In re E.A.

2025 IL App (4th) 241473-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 1, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-1473
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241473-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-24-1473, 4-24-1474 cons. April 1, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re E.A., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Winnebago County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 22JA150 v. (No. 4-24-1473) ) Rebecca G., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ) In re P.A., a Minor ) No. 22JA429 ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-24-1474) ) Honorable Rebecca G., ) Erin B. Buhl, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s judgments, concluding no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.

¶2 Respondent mother, Rebecca G., appeals the trial court’s judgments terminating

her parental rights to her daughters, E.A. (born September 2020) and P.A. (born September 2022).

On appeal, respondent’s appellate counsel moves to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), on the ground no issue of arguable merit can be raised. For the reasons that

follow, we grant appellate counsel’s motion and affirm the court’s judgments. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The parental rights of the minors’ father were also terminated during the

proceedings below. He is not, however, a party to this appeal.

¶5 A. Neglect and Wardship

¶6 In April 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging E.A.

was neglected in that she was subject to an environment injurious to her welfare pursuant to section

2-3(1)(a)-(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a)-(b)

(West 2022)). In support of the allegation, the State cited unsanitary conditions in E.A.’s home

and domestic violence committed by respondent against the minors’ father while E.A. was present.

That same month, E.A. was placed in the temporary custody of the Illinois Department of Children

and Family Services (DCFS).

¶7 In July 2022, respondent and the minors’ father stipulated to the neglect allegation

based upon unsanitary home conditions but agreed to engage in recommended services with

respect to all the neglect allegations. Thereafter, the trial court adjudicated E.A. neglected and

made her a ward of the court. The court further found respondent and the minors’ father were unfit

or unable to care for E.A. and placed custody and guardianship of her with DCFS. The court

ordered respondent to cooperate with any recommended services.

¶8 In September 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging

P.A. was neglected in that she was subject to an environment injurious to her welfare pursuant to

section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (id. § 2-3(1)(b)). In support of the allegation, the State

cited the failure of respondent and the minors’ father to correct the conditions which led to E.A.’s

removal from the home. That same month, P.A. was placed in the temporary custody of DCFS.

¶9 In December 2022, respondent and the minors’ father stipulated to the neglect

-2- allegation concerning P.A. Thereafter, the trial court adjudicated P.A. neglected and made her a

ward of the court. The court further found respondent and the minors’ father were unfit or unable

to care for P.A. and placed custody and guardianship of her with DCFS. The court again ordered

respondent to cooperate with any recommended services.

¶ 10 B. Motions to Terminate Parental Rights

¶ 11 In July 2024, the State filed motions to terminate respondent’s parental rights to the

minors. In the motions, as later amended, the State alleged respondent was an unfit parent in that

she failed to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the

minors’ welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022)); (2) make reasonable efforts to correct the

conditions that caused the minors to be removed from her care during certain nine-month periods

following the minors’ adjudications of neglected, namely, June 26, 2023, through March 26, 2024,

and October 9, 2023, through July 9, 2024 (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (3) make reasonable progress

toward the return of the minors to her care during certain nine-month periods following the minors’

adjudications of neglect, namely, June 26, 2023, through March 26, 2024, and October 9, 2023,

through July 9, 2024 (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). The State further alleged it was in the minors’ best interest

to terminate respondent’s parental rights and appoint DCFS as their guardian, with the power to

consent to adoption.

¶ 12 C. Fitness Hearing

¶ 13 In September 2024, the trial court held a fitness hearing. The court took judicial

notice of various pleadings and orders, received multiple exhibits, and heard testimony from a case

supervisor. The following is gleaned from the evidence as it relates to respondent.

¶ 14 It was recommended respondent (1) complete a domestic-violence assessment and

comply with any recommended treatment, (2) complete a mental-health assessment and comply

-3- with any recommended treatment, and (3) complete a parenting education course. It was also

recommended respondent obtain suitable housing. Respondent was informed of the importance of

satisfying the recommended services.

¶ 15 In late 2022 and early 2023, respondent was engaged in the recommended services.

She completed a domestic-violence assessment, which resulted in a recommendation for treatment

through a 27-week partner abuse intervention program. She completed a mental-health assessment,

which resulted in a recommendation for treatment through counseling. Respondent began the

partner abuse intervention program, counseling, and a parenting education course.

¶ 16 In February 2023, respondent was unsuccessfully discharged from the partner

abuse intervention program and the parenting education course and arrested on a charge of

domestic battery involving the minors’ father. In March 2023, respondent was arrested on another

charge of domestic battery involving the minors’ father. Respondent ultimately pleaded guilty to

the charges, and her conduct led to her being incarcerated at several points throughout 2023. While

incarcerated, respondent completed various courses. The courses did not, however, satisfy the

service recommendations, and her incarceration impeded her reengagement with the recommended

services.

¶ 17 In 2024, respondent, despite the existence of a no-contact order, continued contact

with the minors’ father and reported living with him in January of that year. They continued to

have domestic issues that involved police contact. In April 2024, respondent completed a

psychological evaluation and a parenting capacity assessment, and she was expected to reengage

in counseling in May 2024. It was recommended respondent reengage in counseling before

reengaging in a parenting education course. Around July 2024, respondent completed another

domestic-violence assessment, which again resulted in a recommendation for treatment through a

-4- 27-week partner abuse intervention program.

¶ 18 When respondent was not incarcerated, she would attend weekly visits with the

minors. She demonstrated appropriate behaviors during the visits and provided the minors with

snacks, drinks, and toys. She also inquired about the minors’ well-being with their caseworker and

participated in child and family team meetings.

¶ 19 After considering the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court found

respondent was an unfit parent for the reasons alleged in the State’s petitions. As for the unfitness

allegations based upon respondent’s failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,

or responsibility as to the minors’ welfare, the court noted, “while she has shown some interest

and concern as to her children’s welfare, she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of

responsibility as to [their] welfare.”

¶ 20 D. Best-Interest Hearing

¶ 21 In November 2024, the trial court held a best-interest hearing. The court took

judicial notice of the evidence from the fitness hearing, received multiple exhibits and a

best-interest report, and heard testimony from a caseworker and an account from a guardian

ad litem (GAL). The following is gleaned from the evidence as it relates to respondent.

¶ 22 The minors, who were four and two years old at the time of the hearing, had been

together in their current placement, which was a traditional foster home, since June 2024. The

minors were doing well in their placement, and they referred to their foster parents as “Mom” and

“Dad.” The minors were involved in family activities with their foster parents, including activities

with extended family. The foster parents ensured the minors attended all necessary appointments

and followed any recommended treatment for their health and developmental issues. The minors’

caseworker had no concerns with the ability of the foster parents to care for the minors. The foster

-5- parents were willing to provide the minors with permanency through adoption. The foster parents

were also willing to allow contact between the minors and their newborn sibling, who was in the

care of their biological grandmother, if they were adopted.

¶ 23 Respondent, who loves and cares for the minors, desired for them to be returned to

her care. Respondent had not completed the recommended services. She was discharged from

counseling in August 2024 due to a lack of attendance. In October 2024, she reported residing at

a shelter, and she gave birth to the minors’ sibling, who has the same father as the minors. The

psychological evaluation and parenting capacity assessment report, which was completed in April

2024, noted respondent acknowledged harming the minors’ father but mitigated her behavior by

stating she was frustrated with him for not contributing to the family. The report further noted

respondent remained at risk of repeating aggressive behavior, as she had not appeared to have

overcome her past trauma. The author of the report opined respondent could not in a reasonable

time frame develop adequate skills for the safe return of the minors to her care because of her

long-standing mental-health concerns and failure to learn from her past behaviors. The minors’

caseworker noted she had not heard the minors speak about respondent during her visits to the

foster home.

¶ 24 The minors’ caseworker and the GAL believed it would be in the minors’ best

interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Respondent disagreed.

¶ 25 After considering the evidence and arguments presented, as well as the statutory

best-interest factors, the trial court found it would be in the minors’ best interest to terminate

respondent’s parental rights. The court entered written orders terminating respondent’s parental

rights to each of the minors.

