In re E.K.

2024 Ohio 5291

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 6, 2024
• Docket: C-240229
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re E.K., 2024-Ohio-5291.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: E.K. : APPEAL NO. C-240229 TRIAL NO. 20/3585 X :

: OPINION

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 6, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Norbert Wessels, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant State of Ohio,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Jessica Moss, Assistant Public Defender, for Apellee E.K. [Cite as In re E.K., 2024-Ohio-5291.]

CROUSE, Judge.

{¶1} This appeal concerns the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Hamilton

County Juvenile Court. The court dismissed a complaint for a parole violation that was

filed against appellee E.K. after it determined that E.K., who was over 18 years old, was

no longer subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Appellant the State of Ohio

appeals, arguing that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional determination and resulting

dismissal of the complaint were in error. Because E.K. was subject to the jurisdiction

of the juvenile court with respect to the parole violation until he attained the age of 21,

we hold that the court erred in dismissing the complaint. We accordingly reverse the

juvenile court’s judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} In November of 2020, a complaint for felonious assault, along with an

accompanying weapon specification, was filed against E.K. in the Hamilton County

Juvenile Court. E.K. was 15 years old at the time. E.K. admitted to the allegations in

the complaint and was adjudged delinquent. He was committed to the Ohio

Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) for a minimum of 12 months and a maximum

not to exceed E.K.’s attainment of 21 years of age. He received an additional 12-month

commitment on the weapon specification, to be served consecutively to the

commitment imposed for felonious assault.

{¶3} E.K. was granted early release from DYS on October 26, 2023, and

placed on electronic monitoring as a condition of his parole. The juvenile court’s entry

granting early release prohibited E.K. from driving a car and stated that he was to live

with his aunt, enroll in school, and have no contact with the victim of the offense. A

juvenile court magistrate issued a decision accepting and approving the rules of parole,

and that decision was adopted by the court. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶4} On December 19, 2023, a complaint for a parole violation was filed

against E.K., alleging that he failed to follow his treatment plan and failed to maintain

contact with his parole officer. At the request of defense counsel and E.K.’s parole

officer, the magistrate delayed any further action on the complaint so that the parties

could evaluate E.K.’s ongoing performance on parole.

{¶5} On March 6, 2024, an amended complaint for a parole violation was

filed. The complaint contained allegations from E.K.’s parole officer, Derrica Chatman,

that E.K. had been arrested and charged with carrying a concealed weapon, having a

weapon while under disability, and receiving stolen property, and that he had

consequently violated the conditions of his parole requiring him to obey all laws and

to refrain from purchasing or possessing any weapon.

{¶6} A hearing was held regarding the parole violation on April 2, 2024.

Chatman told the juvenile court that E.K. had pled to charges in the court of common

pleas and was currently being held at the River City Correctional Center (“River City”).

Chatman stated that E.K. would be on adult parole supervision upon his release from

River City and asked that E.K. be discharged from parole through DYS. The State

indicated that it would not stand in the way if the parole officer was withdrawing the

violation, but it expressed concern that the victim of E.K.’s underlying offense had not

been informed of the hearing in compliance with Marsy’s Law. The court told the State

to “let us know where you stand at the next hearing or before, that’s fine.”

{¶7} A subsequent hearing was held on April 10, 2024. The juvenile court

initiated that hearing by stating, “[E.K.] has received an adult conviction for a firearm.

The Court of Common Pleas, General Division placed him in River City. And his parole

violation, here with us, will be dismissed. He’ll be discharged from parole by the

appropriate methods by DYS.”

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{¶8} The State objected, arguing that because E.K. was adjudicated

delinquent for the underlying offense prior to turning 18, the juvenile court had

continuing jurisdiction until he reached the age of 21, and therefore, could adjudicate

the parole-violation complaint. The State asked for a plea of “admit” on the parole

violation. Upon further questioning by the court regarding its position, the State

responded:

I think it makes a complete record. He’s on parole. This was a parole

violation, because he has picked up these new charges. The State

understands he’s in River City, but having a complete record for these

purposes, for whatever happens in the future, it comes back and things

of that nature, I think it does just that. It makes the record clear. And I

believe the Court can do it under the statute.

