In re D.W.

2025 Ohio 1255

Opinion

[Cite as In re D.W., 2025-Ohio-1255.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE D.W. : Nos. 113994 and 113995 A Minor Child :

[Appeal by the State of Ohio] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 10, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. DL-23-110620 and DL-23-111126

Appearances:

James J. Hofelich, for appellee.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gregory J. Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.:

Appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the juvenile court’s May 1, 2024

order denying the State’s motion for a discretionary transfer of appellee, D.W., to

the General Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for the purpose of criminal prosecution pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(B). For the following

reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

This appeal stems from two separate complaints that were filed in the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. In Cuyahoga C.P.

No. DL-23-110620, the complaint alleged that D.W. was a delinquent child because

he committed three counts of robbery, one count of theft, one count of assault, and

one count of aggravated menacing on June 21, 2022. In Cuyahoga C.P.

No. DL-23-111126, the complaint alleged that D.W. was a delinquent child because

he committed robbery, theft, and assault on May 25, 2022. D.W. was 15 years old at

the time of the alleged offenses.

The State moved to transfer D.W. to the general division for purposes

of criminal prosecution.

On December 12, 2023, probable cause was established; D.W. waived

his right to a probable cause hearing in both cases.

On April 15, 2024, the juvenile court held an amenability hearing.

The court heard testimony from Dr. Lynn Williams (“Williams”), who had

conducted a psychological evaluation of D.W. pursuant to R.C. 2152.12 and

Juv.R. 30. Williams testified as to the evaluation, explaining that she looked at risk

factors for violence, treatment amenability, and maturity. With respect to D.W.’s

risk of violence tendencies, Williams testified that she considered historical, societal,

and clinical factors and noted that D.W. had a history of fighting, parent criminality, and an unstable family environment. Ultimately, Williams concluded that D.W. had

a moderate risk of violence. Williams testified that with respect to D.W.’s maturity,

she evaluated his autonomy, cognitive capacity, and emotional maturity. Williams

explained that D.W. scored in the 83rd percentile for maturity, which placed him in

the high offender range. With respect to treatment amenability, Williams testified

that D.W. first became involved with juvenile court at age 11, he had previously been

on probation for different offenses, and he had completed multiple treatment

programs, including a residential placement.

The State called Detective Wohl from the Cleveland Division of Police

to testify. D.W.’s counsel objected to the detective testifying as to D.W.’s amenability

because D.W. had stipulated to probable cause. The court briefly recessed and

subsequently sustained D.W.’s objection and declined to hear testimony from the

detective. The court stated that it would consider the police reports in both cases

because they had been stipulated to as part of D.W.’s waiver of the probable cause

hearing.

The court went on to hear from D.W.’s counsel and the State as to the

factors in favor of and against transfer pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). The

State argued that the victims suffered physical, psychological, and economic harm

because D.W. approached both victims at a gas station and threw them on the

ground; D.W. stole the wallet of one of the victims. The State also argued that the

harm to the victims was exacerbated by their ages because the victims were 71 and

83 years old, respectively. The State acknowledged that D.W. had no relationship to either victim and that there was no evidence in either case that D.W. committed the

alleged acts as part of his involvement in a gang. The State further argued that D.W.

had multiple pending cases when the underlying cases occurred. Finally, the State

argued that the factors contemplated by Williams’s evaluation weighed in favor of

transfer.

On May 1, 2024, the juvenile court denied the State’s motions for

discretionary transfer. In the corresponding journal entry, the court made the

following findings:

The court finds after a full investigation, including a mental examination of said child made by a duly qualified person, and after full consideration of the child’s prior juvenile record, family environment, school record, efforts previously made to treat and rehabilitate the child, including prior commitments to the Department of Youth Services, the nature and severity of the offense herein, the age, physical, and mental condition of the victim as affected by the matter herein, and other matters of evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child herein is amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system.

The court considered the relevant factors in favor of transfer pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D) and makes the following findings:

— The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act.

— The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim.

— The child’s relationship with the victim facilitated the act charged.

— The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under the child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.

The Court considered the relevant factors against transfer pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E) and makes the following findings:

— There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system, and the level of security available in the juvenile system provides a reasonable assurance of public safety.

The Court further finds that the child has never received a sentence to the Ohio Department of Youth Services and as such there are programs and resources potentially available to further the child’s rehabilitative potential, pursuant to State v. Carter, 2023-Ohio-4310.

