In re Eduardo E.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Eduardo E.

91 A.D.3d 505, 937 N.Y.2d 182

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 17, 2012

StatusPublished

This text of 91 A.D.3d 505 (In re Eduardo E.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Eduardo E., 91 A.D.3d 505, 937 N.Y.2d 182 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012).

Pincite

Opinion

The court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress his statement to the police. The totality of the circumstances establishes that the statement was voluntarily made (see Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 285-288 [1991]; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38-39 [1977]). There is no evidence that appellant had any mental impairment that would affect his ability to understand Miranda warnings. Appellant turned 16 years of age between the incident and the interrogation; therefore, the special statutory procedures for juvenile interrogations were not required (see Family Court Act § 305.2 [2]; Matter of Christopher QQ., 40 AD3d 1183 [2007]).

The fact-finding determination was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations. Concur — Tom, J.E, Catterson, DeGrasse, Richter and ManzanetDaniels, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

The court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress his statement to the police. The totality of the circumstances establishes that the statement was voluntarily made (see Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 285-288 [1991]; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38-39 [1977]). There is no evidence that appellant had any mental impairment that would affect his ability to understand Miranda warnings. Appellant turned 16 years of age between the incident and the interrogation; therefore, the special statutory procedures for juvenile interrogations were not required (see Family Court Act § 305.2 [2]; Matter of Christopher QQ., 40 AD3d 1183 [2007]).

The fact-finding determination was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations. Concur — Tom, J.E, Catterson, DeGrasse, Richter and ManzanetDaniels, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

91 A.D.3d 505, 937 N.Y.2d 182, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-eduardo-e-nyappdiv-2012.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack