In Re: E.K.C., a Minor

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 273 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: E.K.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: K.R.I.R, MOTHER : : : : : : No. 273 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 140-AD-2024

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2025

K.R.I.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree entered on February 3,

2025, involuntarily terminating her parental rights as to E.K.C., born in

September 2022.1 Mother’s counsel, Lisa M. Watson, Esquire, has filed an

application to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.

2009). We affirm the decree terminating Mother’s parental rights and grant

counsel’s application to withdraw.

The orphans’ court summarized the background of this matter thusly:

Dauphin County Children and Youth Services (“the Agency”) became involved with Mother and E.K.C. in 202[1] due to concerns ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The orphans’ court on the same day also terminated by consent the parental

rights of E.K.C.’s father, E.C.-S. (“Father”). Father has not appealed that determination. J-S22017-25

of Mother’s housing and alcohol use. E.K.C. was adjudicated dependent on November 24, 2021, and placed under the court- ordered protective supervision of Mother. At that time, Mother resided with maternal grandmother. Soon thereafter, and while the child was under Mother’s court-ordered protective supervision, Father brought the child to the hospital stating that Mother and maternal grandmother were neglecting the child. After Mother and maternal grandmother arrived at the hospital visibly intoxicated, the Agency attempted a safety plan, but the parties could not come to an agreement. On March 3, 2022, the Agency conducted a shelter hearing for E.K.C., which resulted in the child being removed from Mother’s court-ordered protective supervision and placed in formal foster case. Since then, the Agency has had ten . . . permanency review hearings for E.K.C. On September 21, 2023, the Agency sought and was granted aggravated circumstances against Mother due to her failure to maintain substantial contact with E.K.C. for a period in excess of six months, relieving the Agency of reasonable efforts.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/27/25, at unnumbered 1-2 (some capitalization

altered).

From the time of E.K.C.’s dependency, Mother was tasked with making

progress as to ten distinct services objectives: (1) cooperate and comply with

the Agency; (2) follow through with a drug and alcohol evaluation; (3)

complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations; (4)

obtain stable housing; (5) maintain legal employment; (6) ensure that E.K.C.

was medically up to date; (7) abide by any services implemented by the

Agency; (8) attend all court hearings and treatment plan meetings; (9) sign

all releases of information pertaining to E.K.C.; and (10) notify the Agency of

any changes in residence or contact information within twenty-four hours.

Mother’s compliance was minimal or wholly lacking as to the vast majority of

these objectives. For example, she did not attend child wellness appointments

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for E.K.C. or otherwise ensure he was medically up to date, participate in

parenting or other programs recommended by the Agency, maintain a stable

residence, or provide proof that she was regularly employed.

While E.K.C. was in foster care between March 2022 and May 2024,

Mother would only visit sporadically and frequently would go several months

without communicating with the Agency. On May 30, 2024, E.K.C. was placed

in the pre-adoptive home of a paternal aunt in North Carolina. The foster

family made weekly virtual calls available to Mother, but she often failed to

participate.

Accordingly, the Agency filed the underlying petition seeking

termination of Mother’s parental rights on December 11, 2024. The

termination hearing was held on February 5, 2025.2 Mother appeared and

was represented by counsel. The Agency proffered testimony as to the above

facts. Additionally, case worker Samantha Weirich testified that E.K.C. was

doing “amazing” with his foster family and has bonded with them, relying upon

them to meet his needs. See N.T. Hearing, 2/5/25, at 22. Particularly,

E.K.C.’s paternal aunt has kept E.K.C. medically up to date and engaged in

services to address special needs arising from his diagnosis of autism

spectrum disorder.

____________________________________________

2 The orphans’ court appointed Joy Waters Fleming, Esquire, as guardian ad

litem (“GAL”) and legal counsel for E.K.C., finding no conflict between the legal interest and best interest of the two-and-one-half-year-old child.

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Mother testified in her defense. She indicated that approximately four

months before the date of the hearing, she began residing in a “Mommy and

Me” program at a Gaudenzia rehabilitation facility with her nine-month-old

daughter.3 She had recently begun to participate in parenting and behavioral

therapy programs offered therein. Mother acknowledged that she lacked

stable housing and employment, but indicated that her plans were to attend

a step-down facility with the hope that assistance could be provided for her to

achieve stability. Overall, Mother expressed her love for E.K.C. and regretted

her lack of responsibility as a parent.

