In re Estate of Arlene

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 260439-U FILED This Order was filed under July 2, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-26-0439 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1).

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re ESTATE OF ARLENE STAFFELDT, Deceased ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (William Staffeldt, ) Knox County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 23PR76 v. ) Michael Staffeldt and Brandt Staffeldt, ) Honorable Defendants-Appellants). ) Curtis S. Lane, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when denying defendants’ motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

¶2 In August 2023, plaintiff, William Staffeldt, sought a preliminary injunction to

stop defendants, Michael and Brandt Staffeldt, from selling or disposing of estate property

belonging to decedent, Arlene Staffeldt. In January 2024, the circuit court granted the

preliminary injunction. In August 2025, following numerous continuances and prior to trial,

defendants moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction, which the court denied. On appeal,

defendants argue the court erred when denying their motion to dissolve the preliminary

injunction. We disagree and affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Decedent died testate on May 5, 2023. That same month, the circuit court entered an order admitting decedent’s will to probate. The order appointed defendants as independent co-

executors. Additionally, the order named defendants, plaintiff, and decedent’s other children:

Georgene Hawkins, Renee Staffeldt, and Kristine Ogonowski as heirs.

¶5 The particular language in dispute within decedent’s will stated:

“I give all my personal and household effects, collections,

and automobiles, and any insurance policies thereon *** to my

children who survive me to be divided equally among them as they

agree. My executor shall have the right to donate, or sell, any

property as to which there is no agreement within 270 days after

my date of death; in the event of a sale the executor shall add the

proceeds to the residue of my estate.”

¶6 In August 2023, plaintiff filed several requests for relief, including an

“Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [(TRO)],” a “Complaint for Injunctive

Relief and Estate Inventory,” and a “Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief.” The filings

alleged defendants had scheduled an auction of decedent’s personal property in violation of the

will.

¶7 On August 28, 2023, the circuit court granted the TRO. There is no record of this

hearing; however, the order indicates the court granted the TRO following “arguments on the

pleadings from counsel in chambers.” The court scheduled the remainder of plaintiff’s filings for

a hearing to be held at a later date.

¶8 A hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction occurred on November 27,

2023. The circuit court stated there was “clear animosity with this family” and described the

issue between the parties as their inability to meet to equally divide decedent’s property.

-2- ¶9 Plaintiff informed the circuit court he was temporarily residing in a hotel in

Illinois but needed to return to his home in Montana.

¶ 10 Defendant Brandt testified all the heirs, except for plaintiff, had agreed to meet on

October 1, 2023, to identify the personal property they wanted. He stated plaintiff ignored their

requests to meet. He said plaintiff had provided a list of personal items he wanted, which were

gathered and stored separately. He said decedent’s home, where the property was located, had

been sold. The personal property had been boxed and stored in storage lockers, some of which

were stored at defendant Michael’s residence.

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Brandt conceded plaintiff requested to view the property in

September 2023, when he was in town, but he was denied access to the property.

¶ 12 On redirect examination, Brandt explained plaintiff had been denied access to the

property in September 2023 because he had threatened to take all the inheritance and one of

decedent’s daughters, Renee, had not yet finished sorting and packing all of the property.

¶ 13 Michael testified the list of items plaintiff had requested were boxed and stored.

All other property that was not expressly listed by the heirs was at his residence. He said he

would be willing to let plaintiff come view the items at his home in the presence of a sheriff’s

deputy.

¶ 14 Plaintiff testified there were a handful of property items unaccounted for that he

wished to recover.

¶ 15 Decedent’s daughter, Kristine, testified she had not agreed to meet on October 1,

2023.

¶ 16 Decedent’s daughter, Georgene, testified she had not agreed to meet on October

1, 2023.

-3- ¶ 17 The circuit court granted the preliminary injunction. In January 2024, in a written

order, the court instructed the heirs to review and take possession of property separately stored

based on their respective lists. The order prohibited defendants from selling or disposing of any

property until after a hearing scheduled for February 1, 2024.

¶ 18 The matter was subsequently continued multiple times. On each occasion, the

preliminary injunction was extended until further order of the circuit court.

¶ 19 In August 2025, defendants filed a “Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction,”

arguing the circuit court should dissolve the preliminary injunction because the firm that

represented plaintiff had acted adversely to the interests of its former clients, Renee and Kristine.

