2026 IL App (1st) 240738
SECOND DIVISION June 16, 2026
No. 1-24-0738
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re ESTATE OF EDWARD HEGNER, Deceased ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of (Colin Lateano, ) Cook County, Illinois ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Nos. 2017 L 50735 and 2016 P 7861 v. ) (Consolidated) ) Margaret Murin, Individually and as Administrator, ) and Thomas Hegner, ) Hon. Kent Delgado, ) Judge Presiding Defendants-Appellees). ) ___________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In November 2016, Edward Hegner died intestate—that is, without a will. His sister,
defendant Margaret Murin, was the administrator of Ed’s estate. Plaintiff Colin Lateano, age 25
at the time of Ed’s death, filed a lawsuit, later consolidated with the probate case, in which he
claimed entitlement to a portion of Ed’s estate on the theory of equitable adoption, a doctrine
first recognized by our supreme court in DeHart v. DeHart, 2013 IL 114137, ¶ 60.
¶2 Colin demanded a jury trial. Defendants—Margaret, both as administrator and in her
personal capacity as an heir to the estate, plus her brother Thomas Hegner, also an heir—
objected, claiming Colin had no right to a jury trial. The trial court agreed and struck Colin’s jury No. 1-24-0738
demand. After a lengthy trial, including a ruling that barred much of Colin’s testimony under the
Dead-Man’s Act, the trial court entered judgment for defendants and against Colin.
¶3 Colin appeals, claiming he had a constitutional right to a jury trial and that the court erred
in barring his testimony. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 I. Overview of Equitable Adoption
¶6 For context, we start with a brief explanation of equitable adoption, first recognized by
our supreme court in DeHart. See id. “Essentially, the doctrine of equitable adoption allows a
person who was accepted and treated as a natural or adopted child, and as to whom adoption
typically was promised or contemplated but never performed, to share in the inheritance of the
foster or stepparent.” In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 48.
¶7 Equitable adoption “is a probate concept to determine inheritance and does not apply to
proceedings for parentage, custody, and visitation.” Id. ¶ 52. It does not “create the legal
relationship of parent and child, with all the legal consequences of such relationship, nor is it
meant to create a legal adoption.” Id. ¶ 53.
¶8 The claim requires more than mere proof “that a familial relationship existed between the
decedent and the plaintiff” or that, “from an age of tender years, [the plaintiff] held a position
exactly equivalent to a statutorily adopted child.” DeHart, 2013 IL 114137, ¶ 59. Rather, the
plaintiff must show “an intent to adopt” and that “the decedent acted consistently with that intent
by forming with the plaintiff a close and enduring familial relationship.” Id.
¶9 A plaintiff proves such intent “by showing that the decedent represented to the plaintiff
and the community at large that the plaintiff was the decedent’s natural or legally adopted child.”
Id. ¶ 60 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Beyond that, our supreme court
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“envision[ed] a case where *** a decedent had held out the plaintiff his whole life as his or her
natural child, never even letting it be known throughout the childhood of the plaintiff that the
child was not the natural offspring of the deceased.” Id.
¶ 10 In response to concerns that this doctrine would deter foster and stepparents with no
intent to adopt from taking orphans or stepchildren into their homes or providing kindness and
compassion to children who were not theirs by blood, the supreme court made two points. First,
the court emphasized “the limited nature of our holding—only in those cases where there is
sufficient, objective evidence of an intent to adopt ***, supported by a close enduring familial
relationship, will an equitable adoption be recognized.” Id. ¶ 62 (parenthetical in original).
¶ 11 And second, the court heightened the standard of proof, noting that “if too lax a standard
were created it could create a danger that a person could not take in a child in need without
having a de facto adoption perpetrated upon him after his death.” Id. ¶ 64. Thus, “[w]hen the lips
of a deceased person who is alleged to have intended an adoption are sealed by death, proof of
the facts necessary to invoke principles of equity should be clear, unequivocal and convincing.”
Id. (emphasis added).
¶ 12 II. Factual Background
¶ 13 With that said, we discuss the evidence at trial, which spanned multiple days spread over
several months. Colin doesn’t challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, so we can be brief.
