2023 IL App (5th) 230284-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 09/18/23. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NOS. 5-23-0284, 5-23-0285 cons. Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re E.L. and P.L., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) St. Clair County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Nos. 13-JA-127, 13-JA-128 ) Elsie L.G., ) Honorable ) William G. Clay IV, Respondent-Appellant.) ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Welch concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where the trial court’s orders finding that Elsie L.G. was an unfit parent, and that the best interest of the minors required termination of her parental rights, were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm.
¶2 Elsie L.G. (Elsie) is the mother of E.L., a female child, and P.L., a male child. The
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) opened an intact family case in July 2012.
In November 2013, DCFS removed both children from the home following a hotline report that
the children were being inadequately supervised. The children were placed in a foster home at that
time. The State initially filed petitions to terminate Elsie’s parental rights in December 2017. The
State dismissed its petitions in October 2018 and reinstated the petitions in June 2019. The trial
court found that Elsie was an unfit person in November 2021 and in December 2022 terminated
1 her parental rights. Elsie does not raise any issues on appeal regarding the best interest hearing that
resulted in the termination of her parental rights. She only appeals from the orders finding that she
was an unfit person.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 E.L. was born on October 17, 2012, and P.L. was born on August 25, 2011. Their mother
is Elsie, and their father is Marcus J., who is not involved in this appeal.
¶5 DCFS became involved in this case in mid-2012 before E.L.’s birth. At the time of the
2012 report, Elsie was homeless and living in a shelter. Other residents reported that Elsie left P.L.
unsupervised. P.L. reportedly crawled out of the room and was found with an electrical cord in his
mouth. There were other reports that Elsie frequently screamed at P.L. DCFS stated that it had
concerns about Elsie providing inadequate supervision, and also having unrealistic expectations of
her baby’s development and needs. DCFS’s report “indicated” Elsie for inadequate supervision of
P.L.
¶6 DCFS opened an intact family case and implemented a safety plan for Elsie to address the
issues that were threatening P.L.’s safety. DCFS determined that Elsie needed assistance with
housing, employment, mental health, parenting, and assistance with community resources.
¶7 On August 26, 2013, DCFS received a hotline call about Elsie’s treatment of P.L. Elsie
was captured on surveillance video at her group home picking P.L. up by his hair and then dropping
him on the floor. In addition, the hotline caller stated that Elsie kicked P.L. On August 27, 2013,
DCFS removed E.L. and P.L. from Elsie’s care and placed the children in a foster home.
Thereafter, Elsie was arrested for domestic battery. On August 29, 2013, the trial court held a
temporary custody hearing, and ruled that the case involved neglect and not abuse. The court
returned the children to Elsie and directed DCFS to maintain the intact family case.
2 ¶8 On November 23, 2013, DCFS received another hotline call regarding the children. The
caller reported that Elsie and the children were living at the home of one of Elsie’s friends.
According to the report, Elsie was sleeping all day and did not feed or bathe her children. The
children frequently cried and were unable to wake Elsie. The friend told DCFS that they were no
longer willing to allow Elsie and the children to continue living with them. DCFS reported that
Elsie was not cooperating with the intact family services being provided to her by its agent,
Children’s Home & Aid. On November 27, 2013, DCFS again removed the children from Elsie’s
care and placed them in a foster home. That same date, the trial court entered its temporary custody
order, noting that Elsie had been noncompliant with services involving “domestic violence, anger
management, and parenting classes.”
¶9 The shelter care and adjudicatory hearings were initially set for December 16, 2013, but
were continued multiple times until July 7, 2014. E.L. and P.L. were adjudicated as neglected
minors and found to have been living in an environment that was injurious to their welfare. More
specifically, the court found that the mother and children had been missing for weeks and the
assigned worker was unable to observe and assess the safety and well-being of the children. The
order does not provide details about when Elsie and the children were “missing.” In addition to
adjudicating the children as neglected, the trial court entered its dispositional findings that it was
in the children’s health, welfare, and safety as well as in the minors’ best interest to make them
wards of the court. The court found that Elsie was unable to care for the children for reasons other
than financial circumstances alone. The court set the permanency goal to return the children home
within 12 months. The record on appeal does not contain the transcript of the hearing.
¶ 10 The record on appeal lacks detail about Elsie’s service plans and the children until an
advocate with CASA of Southwestern Illinois filed his report with the trial court in March 2015.