Following the hearing, the orphans’ court entered a decree terminating

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),

and (b). Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and concise statement of errors

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The orphans’ court authored an opinion

discussing the evidence supporting its decision to terminate Mother’s parental

rights.

In this Court, Mother’s counsel filed both an Anders brief and a petition

to withdraw as counsel, which we must first consider before addressing the

underlying merits. See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 240 A.3d 658, 661

(Pa.Super. 2020) (“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may

not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the

request to withdraw.” (cleaned up)).

3 That child is not implicated in these proceedings.

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In order to successfully withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw and aver that, after making a

conscientious examination of the record, she has determined that an appeal

would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy of the Anders brief to the appellant;

and (3) advise the appellant that they have the right to immediately retain

private counsel or bring additional arguments to the court’s attention. Id. To

confirm client notification has occurred, counsel must provide a copy of the

letter advising the appellant of their rights in conformity with

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa.Super. 2005). See

B.G.S., 240 A.3d at 661.

Our High Court further delineated counsel’s duties as follows:

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Based upon our examination of the petition to withdraw and Anders

brief, we conclude that counsel has complied with the technical requirements

set forth above. As required by Santiago, counsel presented a history of the

case, referred to issues that arguably support the appeal, stated her

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, and cited case law. See Anders brief

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at 6-21. Counsel also sent Mother the petition and brief, along with a letter

apprising Mother of her immediate right to obtain counsel or proceed pro se.

Mother has not availed herself of that opportunity. We must therefore “‘make

a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent judgment to

decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.’” Commonwealth v.

Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1249 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Santiago, 978

A.2d at 354 n.5).

The Anders brief identifies the following claims:

1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law concluding that the Agency met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother refused or failed to perform parental duties [f]or a period of at least six months prior to the filing of the petition seeking the involuntary termination of her parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law concluding that Mother had failed, refused, or was incapable of remedying the conditions which led to the removal of the child, and therefore the termination of parental rights best serves the needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8).

3. Whether the [orphans’] court properly considered the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child when issuing a decree involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Mother, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

Anders brief at 4-5 (cleaned up).

As all three of the potential claims identified in the Anders brief pertain

to whether the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s decree

terminating Mother’s parental rights, we examine them together. We begin

with the legal principles governing our review of such appeals:

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In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported, we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However, we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(citation omitted). Further, “if competent evidence supports the trial court’s

findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite

result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003)

(citation omitted).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act sets forth the following two-part

analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence

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that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.

In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 705 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up).

We have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear,

direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up).

To affirm a termination decree, we need only agree with the orphans’

court that any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b), is met. See

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). As it pertains

to the case sub judice, we consider § 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as

follows in relevant part:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

....

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

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income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), . . . the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

Our Supreme Court has offered authoritative guidance on the inquiry

central to termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(1):

Parental duties are not defined in the Adoption Act, but our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance[,] and support. Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and association. The performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with reasonable firmness to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform parental responsibilities.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 592 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

Although our General Assembly emphasized “the six months

immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition” as the “most

critical period for evaluation[,]” the High Court cautioned that courts should

“avoid a mechanical application of the law regarding the termination of

parental rights.” Id. at 592-93. Rather, the review conducted by the orphans’

court should encompass the “whole history of a given case.” In re Adoption

of C.M., 255 A.3d at 364. Moreover, every assessment of § 2511(a)(1) “must

examine the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the

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parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of the

circumstances, clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination of

parental rights.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 593. These factors

include, among other things: (1) the parent’s explanation for her conduct;

(2) post-abandonment contact and efforts to re-engage with the child; and

(3) the effect on the child of terminating the parent’s rights pursuant to

§ 2511(b). Id.

In discussing the sufficiency of the evidence within the Anders brief as

to § 2511(a)(1), counsel notes as follows:

An analysis of the six . . . month period prior to the filing of the Agency’s petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights indicates Mother did not begin to make sustained, affirmative efforts toward exercising her parental rights until [she began attending Gaudenzia] on or about October 11, 2024—a mere two . . . months prior to the filing of the petition giving rise to the instant appeal.

Anders brief at 19. She further highlights that in viewing the totality of the

case, Mother did not make any significant effort toward reunification until

nearly three years after the child’s placement. Id. Counsel recognized the

praise the orphans’ court gave to Mother for her recent progress toward

rehabilitation, but noted the legal authority that “parental rights simply cannot

be preserved by waiting for a more suitable time to perform one’s parental

responsibilities.” Id.

