In Re: Est. of R.T., Appeal of: N.H.T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 11, 2025
• Docket: 2708 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A18017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ESTATE OF: ROBERT : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TORRENS, DECEASED : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: NANCY H. TORRENS : : : : : No. 2708 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 18, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Orphans' Court at No(s): 0292-2021-O

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2025

Nancy H. Torrens (“Torrens”) appeals from the decree entered by the

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court (“orphans’ court”)

sustaining the preliminary objections of Stephen Carroll, Esquire (“Carroll”),

Donald W. Torrens (“Mr. Torrens”), and Stefanie Davis (“Davis”) (collectively

“Respondents”) to Torrens’ petition for citation to show cause why the

admission of the will of Robert W. Torrens (“Decedent”) should not be revoked

(“Petition to Revoke”). Torrens argues that the orphan’s court erred in

determining that her challenge to Decedent’s will was time barred under 20

Pa.C.S. § 908(a). As we agree with the orphans’ court that Torrens’ challenge

to Decedent’s will violates the statute of limitations, we affirm.

On January 10, 2008, the orphans’ court issued a decree adjudicating

Decedent an incapacitated person who was unable to manage his personal J-A18017-25

and financial affairs. The decree appointed Carroll guardian of his estate and

Torrens guardian of Decedent’s person. On June 18, 2010, Decedent executed

a last will and testament in which he made specific monetary bequests to his

parents and siblings, and left the residuary of his estate to his four children.

The will also named Decedent’s father, Mr. Torrens, executor and his

daughter, Davis, as the successor executrix in the event Mr. Torrens was

unable to serve as executor of the estate. Decedent’s will made no provision

for Torrens. In the intervening years, Decedent and Torrens entered into

divorce proceedings, which resulted in a property settlement agreement on

September 14, 2017. It is unclear from the record whether the divorce was

ever finalized.

Decedent died on February 8, 2021. Carroll submitted Decedent’s will

to probate with the Delaware County Register of Wills (“register of wills”) on

March 10, 2021. The register of wills subsequently admitted Decedent’s will

to probate and appointed Mr. Torrens executor of Decedent’s estate.

On July 21, 2021, Torrens filed a petition to audit Decedent’s estate in

which she alleged, inter alia, that she was legally Decedent’s wife at the time

of his death and that Carroll had been mismanaging Decedent’s estate as its

guardian prior to Decedent’s death. See Petition to Audit Estate, 7/21/2021,

¶¶ 1, 9, 11. In addition to an independent audit of Decedent’s estate, Torrens

sought, inter alia, a decree that Decedent’s will was null and void, the award

of the entirety of Decedent’s estate, and the removal of Mr. Torrens as

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executor. See id. ¶ 14. On August 23, 2021, Torrens filed an emergency

petition in which she again alleged that she and Decedent never finalized their

divorce, and that she was “erroneously and particularly excluded from

inheriting” Decedent’s estate. Emergency Petition, 8/23/2021, ¶¶ 4, 7.

Consequently, the orphans’ court entered a decree staying the probate of

Decedent’s estate. Torrens filed a second emergency petition on September

3, 2021, in which she raised allegations similar to those in her first emergency

petition and again accused Carroll of mismanaging Decedent’s estate. See

Emergency Petition, 9/3/2021. Carroll filed preliminary objections to Torrens’

various petitions. On October 29, 2021, the orphans’ court entered a decree

sustaining Carroll’s preliminary objections and dismissing with prejudice

Torrens’ petition to audit Decedent’s estate and both emergency petitions.

On July 22, 2022, Torrens filed a petition for hearing in which she once

again asserted that Decedent had erroneously excluded her from his will.

Petition for a Hearing, 7/22/2022, ¶ 16. Torrens further asserted that

Decedent was not of “sound mind” to properly execute a will and stated that

she intended to file a formal challenge contesting the validity of Decedent’s

will and its admission to probate. Id. ¶¶ 17-20.