The State filed a motion for leave to appeal both cases. This court

granted this motion and consolidated the cases for appeal. The State presents two

assignments of error for our review:

I. The juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the State’s motion for discretionary transfer.

II. The juvenile court erred when it refused to allow the detective to testify at the amenability hearing.

Law and Analysis

In the State’s first assignment of error, it argues that the juvenile court

abused its discretion in denying the State’s motion for discretionary transfer.

Specifically, the State argues that the juvenile court did not make a finding, pursuant

to R.C. 2152.18(D)(8), that D.W. was emotionally, physically, or psychologically

mature enough for transfer despite Williams’s testimony that D.W. scored in the

high range for sophistication maturity. Further, the State argues that the juvenile

court’s finding that there was sufficient time to rehabilitate D.W. in the juvenile

justice system was directly refuted by the evidence. Ohio’s juvenile justice system provides for two types of transfer:

discretionary and mandatory. State v. Carter, 2023-Ohio-4310, ¶ 2 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Hanning, 2000-Ohio-436. “‘Discretionary transfer affords juvenile

court judges the discretion to transfer to adult court certain juveniles who do not

appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system or who

appear to be a threat to public safety.’” Id., quoting State v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-

4276, ¶ 3, citing R.C. 2152.12(B).

In determining whether to exercise its discretion to transfer a juvenile

to adult court under R.C. 2152.12(B), the juvenile court must weigh the statutory

factors in R.C. 2152.12(D) in favor of transfer against the statutory factors in

R.C. 2152.12(E) against transfer and the court must indicate on the record the

specific factors it weighed in making its determination. Carter at ¶ 4, citing

R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). A juvenile court’s decision to exercise its jurisdiction to transfer

a juvenile to adult court must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and

the State bears the burden of persuasion when it asks the juvenile court to transfer

a juvenile’s case to adult court. Id., citing Nicholas at ¶ 27, 35.

Juvenile courts have wide discretion to transfer their cases to adult

courts, and therefore, we review a juvenile court’s decision to bind over a case for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Hennings, 2019-Ohio-4675, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing State

v. Poole, 2012-Ohio-5739, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). Where the juvenile court weighed the

statutory factors and the record shows a rational basis for the court’s findings regarding those statutory factors, an appellate court cannot conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion in transferring or maintaining jurisdiction. Id.

Here, the record is clear that the juvenile court considered the

relevant statutory factors weighing in favor of and against transfer. With one

exception, the record reflects a rational basis for each of the court’s findings. The

exception — the juvenile court’s finding that D.W.’s relationship with the victims

facilitated the offense — was unsupported by the record, which indicates that both

victims were unknown to D.W. Thus, this factor actually weighs against transfer.

The State argues that the juvenile court failed to make numerous

findings supported by the evidence presented at the amenability hearing.

Specifically, the State argues that the juvenile court did not make a finding pursuant

to R.C. 2152.12(D)(6) that “at the time of the act[s] charged, D.W. was awaiting

adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control

sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or conviction,”

despite the fact that the record reflects that D.W. had multiple cases pending before

the juvenile court at the time of the amenability hearing. While this finding, had it

been made by the juvenile court, would have been supported by the record, the fact

that no such finding was made does not render the juvenile court’s decision an abuse

of discretion. The relevant statute, R.C. 2152.12(D), states that in considering

whether to transfer a juvenile to adult court, the juvenile court “shall consider” the

enumerated factors, and any other relevant factors. The juvenile court’s journal

entry states that it considered the relevant factors in favor of transfer pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D); the absence of any particular factual finding in the court’s journal

entry does not mean that the trial court violated the governing statute, let alone

abused its discretion.

The State also argues that the juvenile court failed to make a finding,

pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(8), that D.W. was emotionally, physically, or

psychologically mature enough for the transfer, despite Williams’s testimony as to

D.W.’s maturity. Williams testified at length as to D.W.’s maturity, as well as his

demonstrated ability to change his behavior and his likely amenability to juvenile

court sanctions. The juvenile court’s findings demonstrate that the court considered

Williams’s testimony. We cannot conclude that the fact that the court did or did not

make any particular finding amounts to an abuse of discretion.

Finally, the State argues that the juvenile court’s finding that there

was sufficient time to rehabilitate D.W. in the juvenile justice system was directly

refuted by the evidence. We disagree. As discussed above, the court considered the

evidence presented at the amenability hearing, including Williams’s testimony that

D.W. demonstrated an ability to change his behavior. Having considered this, the

juvenile court concluded that D.W. was amenable to juvenile court. This does not

amount to an abuse of discretion.