In its opinion, the orphans’ court likewise held: “Mother’s sporadic

contact with the child and history of visits fail to demonstrate a commitment

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to parenting E.K.C. The Agency referred Mother to various parenting and

visitation services, such as JusticeWorks STOPP, the Samara House Parenting,

and the YWCA, all of which Mother failed to follow through.” Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 3/27/25, at unnumbered 10. It further concluded that Mother left

the child without parental control or care for an unreasonable amount of time,

opining as follows:

While the record includes evidence of very recent instances of minimal progress, this insubstantial progress occurred after the Agency received aggravated circumstances against Mother, and after the child had been in the care and custody of the Agency for nearly three years. E.K.C. is innocent, and deserves a mother who consistently works on h[is] goals and unfailingly provides the love and care he deserves.

Id. at unnumbered 11 (some capitalization altered).

Upon review, we agree that any challenge to the sufficiency of the

Agency’s proof as to § 2511(a)(1) would necessarily fail, as the uncontested

evidence demonstrated that Mother had not performed any parental duties in

the six-month period leading up to the filing of the termination petition. She

had nearly no communication with E.K.C. or the Agency during that time, was

not involved in E.K.C.’s medical care, lacked stabile housing and monetary

resources to care for the child, and otherwise did not “exert [herself] to take

and maintain a place of importance in” E.K.C.’s life. See In re Adoption of

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592. Despite Mother making minimal progress on her

rehabilitative goals in the months leading up to the termination hearing, there

was no record evidence that Mother fulfilled any parental duties during the

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critical period contemplated by § 2511(a)(1). In sum, the certified record

upholds the court’s determination.

Having found statutory support for termination under subsection (a), we

now pivot to § 2511(b), which is reviewed from the child’s perspective. See

Matter of Adoption of L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d 41, 51 (Pa.Super. 2024). In

conducting a § 2511(b) analysis, the court must place the child’s

“developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns

for the parent. Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must be made on

a case-by-case basis.” Id. (cleaned up). Those emotional needs “include

intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” Id. at 52 (cleaned

up). “[I]f the child has any bond with the biological parent, the court must

conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not always an easy task.” Id.

(cleaned up). Finally, this Court “must keep the ticking clock of childhood

ever in mind” and we “will not disturb [the court’s bonding] assessment when

[its] factual findings are supported by the record.” Matter of Adoption of

L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d at 52 (cleaned up).

In the Anders brief, counsel discusses subsection (b) by noting that

Mother cannot point to any record evidence demonstrating that E.K.C. had a

beneficial, necessary bond with her, whether caused by “geographical

constraints or the passing of time.” Anders brief at 20. In a similar vein, the

orphans’ court addressed this prong as follows:

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[There was no evidence presented] that a bond exists [between Mother and E.K.C.] which, if broken, will cause detriment to E.K.C. E.K.C. has resided in foster care since February 2023. His new kinship foster home is a pre-adoptive home that ensures E.K.C.’s needs for love, safety[,] and stability are met. E.K.C. enjoys his time with his family, is in a specialized school that can address his autistic needs, has bonded with his foster family and his best interests are served in that home. The caseworker testified that he is doing “amazing” and in her nearly three-year involvement with this case, he is currently the best she has ever seen him.

We will not disrupt the permanency and stability E.K.C. enjoys based upon the hope that Mother can finally acquire stable housing and employment, and maintain the necessary sobriety and commitment to properly parent.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/27/25, at unnumbered 13.

Again, we find that the Agency’s evidence with respect to subsection (b)

renders any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence wholly without merit.

The orphans’ court’s findings of a bond between E.K.C. and the foster family

are amply supported by the record. Conversely, there was no evidence of any

existing bond between Mother and E.K.C., or that termination would detriment

E.K.C.’s wellbeing. In other words, nothing supports the contention that by

terminating Mother’s parental rights, the court was not giving “primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

Having addressed the issues raised in the Anders brief, we lastly

determine that our “simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear[s]

on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not,

missed or misstated[,]” has revealed no additional issues that counsel failed

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to address. See Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272

(Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc). Therefore, we affirm the decree terminating

Mother’s parental rights and we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Application of Lisa M. Watson, Esquire, to withdraw as counsel is

granted. Decree affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 09/04/2025

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