On October 3, 2023, Carroll again submitted Decedent’s will to probate,

but this time requested that Davis be substituted for Mr. Torrens as successor

executrix of Decedent’s estate. The register of wills once again admitted

Decedent’s will for probate and appointed Davis as executrix.

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On January 25, 2024, Torrens filed her Petition to Revoke. She filed

amended Petitions to Revoke on March 4, 2024, and April 15, 2024. Torrens

alleged that both the property settlement agreement relating to the

dissolution of her marriage to Decedent and Decedent’s will were legal nullities

because Decedent lacked the capacity to execute either document. See

Second Amended Petition to Revoke, 4/15/2024, ¶¶ 50, 52, 59. Torrens

maintained that Carroll had committed fraud on the register of wills because

he submitted a will to probate that Decedent had signed even though Carroll

was aware that Decedent was an incapacitated person incapable of executing

a written instrument. See id. ¶¶ 56-57. Thus, Torrens contended that her

petition challenging the admission of Decedent’s will to probate was not

subject to the one-year statute of limitations for such petitions under 20

Pa.C.S. § 908(a). See Second Amended Petition to Revoke, 4/15/2024, ¶ 58.

Respondents filed preliminary objections in which they asserted, inter alia,

that Torrens’ challenge to Decedent’s will was time barred by the one-year

statute of limitations under section 908(a).

On September 18, 2024, following a hearing on Torrens’ Petition to

Revoke and Respondents’ preliminary objections, the orphans’ court entered

a decree sustaining Respondents’ preliminary objection regarding the statute

of limitations and dismissing Torrens’ petition with prejudice. Torrens timely

appealed to this Court. Both Torrens and the orphans’ court have complied

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with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. Torrens presents the

following issues for review:

A. Did the [orphans’ court], in granting the preliminary objections demurring to [Torrens’ Petition to Revoke] and dismissing with prejudice the petition, abuse its discretion and commit error as a matter of law, in reliance upon documents attached to the preliminary objections and in finding that when Torrens learned she had been injured by her disinheritance was the same as when she learned the cause of her injury?

B. Did the [orphans’ court] abuse [its] discretion and commit error as a matter of law in determining the question of fact when Torrens knew or should have known the cause of her injury?

C. Did the [orphans’ court] have subject matter jurisdiction of Torrens’ petition when it failed to issue a citation?

Torrens’ Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

As Torrens’ first and second issues are related, we address them

together. Torrens argues that the orphans’ court erred in sustaining

Respondents’ preliminary objection and finding that she failed to raise a claim

upon which relief could be granted because her claim that Decedent’s will was

invalid was barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at 16-23. Torrens

asserts that her claim regarding the validity of Decedent’s will was not time

barred because Carroll had committed fraud on the register of wills by

submitting Decedent’s will to probate knowing that the orphans’ court had

adjudicated Decedent a totally incapacitated person that was incapable of

executing a written instrument. See id. She baldly contends that she could

not have sooner contested Decedent’s will and that it is a question of fact as

to when she knew or should have known that Decedent’s will was invalid. See

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id. at 32-36. Torrens further asserts that the orphans’ court, in reaching its

decision to sustain Respondents’ preliminary objection regarding the statute

of limitations, improperly relied on documents that Respondents submitted

with their filing. See id. at 23-30. Torrens argues that the orphans’ court

could only rely on facts she admitted in her Petition to Revoke. See id.

In reviewing a trial court’s grant of preliminary objections, the standard

of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Caltagirone v.

Cephalon, Inc., 190 A.3d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2018). “Preliminary

objections in the nature of a demurrer require the court to resolve the issues

solely on the basis of the pleadings; no testimony or other evidence outside

of the complaint may be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented

by the demurrer.” Id. (citation omitted).

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections.

This Court will reverse the trial court’s decision regarding preliminary objections only where there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion.

Godlove v. Humes, 303 A.3d 477, 481 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations omitted).

Section 908(a) of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code states:

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Any party in interest seeking to challenge the probate of a will or who is otherwise aggrieved by a decree of the register, or a fiduciary whose estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom to the court within one year of the decree: Provided, That the executor designated in an instrument shall not by virtue of such designation be deemed a party in interest who may appeal from a decree refusing probate of it. The court, upon petition of a party in interest, may limit the time for appeal to three months.