The motion also argued the continued prohibition of the sale of estate property was contrary to

the intent and terms of decedent’s will. A hearing on the motion occurred on March 24, 2026.

¶ 20 Prior to evidence being heard, defendants contended the prior attorney who

represented plaintiff, Renee, and Kristine did so under an actual conflict of interest because

Renee and Kristine had expressly told counsel not to pursue the original preliminary injunction.

The circuit court noted decedent’s will did not permit defendants to sell the personal property in

dispute.

¶ 21 On direct examination, Michael was asked about his efforts to supply plaintiff

with the property he had requested. Plaintiff objected to the question as being outside the scope

of the motion. The circuit court sustained the objection. Michael stated more than 270 days had

passed since decedent’s death. By way of an offer of proof, Michael said he had provided

plaintiff with “two truck loads” of the property requested. Michael did not recall any other heir

taking two truckloads of property from the estate. He recalled completing a list of items for

plaintiff prior to the sale of decedent’s home. He said plaintiff continued to provide lists of items,

-4- as there were six lists of requested property. He recounted some of the specific items plaintiff

requested and said, “[w]e gave him all we had. So, we filled everything we possibly could.” He

then noted the costs of storing the property and concerns regarding delaying the sale of the

remaining property.

¶ 22 Defendants argued the preliminary injunction was crafted to prohibit the sale of

any estate property before 270 days had passed after decedent’s death. They contended the 270-

day time period had long since passed, making the preliminary injunction no longer necessary.

Defendants conceded some property had been sold prior to the preliminary injunction being

ordered. Plaintiff argued the preliminary injunction had remained in place beyond the 270 days,

not only to prevent the sale of property but also to continue his pending action to remove

defendants as executors of decedent’s estate.

¶ 23 The circuit court denied defendants’ motion. The court noted its frustration with

the parties and the poor attempts to permit plaintiff to view the property in defendants’

possession. The court said the matter would remain “status quo until the trial is done.” The court

then stated:

“Nothing is going anywhere because the will has, the terms of the will

have already been violated. I’ve said that on a multitude of occasions.

So, you can take it however you want it, but I’m not gonna just

authorize things to be sold which was done without authority in the first

place.”

¶ 24 This appeal followed.

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26 Before we address defendants’ arguments on appeal, we must first address their

-5- request for a de novo standard of review. Defendants contend the circuit court made no factual

findings, but instead, refused to dissolve the preliminary injunction based on its interpretation of

decedent’s will. Accordingly, they argue we should review the court’s construction of the will

and legal conclusions de novo. See In re Estate of White, 2020 IL App (4th) 190385, ¶ 11 (“We

review de novo a [circuit] court’s legal conclusions as to the construction and legal effect of a

will.”).

¶ 27 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 28 “A preliminary injunction preserves the status quo until the merits of the case are

decided.” Alms v. Peoria County Election Comm’n, 2022 IL App (4th) 220976, ¶ 25. It is within

the broad discretion of the circuit court whether or not to dissolve a preliminary injunction.

McHenry County Sheriff v. McHenry County Department of Health, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339,

¶ 22. “The only issue before the appellate court when reviewing the denial of a motion to

dissolve a [TRO or preliminary injunction] is whether the [circuit] court abused its discretion.”

Id. “Substantive issues are to be considered only insofar as it is necessary to determine whether

the court abused its discretion.” Id.

¶ 29 Here the substantive issue—relevant to the standard of review—is the disputed

interpretation of decedent’s will. However, we may only consider this disputed interpretation

insomuch as it is necessary to determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion when

denying defendants’ motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Id. Therefore, we decline

defendants’ invitation to review this matter de novo and will apply an abuse-of-discretion

standard of review.

¶ 30 B. Defendants’ Arguments

¶ 31 On appeal, defendants argue the circuit court erred when denying their motion to

-6- dissolve the preliminary injunction because (1) the plain language of the will permitted the sale

or disposal of estate property now that 270 days had lapsed since decedent’s death, (2) the

evidence showed plaintiff had received all estate property requested that was in defendants’

possession, (3) Sauvage v. Gallaway, 331 Ill. App. 309 (1947), as briefly argued by plaintiff at

the hearing, is both distinguishable and inapplicable to the instant matter, and (4) plaintiff has an

alternative remedy at law, thereby making the preliminary injunction unnecessary. We address

each claim in turn.