{¶9} The court was not persuaded. It held that “[b]ecause he is over eighteen,

because he has been convicted in adult court, and because he is now under the

supervision of the Court of Common Pleas, this case is dismissed.” In a corresponding

entry dismissing the complaint, the court stated, “E.K. is over 18, has an adult

conviction, and is currently held in River City on that adult matter. The Court declines

to exercise concurrent jurisdiction as E.K. is an adult and no longer subject to Juvenile

Court jurisdiction.” The State now appeals.

II. Dismissal of the Complaint

{¶10} In its sole assignment of error, the State argues that the juvenile court

erred in determining that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over E.K. because he is

now an adult. E.K. concedes that the juvenile court has jurisdiction over him on the

original delinquency charge, including the complaint for a parole violation, until he

turns 21. Despite that concession, he argues that the juvenile court’s dismissal of the

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

complaint should be upheld because the court nevertheless had the authority to

dismiss the complaint under Juv.R. 9(A). He further argues, in the alternative, that

this court should either affirm the juvenile court’s judgment or dismiss the State’s

appeal because no meaningful relief can be granted and the appeal is moot.

{¶11} While a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment is

typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion, where, as here, a question of law has been

raised as to whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction, our review is de

novo. State v. Hudson, 2022-Ohio-1435, ¶ 19.

{¶12} We first address the State’s argument that the juvenile court erred in

dismissing the complaint based on its determination that E.K. was an adult. We then

discuss the alternative bases provided by E.K. for affirming the juvenile court’s

judgment.

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

{¶13} R.C. 2151.23 addresses the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In relevant

part, it provides that “[t]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction . . .

[c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint” is alleged

to be a delinquent child. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2151.23(A)(1).

{¶14} The hearing on the parole violation was a delinquency proceeding. In re

Andrew, 2008-Ohio-4791, ¶ 8 (“A parole-violation hearing of a person adjudicated a

delinquent child is a delinquency proceeding.”). The juvenile court’s jurisdiction

accordingly hinged on whether E.K. was considered a child even though he was over

18 years of age.

{¶15} The term “child” is defined in R.C. 2152.02(C)(1) as “a person who is

under eighteen years of age, except as otherwise provided in divisions (C)(2) to (8) of

this section.” The exception set forth in R.C. 2152.02(C)(6) applies in this case. It

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

provides that:

The juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is adjudicated a

delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender prior to attaining eighteen

years of age until the person attains twenty-one years of age, and, for

purposes of that jurisdiction related to that adjudication, except as

otherwise provided in this division, a person who is so adjudicated a

delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender shall be deemed a “child”

until the person attains twenty-one years of age.

R.C. 2152.02(C)(6). Interpreting this provision, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that

“when a juvenile court is exercising jurisdiction over a person adjudicated a delinquent

child pursuant to the matter for which the person was adjudicated delinquent,” the

person will be treated as a child until she or he attains 21 years of age. In re Andrew at

¶ 6.

{¶16} Here, E.K. was adjudicated delinquent for felonious assault at the age of

16 and committed to DYS. He was granted early release at the age of 18 and placed on

parole. After his release, and while he was still 18, a complaint was filed charging him

with a parole violation. In conducting a parole-violation hearing, the court was

exercising its jurisdiction over E.K. pursuant to the matter for which E.K. was

adjudicated delinquent. Pursuant to R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), the juvenile court retained

jurisdiction over E.K. for such a purpose until he attained 21 years of age. As E.K. was

not yet 21, he was considered a child and was subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile

court. In re Andrew at ¶ 6; R.C. 2152.02(C)(6). The juvenile court erred in determining

otherwise.

{¶17} The Tenth District considered whether a juvenile court had subject-

matter jurisdiction in similar circumstances in In re Kelly, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 808

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(10th Dist. Mar. 4, 1999). The juvenile appellant in Kelly was adjudicated delinquent

for robbery and placed on probation. Id. at *1. He was charged with a probation

violation just before turning 18, and DYS filed a motion for the juvenile court to

continue exercising jurisdiction. Id. at *1-2. Several weeks later, shortly after he turned

18, appellant was indicted on a weapon charge in the court of common pleas and his

counsel filed a motion to terminate the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Id. at *2-3. The

juvenile court granted DYS’s motion to exercise continuing jurisdiction. Id. at *3.