20 Pa.C.S. § 908(a).

The record reflects that the register of wills admitted Decedent’s will to

probate on March 10, 2021, almost three years before Torrens filed her

Petition to Revoke Decedent’s Will on January 25, 2024. See Second

Amended Petition to Revoke, 4/15/2024, ¶ 24. Torrens never appealed the

admission of Decedent’s will to probate in the years that followed. The record

further reflects that in the intervening years, although she never contested

Decedent’s will, Torrens filed various petitions relating to Carroll’s

guardianship of Decedent’s estate and her exclusion from Decedent’s will.

Throughout each of these various filings, Torrens frequently acknowledged

Decedent’s incapacity dating back to 2008, the terms of Decedent’s will, its

admission to probate, and her exclusion from the will.

For example, in her petition to audit Decedent’s estate, which she filed

on July 21, 2021, Torrens acknowledged that she was aware Mr. Torrens was

the executor of Decedent’s estate and that she was familiar with various terms

of Decedent’s will. See Petition to Audit Decedent’s Estate, 7/21/2021, ¶¶ 5,

9-10. Similarly, in her first and second emergency petitions, which she filed

in August and September 2021, Torrens alleged that she was “erroneously

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and particularly excluded from inheriting from Decedent’s Last Will and

Testament.” See First Emergency Petition, 8/23/2021, ¶ 6; Second

Emergency Petition, 9/3/2021, ¶ 8. In none of these filings, however, did

Torrens ever contest the validity of Decedent’s will.

Furthermore, on July 22, 2022, sixteen months after the admission of

Decedent’s will to probate, Torrens filed a petition for a hearing in which she

again acknowledged the terms of Decedent’s will, as well as Decedent’s

incapacity. See Petition for a Hearing, 7/22/2022, ¶¶ 15-18. She also alleged

in this petition that Decedent was not of “sound mind,” and thus incapable of

executing a last will and testament. See id. ¶¶ 18-19. Torrens even stated

that she intended to file a formal challenge to Decedent’s will. Id. ¶ 20.

Despite expressly claiming the invalidity of Decedent’s will in the petition for

a hearing, Torrens did not file an actual challenge to Decedent’s will and

attempt to revoke its admission from probate until January 25, 2024.

Even if we accepted as true Torrens’ claim that Carroll committed fraud

upon the register of wills by submitting Decedent’s will to probate when

Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute a last will and testament,

it would not provide a basis to avoid the statutory time bar of section 908.

The facts of record—including Torrens’ own admissions in her petitions and

pleadings—reveal that Torrens knew that Decedent had been declared

incapacitated in 2008, as she admits in her appellate brief the orphans’ court

named her the guardian of Decedent’s person at that time. Torrens’ Brief at

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8. She has also asserted throughout her various filings that Decedent lacked

the capacity to execute a will. See, e.g., Petition for a Hearing, 7/22/2022,

¶¶ 18-19. Torrens’ claim that, until recently, she lacked the knowledge that

Carroll submitted Decedent’s allegedly invalid will for probate is entirely belied

by the record, as such a claim contradicts all her previous petitions and

pleadings that she has filed and admissions that she has made throughout the

entirety of this case.

We also find unavailing Torrens’ claim that the orphans’ court

impermissibly relied on the documents that were not appended to her Petition

to Revoke. See Torrens’ Brief at 29. It is true that “[p]reliminary objections

in the nature of a demurrer require the court to resolve the issues solely on

the basis of the pleadings” and that “no testimony or other evidence outside

of the complaint may be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented

by the demurrer.” Caltagirone, 190 A.3d at 599. However, Torrens cites

nothing that would support the proposition that the orphans’ court should have

ignored Torrens’ own filings and admissions, all of which are of record in this

matter, simply because Respondents filed preliminary objections.