¶ 14 Colin is the biological child of Shirley Lateano and a man who was not interested in
being a father to Colin (though he paid court-ordered child support and included him in his will
at Shirley’s behest). Shirley testified that she never told Colin, as a child, about his true
biological father. She told others that her son was conceived via in vitro fertilization.
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¶ 15 Ed and Shirley never married. They began dating while Shirley was pregnant with Colin,
who was born in September 1991. Shirley lived with her mother at the time; Ed lived in Palos
Heights (the record at times refers to Palos Hills; we will leave it at “Palos”). Ed was involved in
the day-to-day care of Colin as an infant and toddler.
¶ 16 After the death of Shirley’s mother, Ed became even more involved in caring for Colin
and sometimes even stayed overnight at Shirley’s house. When Colin reached sixth grade, Ed
and Shirley bought a townhouse in Lincoln Park so Colin could attend a prestigious high school.
Ed funded a prepaid-tuition plan that allowed Colin to attend the University of Illinois. Colin
joined a fraternity as a “legacy” because Ed had been a member of the same fraternity during his
own time in college. (The clear import of this evidence was that Colin could not have been a
“legacy” unless he was identified as Ed’s son.)
¶ 17 Though Colin’s testimony was largely barred under the Dead-Man’s Act, as we will
discuss in detail below, Colin did make a lengthy offer of proof. In sum, Colin would testify that
“he believed he was the biological son of Ed Hegner.” He would testify that he remembers Ed
from his earliest days, where Ed performed all the roles one might expect of a father: teaching
him to read and tucking him in to bed; coaching his soccer team; serving as scoutmaster for his
cub scouts troop; teaching him to golf and swim and play baseball; playing video games with
him; driving him wherever he needed to go; helping him choose a college and communicating
with him weekly during college. Colin would testify that “[u]p until he heard the news [that he
had a different biological father after Ed’s death], he knew in his heart and mind that his father
was Ed Hegner.”
¶ 18 The evidence shows that Ed attended all major events in Colin’s life that one might
expect—graduations, birthdays, holidays—and that he was sometimes introduced as Colin’s
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father without objection and sometimes introduced himself as such. The trial court found from
the evidence that Shirley wanted the three of them (she and Ed and Colin) to be a family unit and
that Ed largely accommodated her wishes. The evidence is clear that Ed loved Colin deeply.
¶ 19 The court also found, however, that insofar as Ed interacted with the community at large
and with his own biological family, he did not hold out Colin as his son. He was not listed as
Colin’s father on any official documents—school contracts, birth and baptismal certificates, tax
filings, or health records. He always maintained a separate residence in Palos and even
convalesced there (or at his sister Margaret’s home) after his two hip surgeries. He never told his
close friends that Colin was his son and, in fact, told them Colin was not his son. At his
retirement party, Colin was present, but Ed did not introduce him as his son. He told his close
friend, Denise Boyle, that he had no intention of preparing estate documents, as he intended for
his estate to go to his siblings, given that he was not married and had no children.
¶ 20 The court found that, while Ed loved Colin and was a “father figure” to him, Ed did not
intend to adopt Colin, nor did he hold himself out to the community at large as Colin’s father.
The court noted that Shirley had sued the biological father for child support and even made him
include Colin as a beneficiary in his will. Ed, in contrast, never made any attempt to adopt Colin
or to prepare estate documents that would add him as an heir.
¶ 21 The court specifically found that Ed “went along with” Shirley’s attempt to portray the
three of them as a nuclear family but that, outside of Shirley and the people in her “orbit,” Ed did
nothing to indicate that he was the father of Colin or intended to adopt him. The court also noted
that, while Ed would routinely give Colin greeting cards on special occasions which sometimes
contained the preprinted word “son,” Ed signed his name “Ed,” not “Dad,” to the cards. He also
signed the name “Ed,” not “Dad,” in Colin’s yearbook.
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¶ 22 The court also did not find Colin’s offer of proof credible. The court felt that Colin might
have viewed Ed as his father when he was quite young, but the court found it difficult to believe
that, as Colin grew up, he did not realize otherwise, given “the fact that Ed didn’t live with him
all the time, Ed had a different last name, he referred to himself in cards and in the yearbook as
‘Ed’ and not ‘dad,’ at some point, when Colin’s in high school or when he’s in college, I mean,
it’s possible that it didn’t dawn on him but it probably did.” The court did not find it credible
“that the first time he found out was when he was going through—after Ed died.”
