In re East River Bridge Co.

27 N.Y.S. 145, 75 Hun 119, 82 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 119, 57 N.Y. St. Rep. 732
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 12, 1894
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 27 N.Y.S. 145 (In re East River Bridge Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re East River Bridge Co., 27 N.Y.S. 145, 75 Hun 119, 82 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 119, 57 N.Y. St. Rep. 732 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1894).

Opinions

VAN BRUNT, P. J.

By chapter 101 of the Laws of 1892 the East was incorporated, certainly with somewhat ■extraordinary powers. By this act it was organized with a capital •of $25,000,000, which it was authorized to increase or decrease at pleasure. It was also authorized to construct two bridges across the East river,—one between a point at or near Broadway, in the city of Brooklyn, across the East river, to a point or place between Delaney and Rivington streets and Columbia and Cannon streets, in the city of New York; and the other commencing at a point between the pier line of East river and Fulton street, in the city of Brooklyn, across the East river, to a point or place between Jackson and Scammel streets, in the city of New York. It was further provided that an approach to said first-mentioned bridge should be constructed and maintained from a point on said bridge at or about Cannon street; thence extending westerly over, through, and along private property, and across the intervening streets, to the Bowery; and thence across the Bowery to Spring street,—which extension might [146]*146be extended, if in the judgment of a majority of the stockholders it should deemed for public convenience so to do, from its termination at the Bowery and Spring street, westerly, above, through, and along Spring street, to or near the Hudson river, in the city of New York. The company was also authorized to construct all necessary approaches other than those specified, and all necessary connections between said approach or approaches and bridges and any railroad or railroads in the city of New York, so as to enable passengers to be transported to and from the same. By chapter. 102 of the Laws of 1892, amending the rapid transit act, the directors of any company incorporated to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge or bridges connecting a city of more than 1,000,000 of inhabitants with another situate in the state, and by the act of incorporation by which authority should have been conferred, or intended to be conferred, to construct, maintain, and operate, as a part of, or in connection with, this bridge, an approach or approaches thereto, extending generally in an easterly or westerly direction, may determine, in lieu of constructing such approach or approaches, to build, maintain, and operate an elevated railway, the route of which shall be coincident with the route of said approach or approaches as defined by said act. The method of procedure of such bridge company in that behalf was by the ■ amendatory act prescribed and regulated. The directors of the petitioner located the main cross-town approach above mentioned through a new street 50 feet wide, through private property, to the Bowery,- and from thence, absorbing Spring street, through the same to West street, and thence, turning to the south, it continued along West street 1,200 feet, to the Desbrosses street ferry, connecting with the ferries of the Pennsylvania Railroad. An approach was also located to connect one bridge with the other, and to extend from such junction through Grand street to the East river. The directors of the bridge company determined to construct, in lieu of these approaches, an elevated railroad, and adopted a plan, of which a copy is annexed to the petition. The consent of the local authorities to the construction was given, and the capital of the corporation reduced to $2,000,000, 10 per cent, of which has been paid in. The property holders along the proposed line of said elevated railroads having refused their consent to their construction, application was made to the general term for the appointment of commissioners under the rapid transit act, which commissioners, were appointed, who reported in favor of the enterprise; and the question now presented is whether the court should confirm the same.

The learned counsel for the petitioner seems to have a rather exalted idea of the functions and the dignity of the determination of the commissioners appointed in this proceeding. It is urged that the determination of the commissioners that the construction of the proposed road is a public necessity will not be reviewed by this court, except fraud or manifest error on their part be averred, which is not the case, and that the conclusions arrived at by them upon all matters of fact are the same as the verdict of a jury, as far as this court is concerned; and our attention is called to the [147]*147case of In re Nassau Cable Co., 36 Hun, 272, where, the commissioners having reported adversely to the building of the proposed road, it was held that, in the absence of fraud or mistake in the proceedings, the general term had no power to send the case back, or to appoint a new commission, but that the determination of the commissioners was final. This conclusion was evidently in accordance with the law. There is no' provision in the rapid transit act for any action upon the part of the court unless the report of the commissioners is in favor of the construction of such railroad. Hence, by the very terms of the act, if the commissioners report against the enterprise, it is final; and for that reason the commissioners, in proceedings of this nature, have always resolved questions in regard to which there may be any possible doubt in favor of the applicant, in order that it may be finally determined by the court as to whether their conclusion should be confirmed or not. Our attention is also called to the case of In re New York El. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 357, where the court of appeals say that they cannot, or at least ought not, to interfere with the findings of the commissioners upon questions of fact. Upon an examination of the act it is difficult to see where the court of appeals have any authority or jurisdiction to interfere with the question as to whether the benefits arising from the construction of an elevated railroad are of such a character as to counterbalance any damage which will be done to private interests from its operation. This court is of opinion that the responsibility in respect to this matter of construction finally rests with it, and it is to determine, where the property holders have refused their assents, upon all the facts before the commissioners, and those of which they may take judicial notice, whether it should authorize the construction of the railroad, notwithstanding the objection of the persons who would be injuriously affected thereby.

It is not at all necessary to discuss any of the constitutional questions which have been raised upon this application, because, as we understand it, the court of last resort has practically swept away all the limitations which have been attempted to be placed upon private and local enterprises affecting private interests. In Re Church, 92 N. Y. 1, it has been held that a law relating to particular persons or things as a class was general, while one relating to particular persons or things of a class was deemed local or private; and that an act which under no possible circumstances could apply to but a single county of the state, because it created a class consisting of. one, and did not refer by name to the individual composing this class of one, was not local, but general, and therefore constitutional. Under this decision, all that it is necessary to do to evade the constitutional provision is to use general language, qualified, however, by particular descriptions which can make it applicable only to the particular thing in respect to which there is an intent to legislate.

An objection has also been raised that the petitioner has not sufficient means or capital to complete the enterprise, or to compensate the property owners for the damage which will result in [148]

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6 A.D. 141 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1896)

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Bluebook (online)
27 N.Y.S. 145, 75 Hun 119, 82 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 119, 57 N.Y. St. Rep. 732, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-east-river-bridge-co-nysupct-1894.