2026 IL App (2d) 250530-U No. 2-25-0530 Order filed July 29, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
In re ESTATE OF MEGAN ANN SCHLAISS, Deceased
(Petitioner-Appellee, Debra Schlaiss, v. Nathan Nicholas, Contemnor-Appellant).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Honorable Joseph M. Grady, Judge, Presiding. No. 21-P-657
JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly found decedent’s fiancé in contempt of court for failing to turn over the decedent’s cremains and personal items to the estate. However, the court’s sanction was not a proper civil contempt sanction because it was not directed at enforcing compliance with the trial court’s prior orders but was intended to compensate the estate for the personal items.
¶2 Contemnor, Nathan Nicholas, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Kane County
finding him in indirect civil contempt and imposing sanctions for failing to comply with the trial
court’s order directing him to turn over certain property to the estate of his deceased fiancée,
Megan Ann Schlaiss. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On October 15, 2021, Debra Schlaiss, Megan’s mother, filed a petition for letters of
administration for Megan’s estate. Megan died on September 16, 2021. According to the affidavit of heirship, Megan was never married and had three surviving minor children: A.B., J.S., and Q.N.
On October 28, 2021, the trial court issued letters of office appointing Debra as independent
administrator.
¶5 On June 6, 2023, Nathan, as personal representative of Q.N., filed a “Petition to Terminate
Independent Administration, for Accounting, and for Inventory.” When Megan died, she and
Nathan were engaged and living together.
¶6 On November 20, 2023, Megan filed an inventory (the inventory), which the trial court
later accepted and approved. According to the inventory, “[t]he approximate value of [Megan’s]
personal estate as of date of death was $5,009.20.” The inventory listed the following personal
property:
“1. Chase Bank checking account ending in [*******] titled in the name of Megan
Schlaiss, with date of death value of: $3,339.47[;]
2. 2021 1 Ford Escape Limited 4D Sport Utility; VIN No. *****************;
location under investigation[;]
3. 2009 Mitsubishi Sports Utility Vehicle; location under investigation[;]
4. Goods and Chattels, located at ***, Elburn, Illinois at date of death[;]
5. Contents of Storage Unit, location under investigation[;]
6. Final paycheck and employee benefits from Logicoll, LLC, amount under
investigation.”
1 The record reflects that the Ford vehicle was a 2012 model. To the extent Debra’s filings
occasionally refer to a 2021 model, those references appear to be inadvertent.
-2- In addition to the personal property, the inventory listed a cause of action: “Debra Schlaiss,
Administrator of Megan Ann Schlaiss v. Northwestern Medicine Aco, LLC, Et. Al., 2023 LA 971,
pending.”
¶7 On December 8, 2023, Nathan’s petition to terminate independent administration was
withdrawn. On December 27, 2023, Nathan’s counsel was granted leave to withdraw.
¶8 On January 29, 2024, Debra’s counsel sent to Nathan, via e-mail and regular mail, a letter
seeking the return of Megan’s possessions. In addition to the two vehicles and the final paycheck
listed in the inventory, the letter sought return of the following additional items: (1) keys to a
storage unit in Megan’s name, (2) Megan’s cremains, (3) Megan’s brother’s cremains, (4) Megan’s
handgun, (5) Megan’s personal files, (6) vintage ceramic tea set, (7) Princess Diana doll,
(8) freestanding room divider/picture frame, (9) two printers, (10) desk with file cabinets and its
contents, (11) silverware set, (12) radio/record/CD player, (13) cell phone, and (14) television.
¶9 On January 31, 2024, the trial court entered an order indicating that the parties had appeared
for status that day. Nathan advised the court that he did not intend to hire counsel. The court
directed Nathan to cooperate with Debra as independent administrator. (The record does not
contain a report of this proceeding.)
¶ 10 On March 7, 2024, the parties appeared again for status. (The record does not contain a
report of this proceeding.) The trial court’s order noted that the parties were present and that the
court was “fully advised in the premises that Nathan *** has stated that he does not intend to retain
counsel.” The order directed Nathan “to turn over estate assets and/or materials to which he has
no authority.” The order listed all items from the inventory and now also included Megan’s
“cremains.” It specifically identified (not in this particular order): (1) Megan’s cremains; (2) a
Chase bank account; (3) Megan’s “[f]inal paycheck and employee benefits”; (4) a “2021 Ford
-3- Escape Limited 4D Sport Utility, VIN *****************”; (5) a “2009 Mitsubishi Sports Utility
Vehicle”; (6) “[g]oods and [c]hattel” previously located at Nathan’s and Megan’s Elburn address;
and (7) the “[c]ontents of [a] [s]torage [u]nit.” The order provided further: “Should Nathan ***
fail to cooperate, a Rule to Show Cause shall issue.” The matter was continued to April 10, 2024,
for status on Nathan’s compliance.