3 The advocate reported that the children had been placed in a second foster home in Shiloh. This
placement occurred in April 2014. Elsie was living with a cousin in Collinsville, as well as living
at her pastor’s O’Fallon residence. The advocate also reported that he had observed some of Elsie’s
visits with the children and commented that Elsie lacked necessary parenting skills. DCFS secured
the services of a parenting coach to work with Elsie.
¶ 11 The first service plan for Elsie and the children included in the record on appeal was dated
November 13, 2017. DCFS reported that Elsie had not engaged with individual counseling since
2015, had not completed domestic violence services, had not completed specialized training
designed to provide her with a better understanding of the needs of her children, and still lacked
stable housing. Overall, Elsie had not engaged in any services within the past six months. Elsie
was taking advantage of her supervised visits with the children, but DCFS noted that her attendance
was sporadic. Elsie also had not attended her monthly scheduled appointments with her
caseworker.
¶ 12 In September 2017, the CASA advocate provided an update about the children. P.L. had
begun kindergarten in Shiloh in 2016 but was having significant behavioral problems in school
that resulted in his being transferred to the Pathways School in Belleville. 1 At the beginning of the
2017 school year, P.L. started in the Shiloh school, but was again transferred to Pathways School
because of his behavioral issues. The advocate reported that P.L. had been hospitalized for several
days to address these behaviors. E.L. was in pre-kindergarten and doing well. The advocate stated
that in his observations, Elsie was still not capable of parenting the children.
1 Pathways is a school for children who have not been successful in a public-school setting and have substantial social, emotional, and behavior disorders. https://www.bassc-sped.org/o/bassc/page/bassc- pathways-program
4 ¶ 13 On December 15, 2017, the State filed its motion seeking to terminate Elsie’s parental
rights. The State alleged that Elsie had failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of her
children during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect and that she had failed
to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal of the children
during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West
2016). 2
¶ 14 The trial court scheduled the fitness hearing for April 9, 2018. Elsie did not appear at that
hearing, and the trial court entered a default order finding that she was an unfit person. However,
on April 10, 2018, the State appeared in court and obtained a court order setting aside the default
judgment against Elsie.
¶ 15 The next service plan in the record on appeal is dated May 18, 2018. DCFS reported that
Elsie had not engaged in any services within the preceding six months. She attended supervised
visits with the children. Elsie did not yet have stable housing but was employed by temporary
agencies. She had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, histrionic personality
disorder, antisocial personality disorder, narcissistic disorder, and attention-deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD). DCFS noted that the hearing on the State’s petition to terminate parental rights
had been continued five times but was then scheduled for hearing in July 2018. Elsie was rated
unsatisfactory on weekly mental health counseling. Elsie had not attended a counseling session
since September 2015, but she had been referred to Chestnut Health Systems. She was rated
unsatisfactory on improvement of parenting skills. Elsie had completed an initial parenting course,
2 The State also included a third ground for termination of Elsie’s parental rights: that she was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities as supported by competent evidence of mental impairment. 405 ILCS 5/1-116 (West 2016). As there was no evidence adduced to support this ground throughout the extended duration of this case, we believe that this ground for termination may have been mistakenly included in the State’s motion. 5 but DCFS determined she would benefit from parenting coaching during child visits. However,
Elsie refused this service. Elsie was rated unsatisfactory on attending specialized foster care
training to address the needs and behaviors of her children. She was rated unsatisfactory on
addressing her history of domestic violence in relationships to avoid similar relationships in the
future. DCFS referred her to Chestnut Health Systems for domestic violence services. Elsie was
rated unsatisfactory in individual counseling at Chestnut Health Systems for her history of being
sexually abused. Elsie completed the assessment on June 19, 2013, which recommended
counseling, but she did not engage in counseling. Due to the passage of time, DCFS indicated that
she would now need to complete a new sexual abuse assessment. Elsie successfully completed a
substance abuse assessment and all related services approximately four years before the date of
this service plan.
¶ 16 On October 25, 2018, the trial court entered an order that stated: “On State’s motion, and
by agreement of all parties, the State’s Motion for Termination of Parental Rights and for
Appointment of Guardian with Power to Consent to Adoption is hereby dismissed with leave to
reinstate.” The record on appeal does not contain a written motion to dismiss, and the record does
not contain a transcript of the hearing held that date. The reason for the State’s dismissal is not
contained in the record or in the briefs on appeal.
