2025 IL App (1st) 242200-U
SIXTH DIVISION August 15, 2025
No. 1-24-2200
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
In re ESTATE OF MARY L. RICHARDSON, ) Deceased, ) ) Appeal from the (SHAMEKA V. RICHARDSON, Independent ) Circuit Court of Administrator, ) Cook County ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) No. 2023 P 005681 ) v. ) The Honorable ) Kent A. Delgado, VAQUITA DAVIS and TARONNA DAVIS, ) Judge presiding. ) Respondents-Appellees.) )
PRESIDING JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hyman and Gamrath concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. The trial court properly granted respondents’ motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of laches.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Mary Richardson and her husband, Perry Richardson Sr., had 10 children together: Linda,
Larry, Denise, Donald, Michael, Perry Jr., Kenneth, Willard, Norman, and Jerrod. Perry Sr. passed
away, and Mary subsequently died intestate on March 23, 1996. Her son, Michael, passed away No. 1-24-2200
on February 21, 2023, and was survived by his daughters/respondents, Vaquita Davis and Taronna
Davis (Respondents).
¶4 On August 16, 2023, Linda filed a Petition for Letters of Administration, nominating her
daughter, Shameka Richardson, as the proposed independent administrator for Mary’s estate. On
September 18, 2023, the court appointed Shameka as independent administrator, and the Letters
of Office authorized her to take possession of Mary’s estate.
¶5 On October 11, 2023, Shameka filed a Petition for Issuance of Citation in Recovery and
for Other Relief, alleging that at the time of Mary’s death, Mary held an interest in the real property
located at 1956 S. Springfield Avenue in Chicago, and that “no deed or other transfer document
had been recorded transferring title to any other person, so at the time of her death the Real Estate
was in her name alone.” The Springfield Avenue property was Mary’s only purported probate
asset. When Linda “began to look into administering the [Springfield Avenue Property] on behalf
of [Mary’s] estate,” she “discovered that *** a Quit Claim Deed was recorded which purportedly
quit claimed [Mary’s] interest [in the Springfield Avenue Property] from herself to Michael.” The
deed, which was attached to the petition, shows that it was signed by Mary on June 1, 1995, and
recorded with the Cook County Clerk’s Office two years later on July 3, 1997, after Mary had
died.
¶6 The petition alleged a single count – lack of delivery – and claimed that because the quit
claim deed was not recorded during Mary’s lifetime, there was no presumption of valid delivery.
It also claimed that “[u]pon information and belief, during her lifetime, [Mary] made
representations to her friends and family that she was the sole owner of the Real Estate and she
never made any representations that she transferred her interest in the [Springfield Avenue
Property] to Michael.” It also alleged that Respondents had been “collecting rent at the [Springfield
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Avenue Property] which belongs to [Mary’s] estate.” Shameka asked the court to declare the quit
claim deed void and invalid due to inadequate delivery, to compel Respondents to sign documents
transferring their interest in the Springfield Avenue Property to Mary’s estate, and to prepare an
accounting of all rents received since Michael’s death.
¶7 On March 7, 2024, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Shameka’s petition. They
asserted that prior to Mary’s death, she executed a quit claim deed conveying her interest in the
Springfield Avenue Property to her son, Michael, and that Michael recorded this deed on July 3,
1997. Therefore, they argued that the property did not belong to Mary’s estate. Respondents
alternatively argued that Shameka’s petition should be dismissed under the doctrine of laches,
because she waited more than 27 years to probate Mary’s estate and to assert a claim for title to
the Springfield Avenue Property, at which point “the principal witness [Michael] who could testify
*** was no longer available to contradict [her].” Respondents argued that the recording of the deed
in 1997 provided constructive notice to Shameka that Mary’s estate no longer possessed the
property, and therefore she failed to act with due diligence by failing to bring suit until 27 years
after Mary’s death. Respondents also argued that they would suffer prejudice if Shameka was
allowed to proceed with her claim, because “the monetary investments and efforts made by
Michael and his heirs would unjustly enrich the other heirs of [Mary] to the detriment of the
rightful owner.” In their reply to Shameka’s response, Respondents attached their own affidavits,
in which they asserted that their father Michael “made numerous public declarations to various
family members that the Springfield Avenue Property was his own property,” that he “put in [a]
tremendous amount of work and expended significant funds in maintaining the Springfield
[Avenue] Property *** because it was his responsibility as the owner” and that he “paid the
property taxes, mortgage payments, [and] utility bills for the property.” They also attached an
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affidavit from Roseland Watt, who averred that she lived at the Springfield Avenue Property and
that Michael was the owner and her only landlord until he passed away.