¶ 11 On April 11, 2024, Debra’s counsel appeared. (The record does not contain a report of this
proceeding.) According to the trial court’s written order, the court was advised that Nathan had
not turned over the items as directed. The matter was continued to May 2, 2024, “for Status and
Petition for Rule to Show Cause.”
¶ 12 On April 26, 2024, Debra filed “Petition for Leave to Issue Rule to Show Cause.” Debra
alleged that, “[o]n March 7, 2024, this [c]ourt entered an order directing [Nathan] to turn over
estate assets and/or materials to which he has no authority.” Debra further alleged that, “[t]o date,
[Nathan] has failed and refused to turn over any of the assets identified in Megan’s estate
[i]nventory.” Debra attached to the petition: (1) the inventory; (2) the January 29, 2024,
correspondence; (3) the January 31, 2024, order directing Nathan to cooperate with Debra as
independent administrator; and (4) the March 7, 2024, order directing Nathan to turn over Megan’s
cremains and possessions.
¶ 13 On May 2, 2024, the parties appeared for status on the petition for rule to show cause. (The
record does not contain a report of this proceeding.) According to the written order, the trial court,
“being fully advised in the premises,” found as follows: “Based upon the allegations in the Petition
for Rule to Show Cause and his admission that he has not turned in the subject items, Nathan ***
has violated the March 7, 2024[,] [c]ourt [o]rder.” The court ordered that “[r]ule to [s]how [c]ause
shall issue against Nathan ***, requiring him to appear in court and show cause, if any, why he
-4- should not be held in indirect civil contempt of court.” Nathan accepted service of the rule in open
court. The court granted Nathan time to file a response and Debra time to file a reply. The matter
was set for hearing on July 8, 2024, and later continued to September 10, 2024. (No response or
reply was filed.)
¶ 14 On September 4, 2024, Debra filed a motion asking the trial court to order the release of
unredacted full title searches for the Ford vehicle referenced in the inventory.
¶ 15 On September 10, 2024, the parties appeared for a hearing on the petition. (The record
does not contain a report of this proceeding.) Based on Nathan’s conduct at the hearing, the trial
court entered an order adjudicating Nathan to be in direct criminal contempt and sentencing him
to 180 days in the Kane County jail (September 10, 2024, to March 9, 2025). According to the
written order, during the hearing, Nathan “shouted profanities at the judge repeatedly, at the
security officers who responded, and at the parents of [Megan] in the courtroom, and resisted the
efforts of the security officers to remove [him] from the courtroom.”
¶ 16 That same day, the trial court entered a second order finding Nathan in contempt for
violating the March 7, 2024, order. The boxes next to “Judgment to enter” and “Upon trial or
hearing” were marked with an X. The following was handwritten at the bottom:
“(1) [Nathan] is found in contempt of court for willfully violating the 3/7/2024
court order and failing to provide reasonable justification &/or credible justification for
non-compliance.
(2) He is ordered to return said items &/or their reasonable value within 7 days after
release from detention per separate contempt order or 187 days, whichever sooner.”
The order also indicated that the petition for rule to show cause was continued to March 25, 2025.
-5- ¶ 17 On September 11, 2024, the trial court entered an order authorizing the release of
unredacted full title searches for the Ford and Mitsubishi vehicles referenced in the inventory.
¶ 18 The matter was later continued to April 2, 2025. On April 1, 2025, new counsel entered an
appearance for Nathan, and the matter was continued to July 17, 2025. Nathan was given time to
file a response to Debra’s petition, and Debra was given time to file a reply.
¶ 19 On May 14, 2025, Nathan answered the petition. Nathan asserted, among other things, that
Megan’s cremains were already in Debra’s possession, the Ford and Mitsubishi belonged to him,
Debra told him to withdraw the money from the Chase account, Debra already received Megan’s
employee benefits, and he did not know where some of Megan’s personal property was located.
He argued further that he could not comply with the court order, given his lack of knowledge as to
the whereabouts of Megan’s possessions.
