In re Estate of Biddle

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 8, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-0575
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250575-U FILED This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is April 8, 2026 NO. 4-25-0575 Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re ESTATE OF WANDA R. BIDDLE, Deceased, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (Amanda Biddle-Anderson, ) Mercer County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 23PR27 v. ) Ricardo Tejano and Jody Tejano, ) Honorable Defendants-Appellants). ) Matthew W. Durbin, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

¶2 In November 2024, plaintiff, Amanda Biddle-Anderson, filed a complaint

alleging defendant, Ricardo Tejano, and Ricardo’s wife, defendant, Jody Tejano,

misappropriated funds owned by decedent, Wanda R. Biddle, while Ricardo was acting as

Wanda’s financial power of attorney. The primary allegations were Ricardo obtained Wanda’s

funds and defendants used her funds to construct a house for the benefit of Wanda and

defendants’ daughter but then deeded the house to themselves. Ricardo’s defense was his

assertion Wanda had fears her ex-husband would be able to obtain the property if it were titled in

her name. Ricardo initially was the executor of Wanda’s estate and did not include the house or

other money he obtained in the estate. The trial court subsequently removed Ricardo as executor

and appointed plaintiff in his place. Among the relief plaintiff sought were awards of punitive damages and attorney fees.

¶3 Following discovery, the trial court, applying the Dead-Man’s Act (735 ILCS 5/8-

201 et seq. (West 2024)), disallowed evidence of conversations defendants had with Wanda

about the house. The court then granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, finding there

was no issue of material fact defendants violated their fiduciary duties. The court entered a

monetary judgment, barred Ricardo from claiming any interest in the estate, and ordered the

creation of a constructive trust for the house and any remaining assets. The court appointed

plaintiff as the administrator of the trust. The court also ordered defendants to sign any necessary

documents to comply with the order. However, the court reserved ruling on issues of punitive

damages and attorney fees.

¶4 On appeal, defendants contend the trial court erred in disallowing evidence under

the Dead-Man’s Act and granting the motion for summary judgment. We dismiss the appeal

because the record shows a premature appeal due to the lack of a final order when the court

reserved ruling on the issues of punitive damages and attorney fees.

¶5 I. BACKGROUND

¶6 Plaintiff is a daughter of Wanda. In November 2024, plaintiff filed a pleading

titled “Second Amended Third Party Complaint For Conversion, Fraud, Imposition of

Constructive Trust, and Other Relief.” In the complaint, which cited section 2-7 of the Illinois

Power of Attorney Act (755 ILCS 45/2-7 (West 2024)), plaintiff alleged Ricardo, while acting

under a power of attorney, fraudulently converted Wanda’s money and used her funds to

construct a house that was deeded to defendants. The complaint further alleged defendants acted

in a willful, reckless, and fraudulent manner, warranting an award of punitive damages against

them for willful, wrongful, and vexatious conduct. For relief, the complaint sought (1) judgment

-2- against defendants for the monetary amount converted, (2) an order barring Ricardo from

receiving any benefit due to Wanda’s death, (3) an order directing the sale of the house, with the

proceeds reimbursed to the estate, (4) attorney fees and costs, and (5) punitive damages.

¶7 In January 2025, plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking, under the Dead-Man’s

Act, to bar evidence of any conversations between defendants and Wanda concerning the house

and the use of her funds. The trial court granted the motion.

¶8 Plaintiff also filed a motion for summary judgment listing money Ricardo took

possession of under the power of attorney and stating it was undisputed defendants were the sole

owners of the house under the deed. Plaintiffs alleged a presumption of fraud applied that was

not rebutted as a matter of law. Plaintiff requested the trial court (1) enter a judgment against

defendants for the monetary amount converted, (2) order Ricardo barred from receiving any

benefit due to Wanda’s death, and (3) impose a constructive trust on the house and authorize

plaintiff to sell the property and distribute it to the estate’s beneficiaries. Plaintiff asked the court

to reserve the issues of punitive damages and attorney fees for further hearing.

¶9 On May 21, 2025, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment, finding there was no issue of material fact defendants violated their fiduciary duties.

The court entered a monetary judgment, barred Ricardo from claiming any interest in the estate,

and ordered the creation of a constructive trust for the house and any remaining assets. The court

appointed plaintiff the administrator of the trust subject to court review and supervision. The

court also ordered defendants to sign any necessary documents to comply with the order.

However, the court stated, “Further issues regarding attorney fees and other reserved issues,

including any further disgorgement of held assets by the Defendants, shall be set by the parties

through the Mercer County Circuit Clerk’s Office in coordination with all attorneys and parties

-3- of this action.”

¶ 10 On June 6, 2025, defendants filed their notice of appeal. The record does not

reflect any subsequent ruling by the trial court on plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and

punitive damages.

¶ 11 On June 20, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the order, seeking

authorization of the trial court to sell the house and an order requiring defendants to transfer title

to the house. Defendants filed a motion to stay judgment pending appeal and for an extension of

time for obtaining an appeal bond. Written orders on those motions do not appear in the record,

although a report of proceedings indicates the court denied the motions to stay and for an

extension of time to obtain an appeal bond and granted the motion to enforce the order.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, defendants contend the trial court erred in disallowing evidence under

the Dead-Man’s Act and granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Without providing

analysis or a discussion of the court’s reservation of issues concerning punitive damages and

attorney fees, defendants state this court has jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

304(b)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). We disagree and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 14 “A reviewing court has a duty to ascertain its jurisdiction before proceeding in a

cause of action and must dismiss the appeal if the court lacks jurisdiction.” In re Estate of York,

2015 IL App (1st) 132830, ¶ 19. Generally, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing appeals from

final judgments. In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542, 553 (1989).

