[Cite as In re D.W., 2019-Ohio-1880.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: D.W., JR., : JUDGES: : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. : : : Case No. 19CA2 : : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 2016 DEP 00167
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: May 13, 2019
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant N.Z.
EDITH A. GILLILAND JOHN C. O'DONNELL, III Richland County Children Services 10 West Newlon Place 731 Scholl Road Mansfield, Ohio 44902 Mansfield, Ohio 44907 Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Appellant N.Z. appeals from the January 10, 2019 Entry of the Richland
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, approving and adopting the
Magistrate’s Decision.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant N.Z. is the mother of D.W., Jr. (“DW”) (DOB 7/24/13). On
December 9, 2016, the Richland County Children Services Board (RCCSB) filed a
complaint alleging that D.W. was a dependent child. An amended complaint was filed
December 14, 2016.
{¶3} On January 20, 2017, RCCSB filed a motion seeking temporary custody of
D.W. As memorialized in a Magistrate’s Order filed on February 6, 2017, the child was
placed in the temporary custody of the agency.
{¶4} The Guardian ad Litem, in a report filed on October 10, 2018, recommended
that D.W. be placed in the permanent custody of RCCSB. Following a hearing the
Magistrate, in a Magistrates’ Decision filed on March 28, 2017, found D.W. to be a
dependent child and placed him in the temporary custody of RCCSB. The trial court’s
Judgment Entry approving the Magistrate’s Decision was filed on March 28, 2017.
{¶5} Thereafter, on July 27, 2018, RCCSB filed a motion seeking permanent
custody of D.W. RCCSB, in its motion, indicated that D.W. had been in the temporary
custody of the agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month
period and that, alternatively, D.W. could not and should not be placed with appellant
within a reasonable period of time. The Guardian ad Litem, in a report filed on October
10, 2018, recommended that D.W. be placed in the permanent custody of RCCSB. A Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 3
hearing on the motion commenced on October 17, 2018 before a Magistrate. Neither
appellant nor the child’s father were present at the hearing, although both were
represented by counsel.
{¶6} At the hearing, Benjamin Chapman testified that D.W, had been a foster
child in his home for just over two years and had some behavioral struggles that were
improving. Chapman testified that D.W. was in counseling and that he and his wife
intended to continue the counseling. Chapman testified that they had a fetal alcohol
spectrum disorder evaluation scheduled for D.W. because they were concerned that D.W.
exhibited similarities to their first adopted son who had been diagnosed with the disorder.
Chapman testified that D.W. had confusion with directions and threw tantrums and fits.
He testified that he and his wife had a generally positive relationship with D.W. and that
he fit in with the other children in the home. Chapman testified that D.W. called his sons
brother and they called D.W. their brother and that D.W. had a relationship with
Chapman’s extended family.
{¶7} Chapman testified that D.W. had visited with his mother while in their care
and that D.W.’s mother did not want to talk about him a lot and was totally fine that they
were taking care of her son. The more regular and closer together the visits were between
D.W. and his mother, the more frequently he acted defiantly or had tantrums. Chapman
testified that he and his wife wanted to adopt D.W. despite concerns over his behavioral
issues. He testified that D.W. had dietary restrictions namely, a dairy intolerance and saw
a lot of doctors. He further testified that D.W. was in kindergarten and was doing well and
getting good reports. He testified that they had asked the school for D.W. to be evaluated
for IEP (individualized education plan) services. According to Chapman. D.W. was in Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 4
speech and occupational therapy when he was first placed with them because he could
not speak very well and used words incorrectly. D.W. had successfully completed speech
and occupational therapy.
{¶8} On cross-examination, Chapman testified that D.W. had last visited with his
mother at least two months ago and that the visitation was “[v]ery inconsistent.” Transcript
at 16. He testified that appellant missed about half of the visits and that D.W. was placed
with them on September of 2016.
{¶9} The next witness to testify was Kenneth Haynes, the CASA/Guardian ad
Litem. He testified that he recommended that it was in D.W.’s best interest to be placed
in the permanent custody of the agency and to be available for adoption. The following
testimony was adduced when he was asked the basis for his recommendation;
{¶10} “A: Having the time that he’s been in the foster home, uh seems to uh, from
my investigations, been the most uh stable environment that he’s been in pretty much his
whole life. Uh, prior to being in the foster home, uh he spent time with different people.