¶ 20 On September 11, 2025, the trial court ordered that “[b]y agreement of the parties, the
hearing on the Petition for Rule to Show Cause is entered and continued for hearing to October
23, 2025.”
¶ 21 The hearing on Debra’s petition ultimately took place on October 23, 2025. The trial court
heard testimony from Nathan, Debra, and Jessica Leffew. Nathan testified that he last possessed
Megan’s cremains on “Christmas of ’21.” According to Nathan, he gave them to Debra. He also
testified that he brought Megan’s brother’s cremains to his “former lawyer’s office a couple years
ago.” Nathan had “no idea” where Megan’s handgun was. He knew that she had purchased a
handgun, but he “ha[d] no idea where she put it or what she did with it.” Nathan agreed that he
and Megan were living together when she died. He did not know the current location of the
personal items Megan owned when she died. He testified that when he moved out of the home
where he lived with Megan, he left “a lot of stuff” behind. He explained that he had to move out
-6- quickly because he was “breaking the lease” and did not want to be fined by his landlord. He did
not let anyone know about Megan’s possessions because he had no reason to believe that anybody
wanted them. Nathan was asked specifically about a “silverware set *** that belonged to Megan’s
grandmother” and a “vintage china [sic] ceramic tea set.” Nathan said he did not know the
whereabouts of either item.
¶ 22 Nathan testified that he and Megan had rented a storage unit in Elburn, but he did not know
whose name it was under. According to Nathan, everything was removed from the storage unit
“[t]wo or three years ago.” Upon further questioning, Nathan stated that he packed up what was
his and left behind what he did not want. Nathan asked Debra several times if she wanted anything
from the storage unit, but she always “had some reason as to why she could not make it.” Nathan
was asked, “And when did you go out and empty it?” He replied that he did not know the exact
date.
¶ 23 Nathan testified that Megan had owned two cars, one of which was a Ford Escape.
According to Nathan, before she died, Megan executed a bill of sale of both vehicles to Nathan.
Nathan claimed that the transfer was done to avoid the requirement that the vehicles “pass
emissions” because “[i]t was too much money to put them in the car to get it to just pass emissions.”
He stated that, “in Elburn, you don’t need to pass emissions.” Because Nathan’s driver’s license
showed the Elburn address where he and Megan lived, Megan transferred title of both vehicles to
Nathan. At that time, Megan had not yet changed her driver’s license to reflect the Elburn address;
according to Nathan, she did not want to get a new license until after her baby was born and she
lost her “baby weight.” Nathan later registered the vehicles in his name. Subsequently, he sold
one of the vehicles—the Mitsubishi—to his aunt for about $1,200; she paid in cash.
-7- ¶ 24 Nathan did not recall ever having Megan’s birth certificate, Social Security card, or other
personal documents. Nathan testified that he cashed Megan’s final paycheck from Logicoll, LLC,
at Debra’s direction to use it to take care of Megan’s children. He also cashed out Megan’s Chase
bank account at Debra’s direction. He had no receipts for any of the money that he spent. He did
not have any of Megan’s clothing or furniture. He did not have any of Megan’s jewelry other than
the engagement ring that he had given her.
¶ 25 On cross-examination, Nathan testified that no one ever told him what to do with Megan’s
property after she died. He stated that it was not until two years after Megan died that he first
received a letter (presumably the January 29, 2024, letter) from Megan’s attorney asking for
Megan’s possessions. He could not confirm whether he was still living at the Elburn address at
that time or whether he received the letter via e-mail or regular mail.
¶ 26 Leffew testified that Megan had been her best friend. After Megan died, Leffew visited
Nathan at his house to check on him and Megan’s two older boys. On another occasion, on
September 7, 2022, Leffew went to the house to retrieve some of Megan’s cremains so that she
could release them into the ocean on the first anniversary of Megan’s death. While at Nathan’s
home, Leffew saw an urn containing Megan’s cremains and took a picture of it. A screenshot of
the photograph was admitted into evidence. The photograph depicts an urn engraved with: “In
Loving Memory of Megan Ann Schlaiss 1987-2021.” The timestamp on the photograph was
September 7, 2022, at 7:37 p.m. Leffew was given a portion of Megan’s remains on that date. She
did not see the urn again after that day.
