In Re Environment Plus, R. Alexander Conant, and Joshua Eames-Cepero v. the State of Texas

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-26-00537-CV

In re Environment Plus, Inc., R. Alexander Conant, and Joshua Eames-Cepero

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relators Environment Plus, Inc.; R. Alexander Conant; and Joshua Eames-Cepero have filed a mandamus petition challenging the trial court’s order imposing sanctions against them, jointly and severally, and requiring the sanctions to be paid within eleven days of the order. We conclude that the portions of the order imposing sanctions for relators’ actions in a prior, different proceeding are void, and we therefore direct the trial court to vacate those portions. We otherwise deny relief.

BACKGROUND

In July 2024, in Cause Number D-1-GN-24-004203 (the Contract Suit), real party in interest JRMG Solutions, LLC sued Environment Plus for its alleged failure to pay for contractual staffing services. The parties mediated their dispute, and the trial court rendered an agreed judgment of $60,000 in favor of JRMG. Thereafter, Environment Plus filed a motion for new trial and to set aside judgment, which the trial court denied; a motion to modify or reconsider the order denying its motion for new trial or, in the alternative, a request for findings

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of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court also denied; and then a formal bill of exception and offer of proof, to which JRMG responded in opposition. In February 2026, JRMG filed a motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees, challenging each of Environment Plus’s post-judgment motions and filings as being in violation of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 10.001, .004. On April 15, 2026, the court signed (1) an order dismissing JRMG’s motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees for want of jurisdiction, finding that its plenary power had already expired; and (2) its Judge-Prepared Bill of Exception stating that its bill “accurately reflects the proceedings in the trial court, as follows:

The record in this cause begins with Plaintiff’s Original Petition filed on July 8, 2024, and consists of everything that is filed into this cause up to and including the Order Denying Defendant Environment Plus, Inc.’s Motion to Modify or Reconsider Order on New Trial or in the Alternative Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, signed on February 4, 2026, which was the last exercise of the trial court’s plenary power in this cause and none further.”

Environment Plus perfected an appeal in this Court of the agreed judgment, which is pending under Cause Number 03-26-000114-CV.

Meanwhile, on January 8, 2026, JRMG filed in the trial court an application for a writ of garnishment to collect on the $60,000 agreed judgment in a separate proceeding, Cause Number D-1-GN-000145 (the Garnishment Proceeding). JRMG listed the debtor as Environment Plus and the garnishee as Bank of America, alleging that JRMG is entitled to a writ of garnishment to collect on the agreed judgment and attaching the affidavit of its owner, Jose Mata Guerra. A writ was issued, and thereafter Environment Plus filed an original answer,

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cross-claims, and emergency application to dissolve the writ of garnishment and later a renewed application to dissolve the writ of garnishment and to strike the affidavit of Guerra. JRMG filed a motion for sanctions and attorneys’ fees, moving the court to impose sanctions and award it the attorneys’ fees it incurred in responding to and defending against (1) Environment Plus’s post-judgment filings in the Contract Suit and (2) Environment Plus’s filings opposing the writ of garnishment in the Garnishment Proceeding.

After a hearing, the trial court signed an order (Sanctions Order) in the Garnishment Proceeding requiring relators to pay, jointly and severally, $47,516.56 to JRMG “for its reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees incurred to defend and respond to the post-judgment pleadings and related conduct as identified and described hereinabove including the efforts necessary in obtaining this Order, by 5:00 p.m. on June 19, 2026.” In the Sanctions Order’s Conclusions of Law (appearing in paragraphs 39–42 and 47–48), the trial court concluded that the following post-judgment filings of Environment Plus in the Contract Suit are “groundless and evince[] bad faith” and that JRMG incurred the following respective reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees in responding to or defending against each filing:

• Motion for New Trial and to Set Aside Agreed Judgment—$8,608.75;

• Motion to Modify or Reconsider Order on New Trial or in the Alternative Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law—$2,044; and • Formal Bill of Exception and Offer of Proof—$5,749.50.

The trial court additionally concluded that JRMG incurred the following reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees in responding to or against the following groundless and bad-faith filings of Environment Plus in the Garnishment Proceeding:

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• Original Answer, Cross-Claims, and Emergency Application to Dissolve Writ of Garnishment—$4,199; and • Renewed Sworn Application to Dissolve Writ of Garnishment and Strike Affidavit of Guerra—$6,390.

The trial court’s Sanctions Order also awarded JRMG $18,417.29 for the attorneys’ fees it incurred in seeking the recovery of sanctions and $2,108.02 it incurred for the hearing on its motion for sanctions, but the order did not segregate those amounts between JRMG’s efforts to obtain sanctions for Environment Plus’s post-judgment filings in the Contract Case and its filings opposing JRMG’s writ of garnishment in the Garnishment Proceeding.

