In Re: Est. of Miller, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 25, 2023
• Docket: 1666 MDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S21034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ESTATE OF ALVENA T. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MILLER, DECEASED : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: RONALD A. MILLER : : : : : No. 1666 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered October 31, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Orphans’ Court at No(s): OC-18-0141

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: JULY 25, 2023

Ronald A. Miller (Miller) appeals from the decree entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Northumberland County (orphans’ court) finding that he

breached his fiduciary duty as the Executor of the estate of his mother, Alvena

T. Miller (Decedent). Miller challenges the orphans’ court’s determination that

a gifting agreement Decedent executed before her death was the product of

his undue influence. We affirm.

I.

A.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Decedent passed away in June of 2015 at the age of 93 and was suffering

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S21034-23

from advanced dementia at the time. Decedent named her son, Miller, as the

Executor in her will and her three grandsons as the beneficiaries to share

equally in her estate.

Miller did not submit Decedent’s will for probate until he was directed to

do so by court order in October of 2017, over two years after Decedent’s

death. Miller was issued letters testamentary and he listed the value of

Decedent’s personal property in the estate at $900. Miller ignored several

court orders to provide an accounting and he averred that a safe deposit box

owned by Decedent was empty at her death. Miller filed a first and final

accounting on December 18, 2019, over two years after he was appointed

Executor. Miller’s brother, Joseph Miller, Jr. (J.M.) and his son, Joseph Miller

III, filed objections contending that several estate assets were not included in

the accounting including $42,525 in cash, numerous coins, silver items and

the contents of Decedent’s safe deposit box.1

B.

The orphans’ court held multiple hearings in April of 2021 and August of

2022 at which several witnesses testified concerning Decedent’s mental

condition in the years leading up to her death. Relevant to this appeal, the

testimony also addressed the validity of a gifting agreement Decedent

1 Decedent named Miller’s two sons and Joseph Miller III as the beneficiaries

of her will, executed in March of 2014.

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executed in July of 2014 giving a valuable coin and currency collection to Miller

only. This document was prepared by Frank William Garrigan, Esq.,

approximately four months after Decedent executed her will. Miller and

Attorney Garrigan have a professional relationship in that Miller is the

Executive Director of the Shamokin Housing Authority and Attorney Garrigan

is the solicitor.

Miller testified that during the course of the administration of Decedent’s

estate, he did not take anything to which he was not entitled. Miller stated

that he gave his attorney approximately $5,000 in coins for deposit in the

estate account. (See N.T. Hearing, 4/20/21, at 79-80). Miller explained that

Decedent had directed him not to bury her with her jewelry on, that he had

placed her diamond engagement ring in her jewelry box, and that the box

“disappeared” after she died. (Id. at 83). He averred that he did not take

the box or any of the jewelry belonging to his mother.

Miller also testified that prior to her death, Decedent had placed several

coins and a detailed list stating their denomination and minting information in

a safe deposit box in his name at Susquehanna Bank. Miller indicated that he

removed the contents of the safe deposit box around the time of her death

because she gifted it to him through the gifting agreement prepared by

Attorney Garrigan in 2014. Miller stated that he drove Decedent to Attorney

Garrigan’s office to execute the gifting agreement while en route to her sister’s

home for one of their regular visits. (See id. at 88).

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On cross-examination, Miller acknowledged that Decedent had made a

will in March of 2014 and that he had contacted Attorney Garrigan to prepare

it. However, he denied having any knowledge of the terms of the will,

including that he had been named the sole Executor until after Decedent died.

Miller relayed that Decedent had given him an envelope containing the will

and instructed him not to open it until her death. He averred that he opened

the envelope at a family meeting on July 18, 2015, about three weeks after

she died. (See id. at 102). Miller also indicated that before Decedent died,

he and his brother J.M. found $42,000 in cash in her freezer in April of 2015.