¶ 15 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) provides if multiple claims

are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but

fewer than all claims only if the trial court makes an express written finding there is no just

-4- reason to delay enforcement or appeal or both. A “claim” is any right, liability, or matter raised

in an action. Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990).

Without a Rule 304(a) finding, a final order disposing of fewer than all claims is not an

appealable order and does not become appealable until all of the claims are resolved. Id. at 464.

¶ 16 Rule 304(b)(1) provides an exception to Rule 304(a), whereby “[a] judgment or

order entered in the administration of an estate, guardianship, or similar proceeding which finally

determines a right or status of a party” is appealable without the finding required under Rule

304(a).“Orders within the scope of Rule 304(b)(1), even though entered before the final

settlement of estate proceedings, must be appealed within 30 days of entry or be barred.” Stephen

v. Huckaba, 361 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 1051 (2005). “ ‘A central reason behind making the time for

appeal of such orders mandatory, and not optional, is that certainty as to some issues is a

necessity during the lengthy procedure of estate administration.’ ” Id. (quoting in re Estate of

Kime, 95 Ill. App. 3d 262, 268 (1981)). “Without the Rule 304(b)(1) exception, an appeal would

have to be brought after an estate was closed, the result of which might require reopening the

estate and marshaling assets that have already been distributed.” Id. “That result would be both

impractical and inefficient.” Id.

¶ 17 However, “not every order entered in an estate proceeding may be immediately

appealed.” In re Estate of Vogt, 249 Ill. App. 3d 282, 285 (1993). “Only final orders fit within

Rule 304(b)(1).” Stephen, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 1051. “It is not necessary that the order resolve all

matters in the estate, but it must resolve all matters on the particular issue.” Id. “A judgment is

final for appeal purposes if it determines the litigation on the merits or some definite part thereof

so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment.”

Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d at 553. This court, in applying Rule 304(b)(1), has stated a final order is one

-5- that disposes of the rights of the parties either with respect to the entire controversy or some

definite and separate portion of it. In re Estate of Prunty, 2018 IL App (4th) 170455, ¶ 20.

¶ 18 The committee comments to Rule 304(b)(1) state, “Subparagraph (1) applies to

orders that are final in character although entered in comprehensive proceedings that include

other matters. Examples are an order admitting or refusing to admit a will to probate, appointing

or removing an executor, or allowing or disallowing a claim.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304, Committee

Comments (rev. Sept. 1988). Thus, a court order directing the transfer of property under a will

generally is a final order for purposes of Rule 304(b). Houghtaylen v. Russell D. Houghtaylen

By-Pass Trust, 2017 IL App (2d) 170195, ¶ 14; see In re Estate of Yucis, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1062,

1069 (2008) (finding an order for sale of property in an estate proceeding finally determines the

interested party’s right to possess the property and constitutes a final order under Rule

304(b)(1)); see also In re Estate of Jackson, 354 Ill. App. 3d 616, 619 (2004) (a determination a

party had no right to a property and the property belonged to the estate was a final order under

Rule 304(b)(1)).

¶ 19 Likewise, this court has held an order determining the rights to a property with

respect to the disposition of the property is a final order under Rule 304(b)(1). In re Estate of

Meyer, 2024 IL App (4th) 230787, ¶ 16; see In re Estate of Thorp, 282 Ill. App. 3d 612, 617

(1996) (holding the trial court’s order directing the executor to sell a piece of real estate was a

final order for purposes of Rule 304(b)(1), even though “the exact dollar amounts to be received

by the legatees were yet to be ascertained”). However, those cases did not involve the reservation

of a determination of issues directly related to the claims, such as a reservation of a ruling on

punitive damages and attorney fees. Instead, in both Meyer and Thorp, this court specifically

noted the trial court’s orders did not contemplate further action regarding the issues. Meyer, 2024

-6- IL App (4th) 230787, ¶ 16; Thorp, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 617.

¶ 20 Here, the trial court’s order made determinations regarding matters that normally

would fall under Rule 304(b)(1) had the court finally determined them. However, the court here

did not finally determine the matters or the overarching claim seeking relief for breach of a

fiduciary duty because it reserved ruling on the directly related issues of punitive damages and

attorney fees. As previously stated, only final orders fit within Rule 304(b)(1), and while it is not

necessary the order resolve all matters in the estate, it must resolve all matters on the particular

issue appealed. Stephen, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 1051. The court here did not do so. By reserving

ruling on the issues of punitive damages and attorney fees, the court did not finally decide a

definite and separate portion of the controversy or finally determine the rights or statuses of the

parties. Without a ruling on the outstanding issues directly related to the matters at issue, there

was a lack of a final order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 21 We note defendants can timely file a notice of appeal upon the resolution of the

pending issues. However, if the motion and the pending claims have been resolved during the

pendency of this appeal and the time to file a new notice of appeal has expired, Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017) allows defendants to establish the effectiveness of the

present notice of appeal. In such case, defendants may file a petition for rehearing and seek to

supplement the record with evidence of this court’s jurisdiction to consider the merits of their

appeal. See In re Marriage of Knoerr, 377 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1050 (2007).

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 24 Appeal dismissed.

-7-