In Re Dwayne Cardale McQueen v. the State of Texas

CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
DecidedMay 28, 2026
Docket09-26-00139-CV
StatusPublished

This text of In Re Dwayne Cardale McQueen v. the State of Texas (In Re Dwayne Cardale McQueen v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Dwayne Cardale McQueen v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-26-00139-CV __________________

IN RE DWAYNE CARDALE MCQUEEN

__________________________________________________________________

Original Proceeding 88th District Court of Tyler County, Texas Trial Cause No. 23,317 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In a petition for a writ of mandamus, Dwayne Cardale McQueen contends that

the trial court has failed to perform its ministerial duty to rule on motions that

McQueen filed in a case after the trial court’s plenary power over its judgment

expired. We deny the petition for the writ of mandamus and the motion for temporary

relief.

1 Background

On December 4, 2025, McQueen filed Defendant’s Motion to Declare the

2014 Permanent Injunction Void as Applied to Defendant.1 In that motion, McQueen

asserts he became “the legal and record owner of the mineral estate[]” in 2019, and

since the injunction issued before he “owned the property,” his rights were not

adjudicated in the 2014 permanent injunction, and the injunction is void as to him.

On December 4, 2025, McQueen filed Defendant’s Motion to Declare the

2014 Permanent Injunction Void for Lack of Standing. In this motion, McQueen

alleges the 2014 permanent injunction is void because the company that obtained the

injunction, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, no longer exists after a merger with

Occidental Petroleum Corporation and no party with standing has been substituted

into Trial Cause Number 23,317.

1 McQueen provides no information about the nature of the injunction, other than that it issued in Trial Cause Number 23,317, a case McQueen identifies by the style Anadarko Petroleum Corporation v. Dwayne McQueen. We take judicial notice of our opinion in Appeal Number 09-24-00043-CV, in which we stated, “In 2014, McQueen raised claims against Zarvona’s predecessor, Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC. Anadarko obtained a permanent injunction against McQueen, enjoining him from coming within ten yards of any Anadarko oil or gas well in Tyler County or within 100 yards of Anadarko’s field office.” McQueen v. Zarvona Energy LLC, No. 09-24-00043-CV, 2025 WL 3167314, at *1 (Tex. App.— Beaumont Nov. 13, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). McQueen has been involved in litigation with Anadarko and others in several cases, so it is unclear whether the injunction discussed in McQueen v. Zarvona Energy is the permanent injunction that issued in Trial Cause Number 23,317. 2 On December 4, 2025, McQueen filed Defendant’s Motion for Finding of

Failure to Substitute Parties and for Declaration that No Plaintiff Exists to Support

the 2014 Permanent Injunction. In this motion, McQueen alleges Anadarko

Petroleum Corporation no longer exists and that successor companies, Occidental

Petroleum Corporation and Zarvona Energy, LLC, cannot enforce the injunction

because they failed to substitute as parties in Trial Cause Number 23,317.

On December 5, 2025, McQueen filed Defendants Notice of

Submission/Hearing (on Motions) for a December 19, 2025 submission.

On January 16, 2026, McQueen filed Defendant’s Motion to Invoke the

Court’s Continuing Jurisdiction and for Clarification of [Submission] or Setting of

Hearing. In this motion, McQueen asserts the trial court retains jurisdiction over the

permanent injunction after the case was closed administratively and asks the trial

court to set a hearing at the court’s next available date.

On January 30, 2026, McQueen filed Defendant’s Motion to Request a

Hearing/Setting on Pending Motions. McQueen asserted a hearing would clarify the

procedural posture of McQueen’s post-judgment motions.

On February 17, 2026, McQueen filed Defendant’s Notice and Request for

Ruling on Pending Motions.

3 Analysis

McQueen argues the trial court has a ministerial duty to rule on his motions,

but McQueen has not established that his lawsuit has been effectively reopened or

revived. “Trial courts undoubtedly have jurisdiction to modify or vacate their

judgments granting permanent injunctions because of changed conditions.” City of

Tyler v. St. Louis Ry. Co. of Tex., 405 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. 1966). The question is

whether McQueen properly invoked that jurisdiction. We conclude he did not. In his

motion McQueen asserts that the original parties are no longer interested in the

injunction and suggests new parties possess the mineral interests that were at issue

in Trial Cause Number 23,317. Absent a voluntary appearance, the trial court cannot

acquire personal jurisdiction over new parties without issuance and service of

citation of a new original petition to modify or dissolve the permanent injunction

due to changed circumstances.

“To issue a valid and binding judgment or order, a court must have both

subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and personal jurisdiction over the party it

purports to bind.” Guardianship of Failey, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). For

the trial court to attain the power to bind a particular party to a judgment, the plaintiff

must validly invoke that jurisdiction by valid service of process on the defendant.

Id. at 380. Although Anadarko Petroleum Corporation may have been the original

plaintiff and McQueen may have been the original defendant, in an action to dissolve

4 the permanent injunction McQueen would be the party seeking affirmative relief

from whatever party is restricting the rights McQueen desires to exercise but that are

constrained in some manner by the permanent injunction.

Conclusion

We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by

the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). On this

record, McQueen has not shown an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus and the motion for

temporary relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a), 52.10.

PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on May 27, 2026 Opinion Delivered May 28, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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Related

In Re Prudential Insurance Co. of America
148 S.W.3d 124 (Texas Supreme Court, 2004)
City of Tyler v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. of Texas
405 S.W.2d 330 (Texas Supreme Court, 1966)
Walker v. Packer
827 S.W.2d 833 (Texas Supreme Court, 1992)

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In Re Dwayne Cardale McQueen v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-dwayne-cardale-mcqueen-v-the-state-of-texas-txctapp9-2026.