(See id. at 106). Miller testified that when he asked Decedent what to do

with it, she said: “Give it to your children.” (Id. at 112). Counsel for Miller

stipulated that the $42,000 transfer from Decedent to his children was not

recorded on the inheritance tax return he filed and that the gifting agreement

was not listed on that return.

Attorney Garrigan testified that he prepared Decedent’s will in March of

2014 and she had indicated that she wanted Miller to be the Executor and her

three grandsons to be the beneficiaries, to share equally. Attorney Garrigan

indicated that they did not discuss her assets in detail because she had no

specific bequests and there was no need for a capacity determination because

she was “perfectly lucid.” (N.T. Trial, 8/23/22, at 43). He relayed that if he

had taken any notes regarding Decedent’s will, they were likely destroyed

when the document was executed. Attorney Garrigan testified that he

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prepared the gifting agreement on July 24, 2014, at Decedent’s request

because she wanted to give her coin collection to Miller. He relayed that she

brought an extensive 30-page handwritten attachment that she had prepared

detailing the coin collection to his office and he attached the list to the one-

page gifting agreement.

On cross-examination, Attorney Garrigan acknowledged that Miller is

one of his clients, that they share a professional relationship, and that Miller

may have referred Decedent to him to draft her will. He testified that he did

not know anything about Decedent’s medical condition, nor did he ask about

it “because she completely seemed to understand everything that was going

on.” (Id. at 53). With regard to the gifting agreement, he explained that

Decedent wanted to put the gift in writing to avoid fighting within the family

about the coins, and he indicated that Miller was not in the room when she

signed it.

Dr. Gurdial Singh testified as a medical expert, board certified in

psychiatry. He had conducted an examination of Decedent and was consulted

to treat her on three occasions in February, April and May of 2015. During

the first consultation, Decedent was in the hospital because of a fall, at which

time she appeared confused and was unable to provide any information as to

where she was or why she was there. Dr. Singh relayed that Decedent “was

able to tell her date of birth, but not much of anything else. And she thought

she was in a church at the time.” (Id. at 12). Dr. Singh stated his psychiatric

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impression that Decedent was suffering from advanced dementia, that she

had dementia for at least five or six years, and that she was not capable of

making financial decisions.

During Dr. Singh’s second consultation with Decedent, she was in a

nursing home and was more confused than in the initial visit. He observed

that she was argumentative, disruptive and was wandering into and out of

rooms. Dr. Singh testified that when he saw Decedent in May of 2015, she

had declined further and her behavioral problems were progressing. When

asked about Decedent’s ability to make the financial gift to Miller one year

prior, Dr. Singh indicated that Decedent was likely suffering from dementia at

that time, with impaired judgment and lack of capacity to reason or process

information.

On cross-examination, Dr. Singh clarified that he did not meet with

Decedent in July of 2014, and that although he believed she would have had

dementia at that time, he could not categorize the degree of severity. (See

id. at 20-21). However, Dr. Singh stated that at the time he first saw

Decedent, she already had severe dementia, and that six months prior to that,

she would have had at least moderately severe dementia because the

hallmark of the disease is a slow and gradual progression.

J.M. testified that he observed Decedent’s mental condition begin to

deteriorate in 2012-2013 in that she would mix up her pills, forget to turn the

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stove off and had trouble remembering names and people. He was not aware

of the gifting agreement concerning his brother until the hearing.

In contrast, Decedent’s niece Carol Tressler testified that she visited

with the Decedent on a weekly basis in March-July of 2014 and she did not

have concerns about Decedent’s medical condition or her ability to follow

conversations during that timeframe. Ms. Tressler did notice a change in

Decedent’s behavior in 2015 when she entered the nursing home.

Alakananda Chakrabarty, M.D., testified by deposition as an expert

witness, board certified in internal medicine. Dr. Chakrabarty treated

Decedent for several medical conditions, including coronary heart disease,

stroke and dementia/Alzheimer’s disease from about 2013 until 2015. (See

N.T. Deposition, 4/13/22, at 6-7). Decedent had already been diagnosed with

dementia in 2013 and she was taking medication for the disease, which Dr.

