2020 IL App (5th) 180534-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 03/18/20. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-18-0534 Supreme Court Rule 23 and changed or corrected prior to may not be cited as precedent the filing of a Petition for by any party except in the Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re ESTATE OF ROSE ANNE RIDER, ) Appeal from the Deceased ) Circuit Court of ) Gallatin County. (Stephanie R. Rider, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 13-P-1 ) Todd Martin Rider, Stephanie Leigh Rider, ) and Jennifer B. Humphrey, ) ) Defendants, ) ) and ) ) Damion Rider, Independent Administrator ) of the Estate of Rose Anne Rider, Deceased, ) Honorable ) T. Scott Webb, Defendant-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Welch and Justice Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: In suit for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement of decedent to devise real and personal property to plaintiff in return for services on her part, evidence convincingly and adequately established the agreement and complete performance by the plaintiff, by acts definitely referable to the contract, and change of the plaintiff’s position in reliance upon the contract.
1 ¶2 The plaintiff, Stephanie Rider, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Gallatin County
alleging claims for breach of contract to make a will, injunctive relief, and quantum meruit
against the estate of Rose Anne Rider (Anne), deceased. The defendant-appellant, Damion Rider,
the independent administrator of Anne’s estate, asserted that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by
the Frauds Act. See 740 ILCS 80/1 (West 2012) (bars the enforcement of any unwritten
agreement not contemplating performance within the space of one year); id. § 2 (bars action
charging any person upon any contract for interest in lands, for a longer term than one year,
unless pursuant to a signed writing). The circuit court rejected Damion’s defense, and after
hearing evidence, entered judgment favoring the plaintiff on her claim for breach of contract to
make a will.
¶3 On appeal, Damion argues that the circuit court erred in failing to bar the plaintiff’s claim
pursuant to the Frauds Act and in awarding the plaintiff Anne’s home, home contents, and any
proceeds remaining from the sale of Anne’s vehicle. For the following reasons, we affirm the
circuit court’s judgment.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 On May 17, 2012, Anne died intestate, leaving the defendants, Todd Martin Rider, who is
also the plaintiff’s husband, along with Stephanie Leigh Rider and Jennifer B. Humphrey, as
heirs at law. On April 18, 2013, Damion, Stephanie Leigh’s son and Anne’s grandson, was
appointed independent administrator of Anne’s estate.
¶6 On July 11, 2013, the plaintiff filed her complaint alleging claims for breach of contract
to make a will (count I), injunctive relief (count II), and quantum meruit (count III). In count I,
the plaintiff alleged that in March 2011, Anne requested that the plaintiff care for Anne through
house cleaning, taking her to appointments, grocery shopping, and performing other household
2 tasks. The plaintiff alleged that Anne also requested that plaintiff ensure that she was properly
clothed and fed and would receive necessary medical and other care. The plaintiff alleged that in
exchange, Anne orally promised to make a will leaving her home in fee simple, together with its
contents, and her automobile to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that in compliance with Anne’s
request, the plaintiff cared for Anne and her home until Anne’s death. The plaintiff requested
that the circuit court grant her title in fee simple to Anne’s home and automobile, direct Damion
to execute and deliver the deed to plaintiff in fee simple, and declare that Todd, Stephanie Leigh,
and Jennifer had no interest, right, or title to the property. In count II of her complaint, the
plaintiff sought an injunction preventing Damion from removing the plaintiff from Anne’s
residence or selling the residence. In count III, the plaintiff alternatively alleged a quantum
meruit action seeking damages for the reasonable value of the services she provided to Anne.
¶7 On September 26, 2016, Damion filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiff’s action for breach of contract to make a will was barred by sections 1 and 2 of the
Frauds Act (740 ILCS 80/1, 2 (West 2012)). On April 19, 2017, the circuit court denied
Damion’s motion for summary judgment, holding that because the plaintiff fully performed her
side of the alleged contract, the Frauds Act did not bar her action for breach of contract to make a
will. The circuit court further held that the Frauds Act did not bar the plaintiff’s action because
the alleged agreement could have been fully performed within one year.
¶8 On May 10, 2018, the evidence presented at the bench trial included the following.