Um, uh, his mother would leave him off uh with friends or acquaintances uh for periods
of time, which I believe was the reason he ended up with Children Services. Um, the uh,
his mother, [appellant], um over the two years that I’ve been on the case, uh was very
inconsistent uh with her visitations with him. Uh, his father was in uh, in prison during uh
this time, uh and not uh, not present in his life. Um, and it’s been my observation that the
foster family has been very uh, very bonded with him, uh very caring with him, very loving.
Um, they uh, they met all of his needs. Uh, and uh they just, he’s just in a very loving and
very stable environment right now.”
Transcript at 22. Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 5
{¶11} Haynes testified that he was comfortable with the possibility of the
Chapmans adopting D.W. and that D.W. interacted well with the other children in the
Chapman home and they treated each other like brothers and sisters. When asked
about D.W.’s relationship with appellant, he testified that they seemed to have “more of a
brother-sister relationship than a mother-son relationship” and that there was little
physical contact between them when he saw them together. According to Haynes,
appellant seldom asked D.W. questions about his life and needs and seemed more
concerned about herself. He testified that appellant had rapid mood swings and displayed
fits of anger and irritability. He was unsure where appellant was currently living and
testified that she was not good at complying with her case plan objectives. When asked
when appellant had last visited with D.W., Haynes testified that it was two or three months
before and that appellant had indicated that she was done with visitation and was not
going to do any more counseling or jump through any more hoops..
{¶12} On cross-examination, Haynes testified that his last face-to-face contact
with appellant was two or three months prior and that he had made attempts to contact
her and had no idea where she was. Haynes testified that he observed D.W. interact
with his foster parents and that they were very concerned with him and were loving and
attentive. He testified that D.W. appeared to be happy and content and at home in his
placement. He testified that D.W. called the foster parents mom and dad.
{¶13} Breanne Crossen, a caseworker with RCCSB testified that she was
assigned D.W.’s case. She testified that on July 20, 2014, the agency had received a call
that appellant had left D.W. in the care of a woman named Lisa and that Lisa was not
able to get hold of appellant and did not have contact information for her. Appellant was Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 6
only supposed to have left D.W. in Lisa’s care for a day and he had been there for three
or four days. Crossen testified that D.W. did not have clothes or diapers. Crossen testified
that appellant was charged with endangering children and that the day the call came in,
D.W. “was safety-planned to Shaquita Miller, who had previously cared for [D.W.].”
Transcript at 47.
{¶14} Crossen testified that a case plan was prepared and that the plan was filed
on May 11, 2017. She testified that under the plan, appellant was to have a mental health
assessment and a drug and alcohol assessment and that appellant was to have stable
housing and income and parenting education. Crossen testified that she received the
case at the end of January of 2015 and that appellant had completed a mental health
assessment back then at Catalyst. While appellant completed the assessment, she did
nothing further. The mental health assessment recommended that appellant undergo
individual counseling. Crossen testified that she did not know where appellant was for the
entire year of 2015 and that appellant had not ever indicated to her that in the one year
period between February of 2015 and February of 2016, she had received any type of
mental health counseling services. When appellant returned to Richland County in
February of 2016, the two discussed appellant going to Catalyst, but appellant stated that
she did not want to go there and decided to do a mental health assessment at Family Life
Counseling. After the assessment, it was recommended that appellant receive counseling
for anxiety and depression. According to Crossen, appellant attended two three
counseling appointments and stopped attending after that.
{¶15} Crossen testified that appellant completed another mental health
assessment with Catalyst on May 21, 2017 and was diagnosed with anxiety disorder, Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 7
depression and alcohol abuse and that it was recommended that she complete individual
counseling. Appellant attended three counseling sessions in June and July of 2017 and
then stopped attending. Appellant started attending again and attended three more
sessions between February 12, 2018 and April 30, 2018. Crossen was unaware of any
mental health treatment that appellant was involved in. Crossen testified that it was the
agency’s position that appellant has not successfully completed her case plan objective
for mental health. She further testified that she asked appellant to complete a drug and
alcohol assessment, but that appellant did not follow through and that appellant had not
successfully completed the drug and alcohol treatment component of her case plan.