¶ 17 DCFS’s next service plan was dated October 30, 2018. Elsie engaged in no services the
preceding six months. She did not meet with her caseworker. Elsie recently moved into a friend’s
trailer that was not deemed environmentally appropriate for the family. In all other matters, there
had been no change in Elsie’s required services, and she was rated unsatisfactory on all current
services.
6 ¶ 18 The CASA advocate filed his next report in April 2019. He reported that P.L. continued to
struggle at the Pathways School, throwing tantrums and having “meltdowns.” His school counselor
reported that he did not bond well, was sometimes “depressed,” and had threatened self-harm. The
counselor was working with P.L.’s foster mother, and P.L. was scheduled to begin mental health
services through Chestnut Health Systems. The advocate reported that the foster mother’s social
work background was helpful in dealing with P.L.
¶ 19 DCFS through its agency, Children’s Home & Aid, 3 filed its permanency report with the
trial court in April 2019. Elsie completed a mental health assessment on September 26, 2017, but
was unsuccessfully discharged from Chestnut Health Systems due to a lack of attendance and
engagement. Elsie was living in a trailer in Caseyville that was not considered a “return home
environment.” She was unemployed. Elsie was consistent with visitation, but disregarded all
recommendations to effectively engage with the children. The trial court entered its permanency
order on April 15, 2019, and found that Elsie had made neither reasonable efforts nor reasonable
and substantial progress toward returning the children home.
¶ 20 The next service plan prepared by DCFS was dated May 6, 2019. Elsie was rated
unsatisfactory on all current services. DCFS filed its next permanency report on May 28, 2019, in
which it rated Elsie unsatisfactory on all aspects of her service plan. The trial court entered its
permanency order on June 3, 2019. The trial court made no findings relative to Elsie’s progress
and efforts.
3 The permanency hearing reports, and other reports filed with the trial court, were sometimes printed on Children’s Home & Aid letterhead. Children’s Home & Aid was acting on behalf of DCFS in this case. Some of the permanency hearing reports were not printed on any letterhead, and thus, we do not know if the reports were filed by Children’s Home & Aid or directly by DCFS. For continuity throughout this order, we will refer to the entity who filed these pleadings, reports, and/or documents, as DCFS. 7 ¶ 21 On June 3, 2019, the trial court granted the State’s motion to reinstate the petition to
terminate parental rights. The State’s motion to reinstate was not included in the record on appeal,
and the hearing was not transcribed.
¶ 22 The CASA advocate filed his next report with the trial court on August 26, 2019. The
advocate reported that P.L. behaviorally struggled throughout the summer in that he was barred
from returning to his daycare facility, was kicked out of a YMCA summer program, and was sent
home from the Shiloh school summer program several times. P.L.’s behavior had become
increasingly aggressive. At the beginning of the school year at Pathways School, P.L. attacked
another student in the transportation vehicle. Upon arrival at Pathways School, staff members were
able to remove P.L. from the transportation vehicle. After exiting the vehicle, P.L. tried to
physically harm staff members and caused property damage. Staff members were ultimately able
to restrain P.L. Because of these behaviors, P.L. was admitted to Lincoln Prairie Behavioral Health
Center, a residential psychiatric hospital for children in Springfield. The foster mother reported to
the advocate that both children had asked to discontinue parent visits.
¶ 23 On October 7, 2019, DCFS filed its report of the guardian with the trial court. Because P.L.
had been admitted to a psychiatric facility, DCFS held a priority clinical staffing to determine if
the care was appropriate, and to determine what placement would be in P.L.’s best interest upon
discharge. DCFS determined that upon discharge P.L. needed to be in a residential facility to
receive “trauma-focused treatment to address [his] emotional, social and behavioral issues.” DCFS
also recommended that P.L. participate in rhythmic activities, such as swimming or skateboarding
as those type of activities provide therapeutic benefits for traumatized children. As of the date of
the report, P.L. was on waitlists for residential placements.
8 ¶ 24 The October 4, 2019, permanency report filed by DCFS reflected no change in Elsie’s
progress, other than that she had obtained warehouse-based employment. The agency
recommended that the permanency goal be changed to substitute care pending the determination
of the State’s reinstated petition to terminate parental rights. No permanency hearing was held in
October, and the hearing was apparently continued 4 until December 2019.
