In re E.G. CA1/5

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 8, 2013
DocketA138253
StatusUnpublished

This text of In re E.G. CA1/5 (In re E.G. CA1/5) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re E.G. CA1/5, (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

Filed 11/8/13 In re E.G. CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re E.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A138253 v. E.G., (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J13-00091) Defendant and Appellant.

E.G. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court and placing him on probation after he pled no contest to allegations he had committed battery causing serious bodily injury and grand theft from the person of another. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, §§ 243, subd. (d), 487, subd. (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.778(e).) We reject his challenge to gang-related probation conditions imposed by the court, but agree the case must be remanded so the court can determine whether the commitment offenses should be declared felonies or misdemeanors. BACKGROUND1 On January 10, 2013, 16-year-old appellant took his father’s truck without permission and was driving with a friend Miguel G. in Pittsburg. They stopped the truck

1 Due to appellant’s plea, our description of the underlying facts is taken primarily from the probation report.

1 and chased 17-year-old Mario R., who was walking down the street. When they caught up to Mario, they demanded his shoes and punched him repeatedly, causing him to fall against a fence and break his arm. The attack continued while Mario was on the ground, until Miguel took one of Mario’s shoes and he and appellant fled. Mario walked toward his home, crying and in pain, until emergency personnel arrived. Police officers went to appellant’s home about a week later and located Mario’s stolen shoe in appellant’s mother’s car. During a search of appellant’s bedroom, photographs were found indicating appellant and Miguel were involved in the “Hello Kitty Gang.” The officers also discovered photographs of appellant and Miguel displaying hand signals, and photographs of hand signals in front of guns displayed on a bed. Live ammunition was found in a backpack in appellant’s room. Appellant’s father explained he and his son were both licensed and trained hunters. After being read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, appellant told the police he had been driving his father’s truck and followed Mario to a nearby parking lot. He admitted assaulting Mario, though he noted Miguel had assaulted him first and had taken the shoe. Appellant said the guns in the photographs were used by him and his father for hunting and that he and Miguel were the only members of the Hello Kitty Gang. A juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging appellant had committed a second degree robbery and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 245, subd. (a)(4).) The petition was amended to add counts of battery causing serious bodily injury and grand theft from the person of another. (Pen. Code, §§ 243, subd. (d), 487, subd. (c).) Appellant entered a no contest plea to these new allegations and the robbery and assault counts were dismissed. The probation report prepared for the dispositional hearing noted appellant had “explained the ‘Hello Kitty Gang’ as something that he and the co-defendant started as a way of meeting girls. [Appellant] said they wore clothing and jewelry with the pink logo, and invented a hand sign. He said it is not a ‘serious’ gang affiliation; they are not involved in criminal activity.” Appellant told the probation officer he had known Mario

2 from previous conflicts and blamed him for “disrespecting” appellant’s cousin. According to the report, appellant had “begun to delve into the amateur gang lifestyle[.]” Gang conditions were recommended as part of the probation order, as was a nine-month commitment to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility. The court placed appellant on probation on the terms recommended. It set the maximum period of confinement at four years, eight months and ordered appellant to provide “a collection of specimen samples and print impressions” under Penal Code section 296.1. DISCUSSION I. Gang Terms as Condition of Probation Appellant challenges four of the gang conditions as unreasonable, arguing the commitment offenses were not gang-related and there was no evidence he was at risk of becoming involved in a gang.2 We disagree. Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b) empowers a juvenile court to “impose and require any and all reasonable conditions [of probation] that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” “In fashioning the conditions of probation, the juvenile court should consider the minor’s entire social history in addition to the circumstances of the crime.” (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 100.) “A condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not

2 The four gang conditions challenged by appellant are: (1) “The minor shall not associate with anyone known to the minor to be a gang member or associated with a gang, or anyone who the Probation Officer informs the minor to be a gang member or associated with a gang.” (2) “The minor shall not . . . visit or remain in any specific location known by the minor to be, or that [the] Probation [Officer] informs the minor to be an area of gang activity.” (3) “The minor shall not knowingly possess, display, or wear insignia, clothing logos, emblems, badges or buttons or display any gang signs or gestures that minor knows to be or that the Probation Officer informs the minor to be gang-related.” (4) “The minor shall not post, display, or transmit on or through any cell phone any symbols or information that the minor knows to be, or the Probation Officer informs the minor to be gang-related.” The probation order further specified, “For the purposes of these probation conditions, the words ‘gang’ and ‘gang-related’ mean a ‘criminal street gang’ as defined in [P]enal [C]ode section 186.22[,] subdivision[] (f).”

3 necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.” (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 19.) The juvenile court’s power to set probation conditions is broad, so that it can serve its function of rehabilitating wards and furthering the goals of the juvenile court system. (In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 246 (R.V.).) A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless (1) it has no relationship to the crime for which the juvenile was adjudicated a ward; (2) it relates to conduct that is not itself criminal; and (3) it requires or forbids conduct that is not related to future criminality. (Ibid.) “Where a court entertains genuine concerns that the minor is in danger of falling under the influence of a street gang, an order directing a minor to refrain from gang association is a reasonable preventive measure in avoiding future criminality and setting the minor on a productive course.” (In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1502; disapproved on other grounds in In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 962, fn. 2.) The minor need not actually have joined a gang for the condition to be reasonable, as there is “no logical or beneficial reason to require a court to wait until a minor has become entrenched with a gang, only then to apply mere prophylactic remedies.” (Id. at p.

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Related

Miranda v. Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (Supreme Court, 1966)
In Re Sade C.
920 P.2d 716 (California Supreme Court, 1996)
Davis v. Municipal Court for San Francisco Judicial District
757 P.2d 11 (California Supreme Court, 1988)
People v. Carbajal
899 P.2d 67 (California Supreme Court, 1995)
People v. Manzy W.
930 P.2d 1255 (California Supreme Court, 1997)
People v. Todd L.
113 Cal. App. 3d 14 (California Court of Appeal, 1980)
People v. Laylah K.
229 Cal. App. 3d 1496 (California Court of Appeal, 1991)
People v. Lopez
78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 66 (California Court of Appeal, 1998)
People v. Nancy C.
34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 871 (California Court of Appeal, 2005)
In Re Walter P.
170 Cal. App. 4th 95 (California Court of Appeal, 2009)
People v. Wilkinson
94 P.3d 551 (California Supreme Court, 2004)
People v. R.V.
171 Cal. App. 4th 239 (California Court of Appeal, 2009)

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Bluebook (online)
In re E.G. CA1/5, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-eg-ca15-calctapp-2013.