In Re Estate of George W. Grant

53 S.W. 372, 93 Tex. 68, 1899 Tex. LEXIS 211
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 6, 1899
DocketNo. 821.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 53 S.W. 372 (In Re Estate of George W. Grant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Estate of George W. Grant, 53 S.W. 372, 93 Tex. 68, 1899 Tex. LEXIS 211 (Tex. 1899).

Opinion

GAINES, Chief Justice.

The Court of Civil Appeals for the First Supreme Judicial District have certified for our decision the following questions:

“George W. Grant died in Walker County in March, 1898, leaving a will by which he disposed of a considerable estate. By proper provision in his will, he withdrew the administration of his estate from the county court in accordance with article 1995 of the Revised Statutes. Item 8 of the will is as follows:

“ ‘Eighth. Having full faith and confidence in my personal friends, J. Baldwin, Benton Randolph, and A. T. Randolph, I have appointed them executors of this my last will and testament, and direct that they be not required to give bond for the discharge of their duties as such, but should my said executors fail to qualify as such executors, or one of them die after such qualification, then and in that event I desire that the survivor shall act alone with full exoneration from bond and security as such, and it is my express declared wish and intention that the independent character of this my last will and testament shall not fail or be lost because of the failure of one or both of my executors of this my last will and testament to qualify or die after qualification, but in this event I desire that the probate court of Walker County, Texas, appoint one or more executors until will annexed who shall give bond in a sum as to said court shall seem just and proper, but under any and all circumstances I desire its independent character to be maintained and carried out except as to bond. In the event the court has to appoint an executor, power and authority is hereby given and delegated to whom *71 soever may be called upon to carry into execution the provisions of this will, to sell and convey any of the property of my estate should it be deemed advisable for the best interest of my estate or my legatees under this will, or for the payment of debts/

“The will was duly established and probated in the County Court of Walker County at the May term thereof, 1898, and of the executors named therein, J. Baldwin alone qualified. Letters testamentary were issued to him on May 26, 1898. He administered the estate as independent executor until his death in January, 1899.

“On February 6, 1899, persons interested in said estate made application to the County Court showing the necessity of further administration and praying for the appointment of an independent executor in the place of J. Baldwin, deceased, as provided by the item of said will above copied. The County Court heard the application March 9, 1899, and refused to appoint an independent executor, because it was the opinion of 'the court that, in consequence of the death of the executor of the will of said decedent, the independent character of the will could not be preserved and that the law was against the application, but appointed an administrator de bonis non with the will annexed, and directed that the estate be administered under the orders of the court. The administrator so appointed qualified March 11, 1899. S. Gibbs, one of the creditors of the estate who had joined in the application, appealed from the judgment of the County Court to the District Court of Walker County. The appeal was heard in the District Court at its March term, 1899, and on March 28th judgment was rendered by the court refusing the application for the appointment of an independent executor and rendering in effect the same judgment that had been rendered in the County Court. The applicant has appealed to this court.

“The following are the questions certified by this court to the Supreme Court for decision:

“1. Had the testator, George W. Grant, authority to delegate the power to another to nominate an executor of his will to succeed the executor named in the will, and to keep his estate under the administration of such successor free from the control of the County Court, as provided by article 1995 of the Revised Statutes?

“2. Should the county judge of Walker County have appointed an independent executor of the will of George W. Grant, deceased, and issued to him letters testamentary for the administration of said estate in accordance with said article 1995 of the Revised Statutes?”

The article of our Revised Statutes which empowers a testator to make provision for the administration of his estate free from the control of the county court reads as follows: “Any person capable of making a will may so provide in his will that no other action shall be had in the county court in relation to the settlement of his estate than the probating and recording of the will, and the. return of an inventory, appraisement, and lists of claims of his estate.” Rev. Stats., art. 1995. A hasty glance at this article, standing by itself, tends to lead to the conclusion *72 that it was intended that any person capable of making will should have the power to provide for an administrator of his estate independent of the court, without nominating in his will any person or persons to execute its provisions. Not only does it fail to provide that an executor shall be named to whom the trust is to be confided, but no reference to an executor is made either expressly or impliedly. The language, in effect, simply is that a person may so provide in his will that no other action shall he had in the county court in reference to the settlement of his estate than the probating of the will, etc. But we think an analysis of the statute of necessity leads to a different conclusion. When the testator has provided for an independent •administration of his estate, there are hut three things over which the court has at first any control or jurisdiction: (1) the probating the will, (2) the recording of the will, and (3) the return of the inventory, appraisement, and list of claims. At later stages in the administration the court may, in certain contingencies, require the executor to give bond (Revised Statutes, articles 1997, et seq.), and the court may also in certain cases make the necessary orders and take the necessary steps for dividing the estate among those entitled thereto. Rev. Stats., art 2001. The court may also, at the instance of a creditor, require the heirs to give-bond. Rev. Stats., art. 2002. All these latter sources of jurisdiction apply to exceptional cases. The general rule is that where a testator has provided for an independent administration of his estate, the court, under article 1995, has jurisdiction over the three matters only which are there specified. The appointment of an administrator with the will annexed is not one of these. Hence we are of opinion that if no executor be named, or if the person or persons named should die or refuse to act, the court is left without power to proceed under the provisions of the article last cited. The reason is that under that article the court has no authority to appoint an administrator. It must treat the provision for an independent administration as having failed for the want of an executor; and must proceed under the general law and resume entire control of the administration. Where an executor is nominated who is alive and willing to act when the will comes to-be probated, he, immediately upon the probate, becomes invested with power to administer the estate and needs no recognition from the court. The appointment of an administrator is the act of the court, and without the court's action none can be appointed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Boone v. LeGalley
29 S.W.3d 614 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Morse v. First Nat. Bank of Galveston
194 S.W.2d 578 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1946)
Rowland v. Moore
168 S.W.2d 911 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1943)
Loewenstein v. Watts
119 S.W.2d 176 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1938)
Armstrong v. Anderson
55 S.W.2d 235 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1932)
Huth v. Huth
187 S.W. 523 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1916)
Kent v. McDaniel
178 S.W. 1006 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1915)
Hughes v. Mulanax
153 S.W. 299 (Texas Supreme Court, 1913)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
53 S.W. 372, 93 Tex. 68, 1899 Tex. LEXIS 211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-estate-of-george-w-grant-tex-1899.