¶ 27 Debra testified that she never told Nathan to cash Megan’s final paycheck or to remove
money from Megan’s Chase bank account. Debra testified that her son, Daniel Schlaiss, sold his
car—a Ford Escape—to Megan. Debra was shown two certificates of title for the Ford Escape:
-8- one assigned title from Daniel to Megan, and the other assigned title from Megan to Nathan. Both
bore a signature attributed to Megan. However, according to Debra, only the signature on the
assignment of title from Daniel to Megan looked like Megan’s signature. Debra testified that she
was able to identify Megan’s signature due to the “specific” way Megan wrote certain letters.
¶ 28 Debra testified that she never received the keys to Megan’s storage unit. She never went
to the storage unit because she did not have the keys. When she called to inquire whether there
were any outstanding bills for the storage unit, she was told no. Debra never received any of the
requested items from Nathan, including the Mitsubishi. Nathan never gave her Megan’s cremains.
¶ 29 On cross-examination, Debra testified that Nathan never reached out to have her retrieve
Megan’s items from the storage unit. Debra bought Megan a desk in 2019 for $75 when Megan
lived in Aurora. Megan moved out of her Aurora apartment in April 2021 and moved in with
Nathan. Debra lived with Megan from 2019 until April 2021. Debra visited Megan in Elburn
“every few months” and talked to her every day. Megan did not recall being asked at the funeral
home whether she wanted Megan’s cremains split into three urns, but she knew that the cremains
were placed in one urn.
¶ 30 On redirect examination, Debra testified that she visited the Elburn house after Megan died.
She recalled seeing Megan’s cremains along with her dresser and various personal items. She did
not see any family photographs.
¶ 31 Nathan was recalled to testify. Nathan testified that, while at the funeral home, he had
asked about placing Megan’s cremains into three urns so that he, Daniel, and Debra could each
have an urn. According to Nathan, Debra wanted the cremains put into one urn and said that he
could have them. Nathan testified that Megan signed over the titles to the vehicles before giving
birth and that he put the vehicles in his name after she had died.
-9- ¶ 32 After the parties’ closing arguments, the following colloquy took place:
“THE COURT: ***
I have a fairly good recollection of this entire case. And it seems like, when Megan
died, no one was ready for it or probably could be ready for it. And I’m sure it was very
upsetting to [Nathan] and, obviously, to Megan’s family—rest of Megan’s family.
However, as we’ve gone through the history of this case, [Nathan] was the last
person to have access to the house or apartment, was the last person in the family to have
access to the storage unit or certainly after Miss Megan had died, and, basically, at a
minimum, left everything in either the apartment or the house or in the storage unit. Walked
away from it. There are certain obligations you have to basically to preserve the property
of Megan. If the roles were reversed, she would have had a duty to protect this property.
And as far as the ashes go, we’ve heard various accounts of that through the history
of the case. And now we have evidence.
Anyway, I’m finding [Nathan] in contempt for the—Ms. Reed, you mentioned three
things, failure to obey the orders. What else was there?
ATTORNEY REED [(DEBRA’S COUNSEL)]: For failure to obey the—I believe
there was two different orders, one for him to return the items, and then there was a different
order finding that he was in violation of that order and indicating that items should be
returned within seven days upon his release.
THE COURT: All right. I will find—make those findings.
As far as penalty, Ms. Reed, any suggestion?
One, he’s got to return the engagement ring, wedding ring, whatever it is, within 10
days. And, Ms. Reed, it can be at your office, or it can be at Ms. Becker’s office.
- 10 - ATTORNEY REED: Okay.
THE COURT: Any other suggestions?
ATTORNEY REED: Judge, I am really stuck here. I understand he’s claiming up
and down he doesn’t have the ashes. I would still like in the order that he has to return the
ashes within 10 days. Figure out where they are, bring them out of nowhere, I don’t know.
If he doesn’t, then my client can take that to wherever they need to to follow up
with that.
THE COURT: Okay.
ATTORNEY REED: It’s hard to put a monetary value on that.
THE COURT: I agree. I agree. Okay.
ATTORNEY BECKER [(NATHAN’S COUNSEL)]: Your Honor, I would suggest,
the problem is, is that my client said he handed them to [Debra].
So it’s his testimony that he gave them at the hospital. He couldn’t possibly have
them anymore if he gave them to her.
