In Re Estate of David Luke Brown v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Opinion issued August 13, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

Background

Brown and Ruzynska divorced in November 2009. In the agreed final decree of divorce, the court ordered them to sell a jointly owned property on East Tidwell Road and split the net proceeds equally. The decree specified that the net proceeds would be calculated by subtracting certain sums from the sale price, including $105,000 that would be paid to Brown as reimbursement to his separate property estate for the downpayment and improvements to the property.

During their marriage, Ruzynska and Brown acquired land and numerous salvage vehicles. The divorce decree awarded Ruzynska land (8510 John Ralston Road), the salvage vehicles on that land, and “an additional 130 of the salvage motor vehicles.” The decree did not identify the additional 130 salvage motor vehicles in any way: the decree did not include information about their make, model, color, year, condition, or location. The court confirmed that 8516 John Ralston Rd. was Brown’s separate property, and it awarded Brown 8522 John Ralston Rd. and the remainder of the salvage vehicles.

Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (“Brown I”). In Brown I, Ruzynska challenged the trial court’s rulings on her petition for post-divorce division of property, breach of contract, and tortious interference with prospective business relations based on Brown’s actions. Id. She also challenged the trial court’s declaratory judgment finding that Brown’s estate was entitled to $105,000 relating to sale of property as specified in the divorce decree, which was based on a mediated settlement agreement. Id. We affirmed the probate court’s judgment, and after we denied Ruzynska’s motion for rehearing on May 21, 2026, she has since filed a petition for review by the Texas Supreme Court.

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In July 2019, the Tidwell property was sold in a tax foreclosure sale, and after the tax claims were satisfied, $708,704.94 was deposited in the court registry, where it remained until after Brown died in 2021.

The probate court appointed Louis Ditta as the dependent administrator of Brown’s estate. Ditta petitioned the district court for $105,000 in reimbursement as provided in the divorce decree and one-half of the remaining proceeds. The district court initially distributed $301,408.62 each to Ruzynska and to Brown’s estate, reserving $105,000 in the court’s registry, and transferring the reimbursement claim to the probate court. We affirmed that judgment in Brown I. See Estate of Brown, No. 01-24-00263-CV, 2026 WL 627431, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (“Brown I”).

Meanwhile, Ruzynska asserted, among other things, that she had personal property (salvage vehicles) stored on Brown’s real property. She maintains that the vehicles were present soon after his death but went missing after Ditta became dependent administrator. Specifically, Ruzynska maintains that Elizabeth Green Beam-Lawson, a third party who had been renting a home from Brown, sold the salvage vehicles. Ruzynska faults Ditta for failing to secure the property. She also maintains that she is a creditor of the Brown estate because she believes the estate owes her for the vehicles she alleges went missing from Brown’s property.

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In July 2022, Beam-Lawson, Brown’s former tenant, filed an application to probate Brown’s will. In March 2023, Ruzynska filed a will contest alleging that the will was a forgery. A year later, in early March 2024, the probate court entered a final judgment on Ruzynska’s claims for post-divorce division of property, breach of contract, and tortious interference. This is the judgment affirmed in Brown I. See id. A couple weeks later, Beam-Lawson moved to dismiss the will contest arguing that Ruzynska lacked standing to challenge the will.

Ruzynska responded that she was a creditor based on her potential claims against the estate regarding the missing salvage vehicles and that her other causes of action were then-pending on appeal and not final. She stated that her claims would be materially affected by the probate of the will that Beam-Lawson offered, but her arguments centered on her belief that the will was a forgery.

The probate court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss the will contest, and Ruzynska testified. The court entered an order based on the parties’ agreement in open court, which provided that Ruzynska had two weeks to remove all salvage motor vehicles on Brown’s property. The order also provided that any remaining salvage vehicles would be removed or disposed of by the administrator, and “Ruzynska shall have no further claim to such remaining vehicles pursuant to the Divorce Decree or otherwise.” The court noted that Ruzynska may have some kind of claim regarding the vehicles she alleges went missing (or were sold by Beam-

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Lawson), but even so the only issue the court was considering was whether Ruzynska had standing to contest the will. The court also said that Ruzynska could pursue her claim for damages, but as to the will contest “she’s not coming in as a creditor.”