Crossen was unaware of appellant’s current housing situation and testified that she had
not seen or had any contact with appellant since June of 2018. She indicated that she
could not say if appellant had stable housing since she did not know where appellant was
living and that the last time she was aware that appellant was employed was in December
of 2017. Appellant had had a job for a couple of months, but quit because she was trying
to complete her case plan objectives. When asked if it was the agency’s position that
appellant had the financial ability to meet D.W.’s basic needs, Crossen testified that she
did not know if appellant could provide for him since she did not know appellants’ current
situation. She testified that she did not believe that appellant would be able to provide for
his needs. When asked the reason for her conclusion, Crossen testified as follows:
{¶16} “A: When [appellant] had him, we gave [appellant] a chance to have [D.W.]
back in 2016, March, 2016--. She came up here, she moved into an apartment, she was
supposed to get him into protective daycare. She did not get that set up. She did have
Devall start play therapy at Family Life Counseling. She only took him to two or three Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 8
appointments and stopped taking him. She stopped taking herself to appointments. She
was unable to gain employment while he was in her care. She lost her apartment in June,
2016. She just has not been stable enough to be able to show that she was able to care
for him.”
Transcript at 59-60.
{¶17} Crossen testified that appellant successfully completed a parenting
program and had successfully completed the parenting education component of her case
plan. Crossen testified that appellant’s visits with her son had not been consistent. She
testified that she did not feel that appellant had completed her case plan objectives overall
and had not resolved the problems that the agency identified in the complaint. Crossen
further testified that D.W.’s father was not on the plan because he had been incarcerated.
{¶18} According to Crossen, appellant and the child’s father were both arrested in
August of 2016 due to a domestic dispute. At that time, D.W. was placed in his current
foster home prior to the agency filing the complaint. While the plan was for appellant to
get out of jail, get stable housing and obtain services to help her that did not happen.
{¶19} Crossen testified that she did not believe that there was much of a parent-
child relationship between appellant and D.W. because appellant had not been around
much since he was born. She testified that appellant had left D.W. with various people for
the first 10 months of his life and that appellant “had minimal to no contact “with him.
Transcript at 67. When appellant got D.W. back into her care in March of 2016, he did not
really know who she was. Crossen testified that there was not a lot of hugging between
the two and that when appellant hugged D.W., he did not really reciprocate unless she
brought him toys or other items. At the end of the visits, D.W. would go running to his Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 9
foster mother and hug her. Crossen testified that D.W. did not call appellant mom but
called his foster parents mom and dad. D.W. had minimal to no contact with his biological
siblings who were in the legal custody of appellant’s mother and had no bond with them
or any other maternal relatives. When asked, Crossen testified that the custody of D.W.
had not changed since March of 2017 and that he had been in the custody of the agency
for at least 12 out of the last 22 months.
{¶20} Crossen testified that the agency had investigated other relatives for
placement or custody of D.W. and that appellant’s mother, who had appellant’s other
children, would not take him and did not want to meet him. D.W.’s paternal grandmother
also did not want to take custody of him as long as appellant was working on her case
plan objectives, but had reported, after the motion for permanent custody was filed, that
she was willing to take legal custody of him. No home assessment had been completed.
However, Crossen testified that she did not believe that it would be appropriate to pursue
legal custody to the paternal grandmother since she had no bond or contact with D.W. for
the last two years. Crossen testified that she was concerned that the parenting would be
left to D.W.’s father and that it would not be appropriate.
{¶21} Crossen testified that she believed that permanent custody was in D.W.’s
best interest because he had been passed around since he was born and was in the first
stable place. She voiced concerns over appellant’s ability to meet his medical concerns
and educational needs. Crossen testified that D.W. was well bonded with this foster family
and that he received consistent doctor visits and counseling and consistency in going to
preschool. Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 10
{¶22} Crossen was further questioned about visitation between appellant and
D.W. She testified that appellant was not consistent and would come to a couple visits
and then miss several visits. She testified that it had been a period of at least 90 days
since appellant had contact with D.W.
{¶23} On cross-examination, Crossen testified that she last had contact with
appellant in June of 2018. She further testified that Shaquita Miller, a non-relative who
previously had cared for D.W., had been considered for placement prior to the current
foster family, but that she was denied legal custody of D.W. due to a 2005 felonious
assault charge.
{¶24} The Magistrate, in a Decision filed on November 28, 2018, recommended
that the parental rights of appellant and the child’s father be terminated and that
permanent custody of D.W. be granted to the RCCSB. No objections were filed. Pursuant
to a Judgment Entry filed on December 17, 2018, the trial court approved and adopted
the Magistrate’s Decision.
