In re Embassy Co.

58 F. Supp. 1004, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2647
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedFebruary 5, 1945
DocketNo. 11039
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 58 F. Supp. 1004 (In re Embassy Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Embassy Co., 58 F. Supp. 1004, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2647 (E.D. Mo. 1945).

Opinion

HULEN, District Judge.

This matter is now before the Court on. motion to dismiss, filed by creditor, holder of one $500 bond of the debtor corporation.

The Embassy Company, a Missouri corporation, on November 20, 1944, filed its petition seeking relief under Chapter X (that portion relating to corporate reorganizations) of the Chandler Act, Secs. 501-676, Title 11 U.S.C.A. The petition was approved on November 21, 1944. The indebtedness involved was over $250,000. A trustee was appointed. The trustee, as directed, took charge of debtor’s property, which is an eight story seventy-eight unit apartment building, located at Union and Washington Boulevards, St. Louis, Missouri. A trustee’s report of his investigation of debtor’s affairs and a list of debtor’s creditors has been filed in conformity with Sections 167 and 164 of the Act. January 18, 1945 was fixed as the date for the hearing of objections to the qualifications of the trustee. No questions are raised as to procedure.

On January 17, 1945, a motion to dismiss these proceedings was filed by the holder of a $500 First Mortgage Bond, and same was submitted on January 18th. No evidence was submitted in support of the motion, each of the parties relying on the facts as the same appear from documents on file in this proceeding to support their different positions.

The motion does not purport to be a controverting answer under Section 137 of the Act. It does not deny any of the allegations of fact contained in debtor’s petition. As we understand movant’s contention, it is that debtor’s petition was not filed in good faith and that debtor’s petition fails to show any need for Chapter X relief; that, on the contrary, a Chapter X proceeding will be an unnecessary and useless expense to debtor’s bondholders, who. by virtue of their existing contractual rights, can, if unmolested by these proceedings, provide their own solution of the difficulties that beset them.

The facts are these: The debtor corporation was organized and took title to the property in question pursuant to a previous reorganization in this Court, entitled, “In the Matter of The Koplar Company,” No. 7636. Pursuant to the Plan, debtor issued its First Mortgage Income Bonds to mature December 1, 1944, in the principal amount of $544,000, same being exchanged par for par for bonds in the same amount theretofore issued by the Koplar Company. There now remains outstanding $460,900 of debtor’s income bonds, held by 617 bondholders. Debtor’s stock consists of no par value common stock. There was issued 13,-600 shares, to three voting trustees under a Voting Trust Agreement, which shares are still held in their names. The stock was deposited with the Boatmen’s National Bank of St. Louis, as depositary, and there was issued to the bondholders Voting Trust Certificates representing forty per cent of the stock, at the rate of one share for each $100 in principal amount of bonds. These certificates were denominated Series A Voting Trust Certificates. They were attached to the bonds and were void if detached before maturity, but may be dealt with separately after maturity or December 1, 1944. Voting Trust Certificates denominated Series B, representing the remaining sixty per cent of debtor’s stock, were issued to preferred stockholders and unsecured creditors of the Koplar Company and are now held by 225 certificate holders. The Voting Trust Agreement provides that upon default in the payment of the bonds when due on December 1, 1944, the stock represented by the Series B Voting Trust Certificates shall be delivered to the holders of the then outstanding bonds and that the rights, claims and interests of the [1006]*1006holders of the Series B Voting Trust Certificates to the capital stock of the debtor shall cease and terminate. The Voting Trust Agreement was to terminate December 1, 1944, the maturity date of the bonds, and upon such termination, the voting trustees shall, upon surrender of outstanding Voting Trust Certificates, distribute the capital stock, as provided in the trust instrument.

The voting trustees on January 16, 1945, filed in these proceedings a petition requesting instructions with respect to the distribution of debtor’s stock under the Voting Trust Agreement. An order was entered on January 18, 1945, that action on this petition be deferred and the stock of debtor be continued held by the Boatmen’s National Bank, as depositary, pending further order of the Court. Thus far there has not appeared in these proceedings any holder of a Series B Voting Trust Certificate.

From the report of the trustee’s investigation it appears that debtor has no general unsecured creditors other than current operating expenses, which are presently being paid by the trustee pursuant to the order of November 21, 1944, appointing such trustee.

It is movant’s position that the foregoing provisions of the Stock Trust Agreement were intended to obviate the necessity of any future reorganization; that if debtor’s stock be delivered to the bondholders they will then own and control the debtor corporation and that the prior judgment in the Koplar Company reorganization limits the rights of the parties to their contractual remedies so as to preclude Chapter X relief. By the express provisions of Section 146(4) of the Act a petition shall be deemed to have been filed in bad faith if it appears that “a prior proceeding is pending in any court and it appears that the interests of creditors and stockholders would best be subserved in such prior proceeding,” but such provision can have no application here for the reason that the proceedings for the reorganization of the Koplar Company have been finally concluded and are no longer pending.

An examination of the files in the Koplar case shows that by the order of February 20, 1937 approving the plan, the Court retained jurisdiction “over all matters in connection with the reorganization proceedings which have not been heretofore determined and which are not herein determined.” Thereafter in the final decree of the Court of September 24, 1937 the Court found that “the modified amended plan of reorganization heretofore confirmed by the Court has now been fully and completely executed, carried out and accomplished.” The Court then decreed “that the proceedings in this Court in the above entitled cause be and the same are hereby terminated and finally closed.” We find there was not at the time of filing the present petition, a prior proceeding pending. Mere participation in a prior proceeding does not bar subsequent relief under the Chandler Act. This proceeding can be in good faith even if there were a pending proceeding, if the interests of the parties can best be served in the pending proceeding and it appears they would not be best served in the prior proceeding. (Marine Harbor Properties, Inc., v. Manufacturer’s Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 63 S.Ct. 93, 87 L.Ed. 64.) Having in mind that “one of the purposes of § 77B [11 U.S.C.A. § 207] (and the same is true of Chapter X) was to avoid the consequences to debtors and creditors of foreclosures, liquidations, and forced sales with (heir drastic deflationary effects,” (Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, loc. cit. 124, 60 S.Ct. 1, loc. cit. 11, 84 L.Ed. 110) the undenied allegations of Debtor’s petition are relevant.

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Bluebook (online)
58 F. Supp. 1004, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2647, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-embassy-co-moed-1945.