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the will contest and admitted the will to probate. Ruzynska filed a motion for new trial. At the hearing on the new trial motion, Ruzynska’s attorney argued that she had a monetary claim for the value of the cars that had been removed or sold while Ditta acted as dependent administrator. Ditta argued, among other things, that no such claim had been filed. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and Ruzynska appealed.

Analysis

On appeal, Ruzynska challenges the probate court’s dismissal of her will contest on the basis that she lacked standing. She also asserts that the probate court’s rulings should be reversed due to judicial bias and due process violations and that Ditta breached his fiduciary duty. I. A will contestant must demonstrate she has standing.

“Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit.” Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). We review questions of standing de novo because standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020). A party

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contesting an application to admit a will to probate must demonstrate that she has standing to do so. Womble v. Atkins, 160 Tex. 363, 331 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. 1960).

“Under the Estates Code, any ‘person interested in an estate’ may contest its administration in probate court.” Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 56, 60 (Tex. 2021) (quoting TEX. EST. CODE § 55.001). A “person interested” in an estate is “an heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in or claim against an estate being administered.” TEX. EST. CODE § 22.018(1). “To have standing to contest a will, a person must first establish this interest.” Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 60. “[T]he burden is on every person contesting a will, and on every person offering one for probate, to allege, and, if required, to prove, that he has some legally ascertained pecuniary interest, real or prospective, absolute or contingent, which will be impaired or benefited, or in some manner materially affected, by the probate of the will.” Logan v. Thomason, 146 Tex. 37, 42, 202 S.W.2d 212, 215 (1947); accord Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 60. “In the absence of such interest a contestant is a mere meddlesome intruder.” Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 60 (quoting Abrams v. Ross’ Estate, 250 S.W. 1019, 1021 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, judgm’t adopted), disapproved of on other grounds by Ferreira v. Butler, 575 S.W.3d 331, 338 n.55 (Tex. 2019)).

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An interested person, including a creditor, may have standing to file a claim against the estate. See, e.g., TEX. ESTATES CODE § 55.001 (Opposition in Probate Proceeding); id. § 101.051 (Liability of Estate for Debts in General); id. § 308.051 (Required Notice Regarding Presentment of Claims in General). But because some interests can be equally vindicated whether a decedent’s estate passes intestate or under a will, opposition to a will requires a showing that the party has a pecuniary interest that will be impaired, benefited, or materially affected by the probate of the will. Logan, 202 S.W.2d 215.

Logan involved the proponent of a will. Id. at 213. The decedent left part of his estate to his brother-in-law with language that made it clear the devise would lapse if the brother-in-law died first. Id. at 214–15. The brother-in-law died first, and the Supreme Court concluded that the son could not probate the will based on either the lapsed devise or the debt he claimed the estate owed him. Id.

The Texas Supreme Court first found that because the devise had lapsed, the devise was not a basis for the proponent of the will to claim standing. Id. at 215. Second, as to the debt, the Supreme Court explained that it was “immaterial by whom the claim is paid, or whether the assets of the estate are administered under the will, or as in case of intestacy.” Id. at 217 (citation omitted). Similarly here, to establish standing, Ruzynska must demonstrate that blocking the probate of the will is necessary to protect her asserted interests. As the Court said in Logan: “It is

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a sound rule to prohibit such a party from originating or entering a controversy in which he has no material interest to be affected by the judgment to be rendered.” Id. Ruzynska has not demonstrated she has standing to contest the will.

Ruzynska argues that she has standing based on her claims that are the subject of the appeal in Brown I and based on her claim to salvage vehicles.

A. Brown I Claims In Brown I, Ruzynska challenged the trial court’s summary judgment on her claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with prospective business relations (regarding the sale of the Tidwell property), summary judgment on her post-divorce division of property regarding certain annuities, and declaratory judgment on the distribution of the $105,000 remaining excess proceeds from the tax sale. Brown I, 2026 WL 627431, at *3. In that appeal, Ruzynska did not claim that she and Brown were joint tenants in the tax sale proceeds and that she was entitled to the full value after his death as a joint tenant with right of survivorship. See id. at *6. Instead, she argued that the proceeds should be divided equally, as provided by the divorce decree, or that she should be awarded the estate’s portion as damages for her other claims. We affirmed the trial court’s take nothing- judgment. See id. Ruzynska has filed a petition for review.