¶ 25 DCFS filed its next family service plan on October 21, 2019. The service plan objectives
for Elsie remained the same. There was no change in Elsie’s compliance with any of the current
services required.
¶ 26 On November 27, 2019, DCFS filed its permanency report. As of that date, P.L. remained
in the Springfield psychiatric hospital. Elsie was rated unsatisfactory on all service plan objectives.
While Elsie claimed that she was employed at an Edwardsville warehouse, she had provided no
verification of income. The trial court entered its permanency order on December 2, 2019, finding
that the appropriate permanency goal was substitute care pending determination of termination of
parental rights. The court found that Elsie had not made reasonable efforts nor reasonable and
substantial progress toward returning the children home.
¶ 27 DCFS’s next family service plan was dated February 12, 2020. Elsie had yet to provide
verification of employment. Elsie was rated unsatisfactory on all current service plan objectives.
¶ 28 DCFS filed another family service plan dated May 18, 2020. In this plan, DCFS reported
that Elsie said she had completed a new mental health assessment at Chestnut Health Systems, and
that no services were recommended. DCFS contacted Chestnut Health Services to obtain a copy
4 Many hearings were scheduled in this case in its approximate eight-year history. Often times, there would be no “order” in the preprinted order forms, other than inclusion of a new court date. This October 2019 order is an example. The hearing scheduled for that date was a permanency hearing based upon information included in DCFS’s permanency report filed in advance of the hearing. The record on appeal contains no motion to continue, and the “order” does not reference a continuance, but simply lists a different court date. 9 of this assessment but was informed that Chestnut Health Systems had no record that it had recently
seen Elsie. 5 Elsie was rated unsatisfactory on all current service plan objectives.
¶ 29 On May 27, 2020, DCFS filed its permanency hearing report with the trial court. Elsie was
rated unsatisfactory on her service plan objectives. DCFS reported that on November 21, 2020,
P.L. was transferred to St. John Bosco Children’s Center, a residential facility in Belleville. The
trial court entered an order on June 1, 2020, apparently continuing the permanency hearing until
July 2020.
¶ 30 On July 2, 2020, DCFS filed its next permanency hearing report with the trial court. Elsie
had moved out of the Caseyville trailer and in with a friend. She reported that she had been
approved to move into her own apartment in Granite City. Overall, Elsie was rated unsatisfactory
on all current service plan objectives. The next permanency hearing was scheduled for July 7,
2020, and the fitness hearing was set for July 13, 2020, but the trial court continued the case. On
July 13, 2020, the trial court entered a permanency order finding that Elsie had not made reasonable
efforts nor reasonable and substantial progress toward returning the children home. The court
indicated that because of the status of the case with the State seeking to terminate Elsie’s parental
rights, DCFS must discontinue all reunification services.
¶ 31 DCFS filed its family service plan on November 8, 2020. There were no changes relative
to Elsie’s progress on her service plan objectives. DCFS filed its permanency reports on December
29, 2020, January 19, 2021, and February 17, 2021. Elsie’s apartment in Granite City was found
to be satisfactory. She had established full time warehouse employment with Amazon, and her
5 During the fitness hearing, Elsie’s attorney provided information confirming that Elsie did have a mental health assessment at Chestnut Health Systems in October 2019. In the forms she completed prior to the assessment, she acknowledged that she had experienced sexual abuse, emotional abuse, and physical abuse in the past. We presume that this assessment was to determine if Elsie needed mental health, domestic violence, and/or sexual abuse services. Chestnut Health Systems concluded that Elsie required no services. 10 employment service plan objective was rated satisfactory. On all other services, Elsie was rated
unsatisfactory. The trial court held its permanency hearing on March 5, 2021, finding that Elsie
had not made reasonable efforts nor reasonable and substantial progress toward returning the
children home.
¶ 32 On April 26, 2021, the CASA advocate filed his next report, noting that P.L. remained in
the residential group home. The advocate stated his belief that Elsie’s parental rights should be
terminated to provide permanency for the children as they had been in the foster care system for
the past seven years.
¶ 33 On July 7, 2021, the State filed its notice designating the nine-month periods upon which
it was relying in its petition to terminate Elsie’s parental rights. The two nine-month periods were
March 27, 2018, to December 27, 2018, and December 28, 2018, to September 28, 2019. The State
indicated that Elsie had not made reasonable progress or reasonable efforts during these two nine-
month periods.