Chakrabarty described as progressive, causing cognitive impairment and

memory loss. Dr. Chakrabarty indicated that although she could not state for

certain the degree to which Decedent was cognitively impaired on the day she

executed her will, she would have had at least moderate degrees of dementia

at that time. Dr. Chakrabarty indicated that dementia patients can be easily

influenced and taken advantage of because they are incapable of

understanding whether a decision is favorable to them. Dr. Chakrabarty

opined that during the time she treated Decedent, she was not capable of

making sound decisions about her own health or well-being. (See id. at 14).

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C.

On October 31, 2022, the orphans’ court entered its decree finding that

Miller breached his fiduciary duty as Executor of Decedent’s estate; had

obtained and failed to include $44,908 in coins in the estate and retained items

including stained glass and a shot gun for himself; Decedent was suffering

from advanced dementia when she made the gifting agreement giving a

portion of her estate to Miller in July of 2014 and was subject to undue

influence rendering the document void. The orphans’ court ordered Miller to

return to the estate all sums received under the gifting agreement, pay a

surcharge of $2,500 to the estate, forfeit his commission and reimburse

petitioners’ legal fees and costs. (See Decree, 10/31/22, at 1-2). Miller

timely appealed and he and the court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)-(b). In its Rule 1925 opinion, the orphans’ court stated its

determinations that Miller was in a confidential relationship status with

Decedent for purposes of his undue influence decision and that, without any

justification, Miller engaged in dilatory tactics before and after Decedent’s

death to retain her funds and assets for his own benefit, to the exclusion of

the proper beneficiaries. (See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/09/23, at 3-4).

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II.

On appeal, Miller challenges the orphans’ court’s determination that the

gifting agreement is invalid as a product of undue influence.2 Miller first

disputes the court’s finding that he and Decedent were in a confidential

relationship, where the record shows that he was not involved in her financial

and estate planning decisions and that Decedent instead sought out and

obtained the counsel of Attorney Garrigan. (See Miller’s Brief, at 16-27).

Miller next maintains that even if he were in a confidential relationship with

Decedent, any presumption of undue influence was rebutted by the testimony

of Attorney Garrigan which shows that Decedent independently executed the

gifting agreement and there is no evidence that Miller exercised an

overmastering influence on her. (See id. at 27-30). Lastly, Miller disputes

2 Our standard of review of the findings of an orphans’ court is deferential.

When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans’ Court, this Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error and the court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence. Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that discretion.

However, we are not constrained to give the same deference to any resulting legal conclusions. Where the rules of law on which the court relied are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, we will reverse the court’s decree.

In re Estate of Walter, 191 A.3d 873, 878–79 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted).

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the court’s finding that Decedent lacked the capacity to execute the gifting

agreement where Attorney Garrigan and Ms. Tressler testified that they did

not have concerns about Decedent’s mental state, while the testimony of Drs.

Singh and Chakrabarty was “speculative as to the date of the Gifting

Agreement.” (Id. at 37; see id. at 31-38).3

We begin by observing that “undue influence is a subtle, intangible and

illusive thing, generally accomplished by a gradual, progressive inculcation of

a receptive mind.” In re Staico, 143 A.3d 983, 990 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted). “Because the occurrence of undue influence is so often

obscured by both circumstance and design, our Courts have recognized that

its existence is best measured by its ultimate effect.” Id. (citation omitted).

Weakened intellect in the context of a claim of undue influence need not amount to testamentary incapacity and will generally be proven through evidence more remote in time from the actual date of the will’s execution. While Pennsylvania courts have not established a bright-line test by which weakened intellect can be identified to a legal certainty, they have recognized that it is typically accompanied by persistent confusion, forgetfulness and disorientation. Importantly, in an undue influence case, the Orphans’ Court has greater latitude to consider medical testimony describing a testator’s condition at a time remote from the date that the contested will was executed.

In re Estate of Byerley, 284 A.3d 1225, 1237–38 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citations and brackets omitted; emphasis added).