Relators filed a “Motion to Defer Payment of Sanctions Until Final Judgment and to Stay the June 19, 2026 Payment Deadline.” In their motion, relators cited the supreme court’s Braden v. Downey opinion, see 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding), arguing that Braden required the trial court to defer the sanctions until final judgment so that relators would have the opportunity to supersede and have “meaningful [appellate] review of the order,” and because immediate payment would “threaten” their “ability to keep litigating this cause.” They did not support the motion with evidence or factual allegations beyond these general statements, and they did not request a hearing or set the motion for hearing, instead asking the court to consider the motion on submission, which the court did. The trial court signed a four-page order denying the motion to defer, concluding that relators’ reliance on Braden was “inapt and misplaced” and that “the sanctions imposed in this case do not have the preclusive effects of discovery sanctions under Rule 215 as discussed in Braden.”

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DISCUSSION

Relators initially contend that the portions of the trial court’s Sanctions Order identifying filings they made in the Contract Suit and awarding specified sanction amounts for each of those filings are void due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They additionally argue that the trial court abused its discretion (1) by sanctioning Environment Plus’s attorneys, Conant and Eames-Cepero, because they were not identified in the motion by name and did not have adequate notice and (2) by ordering joint-and-several liability against all three relators for the total sanctions amount because Rule 13 and Chapter 10 require the sanctions to be tied to the party or person who signs and files each sanctionable pleading or motion.

We agree with relators that the provisions of the Sanctions Order sanctioning conduct that occurred in the Contract Suit are void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See In re Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 415 S.W.3d 522, 530–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding) (holding that trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to sanction Department for its conduct in earlier, separate proceeding and that sanctions order was void, conditionally granting mandamus relief and directing trial court to vacate order); Greene v. Young, 174 S.W.3d 291, 301–02 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose Rule 13 sanctions concerning filings made in separate proceeding in bankruptcy court); see also In re Velte, 140 S.W.3d 709, 711–12 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, orig. proceeding) (concluding that trial court’s rendition of sanctions order after its plenary power had expired made such order void); Kenseth v. Dallas County, 126 S.W.3d 584, 600 (Tex App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (“A sanctions order must be tied to the portion of the proceedings in which the sanctionable conduct occurred,” and “[o]nce the court’s plenary power over that portion of the postjudgment

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proceedings had expired, the court had no more power to sanction for conduct within those proceedings.”).

When an order is void, mandamus relief is appropriate, without the necessity of showing the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We therefore direct the trial court to vacate the portions of the Sanctions Order imposing sanctions on relators for the conduct that occurred post-judgment in the Contract Suit.

As to the rest of the Sanctions Order, we deny the requested relief without considering whether the trial court abused its discretion because we conclude that on this record, relators have an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Preventative Pest Control Houston, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 455, 461–62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding) (“Ordinarily, relators have an adequate remedy by appeal from an order awarding sanctions.”); see also Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (observing that mandamus relief is appropriate only if trial court clearly abuses its discretion and there is no other adequate remedy at law). Although the supreme court’s Braden opinion established an exception to the general rule that an adequate remedy by appeal exists for a sanctions order, see 811 S.W.2d at 928–30, we hold that relators did not make the necessary allegations and showings to trigger the exception, see In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., No. 05-24-00447-CV, 2024 WL 4986164, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that under Braden process, relator challenging sanctions order must contend and allege facts showing that prepayment of sanctions before final judgment would preclude or substantially impact its access to court or significantly impair its willingness or ability to continue litigation); In re Preventative Pest Control, 580 S.W.3d at 461–62 (holding that relator

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had not made necessary allegation and showing to trigger Braden exception to general rule that adequate remedy by appeal exists).

In their motion to defer, relators contended that requiring payment of the sanctions by the deadline “would extinguish any meaningful review of the order and would threaten [their] ability to keep litigating this cause,” but they did not allege facts that would establish the immediate-payment requirement would have a preclusive effect or significant impairment of their court access or continued litigation. It was not enough for relators to merely cite Braden and contend in a conclusory statement that their ability to continue litigating was threatened. Cf. In re Casey, 589 S.W.3d 850, 855 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (determining that relator’s sworn declaration averring that deferring sanctions was necessary to ensure that he and his client could continue litigation and that they lacked financial means to make immediate payment was sufficient to invoke Braden’s deferral requirement and require court to hold prompt hearing or make written Braden findings). We conclude that relators are not entitled to their requested relief as to the portions of the Sanctions Order sanctioning conduct occurring in the Garnishment Proceeding.

CONCLUSION

We conditionally grant relators’ petition for writ of mandamus in part and direct the trial court to vacate the portions of its Sanctions Order sanctioning conduct that occurred in the Contract Case and the award of attorneys’ fees associated therewith. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply. We deny the remaining relief requested by relators. In addition, we lift this Court’s June 18, 2026 stay order.

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__________________________________________

Karin Crump, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis Filed: August 12, 2026