¶ 34 The fitness hearing began on July 19, 2021. The State called two witnesses—Katherine
Cotts, a program manager, and Christa Mizulski, a foster care supervisor. Both witnesses were
employed by Children’s Home & Aid. The fitness hearing concluded on September 27, 2021.
¶ 35 Katherine Cotts (Cotts) testified that she has been a program manager for the past 18
months, and prior to that she was a supervisor. Cotts was the supervisor on this case for a period
of two years from July 2018 through May 2020. Cotts identified all service plans from 2017 to the
date of the hearing. She testified about the specific service plans that were in effect during the two
nine-month periods specified by the State in its addendum to the motion to terminate Elsie’s
parental rights. Elsie was required to obtain a new mental health assessment through Chestnut
Health Systems, participate in individual counseling, participate in domestic violence services, and
11 complete a sexual abuse victimization reassessment through Chestnut Health Systems. In addition,
Elsie needed to have appropriate housing, maintain employment, demonstrate appropriate
parenting skills, and attend regular visitation with her children. From March 2018 through
September 2019, Elsie did not participate in services for mental health, domestic violence, or
sexual abuse services. In November 2018, Chestnut Health Systems discharged Elsie from service
due to her lack of engagement, as she only had four face-to-face interactions. 6 She did not have a
reassessment during that time frame. Elsie also continued to struggle with parenting and primarily
used her cellular phone to interact with the children. Because of the children’s behavioral
problems, DCFS offered Elsie specialized parenting training to assist her in better interactions with
her children. However, Elsie would not participate in the offered training and was therefore rated
unsatisfactory on this required objective. During this period, Elsie missed about 5 of 18 monthly
visits with her children because she failed to confirm the visits beforehand. Cotts testified that
Elsie had self-reported an extensive history of domestic violence in her personal relationships. The
assessment and counseling for domestic violence would have taken place at Chestnut Health
Systems, but Elsie never had the assessment during the 18 months at issue. Housing also remained
a difficulty for Elsie and she was never able to obtain housing that could have been considered as
a return home environment for the children.
¶ 36 On cross-examination, Cotts confirmed that early on in this case, Elsie successfully
completed her substance abuse service objectives and initial parenting classes. In addition, Elsie
currently had appropriate housing and employment. Cotts confirmed that one of the resources
offered to parents includes access to the county housing authorities. She testified that while those
6 This testimony appears to establish that Elsie reengaged in counseling at Chestnut Health Systems for a limited number of sessions, potentially dating back to the September 26, 2017, mental health assessment referenced by DCFS in its April 2019 permanency report. The timing of these sessions is not included in the record on appeal. 12 were made available to Elsie, the county housing authorities had lengthy waiting lists. In addition,
if Elsie had a current mental health diagnosis as determined by Chestnut Health Systems, she could
have been approved for a different housing program. At that time, however, Chestnut Health
Systems had not diagnosed Elsie with a mental health disorder. While other providers had
diagnosed her with mental health disorders, the housing program was set up and connected to
Chestnut Health Systems. Cotts confirmed that at the start of this case Elsie completed anger
management classes and parenting classes, and that these completions were not reflected on her
service plan. Cotts also confirmed that DCFS did not require or recommend that Elsie obtain a
psychiatric consultation to determine if she needed psychiatric medications.
¶ 37 Cotts testified that Elsie’s attorney subpoenaed the agency to obtain copies of all emails
from Chestnut Health Systems about Elsie. A Chestnut Health Systems email dated October 4,
2019, confirmed that Elsie completed a mental health evaluation and “due to lack of medical
necessity, further services are not required.” The email further indicated that although Elsie had
been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, as she had informed Chestnut Health Systems
that she was not experiencing any mental illness symptoms and her functioning was not impaired,
Chestnut Health Services did not recommend further services due to a lack of medical necessity.
¶ 38 The guardian ad litem asked Cotts if Elsie had completed mental health services and/or
been evaluated for sexual abuse treatment. Cotts testified that Elsie had been discharged from
Chestnut Health Systems for inconsistent attendance, and thus had not completed these services
during the relevant nine-month periods. Cotts also testified that Elsie was recommended to engage
in one-on-one parenting coaching, but she was unsuccessfully discharged for lack of attendance.