Ruzynska asserts that she has a contingent future interest in the estate by reason of her claims for money and the possibility of reversal in her favor on

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appeal. She also now makes a completely different argument, both in the probate court and on appeal, asserting that she has standing to contest the will because she has a claim for money arising from the joint tenancy of the Tidwell property. Ruzynska reasons that she and Brown were joint tenants of the Tidwell property, that joint tenancy extended to the proceeds of the sale, joint tenants have a right of survival, and when Brown died, all of the proceeds of the sale (including the disputed $105,000) vested in her.

Because it is not before us in this appeal, we make no comment on the merits of the claims on appeal in Brown I or her joint tenancy theory. Regardless of which theory Ruzynska advances, she has, at most, shown that she is an interested party. See TEX. EST. CODE § 22.018(1). She has not shown the probate of the will would affect her claim against the estate, which can continue regardless of whether Brown’s assets are administered under a will. See Logan, 202 S.W.2d at 217; see also Estate of Demel, No. 14-25-00245-CV, 2026 WL 307402, at *4 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 5, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Appellant’s contest of the will alone, even if successful, would not affect its pecuniary interest in any way; appellant would still maintain a claim against the estate.”).

We conclude that neither Ruzynska’s Brown I appeal nor her claim for damages based on her joint tenancy theory demonstrates that she has standing to contest the will.

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B. Salvage Vehicles Ruzynska also argues that she has a claim against the estate in regard to the missing salvage vehicles. The parties make numerous arguments about the vehicles, who was responsible for their safekeeping or disposition, and whether Ruzynska’s claim is barred by res judicata. As with our section I.B.1 analysis of her claim that she has standing based on her Brown I appeal or theory of joint tenancy, we consider whether Ruzynska has demonstrated standing to contest the will without regard to the merits of her claim. And we reach the same conclusion. While Ruzynska may have a claim for monetary damages based on the missing salvage vehicles, she has, at most, shown that she is an interested party. See TEX. EST. CODE § 22.018(1). But she has not shown that the probate of the will would affect her claim against the estate, which can continue whether Brown’s assets are administered under the will or under intestacy. See Logan, 202 S.W.2d at 217; see also Estate of Demel, 2026 WL 307402, at *4. We conclude that Ruzynska’s claim regarding the salvage vehicles does not support her assertion of standing to contest the will. See Logan, 202 S.W.2d at 217

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We conclude that Ruzynska has not demonstrated that she has standing to contest the will, and we hold that the trial court, therefore, did not err by dismissing her will contest. See id. at 215 (stating that person contesting will has

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burden to prove that he has some legally ascertained pecuniary interest that will be impaired, benefited, or materially affected by probate of will); see also Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 60 (same). Having reached this conclusion, we need not address Ruzynska’s remaining issues. 2 Conclusion

We affirm the probate court’s order. All pending motions are dismissed.

Susanna Dokupil

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

2 In her remaining issues, Ruzynska asserts that “judicial bias and denial of due process require remand or reversal” and that “fiduciary breach by the administrator warrants oversight and relief.” In addition to not being necessary to the disposition of this appeal, see TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, these issues are not preserved because Ruzynska did not present them to the probate court and secure a ruling. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see also Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v.

Montgomery Cnty., 365 S.W.3d 314, 317 (Tex. 2012) (explaining “important prudential considerations” underlying preservation-of-error rules).

Footnotes

1. NO. 01-24-00610-CV ——————————— IN RE ESTATE OF DAVID LUKE BROWN, DECEASED On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 4 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 494036 MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from an order dismissing a will contest brought by appellant Valeriya Ruzynska, the ex-wife of decedent David Luke Brown. Because we conclude that Ruzynska lacks standing to contest the will that was admitted to probate, we affirm.1 1 This is Ruzynska’s second appeal in our Court from this probate proceeding. See Estate of Brown, No. 01-24-00263-CV, 2026 WL 627431, at *1 (Tex. App.—