3 We address Miller’s issues, all of which concern the validity of the gifting agreement, together for ease of disposition. (See Miller’s Brief, at 5).

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The resolution of a question as to the existence of undue influence is inextricably linked to the assignment of the burden of proof. Once the proponent of the will in question establishes the proper execution of the will, a presumption of lack of undue influence arises; thereafter, the risk of non-persuasion and the burden of coming forward with evidence of undue influence shift to the contestant. The contestant must then establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a prima facie showing of undue influence by demonstrating that: (1) the testator suffered from a weakened intellect; (2) the testator was in a confidential relationship with the proponent of the will; and (3) the proponent receives a substantial benefit from the will in question. Once the contestant has established each prong of this tripartite test, the burden shifts again to the proponent to produce clear and convincing evidence which affirmatively demonstrates the absence of undue influence.

In re Staico, supra at 990 (citation omitted)

In this context, “a confidential relationship exists whenever

circumstances make it certain that the parties did not deal on equal terms but

that on the one side there was an overmastering influence, and on the other,

dependence or trust, justifiably reposed.” Id. at 991 (citation omitted). While

there is no precise formula for finding a confidential relationship, it will

generally be found when a person justifiably puts his trust in the hands of

another who possesses some overmastering influence, with confidence that it

will be used in the person’s best interests. See id.

In this case, Miller’s own testimony that he drove his mother twice a

week to visit relatives, discussed burial plans with her, took her engagement

ring for safekeeping and that she entrusted him with a copy of her will before

she died, undercuts his claim that they shared no confidential relationship.

Miller’s testimony also reflects that he referred Decedent to his colleague,

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Attorney Garrigan, for preparation of her estate planning documents and he

drove her to Attorney Garrigan’s office to execute her will, which named him

as the Executor. Additionally, Dr. Singh and Dr. Chakrabarty testified to the

susceptibility of dementia patients being taken advantage of by others, given

their inability to assess what is in their best interests and lack of capacity to

make sound financial decisions. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that

Miller had a confidential relationship with Decedent and took advantage of her

weakened condition to the detriment of her named beneficiaries.

With regard to Miller’s contention that any presumption of undue

influence was rebutted, he relies heavily on the testimony of Attorney Garrigan

and Ms. Tressler for the proposition that Decedent was lucid during the

timeframe she executed the gifting agreement and acted independently in

preparing it. However, the orphans’ court, as fact-finder, plainly did not find

the testimony of Attorney Garrigan credible in light of the extensive medical

testimony indicating to the contrary. Because we discern no abuse of

discretion in the orphans’ court’s credibility determinations, which are fully

supported by the record, we decline to disturb them. See In re Estate of

Walter, supra at 878.

Last, with respect to Miller’s contention that the evidence failed to

demonstrate Decedent’s lack of capacity to execute the gifting agreement, we

emphasize that “weakened intellect in the context of a claim of undue

influence need not amount to testamentary incapacity and will generally be

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proven through evidence more remote in time” from the date of execution of

the document, and can be identified using markers such as persistent

confusion, forgetfulness and disorientation. See In re Estate of Byerley,

supra at 1237.

Here, the orphans’ court heard testimony from two medical experts who

had treated Decedent over an extended period of time describe her as a long-

term dementia patient who was likely suffering from at least moderate

dementia when she executed the gifting agreement with impaired judgment

and lack of ability to reason, given her advanced disease and its hallmark of

a slow and gradual progression. J.M. likewise testified as one of Decedent’s

caretakers that he first noticed signs of her mental decline several years

before her death. Upon review of the record in conjunction with the findings

of the orphan’s court, we agree with its conclusion that Decedent was in a

steady mental decline rendering her incapable of making reasoned decisions

at the time she executed the gifting agreement.

In sum, because we find no merit to Miller’s challenges to the orphans’

court’s decision to set aside the gifting agreement as a product of undue

influence, we affirm its decree setting it aside as invalid.

Decree affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 07/25/2023

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