¶8 Following a hearing on June 18, 2024, the court found that “the recording of the Quit Claim
Deed provided notice to the world that Michael Richardson had record title to the property” and
granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss based on the affirmative defense of laches. It stated that
Shameka had an opportunity to assert a claim against the Springfield Avenue Property between
July 3, 1997, and February 21, 2023, yet failed to do so. The court also found that it would
prejudice Respondents to allow the case to move forward more than 27 years after Mary’s death
since “6 of 10 of [Mary’s] heirs have died since 1997 and are unavailable to testify.” It also found
that “if the Citation to Recover were to be granted Citation Respondents would suffer harm in that
they would lose income and equity in the property and suffer other damages and would be
prejudiced by the death of the potential witnesses in the time since the recording of the Quitclaim
Deed.” In its order, the court expressly noted that the affidavits attached to Respondents’ reply
were “not - - being considered by the court because they were not filed with the Motion to Dismiss.”
¶9 Shameka filed a motion to reconsider, with attached affidavits from her mother Linda and
Linda’s sister Denise. In these affidavits, Linda and Denise claimed they had a witness, Ricky
Richardson, who could testify regarding the “forgery of the Quit Claim Deed.” Shameka argued
that the trial court erred when it granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of
laches because it “did not swear in or examine the petitioner [Shameka] or Respondent Davis
before making its findings.” Shameka also argued that “[a]lthough the period of time on which
laches is predicated normally begins to run either when the plaintiff learns of the facts on which
his rights are based or when a reasonable person would acquire such knowledge,” Michael owed
a “fiduciary duty” towards his sisters and his ”failure to disclose certain facts regarding the quit
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claim deed” and to inform them that their mother had transferred the property to him at an earlier
date excused their lack of diligence.
¶ 10 In their response to Shameka’s motion to reconsider, Respondents argued that Shameka
was “simply attempting to relitigate the motion to dismiss based on evidence that was available
and obtainable to her” at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. They argued that the affidavits
attached to the motion to reconsider should be stricken and any new arguments – including
Shameka’s arguments regarding a fiduciary duty – should not be considered.
¶ 11 On October 8, 2024, the court held a hearing on Shameka’s motion to reconsider. First, it
addressed Shameka’s allegation that the court had denied her an evidentiary hearing, stating that
was “just not true.” The court pointed out that it had repeatedly asked both parties if they wanted
an evidentiary hearing, and both said it was unnecessary and declined to present any witnesses.
Next, the court said it would not consider the affidavits filed by Shameka because they contained
no newly discovered evidence. Then, after reviewing its notes, the pleadings, and its order, the
court found it did not misapply the law and therefore denied Shameka’s motion to reconsider.
Shameka timely appealed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 A. Doctrine of Laches
¶ 14 Shameka argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed her petition under section 2-
619 of the Civil Practice Law based on the doctrine of laches.
¶ 15 We review de novo the trial court’s grant of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Tolbert v.
Godinez, 2020 IL App (4th) 180587, ¶ 18. A motion to dismiss under section 2-619 “admits the
legal sufficiency of the complaint, admits all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences
therefrom, and asserts an affirmative matter outside the complaint bars or defeats the cause of
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action.” Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 31. “One such
affirmative matter is the defense of laches.” Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518,
¶ 50.
¶ 16 “Laches is an equitable doctrine which precludes the assertion of a claim by a litigant
whose unreasonable delay in raising that claim has prejudiced the opposing party.” Tully v. State
of Illinois, 143 Ill. 2d 425, 432 (1991). The doctrine is “grounded in the equitable notion that courts
are reluctant to come to the aid of a party who has knowingly slept on his rights to the detriment
of the opposing party.” Id.; PNC Bank, National Association v. Kusmierz, 2022 IL 126606, ¶ 25
(quoting Pyle v. Ferrell, 12 Ill. 2d 547, 552 (1958)) (laches is “principally a question of the
inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced, an inequity founded upon some change in the
condition or relation of the property and parties, and where there is such a change as to make it
inequitable to grant relief, it will be refused”).
