, LLC, 2016 IL
App (4th) 160271, ¶ 46; see Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough, 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 36
(finding the defendant had forfeited its argument raised for the first time in a motion to
reconsider). Because the trial court was well within its discretion to find Brooks had waived his
new argument and legal theory, we find, for the same reason, the court did not abuse its
discretion when finding Brooks had waived his new argument and legal theory raised for the first
time in his motion to reconsider.
¶ 30 B. Whether Decedent’s Will Retroactively Affected the Lease
¶ 31 Next, Brooks argues Riekena had a fiduciary duty to avoid self-dealing prior to
the execution of decedent’s will in 2019. He notes Riekena was named decedent’s power of
attorney in 2002 and contends Riekena’s obligation to avoid self-dealing as a fiduciary began
then. He argues the trial court’s reference to decedent’s will was error because the self-dealing
- 11 - provision within decedent’s will occurred after Riekena had entered into the lease with decedent
in November 2018.
¶ 32 From here, Brooks argues a presumption of fraud or undue influence arose
because Riekena benefited from the lease. Specifically, he benefited from the
right-of-first-refusal provision contained therein. Brooks contends Riekena failed to show by
clear and convincing evidence he could rebut the presumption of fraud or undue influence and
the trial court overlooked or misconstrued various affidavits and documents in the record
supporting Brooks’s contentions.
¶ 33 Riekena contends the trial court was correct to find the right-of-first-refusal
provision was not a conveyance of property, and, in the alternative, if it were a conveyance,
Riekena could have rebutted the presumption of fraud.
¶ 34 Neither party on appeal disputes, as the trial court concluded, that Riekena owed a
fiduciary duty to decedent. The first issue of contention is whether Brooks had shown a
presumption of fraud arose from the right-of-first-refusal provision within the lease. Our
supreme court has explained:
“A presumption of fraud arises when a fiduciary benefits
from a transaction involving the principal. [Citation.] Under a
power of attorney for property, any conveyance of the principal’s
property that either materially benefits the agent or is for the
agent’s own use is presumed to be fraudulent. [Citation.] This rule
applies to conveyances of the principal’s property by the agent to a
third party on behalf of the principal and also to conveyances made
by the principal directly to the agent. [Citation.] Once a fraudulent
- 12 - transaction has been alleged, the burden then shifts to the agent to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was
fair and did not result from his undue influence over the principal.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Estate of Alford v. Shelton,
2017 IL 121199, ¶ 23.
¶ 35 We begin by noting the issue of presumptive fraud based on Riekena’s fiduciary
duty to decedent was raised prior to the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss and will,
therefore, be subject to a de novo standard of review. See Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221. However,
Brooks’s argument to the trial court below was that it had failed to find a fiduciary duty existed,
which was incorrect. Now, on appeal, Brooks argues the court’s finding that decedent’s will
contained a provision waiving any potential issue of self-dealing was error. This issue was not
raised in the trial court.
“The purpose of this court’s forfeiture rules is to encourage parties
to raise issues in the trial court, thus ensuring both that the trial
court is given an opportunity to correct any errors prior to appeal
and that a party does not obtain a reversal through his or her own
inaction.” 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust
Co., 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 14.
We remind Brooks, as the appellant, it is his obligation to preserve his claims and issues for
appeal and avoid forfeiture. Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 76. However, “[w]e require
parties to preserve issues or claims for appeal; we do not require them to limit their arguments
here to the same arguments that were made below.” Id. Accordingly, we will address the merits
of Brooks’s contentions.
- 13 - ¶ 36 Pursuant to Shelton, Brooks needed to first show a conveyance of decedent’s
property to Riekena. The right-of-first-refusal provision contained within the lease was not a
conveyance of property. As the Kellner court explained:
“A right of first refusal, also referred to as a preemptive
right, is a condition precedent to the sale of the property. A right of
first refusal is not an option in that the holder of the right cannot
force the sale of the property at a stipulated price. [Citation.]
