In re Duggan

124 F.2d 215, 29 C.C.P.A. 765, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78, 1941 CCPA LEXIS 183
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 29, 1941
DocketNo. 4548
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 124 F.2d 215 (In re Duggan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Duggan, 124 F.2d 215, 29 C.C.P.A. 765, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78, 1941 CCPA LEXIS 183 (ccpa 1941).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case presents the not unusual situation of an application in the United States Patent Office for a patent for a process in which certain claims, specific to certain concentrations of reagents and temperatures, were allowed, and certain claims, couched broadly in terms of result or function, were denied. It is with the question of whether or not these latter claims were properly denied by the Board of Appeals of the Patent Office that we are here concerned.

Appellants’ process is in the art of finishing cellulosic textile fabrics such as cotton cloth used for making shirts. The process is particularly useful, in finishing cotton broadcloth. The process accomplishes two purposes: (1) it preshrinks the fabric, and (2) it gives it a permanent finish and attractive appearance. There are a number of steps involved in the process, including putting the fabric to be treated in a copper sulphate bath, where it is impregnated or “padded” with copper sulphate, and then passing it into a bath made up of a mixture of caustic soda and ammonia, causing the filaments to swell. Following this bath, the fabric is rinsed in cold water, subjected, with agitation, to a bath of dilute sulphuric acid, and washed in cold water .to remove the acid. The excess moisture is then removed and the material is stentered or stretched to not more than its original width.

The specification calls for a certain range of concentration of the chemicals involved, and also calls for definite times and temperatures in order to obtain the desired result. In their specification, appellants lay considerable stress on the fact that a slight change in the composition of the baths, or in the conditions of time and temperature may have quite an influence in the result obtained. We quote:

We are aware that other methods have been suggested for treating fabrics, but we have found from a long and thorough study thereof that said pre[767]*767viously suggested methods, in most cases, fail to produce the optimum results. Inasmuch as said treatments involve a wide variety of physical and chemical factors, a comparatively slight variation of one or more of said factors is found to produce a great change in the final results, and in view of the close inter-relation of said factors, said results are not usually predictable.

The Primary Examiner, in his statement made following appeal to the Board of Appeals, quoted from “the remarks on page 4 of the amendment of Nov. 21, 1939,” submitted by appellants (not otherwise found in the record) as follows:

It is desired to emphasize again the point which we brought out in the interview that even slight changes in the baths may produce very important differences in results. These changes may take the form of variation in the composition of the baths themselves as well as differences in the conditions of concentration, time and temperature. Applicants recognize as experts in this art that cuprammonium sulphate and caustic soda have been used for years in the treating of textile fabrics.

The allowed claims 6, 7, 10, and 11 recite specifically the conditions emphasized by the applicants as being critical.

The examiner rejected appealed claims 1, 2, and 5, which do not include the critical conditions, on certain prior art and for the further reason that the claims, the sole novelty of which resides in a functional limitation, were vague and indefinite. Upon appeal, the board affirmed the action of the examiner in rejecting said claims 1, 2, and 5 for substantially the same reasons. Upon reconsideration, the board adhered to its former opinion and went into somewhat more detail in its rejection on the references. The concluding sentence of this latter opinion states: “The examiner’s action is therefore again affirmed for the reasons herein and heretofore given.”

From the aforesaid decisions of the board, appellants have appealed to this court.

We regard claim 1 as illustrative of the three claims on appeal. It follows:

1. A method of presbrinking and finishing cellulosie textile fabric, consisting in padding the same with copper sulphate, subjecting the padded cloth to a bath containing caustic soda and ammonia, removing excess alkali, setting the fibre by means of acid, and removing the excess acid, the strength and temperature of said baths and the time of treatment being so adjusted that substantial solubilising of the fiber is avoided. [Italics ours.]

The italicized language in the above-quoted claim (which language also appears in the other appealed claims) is the only attempt to define the critical conditions and this, as is apparent, is done solely in terms of result or function. Claims 2 and 5 have the additional limitation of “stentering the fabric to a width not substantially greater .than its original width” and claim 5 additionally specifies [768]*768the functional effect of the alkali treatment “to swell the fibre” and the subsequent acid bath for “deflating and setting the fibre.”

In view of our conclusion it becomes unnecessary to either cite or discuss the prior art.

The examiner in his statement said that if the appealed claims involved any novelty over the references cited, it would reside solely in the above-italicized functional limitation. Appellants have pointed out that there is a difference between their invention and the inventions of the references other than that of the novelty of the said functional clause. They do not urge, however, that such slight differences as they have called attention to, of themselves lend patentability to the claims. Appellants also differ with the holding .of the examiner in that they insist that the phrase “stentering the fabric to a width not substantially greater than its original width” in claims 2 and 5 relates to a step which accomplishes important objectives, and that such step of stentering, limited as it is in the claims, is not found in the prior art. Appellants do not urge, however, that the prior art does not show stentering of the fabric in a process quite similar to that here involved.

It is pointed out in the brief of the Solicitor for the Patent Office that stentering is old in the art. He does not state, however, that the exact degree of stentering called for by claims 2 and 5 is shown in the prior art. The solicitor states that the appellants did not raise this question before the examiner or the board and that this fact accounts for the failure of the board and the examiner to make mention of it. He further points out that appellants have not called attention to, this fact in the reasons of appeal and also argues that this feature could not possibly lend patentability to the claims. Appellants do not refute said statement of the solicitor except they contend that some of the general reasons of appeal would properly raise the question.

Assuming, without deciding, that appellants’ reasons of appeal sufficiently present the question, it is, we think, proper to say that stentering of the degree called for in claims 2 and 5 would not lend patentability to otherwise unpatentable claims. And so, upon this record, the question presented to us is whether the sole patentable novelty in the process claims at bar can rest alone in the said functional statement.

It is to be noted that the functional statement in each of the appealed claims is as follows:

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Related

Application of Bernard M. Fine, Deceased, Amelia S. Fine, Assignee
240 F.2d 354 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1957)
In re Jolly
172 F.2d 566 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1949)

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Bluebook (online)
124 F.2d 215, 29 C.C.P.A. 765, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78, 1941 CCPA LEXIS 183, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-duggan-ccpa-1941.