¶ 17 “The mere passage of time, however, is not enough for laches to apply.” Waide v.
Department of Natural Resources, 2013 IL App (5th) 120340, ¶ 20. To defeat a claim based on
the defense of laches, a defendant must first show a “lack of diligence by the party asserting the
claim, [which] encompasses the plaintiff's delay in bringing the action while having notice or
knowledge of defendant’s conduct and the opportunity to file suit.” Tillman v. Pritzker, 2021 IL
126387, ¶ 26. A respondent must also show he suffered prejudice as a result of the petitioner’s
delay in filing the action. Id. ¶ 28. “Whether laches bars a claim depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case” (Phoenix Capital, LLC v. Nsiah, 2022 IL App (1st) 220067, ¶ 22),
and “[t]he burden is on the defendant to establish laches by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Osler Institute, Inc. v. Miller, 2015 IL App (1st) 133899, ¶ 23.
6 No. 1-24-2200
¶ 18 It is undisputed that Shameka did not probate Mary’s estate or assert a claim for title to the
Springfield Avenue Property until more than 27 years after Mary’s death. She argues that she had
no reason to bring her claim sooner because she did not know that Mary had purportedly
transferred the Springfield Avenue Property to Michael until after his death in 2023. However, if
Shameka believed Mary owned the Springfield Avenue Property, it would have been reasonable
for her to investigate what happened to the property after Mary’s death, not wait 27 years to do so.
Moreover, “[t]he test is not what the appellant knows, but what he might have known by the use
of the means of information within his reach with the vigilance the law requires of him.” Pyle v.
Ferrell, 12 Ill. 2d at 554. Thus, even if Shameka lacked actual notice that Mary transferred the
Springfield Avenue Property to Michael by quit claim deed in 1995, she had constructive notice
of the transfer on July 3, 1997, the date that Michael recorded the deed with the Cook County
Clerk’s Office. See Almazan v. 7354 Corporation, 2023 IL App (1st) 220794, ¶ 25
(“Actual notice is the knowledge that the purchaser actually had at the time of the conveyance,
and constructive knowledge is knowledge that the law imputes to the purchaser.”) By recording
the deed, the conveyance became a public record, and Michael put the world, including Shameka,
on notice that he was the owner of the Springfield Avenue Property. See Tillman v. Pritzker, 2021
IL 126387, ¶ 27 (“It is well established that matters of public record constitute constructive notice
to a plaintiff for purposes of applying laches.”); Hachem v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 2015 IL App
(1st) 143188, ¶ 27 (“According to the theory of record notice, where an instrument of conveyance
*** is recorded in the appropriate public office, the public record provides constructive notice to
the whole world.”). See also Pyle v. Ferrell, 12 Ill. 2d at 554-55 (finding that although appellant
claimed to have no notice of matters adverse to his ownership, “public records served as
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constructive notice to him” and that absent his “negligence and indifference,” he would have
discovered the alleged deficiencies he complained of).
¶ 19 Shameka contends that Department of Natural Resources v. Waide, 2013 IL App (5th)
120340, supports her position that her delay in filing was not unreasonable. There, Edith Warren
became the sole owner of a property after her husband died. Id. ¶ 4. She held a 3/4 interest in the
oil and gas under the property because she and her husband had already sold the other 1/4 interest
to a realty company. Id. ¶ 18. In 1958, Edith executed an option contract with the Department of
Natural Resources to sell the property and the remaining 3/4 interest in the mineral rights. Id. The
Department timely exercised its option, but Edith died before the sale was completed. Id. The
warranty deed, which was executed in 1960, described the real estate as “the surface and 3/4 of all
oil, gas *** and other minerals *** except an undivided 1/4 of the oil and gas.” Id. ¶ 6.
Approximately 40 years later, an oil production and development company executed oil and gas
leases with Edith’s heirs, because it assumed them to be the owners of some of the mineral rights
on the property based on the language of the warranty deed. Id. ¶ 8. Edith’s heirs received royalty
payments relating to their alleged 1/4 interest in the property’s mineral rights from 2003-2007. Id.
