In Re Estate of Lambert

44 N.E.2d 325, 69 Ohio App. 522, 31 Ohio Law. Abs. 388, 24 Ohio Op. 249, 1940 Ohio App. LEXIS 1011
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 25, 1940
Docket1578
StatusPublished

This text of 44 N.E.2d 325 (In Re Estate of Lambert) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Estate of Lambert, 44 N.E.2d 325, 69 Ohio App. 522, 31 Ohio Law. Abs. 388, 24 Ohio Op. 249, 1940 Ohio App. LEXIS 1011 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940).

Opinion

OPINION

By HORNBECK, PJ.

This is an appeal by the Department of Taxation of the State of Ohio from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court affirming the action of the Probate Court in its order granting an exemption to The Bonebrake Theological Seminary from the payment of inheritance tax on a succession passing to-the said seminary under Item 4 of the will of George Lambert, deceased.

The facts are not in dispute.

The Bonebrake Theological Seminary of Dayton, Ohio, successor to the Union Biblical Seminary, is made up of two schools, the Graduate School of Theology and the Diploma School of Theology. The seminary is operated under the direction of the Conference of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ and may be said to be founded upon the creed of that denomination. In all there are 95 courses offered to students of the Seminary. In the Graduate School one must have an A. B. degree to enter. In the Diploma School a high school education or its equivalent is requisite to matriculation.

The subjects taught are either essentially religious or of kindred character. It may be said that the prin *389 cipal purpose of the Seminary is the preparation of young men for the ministry of the United Brethren Church, although, it appears that throughout the years students of practically all denominations, at least one Jew, and many persons desiring only to better equip themselves for some form of religious training service have attended the Seminary. The teachers in the school are not restricted to one denomination. The institution is open to anyone of good character who meets the scholastic requirements. The school is maintained by endowments, contribution from the United Brethren Church, some minor contributions from other sources and incidental fees of $10.00 a term and $2.00 library fee from each student. The $10.00 fee is but nominal and is used for heating and lighting of class rooms and janitorial service. The purpose of the library fee is obvious. Students are drawn from all parts of the United States and from foreign countries.

It is the claim of the Tax Commission that by virtue of §5334 GC the succession which the Seminary takes from the Lambert will is subject to an inheritance tax. The Seminary asserts that it is exempt from such tax. The Seminary having asserted its exemption sustains the burden of proof. Both the Probate Court originally and the Common Pleas Court on review supported the contention of the Seminary.

Sec. 5334 GC, insofar as pertinent to •the question presented, reads:

“The succession to any property passing to or for the use of * * * public institutions of learning within this state, * * *, or to or for the use of an institution for purposes only of public charity, carried on in whole or in substantial part within this state, shall not be subject to the provis;ons of the preceding sections of this sub-division of this chapter.”

The Seminary asserts that it is a “public institution of learning within this state” and that the succession passing to it is “for the use of an institution for purposes only of public charity carried on in whole or in substantial part within this state”. If it comes within either of these classifications it is exempt. We do not have the opinion of the Probate Judge but have been favored with the decision of Judge Cecil in reviewing the order of. the Probate Court.

It is the claim of the appellant that the Seminary “is a denominational or sectarian institution limited in its activities to the education of ministers of the Gospel in the United Brethren in Christ Church of the United States and is to or for the use of a specific class of individuals and for a specific purpose.” Attention is directed to the use of the word, “public” in qualifying “institution of learning” and that the section exempts only bequests for the use of an institution for purposes only of public charity. It is upon these two propositions that the parties are at issue. We do not purpose to discuss these questions at great length because they have both been considered by the two courts which have passed upon them.

We are in accord with the judgment of the Common Pleas Court and the decision of Judge Cecil and might well conclude our opinion by adopting his decision.

It is urged that the court erred in relying upon the cases of Little, Treas. v United Presbyterian Theological Seminary, 72 Oh St 417 and Gerke v Purcell, 25 Oh St 229, because both of them related to exemptions from general property tax wherein the burden of showing a right to collect the tax was upon the political subdivision claiming; the benefit thereof.

We grant that a situation might arise where the burden of proof would be determinative in favor of the appellant but here the question is what is meant, as a matter of law, by the expression “purposes only of public charity”. The statute which was under consideration in the above cited cases. 2732 R. S., employs the language, “in *390 stitutions of' purely public charity”. The foregoing expressions are identical in meaning. So that, the cases are determinative of the questions presented under §5334 GC.

The Supreme Court considers similar phrases and comes to the conclusion which we reach in Tax Commission v Bank & Trust Co., 117 Oh St 443, 450.

Gerke et v Purcell, 35 Oh St 329, in the 4th and 5th propositions of the syllabus is dispositive of the query whether or not the Seminary in this case is an institution carried on for the purposes only of public charity.

4th Syllabus.

“A charity, in a legal sense, includes not only gifts for the benefit of the poor, but endowments for the advancement of learning, or institutions for the encouragement of science and art, without any particular reference to the poor.”

5th Syllabus.

“Schools established by private donations, and which are carried on for the .benefit of the public, and not with a view to profit, are ‘institutions of purely public charity’ within the meaning of the provision of the constitution, which authorizes such institutions to be exempt from taxation.”

Outside of Ohio the question has been considered in many jurisdictions. See People ex rel v Jessamine Withers Home (111.) and annotation thereto, 34 A. L. R. 628, wherein are cited many cases, the decisions in which are in accord with Gerke v Purcell, supra. Among them are, Philadelphia’s Appeal (Pa.) 15 Atlantic 683 and other Pennsylvania cases wherein it is uniformly held “that a school or college founded and maintained by charitable donations and open to all without reference to race or creed, is a ‘purely public charity’ within the meaning of the tax exemption statute, even though small tuition fees are changed those who are able to pay” and that,

“An incorporated college having no capital stock and not conducted for profit, founded and endowed by public and private charities, which is open to students without reference to race or religious belief, who, when able to pay are charged a nominal tuition, is a ‘purely public charity’.”

Tharpe, et al, against Central Georgia Council of Boy Scouts of America, 116 A. L. R., 373 and annotation, People v First National Bank of Chicago et, (Ill.) 108 A. L. R. 277 and annotation.

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Related

The People v. First National Bank
4 N.E.2d 378 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1936)
Tharpe v. Central Georgia Council of Boy Scouts of America
196 S.E. 762 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1938)

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Bluebook (online)
44 N.E.2d 325, 69 Ohio App. 522, 31 Ohio Law. Abs. 388, 24 Ohio Op. 249, 1940 Ohio App. LEXIS 1011, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-estate-of-lambert-ohioctapp-1940.