In re Enterasys Networks, Inc.

2002 DNH 148
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedAugust 2, 2002
DocketCV-02-071-M
StatusPublished

This text of 2002 DNH 148 (In re Enterasys Networks, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Enterasys Networks, Inc., 2002 DNH 148 (D.N.H. 2002).

Opinion

In re Enterasys Networks, Inc. CV-02-071-M 08/02/02 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

In re Enterasys Networks, Inc. Securities Litigation

Civil Nos. 02-071-M, 02-074-M, 02-082-M, 02-103-M, 02-162-M Opinion N o . 2002 DNH 148

O R D E R

Eugene Roth (02-071-M), Anthony M. Leger (02-074-M), Market

Street Securities, Inc. (02-082-M), Peter Hawkins (02-103-M), and

the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association (02-162-

M ) have all filed class action suits against Enterasys Networks,

Inc. (“Enterasys”), Enrique P. Fiallo (“Fiallo”), and Robert J.

Gagalis (“Gagalis”), alleging violations of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”). 1 Plaintiffs have sued

under the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (part of the Private

Securities Litigation Reform A c t ) , which allows private class

actions to enforce the Exchange Act. Before the court is an

1 Specifically, plaintiffs allege violations of: (1) 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a) (also known as §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange A c t ) ; and (2) 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (also known as Rule 10b-5). unopposed motion, filed by the Los Angeles County Employees

Retirement Association (“LACERA”), asking the court t o : (1)

consolidate all Exchange Act actions against these defendants;

(2) appoint LACERA to serve as lead plaintiff; and (3) approve

LACERA’s selection of lead and liaison counsel. For the reasons

given below, LACERA’s motion is granted.

As noted above, LACERA is one of five plaintiffs who have

filed class action suits against Enterasys, Fiallo, and Gagalis.

In addition, LACERA is one of four entities that initially filed

motions to consolidate, to be named lead plaintiff, and to have

their choices of lead and liaison counsel approved by the court.

The other three are: (1) Market Street Securities, Inc.

(plaintiff in 02-082-M); (2) EnTrust Partners LLC; and (3) The

City of Philadelphia and Jay Y . Gu. Those movants have since

withdrawn their motions, leaving LACERA as the only movant

seeking lead plaintiff status in this litigation.

Although LACERA’s motion is now unopposed, the court

considers, in turn, each of its three requests. See In re Lucent

Techs., Inc., Secs. Lit., 194 F.R.D. 1 3 7 , 152 (D.N.J. 2000) (“The

2 court is under no obligation to accept . . . a proposed lead

plaintiff merely because [its] proposed appointment is unopposed

by other members of the [p]roposed [c]lass.”) (citing In re

Network Assocs., Inc., Secs. Lit., 76 F . Supp. 2d 1017, 1024

(N.D. Cal. 1999)).

Motion to Consolidate

Having examined the complaints in the five cases listed in

the caption of this order, I find no reason why the cases should

not be consolidated. All five involve the same operative facts

and claim violations of the same federal statutes and rules. See

F E D . R . C I V . P . 42(a) (“When actions involving a common question

of law or fact are pending before the court . . . it may order

all the actions consolidated . . . ” ) . And, no party has objected

to consolidation. Accordingly, LACERA’s motion for consolidation

is granted. Hereafter, all pleadings and other filings shall

bear the caption used on this order, “In re Enterasys Networks,

Inc., Securities Litigation,” and shall bear the Civil Number

“02-071-M.” Additional information regarding the procedural

logistics of consolidation may be found in the court’s companion

order, issued this day.

3 Motion to Appoint LACERA as Lead Plaintiff

Under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i), the court “shall

appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported

plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of

adequately representing the interests of class members (hereafter

in this paragraph referred to as the ‘most adequate plaintiff’)

in accordance with this subparagraph.” Furthermore

Subject to subclause ( I I ) , for purposes of clause ( i ) , the court shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this chapter is the person or group of persons that – (aa) has either filed the complaint or made a motion in response to a notice under subparagraph (A)(i); (bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class; and (cc) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).

LACERA plainly meets the first of the three qualification

standards. It filed the complaint in 02-162-M and has moved to

be appointed lead plaintiff.

4 As for the second standard, based upon the record before i t ,

including both LACERA’s factual assertions and the lack of

opposition to LACERA’s motion, the court determines that LACERA

has the largest financial interest of all class members. See

Greebel v . F T P Software, Inc., 939 F . Supp. 5 7 , 64 (D. Mass.

1996) (“As no other persons have sought to be appointed lead

plaintiff, [movants] have the largest financial interest in the

relief sought by the class.”). Factually, L A C E R A claims losses

of over $2 million, and i s , unquestionably, the kind of

institutional investor Congress envisioned as an appropriate lead

plaintiff in actions such as these. See id. at 63-64.

Finally, as to the third standard, compliance with F E D . R .

C I V . P . 2 3 , “a proposed [l]ead [p]laintiff need only make a

preliminary showing that he or she satisfies the typicality and

adequacy requirements of Rule 23.” Chill v . Green Tree Fin.

Corp., 181 F . R . D . 3 9 8 , 407 n.8 (D. Minn. 1998) (citations

omitted). Here, L A C E R A has made a preliminary showing that it

meets the typicality requirement because its “claims arise from

the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise

to the claims of the class members and the claims are based on

5 the same legal theory.” Fields v . Biomatrix, Inc., 198 F.R.D.

451, 456 (D.N.J. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). And LACERA has made a preliminary showing that it

meets the adequacy requirement because the supporting material

submitted with its motion demonstrates that its counsel is

“qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the

proposed litigation,” id. at 457 (citations omitted), and because

it does “not have interests antagonistic to those of the class,”

id. (citations omitted).

Because LACERA meets all three of the qualification

standards set out in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(aa)-

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Related

Keepseagle v. Glickman
194 F.R.D. 1 (District of Columbia, 2000)
Fields v. Biomatrix, Inc.
198 F.R.D. 451 (D. New Jersey, 2000)

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