You know, she says she doesn’t have them, but how do we really know she doesn’t
have them. It’s he said, she said. It’s not like he’s keeping them, because—you know, I
mean—
THE COURT: Ms. Becker, his testimony has changed through the history of this
case from court appearance to court appearance. And, apparently, there was some—
some—there were some proceedings outside of court in the form of possibly deposition or
something where, apparently, there’s different testimony.
Ms. Reed, my thought is I fine him $50,000.
If he returns the ashes, we cut it to $20,000. Okay?
- 11 - ATTORNEY BECKER: Wait a minute. So how much is he—
THE COURT: $50,000.
ATTORNEY BECKER: He doesn’t have to [sic] kind of money, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Make payments. But he gets the ashes back, it goes down to 20. It
may even go lower if he brings—gets the ashes back.
As far as the wedding ring, 10 days.
ATTORNEY REED: Okay. Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: As far as the rest of the furniture, I think that amount of money will
cover the value of the rest of the furniture or possessions.
ATTORNEY BECKER: Your Honor, could—if I could.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
ATTORNEY BECKER: If I could interject here.
THE COURT: Just so you know—
ATTORNEY BECKER: It’s going to be difficult to find the ashes if he doesn’t
know where they are. He doesn’t have them.
However, the girl, her friend, has 25 percent of the ashes left, she said.
THE COURT: 25—
ATTORNEY BECKER: So maybe we could ask her to return some of them.
THE WITNESS: 25 percent of what she got?
JESSICA LEFFEW: I have them with me.
ATTORNEY REED: As an officer of the court, I did speak to her. She actually
gave them back to the family. They put them in the nice urn and said: ‘These are yours,
we would like our portion that is ours.’
- 12 - So I don’t think that that’s a fair assessment. She was given a small portion of the
ashes.
And, again, we’re done arguing here. But we can’t acknowledge that we gave ashes
to someone, and we still don’t have them.
THE COURT: It’s a common courtesy after your fiancée dies, I would think it
should be, to contact the decedent’s family and say: ‘What do you want? Where do I deliver
them? Where do you want to pick them up?’
That’s common human courtesy, and that’s why I’m making this finding. All right.
ATTORNEY REED: Thank you, Judge. I’ll draft the order.”
¶ 33 The trial court’s written order provided, in relevant part:
“1. [Nathan] is held in contempt of court for violating the March 7, 2024[,] order
as well ass [sic] the September 10, 2024[,] order;
2. [Nathan] must return Megan[’s] *** engagement right within 10 days ***; and
3. [Nathan] to pay $50,000.00 to Megan[’s] *** estate or, if Megan[’s] *** ashes
are returned, $20,000.00 to the Estate.”
¶ 34 Nathan timely appealed.
¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 36 Nathan contends that the trial court erred in holding him in indirect civil contempt. Nathan
asserts that there are “two problems” with the trial court’s contempt order: (1) “contempt requires
the non-compliance to be willful” and (2) “the remedy must be ameliorative rather than punitive.”
We treat his first assertion as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and his second assertion
as a challenge to the propriety of the monetary sanction.
¶ 37 We begin by setting forth the applicable legal principles:
- 13 - “Contempt may be either civil or criminal and either direct or indirect, with varying
due process requirements depending on the classification. [Citation.] Whether contempt
is civil or criminal turns on the purpose of the contempt charge. [Citation.] Criminal
contempt is used to punish past contumacious conduct, including ‘an act committed against
the majesty of the law in disrespect of the court or its process’ [citation], whereas civil
contempt is used as a means to compel compliance with a court order, usually ‘for the
benefit or advantage of another party to the proceeding’ [citation]. [Citation.] ‘Civil
contempt proceedings have two fundamental attributes: (1) [t]he contemnor must be
capable of taking the action sought to be coerced, and (2) no further contempt sanctions
are imposed upon the contemnor’s compliance with the pertinent court order.’ [Citation.]
Contempt, whether civil or criminal, may be direct or indirect. The distinction
between direct and indirect contempt largely depends on where the contumacious conduct
took place. [Citation.] Direct contempt occurs in the judge’s presence or in an ‘integral or
constituent part of the court.’ [Citation.] All other contempt is indirect and includes all
contempt that does not occur in such proximity to a court; it ‘must be established by the
presentation of evidence.’ [Citation.] A finding of indirect civil contempt relies on the
existence of a court order and willful disobedience of that court order.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) People v. Weinstein, 2024 IL App (2d) 230062, ¶¶ 105-06.
Thus, “a party may be held in civil contempt for willfully failing to comply with a court order.”
In re Marriage of Harnack, 2022 IL App (1st) 210143, ¶ 46.
¶ 38 Alleged contemnors are guaranteed certain due process protections in proceedings for
indirect contempt. People ex rel. Williams v. Williams, 156 Ill. App. 3d 438, 442 (1987). With
regard to indirect civil contempt, the alleged contemnor is entitled to minimal due process. In re
- 14 - Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 52-53 (1990). The alleged contemnor must be informed of
the charges against him or her “ ‘by information, notice, citation, or rule to show cause,’ ” allowed
to file an answer, and accorded a fair hearing. Williams, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 442 (quoting People v.
Javaras, 51 Ill. 2d 296, 300 (1972)); see also Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 52-53 (noting that in civil
contempt, the contemnor is entitled to minimal due process, consisting of notice and an opportunity
to be heard).
¶ 39 “A petition for a rule to show cause is the method by which a party seeks enforcement of a
court order, by bringing to the court’s attention the opposing party’s alleged violation of that order.”
Weinstein, 2024 IL App (2d) 230062, ¶ 104. “The rule to show cause is the method by which the
court brings the parties before it for a hearing; it is not itself a contempt finding.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 108.
“Initially, the burden falls on the petitioner in a rule to show cause to establish, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged contemnor violated a court order and,
therefore, should be held in contempt. [Citation.] ‘Noncompliance with a court order is
prima facie evidence of contempt.’ [Citation.] Once that burden is satisfied, the burden
shifts to the contemnor, who has the burden of showing that the violation was not willful
and contumacious and that he or she had a valid excuse for failing to follow the order.
[Citation.] ‘Contumacious conduct consists of conduct calculated to embarrass, hinder, or
obstruct a court in its administration of justice or lessening the authority and dignity of the
court.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ***.” In re J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083,
¶ 72.
“An alleged contemnor’s inability to comply with an order is a defense to contempt, but that
defense is unavailable where the contemnor has voluntarily created the inability to comply.”
- 15 - Harnack, 2022 IL App (1st) 210143, ¶ 52. “ ‘Whether a party is guilty of contempt is a question
of fact for the trial court, and a reviewing court should not disturb the trial court’s determination
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence or the record reflects an abuse of
discretion.’ ” In re Marriage of Spangler, 2025 IL App (2d) 240303, ¶ 26 (quoting In re Marriage
of McCormick, 2013 IL App (2d) 120100, ¶ 17).
¶ 40 We first consider whether the trial court’s finding that Nathan was in contempt was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. On March 7, 2024, the trial court ordered Nathan to turn over
to Debra “estate assets and/or materials to which he has no authority.” As noted, the order
specifically identified (1) Megan’s cremains, (2) a Chase bank account, (3) Megan’s final
paycheck, (4) a Ford vehicle, (5) a Mitsubishi vehicle, (6) “[g]oods and [c]hattel” previously
located at Nathan and Megan’s Elburn address, and (7) the “[c]ontents of [a] [s]torage [u]nit.” At
the contempt hearing, Debra testified that Nathan had not given her Megan’s cremains or any of
Megan’s possessions. Thus, she established a prima facie case for indirect contempt of court,
which shifted to Nathan the burden to establish that his noncompliance was not willful or
contumacious but based on a valid excuse. See J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083, ¶ 72.
¶ 41 Nathan testified that he did not have Megan’s cremains. He claimed that he last had them
on “Christmas of ‘21” and that he had given them to Debra. However, this testimony was
contradicted by Debra. It was also contradicted by Leffew, who testified that she was at Nathan’s
house on September 7, 2022—after the time Nathan claimed to have given Megan’s cremains to
Debra—and that Nathan had given her some of Megan’s cremains. Leffew’s testimony was
supported by a photograph of the urn containing Megan’s cremains, bearing a timestamp of
September 7, 2022, at 7:37 p.m.
- 16 - ¶ 42 Nathan also testified that he did not have any of Megan’s possessions. He claimed that
Debra told him to withdraw the funds in Megan’s bank account and to cash her final paycheck. As
for Megan’s vehicles, he claimed that Megan had transferred title of both vehicles to him shortly
before she died and that he later sold the Mitsubishi to his aunt. He further claimed that no one
told him what to do with Megan’s possessions after she died. He stated that he left some items
behind at the Elburn residence when he moved and that he left some items in their shared storage
unit. We note that Debra’s testimony contradicted Nathan’s testimony regarding the bank account
and final paycheck. She also testified that the signature on the title assignment for the Ford was
not Megan’s.
¶ 43 In finding defendant in contempt, the trial court stated: “[A]s far as the ashes go, we’ve
heard various accounts of that through the history of the case. And now we have evidence.” When
Nathan’s counsel argued that “[i]t’s he said, she said,” the court noted that “[Nathan’s] testimony
has changed through the history of this case from court appearance to court appearance.” Clearly,
the court found incredible Nathan’s testimony that he had given Megan’s cremains to Debra and
no longer had them. See People v. Johnson, 2017 IL App (1st) 162876, ¶ 17 (noting that the trial
court, in civil contempt proceedings, is in a superior position to ascertain witness credibility).
Given Leffew’s testimony that she saw Megan’s cremains in Nathan’s possession after the time he
claimed he had given them to Debra, we cannot say that this determination is so unreasonable,
improbable, or unsatisfactory as to require a different conclusion. See People v. City of East St.
Louis, 206 Ill. App. 3d 626, 639 (1990) (“Where an evaluation of credibility or the weight of the
evidence was made by the circuit court, a court of review cannot substitute its judgment for that
of the trier of fact unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as clearly
- 17 - to require a different conclusion.”). Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s finding that Nathan
was in contempt of court for failing to comply with its order to turn over Megan’s cremains.
¶ 44 Regarding Megan’s possessions, Nathan maintains that the trial court expressly found that
Nathan no longer had Megan’s possessions. We disagree with this assertion. When discussing the
possessions, the court stated that Nathan, “at a minimum, left everything in either the apartment
or the house or in the storage unit. Walked away from it.” By stating that, “at a minimum,” Nathan
walked away from Megan’s possessions, the court identified only the minimum factual finding
that it believed could be drawn from Nathan’s testimony. The statement did not foreclose the
possibility that the court also believed that Nathan continued to retain Megan’s possessions.
Further, in making this statement, the court seemed to be addressing only the personal items left
in the Elburn residence and storage unit; it did not comment specifically on the bank account, final
paycheck, or the two vehicles allegedly transferred to Nathan. In any event, the court found Nathan
in contempt for failing to comply with its order to return all listed items. As noted, Debra testified
that she did not tell Nathan to remove money from Megan’s account or cash her final paycheck.
She testified further that the signature on the Ford’s title assignment was not Megan’s. Given
Debra’s testimony, we cannot say that the court’s contempt finding against Nathan was so
unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to require a different conclusion. Accordingly, we
find no error in the court’s finding that Nathan was in contempt of court for failing to comply with
its order to turn over Megan’s possessions.
¶ 45 We turn now to the propriety of the trial court’s sanction. We note first that the contempt
order did not direct Nathan to turn over any of Megan’s possessions. It provided only that Nathan
must “pay $50,000.00 to Megan[’s] *** estate or, if Megan[’s] *** ashes are returned, $20,000.00
to the Estate.” (Emphasis added.) In determining the amount of the sanction, the court stated:
- 18 - “[M]y thought is I fine him $50,000. If he returns the ashes, we cut it to $20,000.” The court later
added: “It may even go lower if he brings—gets the ashes back.” This was error.
¶ 46 Civil contempt is intended to coerce future conduct rather than punish past conduct. Felzak
v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 391 (2007); see also In re Marriage of Blankshain, 346 Ill. App. 3d 750,
752 (2004) (“A civil contempt proceeding seeks to coerce the contemnor to comply with a court
order, and unlike a criminal contempt proceeding, its goal is not punishment.”). Therefore, a valid
purge condition must be a part of an indirect civil contempt order. Felzak, 226 Ill. 2d at 391. “A
contemnor must be able to purge the civil contempt by doing that which the court has ordered him
to do.” Id.; see In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 289 (1984) (“the civil contemnor must
be provided with the ‘keys to his cell’ ”).
¶ 47 Here, the trial court’s order can be reasonably construed as an attempt to coerce Nathan
into complying with its prior orders to return Megan’s cremains. If Nathan returned Megan’s
cremains, the sanction would drop from $50,000 to $20,000. However, Nathan had no way to
purge the civil contempt finding. As noted, a fundamental attribute of civil contempt proceedings
is that “ ‘no further contempt sanctions are imposed upon the contemnor’s compliance with the
pertinent court order.’ ” Weinstein, 2024 IL App (2d) 230062, ¶ 105 (quoting Betts, 200 Ill. App.
3d at 44). Under the order, even if Nathan complied by returning Megan’s cremains, the $20,000
“fine” would remain. Because the sanction was designed not to compel Nathan’s future conduct
but to address his past conduct, it was like a criminal contempt sanction. See Helm v. Thomas, 362
Ill. App. 3d 331, 333-34 (2005) (monetary sanctions issued after mistrial due to discovery violation
were not “impose[d] *** to compel a future act, but to punish [the plaintiffs and their trial counsel]
for prior conduct that they could not undo”); In re Marriage of Carpel, 232 Ill. App. 3d 806, 815,
823 (1992) ($1,000 sanction issued following visitation violations was imposed for “what [the
- 19 - respondent] had already done” (emphasis in original)). A criminal contempt sanction cannot be
imposed without affording the contemnor certain constitutional protections. See Windy City
Limousine Co. v. Milazzo, 2018 IL App (1st) 162827, ¶ 46. There is no dispute that Nathan
received none of those protections. Thus, the court’s sanction was improper.
¶ 48 Nonetheless, Debra contends that the sanction was proper because the remaining $20,000
represented the value of the possessions not returned by Nathan. She points to the following
comment made by the trial court when imposing the sanction: “As far as the rest of the furniture,
I think that amount of money will cover the value of the rest of the furniture or possessions.” She
notes, too, that in its September 10, 2024, order, the court ordered Nathan to return Megan’s
possessions “&/or their reasonable value.” Thus, according to Debra, the $20,000 fine, which
would be imposed even if Nathan returned Megan’s cremains and purged the $30,000 fine, was
valid. We disagree.
¶ 49 Our court has observed that “compensatory damages may not be awarded in a civil
contempt proceeding.” Blankshain, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 752.
“ ‘In Illinois, it is well established that civil contempt is an affront to the authority of the
court and not a private remedy, that any fine imposed pursuant to the contempt is payable
to the public treasury and not a plaintiff, and that a plaintiff may not recover compensatory
damages in a civil contempt proceeding. [Citations.] Because a sanction in a civil
contempt proceeding is strictly coercive, the court is without the authority to compensate
an aggrieved party for its damages.’ ” Id. at 753 (quoting Keuper v. Beechen, Dill &
Sperling Builders, Inc., 301 Ill. App. 3d 667, 669-70 (1998)).
Notably, in its October 27, 2025, contempt order, the court never expressly ordered Nathan to
comply with its prior order to return Megan’s possessions; instead, it essentially determined that
- 20 - $50,000—$30,000 for Megan’s cremains (if he failed to return them) and $20,000 for Megan’s
property—would adequately compensate Debra for Nathan’s failure. To the extent that the trial
court intended to compensate Debra for Nathan’s failure to return Megan’s possessions, the court’s
gesture was improper.
¶ 50 Alternatively, even if the $20,000 can be deemed a proper sanction for indirect civil
contempt, it was imposed without proper procedures. The rule to show cause was issued on May
2, 2024—before the September 10, 2024, order—and thus did not place Nathan on notice that he
could be held in contempt for refusing to return the possessions “&/or their reasonable value.” See
Williams, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 442 (the alleged contemnor must be informed of the charges against
him or her “ ‘by information, notice, citation, or rule to show cause,’ ” allowed to file an answer,
and accorded a fair hearing (quoting Javaras, 51 Ill. 2d at 300)).
¶ 51 Finally, we note that, even if the $30,000 portion of the total sanction was viewed separately
as a coercive sanction with respect to the return of Megan’s cremains, it was improper for the trial
court to order that it be paid to the estate. As noted, “ ‘any fine imposed pursuant to the contempt
is payable to the public treasury and not a plaintiff.’ ” Blankshain, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 753 (quoting
Keuper, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 669-70). Here, the court ordered the money payable to the estate,
making it improperly compensatory.
¶ 52 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 53 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s order finding Nathan in indirect civil
contempt; however, we vacate the sanction imposed and remand for further proceedings. We
caution the trial court that, if it intends to coerce Nathan’s compliance with its order to return
Megan’s cremains and possessions, it should identify with specificity, based on the evidence
- 21 - presented at the hearing and Nathan’s ability to comply, (1) the particular item or items that it is
ordering Nathan to return and (2) any related sanction.
¶ 54 Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for further proceedings.
- 22 -