For these reasons, the State’s first assignment of error is overruled.

In its second assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court

erred and abused its discretion when it refused to allow the detective to testify at the

amenability hearing. A court has discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and appellate

courts review a decision to allow or disallow testimony under an abuse-of-discretion

standard. In re C.L., 2021-Ohio-3819, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing Buckmaster v.

Buckmaster, 2014-Ohio-793, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.).

The State argues that the detective would have provided testimony

relevant to numerous statutory factors the juvenile court was required to consider.

The State also argues that because it was not permitted to present the detective’s

testimony, the juvenile court prevented the State from presenting its case as it saw

fit. We disagree.

While the detective likely would have provided testimony relevant to

some of the statutory factors, including the harm to the victim, the victim’s age

exacerbating their harm, and the fact that D.W. had a firearm on him during the

acts, the detective’s testimony was not necessary. The parties stipulated to the police

reports, which contained much of the information that would have been included in

the detective’s testimony. The juvenile court made findings regarding the

aforementioned factors based on these stipulations and the testimony that was

presented at the amenability hearing. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion in not permitting the detective to testify. The State’s

second assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

WILLIAM A. KLATT, JUDGE*

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCURS; EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., DISSENTING:

I respectfully dissent and would have found merit to both of the

State’s assigned errors and reversed the judgment of the juvenile court.

Preliminarily, I believe the court failed to make the proper statutory

findings in denying the State’s motion to transfer. With regard to amenability under

R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), the juvenile court may transfer a case “if the child is not

amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the

community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.” The court in

this case ultimately concluded that there were “reasonable grounds to believe that

the child herein is amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system.”

(Emphasis added.) This court has previously noted that a mere finding that there

are “reasonable grounds to believe” a child is amenable is not the same as finding that he or she is actually amenable. See State v. T.S., 2024-Ohio-4898, ¶ 87 (8th

Dist.) (“Although we do not believe that ‘magic words’ are required under

R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), we do believe that there is a meaningful difference between

finding that there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ a fact or circumstance exists

and finding that a fact or circumstance, in fact, exists.”).1 In addition, the juvenile

court made no finding regarding the safety of the community prong.

However, even if the court had made the proper statutory findings, I

would still reach the same result. After thoroughly reviewing the record, I conclude

that the evidence presented at the amenability hearing supports a finding, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that D.W. was not amenable to care or rehabilitation

within the juvenile system, and I would find that the juvenile court abused its

discretion in denying the motion to transfer.

In making an amenability determination, the juvenile court must

consider all “relevant factors,” including specific factors identified in R.C.

2152.12(D) and (E), that weigh in favor of and against a transfer. R.C. 2152.12(B)(3),

(D), and (E). No one factor under R.C. 2152.12(D) or (E) is outcome determinative.

If, by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court concludes that the factors in

favor of the transfer outweigh those against, the statutory analysis is satisfied. State

v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276, ¶ 35. Thus, if “‘there is some competent, credible

evidence to support the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion.’”

1 The T.S. Court noted that the “reasonable grounds to believe” language was found

in an earlier version of the statute. Nicholas at ¶ 73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), quoting Middendorf v. Middendorf, 82

Ohio St.3d 397, 401 (1998). “The appellate focus is on the totality of the

consideration required under R.C. 2152.12(B)-(E).” State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-

311, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

In the instant matter, the juvenile court made no findings at the

conclusion of the amenability hearing. Instead, it indicated that it would take the

matter under advisement and, after reviewing the police reports and the statutory

factors, rule by written decision.

Within its written decision, the juvenile court determined that the

following factors weighed in favor of transfer: (1) the victim of the act charged

suffered physical or psychological harm or serious economic harm; (2) the physical

or psychological harm suffered by the victim was exacerbated because of the

physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim; (3) the child’s

relationship with the victim facilitated the act charged; and (4) the child had a

firearm on or about the child’s person at the time of the act charged or used,

displayed, or brandished the firearm in the commission of the act charged, or

indicated that he had a firearm.

As noted by the majority and acknowledged by the State, the juvenile

court incorrectly found that the relationship with the victim facilitated the act

charged. There was no evidence that D.W. had any relationship with either victim.

I agree with the juvenile court’s remaining findings related to the

other factors it found in favor of transfer; however, I believe that the court erred in failing to find under R.C. 2152.12(D)(6) that “at the time of the act[s] charged,

[D.W.] was awaiting adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a

community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child

adjudication or conviction.”