¶ 23 In sum, the court did not find “clear, unequivocal and convincing” proof that Ed intended
to adopt Colin or that he held himself out to Colin and the community at large as Colin’s father.
The court thus ruled in favor of defendants and against Colin. This appeal followed.
¶ 24 ANALYSIS
¶ 25 Colin claims that the trial court erred in striking his jury demand and in barring much of
his testimony under the Dead-Man’s Act. We take the issues in that order.
¶ 26 I. Right to Jury Trial
¶ 27 The trial court ruled that Colin did not have the right to a jury. The court recognized that
it had discretion to empanel one. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1111 (West 2024) (“The court may in its
discretion direct an issue or issues to be tried by a jury, whenever it is judged necessary in any
action seeking equitable relief.”). But the court chose not to do so, thus striking the jury demand.
¶ 28 Colin says he had a constitutional right to a jury trial, and thus the court did not have
discretion to deny his demand. As defendants are quick to note, Colin does not argue on appeal
that the court abused its discretion in denying his demand under section 2-1111. So we are left
only with the question of whether a constitutional right to a jury trial attaches to equitable-
adoption claims, a legal argument we review de novo. Prodromos v. Everen Securities, Inc., 389
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Ill. App. 3d 157, 174 (2009); Bank One, N.A. v. Borse, 351 Ill. App. 3d 482, 488 (2004).
¶ 29 Our constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall
remain inviolate.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 13. Illinois recognizes a right to a jury trial only for
those actions “where such right existed under the English common law at the time the
constitution was adopted.” Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 72-73 (1994).
¶ 30 Unfortunately for Colin, “[t]here was then and there is now no constitutional right of trial
by jury in equity.” Lazarus v. Village of Northbrook, 31 Ill. 2d 146, 148 (1964); see Martin v.
Strubel, 367 Ill. 21, 22-23 (1937) (“In this [s]tate the guaranty of the right to a jury trial does not
extend to cases of equity jurisdiction.”); Shrock v. Meier, 2024 IL App (1st) 230069, ¶ 37;
Benzakry v. Patel, 2017 IL App (3d) 160162, ¶ 31; Wolinsky v. Kadison, 2013 IL App (1st)
111186, ¶ 108 (“ ‘At common law, equitable claims were creations of the courts of chancery and
were tried without the right to a jury.’ ” (quoting Borse, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 488)); Pettey v. First
National Bank of Geneva, 225 Ill. App. 3d 539, 547 (1992) (“There is no constitutional right to a
jury in equity actions.”).
¶ 31 And our supreme court has made clear that “the doctrine of equitable adoption is merely
an equitable remedy.” Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 53. “It is a limited remedial doctrine
devised by courts using their equitable powers” to “correct the injustice that would result were
the intestacy laws woodenly applied.” Id. ¶ 52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 32 We would note, as defendants do, that Colin himself argued that equitable adoption was
an equitable remedy when trying to persuade the trial court that the Dead-Man’s Act was
inapplicable to an equitable-adoption claim. He is hard-pressed to change position now.
Regardless, as we explain below, we find no merit to his counter-argument.
¶ 33 Colin argues on appeal that equitable adoption is more akin to a cause of action known as
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“contract-to-adopt,” a legal claim grounded in a theory of contract, where a would-be parent
attempted to adopt but did so invalidly under the adoption laws. He cites to our supreme court’s
decision in DeHart, claiming in his appellate brief that, “[a]fter carefully considering contract-to-
adopt’s long history in Illinois, and thoughtfully examining the doctrine of equitable adoption,
DeHart found any difference between the cause of actions to be ‘indiscernible.’ ”
¶ 34 Colin takes that language out of context. The court in DeHart noted that some states
equated equitable adoption with contract-to-adopt, such that any difference between the two
doctrines was “essentially indiscernible.” DeHart, 2013 IL 114137, ¶ 52. But our supreme court
did not adopt that approach; it adopted the approach of other states that recognized equitable
adoption without requiring proof of an expressed or implied contract, based on notions of equity
and fundamental fairness. Id. ¶¶ 53-59, 66.
¶ 35 There is more we could add, but we have said enough. In short, nothing in DeHart gives
any reason to believe that equitable adoption is anything but an equitable doctrine. And the
court’s explicit language in Scarlett Z.-D. ends any debate on that topic. Colin had no right to a
jury trial on his equitable-adoption claim.
¶ 36 II. Dead-Man’s Act
¶ 37 On defendants’ motion, the trial court barred Colin from testifying about his interactions
and conversations with Ed. The court did so based on the Dead-Man’s Act, 735 ILCS 5/8-201
(West 2024). This statutory rule of evidence, subject to four exceptions, reads in relevant part:
“In the trial of any action in which any party sues or defends as the representative of a
deceased person ***, no adverse party or person directly interested in the action shall be
allowed to testify on his or her own behalf to any conversation with the deceased *** or
to any event which took place in the presence of the deceased ***.” Id.
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¶ 38 The purposes of the Dead-Man’s Act are “to protect decedents’ estates from fraudulent
claims and to equalize the position of the parties in regard to the giving of testimony.” Gunn v.
Sobucki, 216 Ill. 2d 602, 609 (2005). The point is “not to create a disadvantage for the living but
to remove the temptation of the survivor of a transaction to testify falsely.” Fleming v. Fleming,
85 Ill. App. 3d 532, 538 (1980). That is, the Dead-Man’s Act “ ‘protect[s] decedents’ estates
from depletion based on perjured testimony since it was considered that a party would be prone
to testify falsely when such testimony cannot be directly contradicted’ ” by the decedent. In re
Estate of Sewart, 274 Ill. App. 3d 298, 306 (1995) (quoting Fleming, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 538). As
our supreme court succinctly put it: “The Act bars only that evidence which the decedent could
have refuted.” Gunn, 216 Ill. 2d at 609.
¶ 39 Tracking the language of the statute, the circuit court found that Colin was a “person
directly interested in the action” seeking to give testimony about “conversation[s] with the
deceased” and “event[s] which took place in the presence of the deceased.” 735 ILCS 5/8-201
(West 2024). It is all but impossible to disagree with that conclusion.
¶ 40 The issue truly joins at one of the four exceptions to the Dead-Man’s Act, namely
subsection (d): “No person shall be barred from testifying as to any fact relating to the heirship
of a decedent.” Id. § 8-201(d). The circuit court agreed with defendants that subsection (d) was
inapplicable, as equitable adoption does not affect heirship; rather, it merely allows a non-heir to
obtain a portion of an estate’s distribution based on principles of equity.
¶ 41 The court’s interpretation was consistent with the supreme court’s explanation in Scarlett
Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 48, that equitable adoption does not alter the status of the parties but
merely permits a child who was never adopted “to share in the inheritance of the foster or
stepparent.” The doctrine does not “create the legal relationship of parent and child, with all the
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legal consequences of such relationship” but merely “correct[s] the injustice that would result
were the intestacy laws woodenly applied.” Id. ¶¶ 52-53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 42 Simply put, even had Colin prevailed, he would not have become an heir. That stands in
marked contrast, for example, to a woman testifying that she married the decedent before his
death, testimony that (if accepted) would have made her an heir to the estate. See In re Estate of
Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d 781, 782-83 (1981) (applying earlier version of subsection (d) exception).
¶ 43 As both defendants and the circuit court noted, other aspects of probate law distinguish
between heirship status and the right to a distribution from an estate. For example, the “slayer”
statute provides that an heir is not entitled to a distribution from the estate if he or she
intentionally and unjustifiably causes the decedent’s death. 755 ILCS 5/2-6 (West 2024); see
In re Estate of Ivy, 2019 IL App (1st) 181691, ¶ 34. Likewise, an heir who is convicted of abuse
or neglect of the decedent may not collect a distribution from that estate. 755 ILCS 5/2-6.2 (West
2024); see In re Estate of Lewy, 2018 IL App (1st) 172552, ¶ 8. These individuals do not lose
their status as heirs; they are simply deemed ineligible for inheritance based on their conduct.
¶ 44 We understand that there is little practical difference to Colin between receiving an
inheritance as an heir and receiving one as a non-heir via an equitable remedy. But the difference
remains a real one. His proffered testimony simply does not fit within the wording of subsection
(d) of the Dead-Man’s Act.