Appellant appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in failing to terminate its

jurisdiction once it received notice that the court of common pleas was exercising its

jurisdiction and that an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction was contrary to law.

{¶18} In rejecting appellant’s argument, the Tenth District stated:

In addressing appellant’s contention that the juvenile court and

the general division of the court of common pleas were improperly

exercising “concurrent jurisdiction” over him, the trial court held that,

“the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the parole

violation and no jurisdiction over the carrying a concealed weapon

charge,” whereas “the general division of the court of common pleas has

original jurisdiction over the carrying a concealed weapon charge but no

jurisdiction over the parole violation.” Thus, the court concluded that

appellant “is subject to the jurisdiction of both courts, exercised

separately on two unrelated charges.” We agree with the trial court’s

analysis.

Id. at *10-11. The Tenth District further stated that “the jurisdiction exercised by the

general division of the common pleas court over the charge of carrying a concealed

weapon had no affect [sic] on the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction to consider the

7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

parole violation.” Id. at *12.

{¶19} The same reasoning holds true in the case before us. While the court of

common pleas retained jurisdiction over the matters that E.K. pled to in that court,

the juvenile court retained exclusive jurisdiction over E.K.’s parole violation. Simply

stated, one court’s jurisdiction did not negate the other’s.

{¶20} We accordingly hold, as E.K. concedes, that the juvenile court erred in

dismissing the complaint for a parole violation based on its determination that E.K.

was no longer subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.

B. Juv.R. 9(A)

{¶21} E.K. contends that the juvenile court’s dismissal of the complaint for a

parole violation should nonetheless be affirmed because the court had the authority to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Juv.R. 9(A). He argues that, in dismissing the

complaint, the juvenile court achieved the right result for the wrong reason.

{¶22} Juv.R. 9(A), captioned “[c]ourt action to be avoided,” provides that “[i]n

all appropriate cases formal court action should be avoided and other community

resources utilized to ameliorate situations brought to the attention of the court.” This

rule authorizes the juvenile court to dismiss cases that it believes are best handled in

other manners or by utilizing other resources. But the record before us does not

establish that the court relied on Juv.R. 9(A) in this case or support upholding the

court’s dismissal on the basis of that rule.

{¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court first discussed Juv.R. 9(A) in In re M.D., 38

Ohio St.3d 149 (1988). In M.D., the Court held that to charge a child under 13 with sex

crimes for conduct that was characterized as “playing doctor” was contrary to R.C. Ch.

2151 and Juv.R. 9(A). Id. at 150. The Court elaborated on the purpose of Juv.R. 9(A),

stating:

8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

The best interests of the child and the welfare and protection of

the community are paramount considerations in every juvenile

proceeding in this state. This is further emphasized in the Rules of

Juvenile Procedure. These goals are effectuated at every step in the

juvenile court system, but are most effectively met at the initial intake

of the juvenile by the juvenile court. The overriding rule upon intake of

a child is that formal court action should be a last resort to resolving

juvenile problems.

Id. at 153.

{¶24} More recently, the Court discussed Juv.R. 9(A) in In re D.S., 2017-Ohio-

8289. In that case, a complaint was filed charging a child under the age of 13 with three

counts of gross sexual imposition. Id. at ¶ 2. The alleged victim of these offenses was

also under the age of 13. Id. at ¶ 1. The juvenile court dismissed the charges against the

child pursuant to Juv.R. 9 based on its determination that the treatment needs of both

children involved could be met by alternative methods and that it was not in the best

interest of either child to continue with the prosecution. Id. at ¶ 4.