Instead, the right does not arise until the grantor notifies the holder
of a desire to sell or until offering or contracting to sell to a third
party without first giving the holder of the right of first refusal the
opportunity to buy. [Citation.] Oftentimes a right of first refusal is
a right to elect to take a specified property at the same price and on
the same terms and conditions as are contained in a good-faith
offer to purchase made by a third party.” Kellner, 250 Ill App. 3d
at 1034.
Because Brooks had failed to show any property was conveyed from decedent to Riekena via the
right-of-first-refusal provision, he cannot meet the basis for the presumed fraudulent conduct.
Therefore, Brooks cannot show the trial court erred.
¶ 37 C. Whether Brooks Waived the Issue of Riekena’s
Failure to Exercise his Right of First Refusal
¶ 38 Next, Brooks contends the trial court abused its discretion when denying the
motion to reconsider. He argues Riekena had failed to exercise his right of first refusal to the
property in question. And by failing to exercise his right of first refusal, the matter was not yet
- 14 - ripe for the court to dismiss the action.
¶ 39 Brooks does not cite any authority to support his contentions on this issue. We
remind Brooks, this court
“is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and supported by
pertinent authority and cohesive arguments; it is not merely a
repository into which an appellant may ‘dump the burden of
argument and research,’ nor is it the obligation of this court to act
as an advocate or seek error in the record.” U.S. Bank v. Lindsey,
397 Ill. App. 3d 437, 459 (2009) (quoting Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill.
App. 3d 677, 682 (1993)).
Additionally, we will not “research the issues on the appellant’s behalf.” Gakuba v. Kurtz, 2015
IL App (2d) 140252, ¶ 19.
¶ 40 We also note, the trial court said this issue was “likely waived,” but did not
affirmatively find it waived. Rather, the court said the issue of ripeness did not preclude it from
ruling on the motion to reconsider. As we stated earlier, “[A] trial court is well within its
discretion to deny such a motion [to reconsider] and ignore its contents when it contains material
that was available prior to the hearing at issue but never presented.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted). Liceaga, 2019 IL App (1st) 181170, ¶ 27. Brooks’s ripeness argument was raised for
the first time at the motion to reconsider hearing and the court was within its discretion to ignore
the new argument. Accordingly, we find no basis to show the court abused its discretion.
¶ 41 D. Other Instances of Error Claims
¶ 42 Lastly, Brooks points to various “other errors” in search of relief. First, he
contends the trial court, in its written order, incorrectly stated he was represented by counsel,
- 15 - while decedent was not. He notes that neither Brooks nor decedent were represented by counsel
when the Option Agreement was entered into. Second, he states the court’s written order
incorrectly listed the Option Agreement as being executed in June 2019, when it was, in fact,
executed in November 2018. He states the court’s error on the date of execution “may have
materially affected the outcome of the matter.” Third, he contends the court failed to understand
his complaints during the motion to dismiss hearing that the lease did not contain an adequate
legal description of the property. Lastly, he argues the Option Agreement came first in time
compared to the lease and, as such, he has exclusive rights to the property, as provided by the
Option Agreement.
¶ 43 The entirety of Brooks’s “other errors” can be summarized as brief and
underdeveloped grievances that fail to explain how such errors amount to reversible error. We
remind Brooks again, this court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and supported by
relevant legal authority. Additionally, his “other errors” were not properly raised before the trial
court and subject to forfeiture on that basis alone. Bowman v. Chicago Park District, 2014 IL
App (1st) 132122, ¶ 59. Moreso, these contentions do not comply with Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which required his brief to “contain the contentions of the
appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record
relied on.” “An issue not clearly defined and sufficiently presented fails to satisfy the
requirements of [Rule 341(h)(7)].” Cwik v. Giannoulias, 237 Ill. 2d 409, 423 (2010). Where an
appellant fails to sufficiently present an argument in his opening brief, the argument is “forfeited
and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.” Ill. S. Ct.
R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 44 Ultimately, Brooks’s “other errors” do not show the trial court abused its
- 16 - discretion when denying the motion to reconsider, and they do not show any property was
conveyed to establish a presumption of fraud—the issues that were sufficiently presented in this
appeal. Because Brooks has failed to sufficiently present his “other errors” arguments, we find
they are forfeited.
¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 46 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 47 Affirmed.
- 17 -