¶ 32 First, defendants argue the circuit court refused to consider any other

interpretation of the will’s 270-day provision for selling or disposing of estate property. They

cite the dictionary definition of “within” to mean “no later than” and argue the 270-day provision

is ambiguous. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/within?src=search-dict-box, (Last visited June 8, 2026) (defining

“within” as a “situation or circumstance in the limits or compass of,” “before the end of”).

¶ 33 Alternatively, defendants argue that, even if the circuit court was correct in its

interpretation of the 270-day provision, the lack of an agreement on the estate property would not

impede them from selling or otherwise disposing of the estate property after 270 days had

passed. According to the plain language of the will, appellants contend the court should have

dissolved the preliminary injunction and permitted them to sell or dispose of the estate property.

¶ 34 The evidence at the hearing to dissolve the injunction showed defendants had

contended there was no property in their possession of which plaintiff had requested and

anything he had previously requested had been provided to him. Plaintiff had previously

contended he was not aware of what estate property was in defendants’ possession. Indeed,

evidence from the preliminary injunction hearing supported plaintiff had been denied access to

-7- view estate property in defendants’ possession. The circuit court straightforwardly explained the

reason it had granted the preliminary injunction and the reason it had refused to dissolve it was

because plaintiff had been unable to view the estate property. This is the crux of the factual

dispute: What property is in defendants’ possession, and is plaintiff entitled to any of it? The

court was prepared to have a trial to resolve this issue.

¶ 35 Defendants, on appeal, would have this court bypass the triable issue and interpret

the will in their favor to undercut a need for trial. However, we need not interpret decedent’s will

on review because the applicable “standard governing the [circuit] court’s judgment on a motion

to dissolve a [preliminary injunction] is whether the party in whose favor the order was issue has

demonstrated a fair question as to the existence of its rights.” McHenry County Sheriff, 2020 IL

App (2d) 200339, ¶ 23. “The [circuit] court may deny the motion to dissolve if the party in

whose favor the order was issued demonstrates, to the court’s satisfaction, that the matter out of

which the rights arise should be preserved until a decision on the merits.” Id. Here, plaintiff

sought to exercise his right to seek an agreement as to the equitable division of the estate

property. Defendants, however, argue there was no further need for an agreement. This is the

triable issue the court was seeking to address. We find the record shows plaintiff demonstrated a

fair question as to the existence of his rights. Accordingly, we find the court did not abuse its

discretion when denying defendants’ motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

¶ 36 We decline to address defendants’ arguments concerning Sauvage because the

case was briefly mentioned by plaintiff in argument and was not relevant to the circuit court’s

determination denying the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. See Wilson v. Illinois

Benedictine College, 112 Ill. App. 3d 932, 936 (1983) (“A reviewing court will not consider

questions or contentions which are not essential to the determination of the case before it.”).

-8- ¶ 37 Lastly, defendants argue the original purpose of the preliminary injunction has

been made moot by the fact that they have no estate property plaintiff seeks. They note a

necessary element of a preliminary injunction is no adequate remedy at law. See Alms, 2022 IL

App (4th) 220976, ¶ 25 (stating no adequate remedy at law is a necessary element a party

seeking a preliminary injunction must show). From here, defendants contend any estate property,

whether lost, sold, or donated prior to, or even after, decedent’s death, cannot be recovered by

plaintiff through the preliminary injunction. As such, plaintiff could only seek monetary damages

for disputed estate property, thereby showing an alternative and adequate remedy at law.

¶ 38 “Arguments pertaining to the issuance of the [preliminary injunction] but

unnecessary to resolving the question of the [circuit] court’s exercise of discretion in ruling on

the motion to dissolve are irrelevant.” McHenry County Sheriff, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339, ¶ 22.

As we stated earlier, we have found the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when denying

defendants’ motion. Defendants’ argument attacking the original basis for the preliminary

injunction is irrelevant. Therefore, we find defendants’ argument challenging the original basis

for the preliminary injunction unpersuasive.

¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 40 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 41 Affirmed.

-9-