¶ 39 The State next called Christa Mizulski (Mizulski). Mizulski had been employed as a foster
care supervisor and as a case manager for the previous three years. She testified that she was
13 familiar with Elsie and the children. During the time she was involved with the case, Elsie was
consistent with her visitation with E.L., but less so with P.L., who was in the Springfield
psychiatric hospital.
¶ 40 Mizulski testified that in 2019, DCFS asked Elsie to undergo another mental health
assessment, and to address sexual abuse and domestic violence through Chestnut Health Systems.
She confirmed that the paperwork from the October 2019 assessment reflected that Elsie informed
the assessor that she had a history of being sexually abused, emotionally abused, and physically
abused, and that after the assessment, Chestnut Health Systems did not recommend services for
Elsie. She testified that Children’s Home & Aid did not receive that email from Chestnut Health
for many months. However, Mizulski testified that despite the lack of a recommendation from
Chestnut Health Systems, based upon what they observed with their interactions with Elsie, it was
believed that Elsie still needed additional mental health counseling.
¶ 41 The guardian ad litem asked Mizulski to explain why Elsie needed to address the domestic
violence concerns. DCFS believed that counseling would be beneficial for Elsie so that she would
make better partner choices in the future because of her extensive history of sexual and physical
abuse in relationships.
¶ 42 At the conclusion of the fitness hearing, the trial court took the motion under advisement.
On November 22, 2021, the trial court entered its order granting the State’s motion and finding
that Elsie was an unfit person in that she had failed to show reasonable efforts and/or reasonable
progress toward returning the children home. The court based its decision upon the evidence and
testimony that Elsie was rated unsatisfactory on her service plan objectives during the relevant
time periods—March 2018 through September 2019. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii). The court found
that the State had proved the allegations by clear and convincing evidence.
14 ¶ 43 On December 8, 2022, the trial court held the best interest hearing. On December 16, 2022,
the trial court entered its order finding that the State had proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that it was in the best interest of the minors, E.L. and P.L., to terminate Elsie’s parental rights. The
trial court changed the permanency goal to adoption.
¶ 44 Elsie filed a posttrial motion on January 10, 2023, asking the trial court to set aside the
termination order on the basis that there was additional psychiatric information about P.L. that
would have been highly relevant on the issue of the foster parent’s ability to adequately provide
for P.L.’s needs. On March 30, 2023, the trial court denied the motion.
¶ 45 On April 19, 2023, Elsie filed her notice of appeal of the December 16, 2022, order
terminating her parental rights. On appeal, Elsie is only contesting the fitness component of the
order terminating her parental rights.
¶ 46 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 47 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) and the Adoption
Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)) provide the legal authority for the involuntary
termination of parental rights in Illinois. In re Za. G., 2023 IL App (5th) 220793, ¶ 30 (citing In re
J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337 (2010)). Section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides the
procedural basis for the involuntary termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2020). The process mandated involves two hearings. In the first hearing, the State must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is an “unfit person” as defined by the Adoption
Act. In re Za. G., 2023 IL App (5th) 220793, ¶ 30 (citing In re A.J., 269 Ill. App. 3d 824, 828
(1994)); 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020). If the trial court finds that the parent is unfit, the case
proceeds to a second hearing where the State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
it is in the child’s best interest that the parent’s rights be terminated. In re Za. G., 2023 IL App
15 (5th) 220793, ¶ 30 (citing In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337-38 (2010)); 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2020).
¶ 48 When a parent appeals the trial court’s findings that a parent is unfit and that terminating
the parental rights is in the child’s best interest, the appellate court must not retry the case but,
instead, must review the trial court’s findings to determine if the findings are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. In re Za. G., 2023 IL App (5th) 220793, ¶ 31 (citing In re A.W., 231 Ill.
2d 92, 104 (2008)). The reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s finding of
unfitness because the court had the best opportunity to view and evaluate the parties and their
testimony. Id. (citing In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006)). Therefore, we do not
reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses on appeal. Id. (citing In re M.A.,
325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2001)). “A decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
if the opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not
based on the evidence presented.” Id. (citing In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 28).
¶ 49 We review the evidence to determine if the State met its burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Elsie was an “unfit person.” The trial court determined that the State
met its burden of proof that Elsie failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of E.L. and
P.L. within the two specific nine-month periods from March 27, 2018, to December 27, 2018, and
from December 28, 2018, to September 28, 2019, following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)).