The majority acknowledges that had this finding been made, it would

have been supported by the record. Indeed, the record reflects that D.W. had been

on community control at the time of the acts charged and had several other cases

pending at this time.

In addition, the court failed to make a finding that D.W. was

emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for transfer. There was

certainly evidentiary support for a finding under this factor. Dr. Williams testified

that D.W. scored in the 83rd percentile for sophistication maturity. She noted that

this high level of sophistication and maturity was being used “in a criminogenic

manner.”

Yet, the majority states that the court did not err in failing to make

either of the above findings and noted that the trial court stated that it had

considered all of the factors. The majority maintains that “the absence of any

particular factual finding in the court’s journal entry does not mean that the trial

court violated the governing statute, let alone abused its discretion.” However,

R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) provides that the court must indicate on the record the specific

factors it weighed in making its determination. Thus, we cannot simply assume that

the court weighed the above factors, when it failed to state in its decision that it did so. If the court based its decision on anything beyond the factors stated in its journal

entry, it was required to so indicate. It is not appropriate for this court to

acknowledge that there was evidence in support of certain factors and then simply

presume that the juvenile court utilized those factors in making its determination

while disregarding the court’s statutory obligation to set forth all of its findings.

With respect to the findings weighing against transfer, the juvenile

court only found one factor under subsection (E) — that there was “sufficient time

to rehabilitate D.W. within the juvenile system and the level of security available in

the juvenile system provides a reasonable assurance of public safety.” At the time of

the hearing, D.W. was 17 years old and had been in the juvenile system for six years.

He had seven prior adjudications and had received multiple court-ordered services,

yet he continued to pick up cases. At the time of the amenability hearing, he had

nine other pending cases, including a case in adult court.

The juvenile court stated that D.W. had “never received a sentence to

the Ohio Department of Youth Services and as such[,] there [were] programs and

resources that could further his rehabilitative potential under State v. Carter, 2023-

Ohio-4310 (8th Dist.).” The court’s reliance on Carter is misplaced; Carter does not

stand for the proposition that the availability of services and resources should be

used to weigh against transfer. Rather, the Carter Court refuted the juvenile court’s

conclusion that it had to transfer the child since there were no services available to

the juvenile, noting that a court is not permitted to base its decision to transfer a

child based upon a lack of resources. The inverse is true here — a finding that the juvenile court has

resources available for D.W.’s rehabilitative potential is also not a reason to deny

transfer. “The question of a juvenile’s amenability to care and rehabilitation in the

juvenile system is one of the juvenile’s rehabilitative potential, and it is separate

from the question of the services the state has to offer or the services a juvenile-court

judge perceives the state has to offer.” Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276, at ¶ 54. Here,

the juvenile court looked solely at the existence of resources rather than D.W.’s

potential to be rehabilitated. The record demonstrates that D.W. has not benefited

from the services he has received and has not demonstrated a willingness to be

rehabilitated.

Consequently, I would have found that the juvenile court abused its

discretion in determining that D.W. was amenable to rehabilitation through the

juvenile system. Because I do not believe that there was some rational and factual

basis to support the court’s decision, I would reverse the denial of the motion to

Finally, while I believe the State met its burden of persuasion based

upon the evidence presented at the amenability hearing, I would have further found

that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of the detective. When defense

counsel objected to the State calling the detective as a witness during the amenability

hearing, he did not assert that D.W. would have been prejudiced or that the

detective’s testimony was inadmissible for any particular reason. He only argued

that because probable cause had been stipulated to, the detective’s testimony was essentially unnecessary at the amenability hearing. In sustaining the objection, the

court did not find that the testimony would be cumulative, irrelevant, or prejudicial;

the court merely acknowledged that it would consider the police reports and that no

further testimony was necessary.

The State bears the burden of persuasion when it asks the juvenile

court to transfer a case to adult court. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276, at ¶ 27. “Thus,

the facts presented to the juvenile court with respect to a discretionary transfer must

persuade the court that the juvenile is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the

juvenile system.” Id. Because the State bears the burden of persuasion, the State

should be permitted to decide what evidence and testimony it chooses to present,

albeit within the applicable law and evidentiary rules. While there is no argument

that the court could consider the police reports regarding the two incidents, only the

State knows what additional information the detective would have testified to that

would have assisted it in overcoming its burden at the amenability hearing. There

is no evidentiary rule precluding testimony that is “unnecessary,” and a defendant

should not have a say in what otherwise admissible testimony the State may present.

With regard to this assignment of error, I would have remanded this

matter for a new hearing to allow the State to present the testimony of the detective.