{¶25} While the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that the record was not

sufficiently developed to support a dismissal under Juv.R. 9(A), the Ohio Supreme

Court disagreed and held that it was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss the action

pursuant to that rule. Id. at ¶ 5 and 11. The Court recognized that Juv.R. 9(A) should

be liberally interpreted and construed “‘to provide for the care, protection, and mental

and physical development of children subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,

and to protect the welfare of the community’” and also “‘to protect the public interest

by treating children as persons in need of supervision, care and rehabilitation.’” Id. at

¶ 8, quoting Juv.R. 1(B)(3) and (4). While recognizing that utilization of a formal court

9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

proceeding would have provided a more detailed record to assist in determining an

appropriate outcome, the Court stated:

[T]hat is precisely the kind of proceeding that Juv.R. 9(A) empowers a

juvenile court to avoid—a review of the details of a sexual interaction

between children under the age of 13. A juvenile court’s primary concern

is not always to determine culpability for acts that would be crimes if

committed by an adult. As we have recognized in the past, holding a

formal proceeding to determine whether a child was motivated by

innocent curiosity or by culpable sexual gratification may be as bad or

worse for the children involved—and for society—as was the act itself.

Id. at ¶ 11.

{¶26} The record below plainly demonstrates that the juvenile court dismissed

the complaint based on its mistaken belief that it no longer had jurisdiction over E.K.

because he was 18 years old. There is no indication in the record that the dismissal was

based on a need to protect E.K. or the community or because the court believed that

continuing with a prosecution of the parole violation was not in E.K.’s best interest.

The court did not indicate that it believed E.K.’s treatment needs could best be met by

alternative means to a formal court proceeding. The court quite simply stated that it

lacked jurisdiction over the complaint.

{¶27} A juvenile court generally has the authority to dismiss a complaint

pursuant to Juv.R. 9(A). But where the record is clear that a court gave no

consideration to Juv.R. 9(A), the rule cannot serve as the basis for upholding a juvenile

court’s dismissal of a complaint on other grounds. We accordingly reject E.K.’s Juv.R.

9(A) argument.

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C. Mootness

{¶28} E.K. further argues that this court should either affirm the juvenile

court’s judgment or dismiss the State’s appeal because the case is “technically moot.”

E.K. contends that because he is already serving an adult sentence, the juvenile court

can grant no meaningful relief even if it were to find that he violated parole.

{¶29} An appellate court will only rule on actual controversies, In re A.F.,

2020-Ohio-5420, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), and does not have jurisdiction to rule on the merits

of a moot appeal. State v. Morgan, 2022-Ohio-2932, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). A case will be

considered moot where further action by a court is precluded because the dispute has

been resolved. State v. Potter, 2024-Ohio-4652, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.). In other words, a case

is moot when there no longer exists a live controversy. Miami Twp. Bd. of Trustees v.

Weinle, 2021-Ohio-2284, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.).

{¶30} Any action related to E.K.’s parole violation is not moot. The

controversy has not been resolved, and, once the juvenile court’s jurisdictional

determination is reversed and the cause is remanded, a live controversy will still exist.

Contrary to E.K.’s argument, the situation in the case at bar is not analogous to a

situation in which a defendant raises a challenge on appeal to a sentence that has

already been served. See State v. Carr, 2015-Ohio-2529, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.), citing State v.

Portis, 2011-Ohio-2429, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.) (holding that where a defendant has been

released from prison on a sentence that the defendant has challenged on appeal, the

challenge to the sentence is moot because the defendant cannot be given back the time

served and the court cannot provide meaningful relief).

{¶31} Rather, after reversal by this court, E.K.’s parole violation will remain

pending and further action by the juvenile court will not be precluded. And contrary

to E.K.’s argument, the court can still afford the State with meaningful relief. The State

11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

made clear at the hearing on the parole violation that it wanted E.K. to admit to the

violation for purposes of having a complete record should there be additional

proceedings going forward. Even if the juvenile court ultimately elects to discharge

E.K. from parole, it could still adjudicate him delinquent for the violation.

{¶32} We accordingly decline E.K.’s invitation to find that the case is moot.

III. Conclusion

{¶33} The juvenile court erred in determining that it lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over E.K. because he had turned 18. The State’s assignment of error is

sustained. The court’s judgment dismissing the complaint for a parole violation is

reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.