¶ 50 A. Fitness
¶ 51 1. Reasonable Efforts Within a Nine-Month Period
¶ 52 “Reasonable effort” is determined by a subjective standard that refers to the amount of
effort which is reasonable for that parent. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1066-67. The court
16 must determine whether the parent has made committed and diligent efforts toward correcting the
conditions that led to the removal of the minor from the home. In re L.J.S., 2018 IL App (3d)
180218, ¶ 24. “A parent’s deficiencies collateral to the conditions that were the basis for the
removal of the children are not relevant to the reasonable efforts analysis.” In re D.F., 332 Ill. App.
3d 112, 125 (2002).
¶ 53 Elsie argues that the trial court’s finding that she was unfit for failure to make reasonable
efforts was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and focuses her argument on what she
perceives were deficiencies in the services DCFS provided. Specifically, she notes that she had a
psychological examination in 2015 that identified various possible diagnoses including ADHD.
Elsie argues that the trial court erred in finding that she had not made reasonable efforts because
DCFS did not “explore the issue” of her ADHD diagnosis. We disagree. This argument ignores
the fact that DCFS included counseling in Elsie’s service plans. If Elsie had engaged in the
counseling, her counselor could have referred her to other Chestnut Health Systems providers with
the licensure to prescribe medications. The claimed “failure” of DCFS in not exploring this
diagnosis does not lie with DCFS, which included the requirement of individual counseling
services in every service plan. Elsie was aware that she was required to have counseling for many
reasons: her mental health, her history of sexual abuse, and her history of domestic violence. Elsie
made her choice to forego the recommended counseling services.
¶ 54 Elsie’s argument that DCFS failed in providing her with important services because it did
not add a psychiatric evaluation to her service plan ignores the fact that Elsie did not engage in
any services during the 18-month period. Elsie has no explanation or argument to counter the fact
that her efforts during the 18 months at issue were virtually nonexistent. She was consistent with
maintaining her visitation schedule, but refused any offers of parental coaching despite the DCFS
17 concerns that she could not effectively address the behavioral issues displayed by the children and
had no effective way to interact with them other than with her cellular phone. The visitation
supervisors repeatedly asked Elsie not to use her cellular phone during the visits. Moreover, during
these 18 months, Elsie did not have acceptable housing. She may have been employed, but she
was rated unsatisfactory on this objective because she never provided DCFS with verification of
her employment and income. All other service plan objectives were rated as unsatisfactory as Elsie
engaged in no services during the 18 months. Given the evidence and testimony of Elsie’s case
manager and supervisor, we find that Elsie’s efforts were not reasonable toward correcting the
conditions that brought E.L. and P.L into DCFS care. We find that the trial court’s order finding
that Elsie failed to show reasonable efforts toward correcting these conditions is not contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Za. G., 2023 IL App (5th) 220793, ¶ 31 (citing In re
Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 28).
¶ 55 2. Reasonable Progress Within a Nine-Month Period
¶ 56 The term “reasonable progress” requires an objective determination regarding the amount
of progress based upon the conditions existing at the time the minor child’s custody was removed
from the parent. Id. ¶ 47 (citing In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17).
“ ‘The benchmark for measuring a parent’s reasonable progress under section
1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service
plans and court’s directives in light of the condition that gave rise to the removal of
the child and other conditions which later become known that would prevent the
court from returning custody of the child to the parent.’ ” Id. (quoting In re D.T.,
2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17).
18 “A parent makes reasonable progress when the trial court can find that the progress ‘is sufficiently
demonstrable and of such a quality’ that the trial court may soon be able to order the return of the
minor to the parent’s custody.” Id. (quoting In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17).
¶ 57 The foundational issues in this case involved Elsie’s lack of suitable housing, her inability
to safely parent her children, and her unrealistic expectation of their needs and development. DCFS
became involved via an intact family case in July 2012. Elsie was living in a shelter and P.L. was
found wandering the shelter unsupervised. The August 2013 hotline call involved a report that
Elsie had picked P.L. up by his hair and dropped him onto the floor. By November 2013, Elsie
was living with a friend, but not attending to the needs of her children and expecting her friend to
watch and care for the children. After this situation was reported to DCFS, E.L. and P.L. were
taken into protective custody.