Amanda Seely testified that she had known Anne for 20 years prior to Anne’s death and that she
visited Anne’s home weekly or biweekly for two years prior to Anne’s death. Amanda testified
that during her visits, she witnessed the plaintiff regularly cleaning, grocery shopping, and taking
Anne to her doctor’s appointments. Amanda testified that the plaintiff also mowed Anne’s lawn,
3 drove Anne to the beauty shop, and vacationed with Anne in Florida. Amanda testified that Anne
had told her that the plaintiff had cared for her and that in the event of her death, the plaintiff
“would receive everything she owned due to the fact that she had cared for her and would
continue to do so.” Amanda testified that Anne had stated that the plaintiff would receive Anne’s
house, car, and all of her belongings. Amanda testified that Anne made these statements at a
cookout in the summer of 2011. Amanda testified that Anne repeated these statements in the
plaintiff’s presence during the 2011 Christmas season.
¶9 Amanda testified that she did not observe anyone other than the plaintiff completing
household chores in Anne’s home. Amanda testified that Damion and his family lived with Anne
for a period of time, and the plaintiff babysat Damion’s children four days per week, while
Damion and his wife worked. Amanda testified that she babysat the plaintiff’s children, while the
plaintiff babysat Damion’s children, because the plaintiff’s children did not want to stay at
Anne’s home every day. Amanda testified that the plaintiff performed services for Anne prior to
Damion and his family moving into Anne’s home and after they moved from Anne’s home.
¶ 10 Sherry Roman, a neighbor of Anne’s and the plaintiff’s and Todd’s, considering that the
plaintiff and Todd lived two blocks from Anne during Anne’s life, testified that she had
witnessed the plaintiff’s vehicle parked at Anne’s home, the plaintiff entering and exiting Anne’s
home, and the plaintiff caring for Anne from 2006 until Anne’s death in 2012. Sherry testified
that at a birthday party in 2011, Anne told her that the plaintiff would receive Anne’s belongings,
including her house, the contents, and car, as long as the plaintiff agreed to care for Anne. Sherry
testified that prior to the birthday party in 2011, Anne had told her that the plaintiff cared for her
and would receive “everything she had as long as [the plaintiff] agreed to keep taking care of
her.” Sherry testified that the plaintiff cleaned Anne’s home, cooked for her, and transported her
4 wherever she needed to go. Sherry testified that she witnessed an increase in the plaintiff’s care
when Damion and his family moved into Anne’s home because the plaintiff was caring for
Damion’s children too. Sherry testified that as far as she knew, the plaintiff continued to care for
Anne, including driving her to and from the hospital.
¶ 11 Mary Lee Buckman testified that she had known the plaintiff since the plaintiff was a
baby and had known Anne since the 1960s when she worked with her in a nursing home. Mary
Lee testified that from 2010 through 2012, she would visit Anne weekly or biweekly. Mary Lee
also testified that since 1993, she had lived within two blocks of Anne’s home. Mary Lee
testified that when she drove past Anne’s home, which was about four times a day, she
recognized the plaintiff’s vehicle parked at Anne’s home. Mary Lee testified that the plaintiff
had previously driven her own children to school, but when she began helping Anne, Todd began
driving their children to school. Mary Lee testified that approximately one year prior to Anne’s
death, Anne told her that “everything [Anne] [had] [was] going to go to [the plaintiff]” because
the plaintiff had done so much for her. Mary Lee testified that Anne reiterated the sentiment
probably four or five months before she died in May 2012.
¶ 12 Judy Clark testified that her son and the plaintiff’s son attended school and played sports
together when they were younger. Judy testified that she visited the plaintiff in Anne’s home
while the plaintiff was caring for Anne. Judy testified that the plaintiff mowed Anne’s yard, took
Anne to the doctor, and acquired groceries for Anne. With regard to the compensation for such a
caretaker, Judy testified that when she assisted in the care of a man from 2010 until 2014, she
was compensated $10, and later $12, an hour.
¶ 13 Julie Shaw testified that she worked as a licensed cosmetologist for 25 years and styled
Anne’s hair two to three times a week for probably 21 of those years. Julie testified that she
5 considered Anne as extended family, had styled Anne’s children’s hair, and had visited Anne’s
home numerous times. Julie testified that during her home visits, she witnessed the plaintiff
preparing food for Anne, dressing Anne, and helping Anne with whatever she needed. Julie
testified that the plaintiff stayed with Anne every day, and some nights, and acted as her main
caregiver. Julie testified that in the five years prior to Anne’s death, the plaintiff had driven Anne
to her hair appointments. Julie testified that months before Anne died, Anne told her that because
the plaintiff had driven her everywhere, she would receive Anne’s vehicle and would be
compensated in the end. Julie testified that Anne had stated that she planned to leave Damion $5.
Julie acknowledged that when the plaintiff accompanied Anne to the beauty shop, Anne would
pay for her to style the plaintiff’s hair and that Anne had also paid for her to style the plaintiff’s
children’s hair.
¶ 14 Karen Back testified that she had been a friend of Anne’s for almost 50 years. Karen
testified that in the last few years of Anne’s life, her physical condition deteriorated, she coughed
blood, and she experienced difficulty eating. Karen testified that during this time, Anne required
assistance to bathe or use the bathroom.
¶ 15 Karen testified that she lived in Florida, and in February 2012, before Anne died in May,
Anne and the plaintiff traveled to Florida to visit Karen and the beach. Karen testified that during
the visit, she and Anne discussed how Anne’s assets would be distributed upon death. Karen
testified that Anne had stated that her children would receive $5 each and that she had agreed
with the plaintiff to leave the plaintiff her house, its contents, and her car in return for the
plaintiff agreeing to care for her for the rest of her life and that the plaintiff had agreed to do so.
Karen testified that Anne also told her that when she died, the plaintiff would receive her house
and the new car that she had purchased because the plaintiff needed a new car. Karen testified
6 that during the same February 2012 visit, she had asked the plaintiff whether she would receive
the house and car for caring for Anne, and the plaintiff replied, “Yes, [t]hat’s what [Anne] has
said.”
¶ 16 Karen testified that during the plaintiff’s and Anne’s stay in Florida, the plaintiff helped
Anne with everything. Likewise, Karen testified that when she visited Anne in Anne’s home, she
witnessed the plaintiff caring for Anne, cooking her meals, bathing her, shopping for her, and
taking her to the doctor. Karen testified that the plaintiff also cared for Damion’s children in
Anne’s home because Anne was not well enough to care for them alone. Karen testified the
plaintiff helped Anne five to seven days per week.
¶ 17 Bernice Milletello, pursuant to an evidence deposition taken on May 7, 2018, testified
that she was 78 years old and had been a friend of Anne’s since the first grade. Bernice testified
that in fall 2011, she had visited with Anne, and Anne had told her that she was giving her house,
the furniture, and her vehicle to the plaintiff and that Todd and her other children would receive
$5. Bernice testified that she and Karen Back had later visited Anne in the hospital shortly before
Anne’s death. Bernice testified that she had told Anne to execute a will, and Anne had replied
that she was leaving everything to the plaintiff. Bernice testified that Anne had explained that she
had told the plaintiff that if the plaintiff stayed with her until she died, she would give everything
to the plaintiff.
¶ 18 Bernice testified that from 2009 through 2011, she visited Gallatin County about once or
twice a year. Bernice testified that she spoke to Anne on the phone about three times a week.
Bernice testified that the plaintiff cleaned Anne’s home, purchased groceries for Anne, and cared
for Damion’s children. Bernice testified that Anne gave the plaintiff “a little bit of money” to
7 clean the house and do the chores but did not pay the plaintiff’s bills. Bernice testified that Anne
gave the plaintiff about $40 to clean, even though Anne’s house was big.
¶ 19 Damion Rider testified that he lived with his family in Anne’s home from 2009 until
2011. Damion testified that the plaintiff visited Anne’s home three to five days a week, assisted
Anne with appointments, and cleaned the home. Damion testified that while living with Anne,
Anne had agreed to care for his children, but the plaintiff became their caregiver. Damion
acknowledged that the plaintiff also performed caretaking chores for Anne, including cleaning
her house, cooking, taking her to doctor and hair appointments, grocery shopping, and mowing.
¶ 20 Damion testified that Anne paid many of the plaintiff’s bills. Damion testified that when
the plaintiff accompanied Anne to appointments, Anne bought her purses and jewelry and paid to
eat together at restaurants. Damion testified that Anne also paid the plaintiff’s household bills.
¶ 21 Damion testified that in the summer of 2009, he spoke to Anne about moving into Anne’s
home and about Damion receiving Anne’s home. Damion testified that once he and his wife
moved into the home, Anne directed them to choose flooring and paint colors to remodel the
home since it would ultimately become theirs. Damion testified that they subsequently moved
from Anne’s home to live closer to their employers. Damion acknowledged that when he moved
from the home, Anne provided $10,000 and that he did not pay her back.
¶ 22 Lawrence Dailey, Anne’s brother, testified that from the 1990s until 2012, he visited with
Anne two or three days a week. Lawrence testified that he witnessed the plaintiff at Anne’s home
caring for her and that he witnessed Anne paying the plaintiff with cash and checks.
¶ 23 Jennifer, Anne’s daughter, testified that she graduated high school in 1986 and moved
from home in 1987. Jennifer testified that she returned to live with Anne from 2003 to 2007, but
8 moved to the Springfield area thereafter. Jennifer testified that she returned to visit her mother
for a week every month until 2008.
¶ 24 Jennifer testified that in 2002, Todd and Stephanie had executed a contract-for-deed to
purchase Jennifer’s home, where they had lived until moving into Anne’s home. Jennifer
testified that during the year prior to Anne’s death, she traveled with Anne to Florida, New
Orleans, and San Antonio. Jennifer testified that she cared for Anne during her visits to Gallatin
County, in order to provide the plaintiff an opportunity to be with her own family.
¶ 25 Jennifer testified that she witnessed Anne handing cash and checks to Todd, the plaintiff,
and Damion. Jennifer testified that Anne also paid for haircuts for Todd, the plaintiff’s children,
and Jennifer’s oldest daughter. Jennifer testified that when Anne entered the hospital during her
final stay, she stayed with Anne for three nights. Jennifer testified that the plaintiff had been
staying with her every night and needed to go home and take a break. Jennifer testified that Anne
died after a week or 10 days in the hospital. Jennifer acknowledged that the plaintiff cared for
Anne until Anne’s death.
¶ 26 Jennifer testified that after Anne’s death she took from Anne’s home documents, one of
which was an undated, handwritten document revealing Anne’s handwriting. Jennifer identified
the document and testified that the document indicated that Anne planned to give her car to the
plaintiff, her house to Damion, and various jewelry pieces to other family members. Jennifer
acknowledged that the document referenced a “gold band diamond, Grandma B.” which Anne
had given to Jennifer during their trip to New Orleans in the fall of 2011.
¶ 27 On October 10, 2018, the circuit court entered its judgment, noting that the evidence
remained uncontroverted that the plaintiff provided care for Anne during the final few years of
her life. The circuit court found that the caregiving began around 2006-2007, and that, pursuant
9 to the plaintiff’s claims, in 2011, the plaintiff and Anne entered into a contractual agreement,
wherein the plaintiff agreed to care for Anne in exchange for Anne bequeathing the plaintiff her
vehicle, home, and home contents when she died. The circuit court noted that there was no
evidence that Anne consistently paid the plaintiff and limited testimony that Anne purchased
groceries and haircuts for the plaintiff. The circuit court noted that witnesses testified seeing
Anne give the plaintiff money but found the evidence vague in that the testimony did not include
dollar amounts or how often this occurred. The circuit court concluded that the plaintiff was not
consistently compensated, and therefore, it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate a
change in position. Even so, the circuit court found that the evidence supported a conclusion that
the plaintiff changed her position during the final few years of Anne’s life, when Anne’s health
was failing and she required additional care.
¶ 28 The circuit court held that the plaintiff had provided services above and beyond what a
normal, reasonable daughter-in-law would have provided, given the lack of consistent
compensation provided to her, and that the plaintiff cared for Anne’s every need, every day of
Anne’s life. The circuit court found that the plaintiff had sacrificed time with her children and
husband to meet Anne’s needs. The circuit court concluded that the facts of the case could not
reasonably be harmonized with any other theory than that the work was done for the alleged
promise. Thus, the circuit court held that the plaintiff proved by clear, explicit, and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff and Anne had entered a contract to make a will and awarded Anne’s
home and property to the plaintiff. On October 31, 2018, Damion filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 29 ANALYSIS
¶ 30 On appeal, Damion argues that because the alleged March 2011 agreement anticipated a
relationship lasting longer than one year, considering that Anne died in May 2012, it was barred
10 by section 1 the Frauds Act. 740 ILCS 80/1 (West 2012) (bars the enforcement of any unwritten
agreement not contemplating performance within the space of one year). Damion also argues that
because the plaintiff’s action involved real property to be conveyed absent a written instrument,
it was barred by section 2 of the Frauds Act. Id. § 2 (no action shall be brought to charge any
person upon any contract for interest in lands unless pursuant to a signed writing).
¶ 31 “In Illinois, oral contracts are not considered void [citation], although they may be
unenforceable if they are subject to a Statute of Frauds provision.” Meyer v. Logue, 100 Ill. App.
3d 1039, 1043 (1981). The Frauds Act, also commonly referred to as the Statute of Frauds, is
designed to prevent false claims by requiring a writing to evidence the parties’ contractual intent.
Noesges v. Servicemaster Co., 233 Ill. App. 3d 158, 163 (1992). The legislature has enacted such
provisions for, inter alia, contracts that cannot be performed within a year (740 ILCS 80/1 (West
2012)) and contracts for the sale of an interest in land (id. § 2). Neither of these statutes
“explicitly provide[s] that full performance by one party operates to take the oral contract out of
the Statute of Frauds; however, case law fully supports this result.” Meyer, 100 Ill. App. 3d at
1044; see also Mapes v. Kalva Corp., 68 Ill. App. 3d 362 (1979) (executed oral employment
contract withstands Statute of Frauds defense, especially where all that remains to be done by the
other party is payment of money); Thomas v. Moore, 55 Ill. App. 3d 907 (1977) (oral contract for
sale of real estate is removed from Statute of Frauds where purchaser pays full consideration,
takes possession of the land, or makes valuable improvements thereon); Lund v. E.D. Etnyre &
Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 158 (1968) (where one party has fully performed oral agreement, other
party is estopped to rely on the Statute of Frauds, even though the oral contract violates the
statute); Hills v. Hopp, 287 Ill. 375 (1919) (oral contract for sale of corporate stock was
enforceable because plaintiff performed all of his obligations in reliance on it).
11 ¶ 32 “The rationale of this unilateral full performance concept is sound; if one party, in
reasonable reliance on the contract, performs all of his obligations and cannot be adequately
compensated through restitutionary means, the other party should not be permitted to rely on the
Statute of Frauds as a way to avoid his reciprocal obligations.” Meyer, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1043.
Statute of Frauds provisions are designed to prevent false claims by requiring a writing to
evidence the parties’ contractual intent. Id. “When one party fully performs his part of the
alleged oral contract, however, the courts recognize that this very performance strongly indicates
the existence of a contract.” Id. at 1043-44. Such performance tends to minimize the dangers that
the Statute of Frauds provisions were designed to prevent. Id. at 1044. “Conversely, where an
alleged contract is purely executory, neither side having performed, application of the Statute of
Frauds is justified by the attendant proof problems and the increased likelihood of perjury.” Id.
¶ 33 “The cases allowing specific performance to enforce an oral contract to will or devise
property to another, in consideration of services to be rendered, are universally those in which a
gross fraud would be suffered by the promisee if specific performance were denied.” Wessel v.
Eilenberger, 2 Ill. 2d 522, 527 (1954). “The courts of equity will not permit the Statute of
Frauds, the only purpose of which is to prevent fraud, to be used where the effect will be to
accomplish a fraud, and if the facts are such that it would be a virtual fraud to permit the
defendant to interpose the statute, a court of equity will not listen to that defense.” Id.
¶ 34 In the present case, the evidence revealed that the plaintiff, in reliance on Anne’s promise
to devise real and personal property to her, fully performed daily caretaking services for Anne
until Anne’s death, pursuant to their oral agreement. Because such facts lead to a virtual fraud if
the estate is permitted to interpose the Statute of Frauds, we find that the circuit court properly
rejected it as a defense to the plaintiff’s action.
12 ¶ 35 On appeal, Damion also argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the plaintiff and
Anne had entered into an oral contract to make a will, that plaintiff changed her position in
reliance upon the oral promise, that the plaintiff relied on the oral promise to her detriment, and
that the evidence showing that the plaintiff provided said services cannot reasonably be
harmonized with any other theory than the services were provided for an alleged oral promise to
¶ 36 An oral contract to make a will, supported by valid and adequate consideration, may be
valid and enforceable. See Burke v. Burke, 12 Ill. 2d 483 (1957); In re Estate of Nelson, 103 Ill.
App. 3d 640, 642 (1981). Such a contract “is sufficiently definite and certain to be enforceable if
the court is enabled from the terms and provisions thereof *** to ascertain what the parties have
agreed to do.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pritchett v. Asbestos Claims Management
Corp., 332 Ill. App. 3d 890, 896 (2002). In a suit for specific performance of an oral contract to
make a will, the evidence of the existence of the contract and its terms must be clear and explicit
and “so convincing that it will leave no doubt in the mind of the court.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Estate of Spaulding, 187 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1036 (1989).
¶ 37 Courts accept with caution evidence offered in support of a contract to make a disposition
of property of a deceased person different from that provided by law. Jatcko v. Hoppe, 7 Ill. 2d
479 (1955). Mere expressions of testamentary intent are insufficient to establish an oral contract
to will or devise property to another. In re Estate of Nelson, 103 Ill. App. 3d at 642.