¶ 11. In 2008, after learning that it was not receiving 100% of the mineral rights for the property
at issue, the Department brought suit against Edith’s heirs. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. The Department asserted
that the defendants had no entitlement to the mineral rights at issue, so it asked the court to reform
the deed to remove the phrase “except an undivided 1/4 of the oil and gas.” Id. ¶ 12. The defendants
moved to dismiss based on the doctrine of laches, arguing that the Department’s claim should be
barred because it waited 40-plus years to bring its reformation action. Id. ¶ 13. The trial court
rejected the laches defense and granted the Department’s request for reformation of the warranty
deed. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. On appeal, defendants argued that the trial court erred when it denied their
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laches defense, but this court disagreed. Id. ¶ 17. The court noted that defendants “presented no
evidence of any activity occurring between the execution of a warranty deed in December 1960
and December 2000 that would have put the Department on notice of defendants’ claims of
ownership of the disputed mineral interest” and reasoned that “[t]here was simply no reason for
the Department to believe it had to do anything to protect its interests in the property.” Id. ¶ 20.
The court also found no prejudice to defendants to justify the imposition of the laches defense
because defendants “were not the owners of the property interest and should not have received the
royalty payments in the first place. The loss of a benefit to which they were not entitled is not a
compelling circumstance warranting the imposition of laches.” Id. ¶ 22.
¶ 20 Waide is critically distinguishable, because the defendants there “presented no evidence
*** that would have put the Department on notice of [their] claim of ownership.” Id. ¶ 20. Here,
by contrast, the record reflects that Michael recorded the quit claim deed on July 3, 1997, which
provided Shameka with constructive notice of Michael’s claim of ownership of the Springfield
Avenue Property. Thus, her 27-year delay in challenging the validity of the deed was not
reasonable.
¶ 21 Shameka alternatively argues that “[a]lthough the period of time on which laches is
predicated normally begins to run either when plaintiff learns of the facts on which his rights are
based or when a reasonable person would acquire such knowledge,” a different rule applies here
because Michael owed a “fiduciary duty” to his sisters, and his failure to tell them that their mother
had conveyed the Springfield Avenue Property to him “excused” her failure to use diligence to
ascertain these facts. Shameka’s argument regarding Michael’s fiduciary duty to his sisters was
raised for the first time in her motion to reconsider, so we cannot consider it. See American
Chartered Bank v. USMDS, Inc., 2013 IL App (3d) 120397, ¶ 13 (“issues raised for the first time in
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a motion to reconsider cannot be raised on appeal”). Even if we were to consider it, Shameka's
argument would fail. She cites no authority for the proposition that a brother, who is neither an
executor nor a trustee, owes a fiduciary duty to his siblings during their mother’s lifetime or after
her death as beneficiaries of their mother’s estate. Further, none of the facts set forth
in Shameka’s briefs give rise to a fiduciary duty where Michael became owner of the property
during their mother’s lifetime and did not hold himself out to his siblings as managing the property
for their benefit.
¶ 22 Michael recorded the deed to the Springfield Avenue Property in 1997, and this provided
Shameka with constructive notice of the conveyance. Because she did not bring suit until 26 years
later, we find that she was not diligent in bringing her claim.
¶ 23 Now, we turn to the question of prejudice. Shameka argues that Respondents failed to
establish that they suffered any prejudice because they failed to attach any supporting affidavits to
their motion to dismiss, and the affidavits attached to their reply could not be considered.
Respondents argued in response that they were prejudiced by Shameka’s delay, because “the
principal witness who could testify against their concoction was no longer available to contradict
them.”
¶ 24 Although the trial court expressly stated that the affidavits submitted by Respondents “were
not being considered by the court because they were not filed with the Motion to Dismiss,”
Shameka claims “it was impossible for the court to unsee the affidavits after reading them.” In
their affidavits, Respondents averred that their father Michael “expended significant funds in
maintaining the Springfield [Avenue] Property” and “paid the property taxes, mortgage payments,
[and] utilities bills.”