{¶25} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal:
{¶26} “I. THE TRIAL COURT’S CONCLUSION THAT PERMANENT CUSTODY
WAS WARRANTED IS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.”
I
{¶27} Appellant, in the case sub judice, argues that the trial court’s decision that
permanent custody was warranted was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Appellant specifically contends that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that appellant does not meet the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E). Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 11
{¶28} In the case sub judice, appellant did not object to the decision of the
magistrate. We note Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv) states as follows: “Except for a claim of plain
error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding
or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or
conclusion of law under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding
or conclusion as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b).” To constitute plain error in a civil case,
the error must be “obvious and prejudicial” and “if permitted, would have a material
adverse effect on the character and public confidence in judicial proceedings.” Friedland
v. Djukic, 191 Ohio App.3d 278, 2010–Ohio–5777, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.). Plain error analysis is
limited and is to be applied with the utmost caution. State v. Tart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
76223, 2000 WL 739518.
{¶29} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) states permanent custody may be granted to a public
or private agency if the trial court determines by clear and convincing evidence at a
hearing held pursuant to division (A) of R.C. 215.414, that it is in the best interest of the
child and any of the following apply:
{¶30} (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned* * *and the child cannot be
placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed
with the child's parents.
{¶31} (b) The child is abandoned.
{¶32} (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are
able to take permanent custody. Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 12
{¶33} (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
a consecutive twenty-two-month period* * *.
{¶34} (e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from
whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected,
or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.
{¶35} As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are
alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion
for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007 AP 0041, 2007–
Ohio–5805. The trial court found that RCCSB had temporary custody of D.W. for at least
twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. Appellant does not challenge
this finding. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to
support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No.2008CA00118,
2008–Ohio–5458.
{¶36} However, even if we consider appellant’s argument with regards to D.W.,
we find the trial court did not err in determining that D.W. could not and should not be
placed with appellant at this time or within a reasonable period of time.
{¶37} Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence
before making this determination. The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it
determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated
in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the child's parents.
{¶38} R.C. 2151.414 states, in relevant part, as follows: Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 13
{¶39} (E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section
or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code whether a
child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not
be placed with the parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court
determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A)
of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised
Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child's parents, the court
shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable
time or should not be placed with either parent:
{¶40} (1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the
parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the
home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the
conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home. In determining whether
the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider
parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and
rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for
the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental
duties.
{¶41} (2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual disability,
physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is so severe that it makes
the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present
time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant to Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 14
division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the
Revised Code;
{¶42} (3) The parent committed any abuse as described in section 2151.031 of
the Revised Code against the child, caused the child to suffer any neglect as described
in section 2151.03 of the Revised Code, or allowed the child to suffer any neglect as
described in section 2151.03 of the Revised Code between the date that the original
complaint alleging abuse or neglect was filed and the date of the filing of the motion for
permanent custody;
{¶43} (4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by
failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by
other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the
child;
{¶44} (5) The parent is incarcerated for an offense committed against the child or
a sibling of the child;
{¶45} (6) The parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense under
division (A) or (C) of section 2919.22 or under section 2903.16, 2903.21, 2903.34,
2905.01, 2905.02, 2905.03, 2905.04, 2905.05, 2907.07, 2907.08, 2907.09, 2907.12,
2907.23, 2907.25, 2907.31, 2907.32, 2907.321, 2907.322, 2907.323, 2911.01, 2911.02,
2911.11, 2911.12, 2919.12, 2919.24, 2919.25, 2923.12, 2923.13, 2923.161, 2925.02, or
3716.11 of the Revised Code, and the child or a sibling of the child was a victim of the
offense, or the parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense under section
2903.04 of the Revised Code, a sibling of the child was the victim of the offense, and the Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 15
parent who committed the offense poses an ongoing danger to the child or a sibling of
the child.
