In re Estate of Lewis

32 La. Ann. 385
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMarch 15, 1880
DocketNo. 7806
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 32 La. Ann. 385 (In re Estate of Lewis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Estate of Lewis, 32 La. Ann. 385 (La. 1880).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

DeBlanc, J.

Mrs. Frances Parke Lewis, the wife of E. G. W. Butler, died in the State of Mississippi, leaving as her legal heirs two of her own children — Lawrence L. and Cora, and the issue of the marriage of a deceased daughter with George Williamson.

In her last will, which was twice probated, here and in Mississippi, she declared — and this stands uncontradicted — that she was a citizen and resident of the last mentioned State, named — as her universal legatees — her daughter Cora, the widow of W. B. Turnbull and the sons of said widow, and designated — as the executor of her will — Charles M. Conrad, of New Orleans, who declined to qualify in that capacity.

In 1876, on the 4th of September — a little over a year after the death of Mrs. Butler — Andrew H. Gay qualified as the administrator of her succession. He was appointed as such by the parish court of Iberville. On the 13th of said month, nine days after he had thus qualified, the administration of said succession, with the will annexed, was granted to Elliot Henderson, by one of the chancellors of the State of Mississippi.

On the 30th of April, 1877, Henderson presented a petition to the parish cpurt of Iberville, in which he asks to he recognised as the executor of the last will of Frances Parke Butler, and that Gay’s appointment as the administrator of her succession be revoked.

In Gay’s answer, and in two interventions filed, one by the husband, the other by the son of the deceased, they contend :

1. That Mrs. Butler’s will contains a substitution reprobated by our laws, and — if not — that the legacy made by her should be reduced to the disposable quantum.

2. That her will has not been probated by any court of this State, and is so vague as to render its execution an impossibility.

3. That the appointment, by a foreign court, of an administrator with the will annexed, does not — of itself — authorize him to interfere with an administration previously conferred by a court of this State, nor entitle him — by preference — to the appointment of dative testamentary executor.

4. That — if Gay’s appointment as administrator should be revoked — one of the intervenors, the husband, as partner in community of the deceased, claims to be appointed as dative executor of her will.

[388]*388In April last, we remanded this cause to the lower court, to try and determine two issues :

1. The validity or invalidity of the will, whether in whole or in part.

2. Who is entitled to be appointed as the executor thereof.

I.

Mrs. Butler’s will contains no substitution. She gave to her daughter Cora and the sons of the latter, the whole of the property of which she would die possessed, and then explained the causes which have induced her to thus favor only one of her several descendants. Those causes are not such as would justify any disposition intended to deprive her children or grandchildren of their legitime. This is not denied by their adversaries, and — therefore—as to the property situated in Louisiana and belonging to the succession of Mrs. Butler, the donation already referred to must be reduced to the disposable quantum.

There can be no doubt, as held by our predecessors, that — -when a person dies, leaving property in two or more States, his property in each State, is — for the purpose of its administration — considered as a separate succession ; but can we — from that fact — deduce, as a necessary consequence, that — of whatever it may be composed, that separate succession cannot be — to any extent — disposed of, by testament, otherwise than according to our laws ?

The second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code provides “ that the effect of acts passed in one country to have effect in another, is regulated by the laws of the country where such acts are to have effect,” and the third paragraph “ that the exception made in the 'second does not hold, when a citizen of another State of the Union, or a citizen or subject of a foreign state or country disposes by will or testament, or any other act causa mortis made out of this State, of his movable property situated in this State, if at the time of making said will or testament, or any other act causa mortis, and at the time of his death, he resides and is domiciliated out of the State.”

Mrs. Butler died, and — at the time of her death — had her residence and domicile in the State of Mississippi, and there — by testament — disposed of the whole of her property, movable and immovable, and it is clear that, under the legislative provision which we have quoted, the effect of her testament — as regards her movable property — must be regulated by the laws of Mississippi, and — as regards the balance of said property — this is conceded — by the laws of this State.

C. C. 491 — (483).

In Succession of Senac, this court held that the only exception to the rule laid down in article 483 of our Code, “ that persons who reside out of the State cannot dispose of property they possess here, in a man[389]*389ner different from that prescribed by our laws,” is to be found in the 10th article of said Code, and that it is only under the conditions specified in that' article, that foreign laws are permitted to operate in the disposition of property in this State.

2 R. 258.

As regards her movable property, the effect of Mrs. Butler’s donation is to be regulated by the laws of Mississippi; and — to determine the reduction to which said donation is liable under the laws of Louisiana, an aggregate must be formed of exclusively the property and things, or of the proceeds of the sale of the property and things which she owned in this State at the time of her death, and which — at that date and under our laws — were immovable by either their nature, destination, or the object to which they were applied ; and — this aggregate formed — by deducting therefrom the portion reserved to the forced heirs of the deceased.

0. 0.1493, (1480).

II.

Henderson and Gay ask, the first to be recognized in a capacity ■which — as yet — has not been conferred upon him, and it is that of dative testamentary executor — and the other, to be continued as administrator of a succession, which — as to the minor Williamson — is, by operation of law, accepted with benefit of inventory. Gay’s demand is urged by the surviving husband and one of the forced heirs of Mrs. Butler. The two contestants seek to be recognized, each in his alleged capacity, and not one of them to be appointed as dative testamentary executor.

Henderson claims on but one ground that Gay’s appointment be revoked, and that ground is that he alone, under his appointment by the Mississippi court, has the right to administer the successions opened here and in the adjoining State. In Burbank vs. Payne & Co., this court said : “ It is our deliberate opinion that the powers of administrators, appointed in different States, extend only to the limits of the sovereigns creating them, and that neither allows the other to intermeddle with any assets within their respective jurisdictions ; and had any exception been taken to the right of the foreign administrator to stand in judgment, we should — without hesitation — have maintained it.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
32 La. Ann. 385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-estate-of-lewis-la-1880.