¶ 26 E. Notices of Appeal and Appointment of Appellate Counsel

-6- ¶ 27 Respondent filed timely notices of appeal in each of the minors’ cases. Thereafter,

the trial court appointed appellate counsel to represent respondent.

¶ 28 This consolidated appeal followed.

¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 30 On appeal, respondent’s appellate counsel moves to withdraw as counsel on the

ground no issue of arguable merit can be raised. See In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686-87 (2000)

(holding Anders applies to parental rights cases). Appellate counsel supported his motion with a

brief identifying potential issues and explaining why he believes they would be frivolous. Notice

of the motion to withdraw was given to respondent. Respondent has not filed a response to

counsel’s motion.

¶ 31 A. Unfitness Finding

¶ 32 Appellate counsel indicates he considered contesting the trial court’s unfitness

finding but concluded any argument in support thereof would be frivolous. Specifically, counsel

concluded any argument challenging the court’s unfitness finding based upon respondent’s failure

to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors to her care would be without merit.

¶ 33 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the State must prove parental unfitness

by clear and convincing evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28. A trial court’s finding of

parental unfitness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Id. ¶ 29. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence “only where the

opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” Id.

¶ 34 Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022))

provides, in pertinent part, a parent will be considered an “unfit person” if he or she fails “to make

reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any [nine]-month period

-7- following the adjudication of neglected.” “Reasonable progress” has been defined as

“demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 211 (2001). The benchmark for measuring a parent’s progress toward

reunification

“encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans and the court’s

directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and

in light of other conditions which later become known and which would prevent

the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.” Id. at 216-17.

This court has stated a parent has made reasonable progress when “the progress being made by a

parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and

of such a quality that the [trial] court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to

parental custody.” (Emphasis in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991).

¶ 35 In this case, the minors were taken into DCFS care based, in part, upon the risk of

harm posed to them by respondent’s domestic violence against the minors’ father. As a result, it

was recommended respondent (1) complete a domestic-violence assessment and comply with any

recommended treatment, (2) complete a mental-health assessment and comply with any

recommended treatment, and (3) complete a parenting education course. During the first period

identified in the State’s petitions to terminate parental rights, June 26, 2023, through March 26,

2024, respondent made minimal progress toward completing these services and continued to

engage in an unhealthy relationship with the minors’ father. We note respondent’s incarceration

does not excuse her failure to make reasonable progress. See In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 341 (2010)

(“[T]ime spent in prison does not toll the nine-month period.”). Given respondent’s minimal

progress during the first identified period in the State’s petitions, we agree any argument contesting

-8- the court’s unfitness finding would be frivolous. See In re Z.M., 2019 IL App (3d) 180424, ¶ 70

(stating only one ground for a finding of unfitness is necessary to uphold a finding of parental

unfitness).

¶ 36 B. Best-Interest Findings

¶ 37 Appellate counsel indicates he also considered contesting the trial court’s

best-interest findings but concluded any argument in support thereof would be frivolous.

¶ 38 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the State must prove termination is in

the child’s best interest by a preponderance of the evidence. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 367 (2004).

A trial court’s best-interest finding will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest

weight of the evidence. In re Anaya J.G., 403 Ill. App. 3d 875, 883 (2010). Again, a finding is

against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.

Id.

¶ 39 When considering whether termination of parental rights would be in a child’s best

interest, the trial court must consider several statutory factors within the context of the child’s age

and developmental needs. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022). The focus is on the child, and

the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest

in a stable, loving home life. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364.

¶ 40 In this case, the minors, who were four and two years old at the time of the

best-interest hearing, were together in an adoptive foster placement, where their needs were being

met. The placement provided the minors with permanency and stability. Conversely, respondent

had not completed the recommended services to be able to adequately care for the minors.

Ultimately, the minors’ needs for permanency and stability support the trial court’s best-interest

findings. We, therefore, agree any argument contesting the court’s best-interest findings would be

-9- frivolous.

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 42 Because the record reveals no issue of arguable merit can be raised on appeal, we

grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

¶ 43 Affirmed.

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