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¶ 25 “A party suffers prejudice in the context of laches where he or she ‘incurs risk, enters into
obligations, or makes expenditures for improvements or taxes’ while the other party remains
passive.” PNC Bank, National Association v. Kusmierz, 2022 IL 126606, ¶ 33 (quoting Pyle, 12
Il. 2d at 555). However, a party may also suffer prejudice if critical witnesses are no longer
available to testify. See, e.g., Pyle, 12 Ill. 2d at 555 (finding that when the appellant waited 15
years to assert himself against a tax title and the grantee of the tax deed died before the cause could
be heard, “important evidence on the issue of possession under the tax deed was lost,” which
pointed to “the inequity of granting relief”); James v. Frantz, 21 Ill. 2d 377, 382 (1961) (finding
that the combination of appellant’s delay in bringing suit and the death of critical witnesses barred
the action based on the doctrine of laches, reasoning that “[i]f the present attack were permitted,”
it would “seriously prejudice the appellee in defending against appellant’s claim”).
¶ 26 Here, the trial court found that if the citation to recover were to be granted, Respondents
“would suffer harm in that they would lose income and equity in the property.” It also found that
it would prejudice Respondents to allow Shameka’s case to move forward more than 27 years after
Mary’s death because “6 of 10 of [Mary’s] heirs have died since 1997 and are unavailable to
testify.” We agree with the latter point. Michael’s testimony would have been critical to
Respondents’ ability to defend against Shameka’s claims, because he was the one who received
the deed from his mother and recorded it, and there is no dispute that he managed the property
after Mary’s death in 1996. We find that Respondents would be seriously prejudiced if they were
required to defend against Shameka’s claim without testimony from their father Michael.
¶ 27 Because Shameka failed to exercise diligence in brining suit against Respondents and the
Respondents would suffer prejudice if the suit were allowed to go forward, we find that the trial
court properly granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss based on laches.
11 No. 1-24-2200
¶ 28 B. Evidentiary Hearing
¶ 29 Shameka also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to hold an
evidentiary hearing before reaching a decision. However, at the October 8, 2024, hearing on
Shameka’s motion to reconsider, after noting that Shameka claimed in her written pleadings that
the court had “prevented an evidentiary hearing,” the court said, “that’s just not true.” It went on:
On May 13th, after I had received pleadings on the motion to dismiss, I asked Mr. Garcia
and Mr. Novak, who represented [Shameka] at the time, were we going to set this for an
evidentiary hearing, and I was told by both parties that they did not believe that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary; that it was an issue of law for me to decide.”
The court noted that on the day of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it again asked counsel for
both parties if they had “any witnesses or evidence” they wanted to present, and they declined.
Counsel for Respondents “agree[d]” with the court’s recall of these hearings and said the court
“did nothing to prevent either party from presenting witnesses.” He noted that the witnesses were
there and “could have testified themselves, and they chose not to.”
¶ 30 In her appellate brief, Shameka argues that the trial court “incorrectly remembered whether
the court inquired about an evidentiary hearing.” She attached affidavits from her mother Linda
and her aunt Denise for support, but because these affidavits are not part of the record, we cannot
consider them. See Kilpatrick v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation, 2023 IL App (2d) 230088, ¶ 11
(“An appellate court may not consider documents that are not part of the certified record on appeal,
and attachments to appellate briefs that are not contained in the certified record on appeal cannot
be used to supplement the record and are not properly before a reviewing court. References to
evidence outside the record are not permitted and should be stricken.”) (Internal citations omitted.)
Shameka failed to include transcripts or bystander’s reports from the hearings where an evidentiary
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hearing was discussed or to point to anything else in the record to support her argument. Because
“an appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to
support a claim of error” and “[a]ny doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record
will be resolved against the appellant” (Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984)), we
presume that the trial court’s recollection is supported by the record.
¶ 31 Nothing in the record supports Shameka’s claim. Therefore, we find that she waived any
issue regarding an evidentiary hearing and decline to consider it. Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d
208, 229 (2007) (quoting Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnatti Insurance Co, 213 Ill. 2d 307, 326
(2004) (“[w]aiver arises from an affirmative act, is consensual, and consists of an intentional
relinquishment of a known right.”).
¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
¶ 34 Affirmed.