The orphans’ court did nothing more than rely on the existing record in

reaching its decision. Thus, the orphans’ court plainly did not err in

considering these documents in sustaining Respondents’ preliminary objection

relating to the time bar of section 908(a), and Torrens’ argument to the

contrary is meritless.

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Accordingly, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not err in

determining that her challenge to the validity of Decedent’s will and its

admission to probate is time barred pursuant to section 908(a). Her first and

second issues therefore do not entitle her to relief.

In her third issue, Torrens argues that the orphans’ court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to dispose of the Petition to Revoke because the court did

not issue citations to several beneficiaries of Decedent’s will. Torrens’ Brief at

36-39. Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Rule 3.5 states, in pertinent part, as

follows:

When personal jurisdiction is required and has not previously been obtained or conferred by statute, or when a citation is otherwise required by statute, the petition shall include a preliminary decree for the issuance of a citation to those interested parties for whom a citation is necessary to show cause why the relief requested in the petition should not be granted.

Pa.O.C.R. 3.5(a)(1).

Although Torrens purports to raise an issue of subject matter

jurisdiction, she has, in fact, raised an issue of personal jurisdiction. Indeed,

section 764 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code provides, in pertinent

part that “[j]urisdiction of the person shall be obtained by citation to be

awarded by the orphans’ court division upon application of any party in

interest.” 20 Pa.C.S. § 764. Thus, pursuant to section 764, matters relating

to the issuance of citations are issues of personal jurisdiction, not subject

matter jurisdiction. See id.

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Therefore, the issue that Torrens in fact raises is that because her

Petition to Revoke included a decree under Rule 3.5(a)(1) for the issuance of

citations and the orphans’ court never issued citations to several beneficiaries

of Decedent’s will, the court lacked personal jurisdiction to settle claims

against those who were not parties to the proceedings. See Torrens’ Brief at

37-38; see also In re Miller’s Estate, 28 A. 441, 441-42 (Pa. 1894) (holding

that where the heirs of a decedent are not voluntarily parties to an issue

regarding the validity of a will, or have not been brought into a will dispute by

citation, the orphans’ court has no jurisdiction to settle the validity of the will

against the heirs that were not parties to the proceedings). As the orphans’

court observes, however, Torrens failed to raise this claim at any point prior

to filing her notice of appeal and has therefore waived the issue. See Orphans’

Court Opinion, 1/23/2025, at 12-13; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not

raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.”).1

Torrens intentionally attempts to conflate the orphans’ court’s subject

matter jurisdiction with a question of personal jurisdiction because issues of

subject matter jurisdiction are not waivable.2 See Roman v. McGuire

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1 Additionally, we note that the orphans’ court did not decide any claims or issues against any beneficiaries of Decedent’s will.

2 Indeed, Torrens raised this precise argument in her Rule 1925(b) statement as a question of personal jurisdiction. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, ¶ 5. She (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Mem’l, 127 A.3d 26, 31 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that issues of “subject

matter jurisdiction is non-waivable and can be raised at any time, by any

party, and by a court sua sponte”). “Subject matter jurisdiction relates to the

competency of a court to hear and decide the type of controversy presented.”

Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc., 291 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted). “By jurisdiction over the subject-matter is meant the nature of the

cause of action and of the relief sought[.]” Id. (citation omitted). Section

711, subsections (1) and (18) of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code,

expressly state that an orphans’ court has subject matter jurisdiction over the

administration and distribution of a decedent’s estate and appeals from

registers. 20 Pa.C.S. § 711(1), (18). Thus, an orphans’ court has jurisdiction

over a challenge to a will’s validity and its admission to probate. See id. The

question of whether the orphans’ court should have revoked the admission of

Decedent’s will to probate was precisely the question Torrens raised in this

case. The orphans’ court therefore plainly had subject matter jurisdiction over

Torrens’ Petition to Revoke and her third issue does not entitle her to relief.

Decree affirmed.

presumably amended her argument in her brief before this Court following her receipt of the orphans’ court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, wherein it found her personal jurisdiction claim waived.

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Date: 9/11/2025

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