¶ 58 At the beginning of the case, Elsie successfully completed the substance abuse service plan
tasks and completed the initial parenting course. Those completions occurred prior to the two nine-
month periods at issue in this case. In determining whether a parent has made reasonable progress,
courts must only consider evidence regarding the parent’s progress during the relevant nine-month
period or periods specified by the State. In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d at 341 (citing 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)
(West 2008)).
¶ 59 During the 18 months at issue, Elsie engaged in none of the remainder of her service plan
objectives. With input from her visitation supervisors, Elsie needed direct one-on-one parental
coaching as well as specialized training designed to inform and assist her in addressing the
behavioral problems her children exhibited. Elsie refused parental coaching and never engaged in
the specialized training. Elsie was required to engage in individual counseling for her mental health
through Chestnut Health Systems, and through that counseling, Elsie was to be evaluated and
19 counseled on matters related to her history of domestic violence and sexual abuse. Elsie had
counseling with Chestnut Health Systems in 2015, and then four sessions on unspecified dates
prior to March 2018, but she was unsuccessfully discharged from further services in November
2018. Elsie’s housing was not appropriate for the children. Elsie reported that she had employment
with temporary agencies but failed to provide documentation to DCFS. While Elsie was mostly
consistent with visiting her children, she missed some visits for failing to confirm the sessions
ahead of time.
¶ 60 Elsie argues that the trial court should not have found that she failed to make reasonable
progress because DCFS did not “implement recommended services.” In 2015, DCFS had Elsie
undergo a psychological examination to obtain diagnoses that would determine possible service
recommendations. Elsie again contends that DCFS should have added a service plan objective
related to pharmaceutical treatment of her ADHD disorder. As we stated earlier, DCFS directed
Elsie to obtain mental health counseling at Chestnut Health Services. Elsie chose not to engage in
these services. Had she done so, Chestnut Health Services could have conceivably sent her to one
of its licensed professionals for a psychiatric medication evaluation. Elsie made her decision not
to engage in services.
¶ 61 Elsie’s efforts to correct the issues that brought E.L. and P.L. into care were insufficient.
Her overall progress on the service plan objectives was nonexistent during the nine-month periods
from March 27, 2018, to December 27, 2018, and from December 28, 2018, to September 28,
2019. Reasonable progress is established when the trial court finds that progress “ ‘is sufficiently
demonstrable and of such a quality’ that the trial court may soon be able to order the return of the
minor to the parent’s custody.” In re Za. G., 2023 IL App (5th) 220793, ¶ 47 (quoting In re D.T.,
20 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17). Here, Elsie was no closer to having E.L. and P.L. returned to her
custody than she was in November 2013 when DCFS removed them from her home.
¶ 62 We conclude that the trial court’s order finding that Elsie failed to show any progress
toward correcting these conditions is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
A.W., 231 Ill. 2d at 104.
¶ 63 B. Best Interest of the Children
¶ 64 Elsie did not raise any issues on appeal regarding the best interest hearing. Accordingly,
we find that the trial court’s decision that the best interest of the children required termination of
Elsie’s parental rights was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Jay. H., 395
Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009); In re S.J., 368 Ill. App. 3d 749, 755 (2006).
¶ 65 While we are affirming the decision of the trial court, our opinion should not be construed
as approval of the inexcusable length of time it took the trial court to arrive at that decision. These
children languished in the system for nine years. There was an inexplicable timespan of over a
year between the fitness hearing and the best interest hearing. Nothing in this record remotely
justifies the length of time these children remained in limbo instead of obtaining permanency,
which is one of the stated goals in the Juvenile Court Act. See In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 367-68
(2004). The statement of purpose and policy governing juvenile court proceedings reflects that
they are time sensitive. “ ‘The legislature recognizes that serious delay in the adjudication of abuse,
neglect, or dependency cases can cause grave harm to the minor and the family and that it frustrates
the health, safety, and best interests of the minor and the effort to establish permanent homes for
children in need.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 231 (2003) (quoting 705 ILCS
405/2-14(a) (West 2000)). “For these reasons, we direct the trial court to consider, in an expedited
manner, cases involving children ***, so that the minors whose futures are at stake in these
21 proceedings can obtain a prompt, just, and final resolution of their status.” In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d
1, 13 (2000).
¶ 66 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 67 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court of St. Clair County
finding that Elsie was an unfit parent, and that the best interest of E.L. and P.L. required the
termination of her parental rights.
¶ 68 Affirmed.