¶ 45 Colin understandably finds this result harsh. How, he asks, can he be expected to satisfy
the proof that Ed held himself out to Colin as his son if he cannot testify what they said to each
other and experienced together? He notes that the exception found in subsection (d) was added to
in 1973 in response to Illinois courts decrying the harsh results of people being barred from
testifying to facts that would establish their status as heirs. We have three responses.
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¶ 46 First, this law must always feel harsh to someone barred from testifying about his or her
conversations and interactions with the decedent, as that party is usually in the best position of
anyone—anyone alive, at least—to testify on first-hand knowledge. The legislature balanced that
consideration against the associated risk that it would be all too easy for parties to perjure
themselves, knowing that the decedent cannot contradict them. See Gunn, 216 Ill. 2d at 609.
Whatever a panel of judges may think of this law, we are in no position to second-guess that
legislative judgment. See Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Rosen, 242 Ill. 2d 48, 56 (2011) (“[w]hen the
legislature has declared, by law, the public policy of the State, the judicial department must
remain silent” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶ 47 Second, much of Colin’s offer of proof, which we summarized above, was introduced
through his mother and Ed’s longtime girlfriend, Shirley. Shirley testified about Ed’s interactions
with her and Colin throughout Colin’s lifetime. For example, Ed fed and rocked and dressed
Colin as an infant; was present at the baptism; spent birthdays and holidays with Colin and her;
read to Colin and played with toys with him; always spent Christmas Eves with them but
sometimes spent Christmas Day at his sister’s.
¶ 48 When Shirley, a United Airlines flight attendant, was away for work, Ed would step in
and care for Colin, especially after Shirley’s mother died when Colin was four. Ed helped with
Colin’s homework; they shopped and played sports together. She authenticated a birthday card
(one of many introduced at trial) from 1988 when Colin turned seven that read, “I love you.
You’re the best. Love, Ed.” Ed paid for much, if not all of Colin’s education. Colin lived with Ed
and Shirley after they bought the townhouse in Lincoln Park.
¶ 49 No doubt, there were private moments between Colin and Ed to which Shirley could not
testify. But her testimony largely covered the same topics. So while we agree that the Dead-
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Man’s Act can lead to harsh results, it is also fair to say that Colin was not the only witness who
could competently testify to Colin’s relationship with Ed; Shirley covered much of that ground.
¶ 50 And finally, to Colin’s point that the legislature sought to avoid unfair applications of the
Dead-Man’s Act by amending it in 1973 to add the “heirship” exception: at least two courts have
agreed with him that the exception was added in response to the “harsh” results emanating from
a line of case law beginning with our supreme court’s decision in Laurence v. Laurence, 164 Ill.
367, 373 (1896), where the court held that the Dead-Man’s Act barred a woman from testifying
that she married the decedent and was thus an heir to his estate. In re Estate of Hutchins, 120 Ill.
App. 3d 1084, 1087 (1984); Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 783-84.
¶ 51 But Colin’s point proves ours; it is not for a court to re-write or amend a statute we do not
like. It is for the legislature. The General Assembly is free to amend subsection (d) or create a
new exception for claims relating to equitable adoption, but it is not our place to do it ourselves,
whatever we may think of this statute. People v. Dobbins, 2024 IL App (1st) 230566, ¶ 26 (“we
must interpret the statute as written, not rewrite it to reach an outcome we would prefer”), aff’d,
2026 IL 131187; People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (1st) 190435, ¶ 42 (same).
¶ 52 The circuit court did not err in barring Colin’s testimony under the Dead-Man’s Act.
¶ 53 CONCLUSION
¶ 54 There is no dispute here that Ed loved Colin dearly. No piece of paper or judicial ruling
will ever change that. Our only role is to answer two legal questions. Having found no error in
the trial court’s ruling on either question, we affirm the court’s judgment.
¶ 55 Affirmed.
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In re Estate of Hegner, 2026 IL App (1st) 240738
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 2016-P- 7861, 2017-L-50735; the Hon. Kent Delgado, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Stephen M. Komie and Brian E. King, of Komie and Associates, for and Thomas M. Paris, both of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys James G. Riley and Kathryn T. McCarty, of FMS Law Group for LLS, of Chicago, and Michael Penosky and Kirsten A. Casas, of Appellee: Huck Bouma, PC, of Wheaton, for appellees.
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