Nevertheless, “[a] contract to make a will may be proved by declarations and conduct of the
parties not in the presence of each other.” In re Estate of Niehaus, 341 Ill. App. 454, 459 (1950).
Moreover, “[c]laimant’s acceptance of the contract may be shown by circumstantial evidence,
direct proof is not essential.” Id.
13 ¶ 38 Specific performance is not a matter of right, but rests in the sound discretion of the
court, to be determined from all facts and circumstances. Jatcko, 7 Ill. 2d at 485. The credibility
of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony are within the province of the trier of
fact, and the trial court’s judgment will not be reversed unless its findings are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re Estate of Niehaus, 341 Ill. App. at 459; In re Estate of
Kucharski, 3 Ill. App. 3d 32, 36 (1971).
¶ 39 In In re Estate of Niehaus, 341 Ill. App. 454, the claimant alleged that the decedent
promised to make a will in her favor, leaving her his entire estate, on the condition she would
continue to remain in his home, after the death of his wife, who had been the claimant’s aunt,
and care for him. Id. at 456. As in this case, the claimant presented the testimony of many
witnesses to support her claim. Id. The evidence showed that she had lived with her uncle for
more than 25 years, postponing marriage at the decedent’s request, and that she had cared for
him until his death. Id. Based upon the testimony and the fact that the claimant’s full and
complete performance was uncontradicted, the court found that the evidence sufficient to justify
the trial court’s finding that the essential terms of the oral contract to devise property were
clearly established. Id. at 459.
¶ 40 Similarly, in Holmes v. Ackley, 400 Ill. 372 (1948), the decedent’s step-granddaughter
sought to enforce an oral agreement wherein the decedent agreed to devise certain real property
to her. The evidence revealed that the claimant had moved into the decedent’s home and
performed considerable service for the decedent in the last months of her life. Id. at 377. As in
this case, witnesses testified to the decedent’s statements that if the claimant stayed with her for
the rest of her life, the decedent would give the claimant her home. Id. The court concluded that
14 the activities of the parties and the statements of the decedent were sufficient to establish the
existence and terms of the contract. Id.
¶ 41 Likewise, in Skurat v. Kellerman, 53 Ill. App. 3d 361 (1977), the plaintiff left Chicago at
her uncle’s request to live on his farm, cook, clean and care for him in his old age, work in the
fields, and care for livestock and poultry. Id. at 365. The plaintiff cared for her uncle for
“virtually” 10 years before he died. Id. During that time, the plaintiff’s uncle had told “numerous
people” that he was going to will her the farm. Id. The trial court awarded specific performance
of the agreement to make the will. Id. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed, stating that it
could “infer from the facts and conduct of the parties including the statements of the deceased to
other people, that the farm was to be given to plaintiff if she cared for decedent.” Id. at 365-66.
¶ 42 In this case, the record supports all of the elements for a valid oral contract to make a
will. The evidence established that in 2011, Anne had told the plaintiff, and numerous other
witnesses, that she would devise her home, its contents, and her vehicle to the plaintiff in
exchange for plaintiff’s care until her death. Specifically, both Karen and Bernice testified that
Anne had stated to them that the plaintiff had agreed to these terms. The evidence further
supported the circuit court’s conclusion that Anne’s need for care increased in the last years of
Anne’s life, and the plaintiff was required to sacrifice time with her children and husband in her
own home in order to assist Anne pursuant to the agreement. As further noted by the circuit
court, there was no evidence of consistent compensation to the plaintiff for caring for Anne. Cf.
Cain v. Hougham, 116 Ill. App. 2d 439, 445 (1969) (plaintiff claiming breach of agreement to
make will had been compensated daily). The terms of the agreement between the plaintiff and
Anne were sufficiently definite and certain to constitute a valid and enforceable oral contract to
make a will, and the facts cannot be reasonably harmonized with any other theory than the work
15 was done for the alleged promise. The evidence before the circuit court was clear, explicit, and
convincing in its probative force. Thus, the circuit court properly entered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, awarding her Anne’s home, its contents, and the remaining proceeds of Anne’s
vehicle on this basis, and we need not address the parties’ arguments with regard to plaintiff’s
quantum meruit claim.
¶ 43 CONCLUSION
¶ 44 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Gallatin County.
¶ 45 Affirmed.