{¶46} (7) The parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one of the
following:
{¶47} (a) An offense under section 2903.01, 2903.02, or 2903.03 of the Revised
Code or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States
that is substantially equivalent to an offense described in those sections and the victim of
the offense was a sibling of the child or the victim was another child who lived in the
parent's household at the time of the offense;
{¶48} (b) An offense under section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised
Code or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States
that is substantially equivalent to an offense described in those sections and the victim of
the offense is the child, a sibling of the child, or another child who lived in the parent's
household at the time of the offense;
{¶49} (c) An offense under division (B)(2) of section 2919.22 of the Revised Code
or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States that
is substantially equivalent to the offense described in that section and the child, a sibling
of the child, or another child who lived in the parent's household at the time of the offense
is the victim of the offense;
{¶50} (d) An offense under section 2907.02, 2907.03, 2907.04, 2907.05, or
2907.06 of the Revised Code or under an existing or former law of this state, any other
state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to an offense described in those Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 16
sections and the victim of the offense is the child, a sibling of the child, or another child
who lived in the parent's household at the time of the offense;
{¶51} (e) An offense under section 2905.32, 2907.21, or 2907.22 of the Revised
Code or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States
that is substantially equivalent to the offense described in that section and the victim of
the offense is the child, a sibling of the child, or another child who lived in the parent's
{¶52} (f) A conspiracy or attempt to commit, or complicity in committing, an
offense described in division (E)(7)(a), (d), or (e) of this section.
{¶53} (8) The parent has repeatedly withheld medical treatment or food from the
child when the parent has the means to provide the treatment or food, and, in the case of
withheld medical treatment, the parent withheld it for a purpose other than to treat the
physical or mental illness or defect of the child by spiritual means through prayer alone in
accordance with the tenets of a recognized religious body.
{¶54} (9) The parent has placed the child at substantial risk of harm two or more
times due to alcohol or drug abuse and has rejected treatment two or more times or
refused to participate in further treatment two or more times after a case plan issued
pursuant to section 2151.412 of the Revised Code requiring treatment of the parent was
journalized as part of a dispositional order issued with respect to the child or an order was
issued by any other court requiring treatment of the parent.
{¶55} (10) The parent has abandoned the child.
{¶56} (11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect
to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 17
Revised Code, or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the
United States that is substantially equivalent to those sections, and the parent has failed
to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior
termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate
care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.
{¶57} (12) The parent is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for
permanent custody or the dispositional hearing of the child and will not be available to
care for the child for at least eighteen months after the filing of the motion for permanent
custody or the dispositional hearing.
{¶58} (13) The parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated incarceration
prevents the parent from providing care for the child.
{¶59} (14) The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing, shelter,
and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child from suffering physical,
emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, emotional, or mental neglect.
{¶60} (15) The parent has committed abuse as described in section 2151.031 of
the Revised Code against the child or caused or allowed the child to suffer neglect as
described in section 2151.03 of the Revised Code, and the court determines that the
seriousness, nature, or likelihood of recurrence of the abuse or neglect makes the child's
placement with the child's parent a threat to the child's safety.
{¶61} (16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.
{¶62} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will provide in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”
Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 18
syllabus. See also, In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 481 N.E.2d 361 (1985).
“Where the degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a
reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had
sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” Cross at 477. If some
competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case supports the
trial court's judgment, an appellate court must affirm the judgment and not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d
279, 3
{¶63} The Magistrate, in her Decision, found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (E)(4), and
(E)(10) were applicable. As is stated above in detail, there was testimony that appellant
had failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing
D.W. to be placed outside his home. There was testimony that she did not maintain
appropriate and stable housing or employment and went for periods of time exceeding 90
days before visiting with D.W. and that her visitation was not consistent. The
CASA/Guardian ad Litem in his report, stated that appellant has 13 eviction notices from
2005 through June of 2016. Moreover, appellant, who previously had four other children
removed from her care, had at times left D.W. with acquaintances for periods of time.
There was testimony that the caseworker had not had contact with appellant since June
of 2018 and did not know her current living situation and that her last known address was
vacant. Appellant also sporadically engaged in services despite having three different
assessments and as noted by the Magistrate “had failed consistently and repeatedly to
position herself to assume the responsibilities associated with full-time care of her child.”
The CASA/Guardian ad Litem noted in his report, that appellant had not completed any Richland County, Case No. 19CA2 19
substance abuse assessments or services and that she did not follow through with
counseling. The Magistrate, in her Decision, found that appellant had “failed to
consistently make herself available to the Court, her legal representative and her
caseworker.”
{¶64} We note that appellant does not challenge the trial court’s best interest
finding.
{¶65} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s decision is supported
by clear and convincing evidence and that appellant has not demonstrated plain error in
the findings of the court.
{¶66} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶67} Accordingly, the judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division is affirmed.
By: Baldwin, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur.