An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-448
Filed 18 February 2026
Durham County, Nos. 19JA000090-310, 19JA000093-310, 19JA000094-310, 19JA000095-310
IN THE MATTER OF: D.S., K.R, J.R., S.R.
Appeal by Respondent from order entered 11 December 2024 by Judge Doretta
L. Walker in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27
January 2026.
Parent Defender Annick Lenoir-Peek, by Assistant Parent Defender, Jacky L. Brammer, for respondent-appellant mother.
Keith T. Roberson, for petitioner-appellee Durham County Department of Social Services.
Fox Rothschild LLP, by Brian C. Bernhardt and Nathan W. Wilson, for petitioner-appellee Guardian ad Litem.
STADING, Judge.
Respondent-Mother (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order awarding
guardianship of her minor children to her mother (“Maternal Grandmother.”). On
appeal, Mother contends the trial court committed error by failing to adequately
verify Maternal Grandmother’s financial resources. She also asserts the trial court
erred by failing to make the required statutory findings to waive future reviews, and IN RE: D.S., K.R., J.R., S.R.
Opinion of the Court
by failing to make the required statutory findings for a fourteen-year-old juvenile.
After careful consideration, we affirm in part and remand in part.
I. Background
On 8 April 2019, the Durham County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
accepted a family assessment case for the investigation of improper discipline of
“Denise,” “Kylie,” “Jamal,” “Sam,” and “Nia.”1 Denise disclosed Mother had pushed
her and her older sister down to the floor and beaten them with a belt, a hanger, or
her hand. Denise reported she was beaten with a hanger after she failed to follow
Mother’s directions “quickly enough.” Denise also alleged her and her older sister
were beaten “most days,” sometimes “for no reason.” A social worker observed red
marks on Denise’s left arm.
On 11 April 2019, Mother admitted feeling depressed and requested her
children to be placed outside of her home. In response, DSS conducted a “kinship
placement” of Mother’s minor children with Maternal Grandmother. Thereafter,
Mother was “ejected from her home” and failed to comply with recommendations
concerning her mental health.
On 10 May 2019, DSS filed a petition alleging the minor children were
neglected and dependent. DSS simultaneously requested the trial court to issue a
1 We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of minor children. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). Two other siblings were listed on the petition filed by DSS but are not a part of this appeal. Nia eventually aged out of juvenile proceedings and her custody is no longer at issue.
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nonsecure custody order granting immediate temporary custody of the minor children
to Maternal Grandmother. At the time of filing this petition, DSS was unable to
contact Mother for two straight weeks. According to DSS, Mother had not: contacted
her minor children during the previous two weeks; informed DSS of any new
residence for herself or her minor children; complied with recommendations to
complete services for mental health, substance abuse, and parenting education; or
provided Maternal Grandmother with a food stamp card to feed the minor children.
That same day, the trial court ordered nonsecure custody of the minor children to
Maternal Grandmother for seven days. Based upon the verified petition, the trial
court found there was a reasonable factual basis to believe the minor children had
been abandoned.
On 17 May 2019, the trial court entered an “order on the need for continued
nonsecure custody,” finding good cause to continue the pre-adjudication hearing to be
heard together with the nonsecure custody hearing on 31 May 2019. The minor
children remained placed in the nonsecure custody of Maternal Grandmother. On 31
May 2019, the trial court entered an order continuing nonsecure custody of the minor
children with Maternal Grandmother since Mother failed to appear in court. The
trial court held a pre-adjudication conference and deferred addressing visitation until
service and appearance by the parties.
On 5 November 2019, after a hearing on 4 October 2019, the trial court entered
a pre-adjudication order regarding the placement of the minor children. The trial
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court ordered nonsecure custody of the minor children remain with Maternal
Grandmother since good cause existed for the placement to continue, and that this
placement was consistent with the minor children’s “health, safety, welfare, and best
interests.”
On 31 March 2020, the trial court entered an order on adjudication after
hearings on 25 November 2019 and 27 January 2020. The trial court adjudicated the
minor children neglected and dependent. The trial court found, inter alia, that the
minor children “were neglected in that they were exposed to an environment injurious
to their safety and wellbeing when [Mother] cared for them while failing to maintain
her own mental health needs, while failing to maintain stable housing and while
under the influence of an illegal substance (marijuana)[.]” The trial court also found:
28. When the children moved in with maternal grandmother, she was without adequate resources to care for them and she contacted the fathers[.] Neither father provided any monetary support or other assistance to the grandmother during that period of time prior to the filing of the petition.
The trial court concluded that the return of the minor children to the custody of
Mother would be “contrary to the health, safety, welfare and best interests of the
juveniles.” The trial court ordered that Maternal Grandmother maintain nonsecure
temporary custody of the minor children pending further orders.
On 22 September 2020, the trial court entered a disposition order after a
hearing on 16 June 2020. The trial court found: DSS “has assessed that while
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[Maternal Grandmother] has managed to provide for the children’s needs, she is
strained financially[.] The Department recommends custody of [Denise, Sam, Kylie,
and Jamal] be granted to the Department while Maternal Grandmother maintains
placement[.] This would make her eligible for financial assistance.” The disposition
order concluded that “DSS has made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for the
children to remain outside the home, however, placement outside the home is in the
best interests of the children.” The trial court granted DSS legal custody of the minor
children “with placement authority in that agency including . . . with the current
relative placement [Maternal Grandmother].”
From June 2021 to September 2024, the trial court conducted nine permanency
planning hearings, resulting in seven permanency planning hearing orders (“PPO”).
Mother moved to amend the third PPO order on 7 September 2023, requesting
additional findings, one of which stated:
53. The Court wants to review this matter in July 2023, primarily because of concerns regarding proper supervision of the children. The two older siblings are not good babysitters. Maternal Grandmother’s younger daughter is not reliable enough. Grandmother needs to find a responsible adult.
That same day, the trial court filed an amended PPO to include additional findings.
On 16 November 2023, a permanency planning hearing was adjourned for need
of additional information. During the hearing, Mother was under cross-examination
and refused to read text messages between her and one of her minor children. The
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trial court chose to review the phone records and finish the hearing before
determining whether a contempt proceeding was appropriate. On 6 December 2023,
the trial court entered a permanency planning review adjournment order directing
DSS to subpoena and obtain Mother’s phone records.
On 24 April 2024, the trial court entered the sixth PPO in this matter. The
trial court found that: “[f]urther reunification efforts for all parents would be futile
and not in the best interest of the juveniles and should therefore be ceased[,]” and
“[i]t is not in the best interest of the children to have visitation with their mother at
this time[.]” The trial court ordered Mother’s visits remain ceased because of safety
concerns, but did allow for Mother to motion to reinstate her visitation in the future.
Further, the trial court ordered that Denise “should not be required to babysit her
younger siblings and [Maternal Grandmother] needs to find an alternate
arrangement for a proper adult to provide child care in her absence.”
On 11 December 2024, the trial court entered the final PPO that “accepted into
evidence, reviewed, and considered,” inter alia, Durham County DSS court
summaries, GAL court reports, and Mother’s court report. The trial court found:
33. The children have been in care since June 2020. [Mother] has not addressed the reasons that her children were removed from her home. [Maternal Grandmother] is willing to provide long term care for her grandchildren through guardianship. [Maternal Grandmother] is willing to support the children visiting with their parents.
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The trial court also found that DSS “assisted [Maternal Grandmother] with
completing the requirements to obtain her foster care license[.]” The trial court
ordered placement of the minor children in the care of Maternal Grandmother,
effective 30 September 2024. Additionally, the trial court ordered that there “shall
be no further scheduled reviews,” and the parties may move the court to modify this
order. On 10 January 2025, Mother entered her notice of appeal from the 11
December 2024 PPO.
II. Analysis
Mother contends the trial court erred by failing to properly verify that
Maternal Grandmother had adequate resources before awarding her permanent
guardianship of the minor children. Mother also argues the trial court did not make
the findings required to waive future review hearings, and that these findings were
not made by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, Mother argues the appealed PPO
lacks the required findings to show assistance for fourteen-year-old Denise’s
transition into adulthood.
This Court’s review of a permanency planning order “‘is limited to whether
there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings [of fact] and whether
the findings support the conclusions of law,’ with ‘[t]he trial court’s findings of fact
[being] conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence.’” In re L.E.W.,
375 N.C. 124, 129, 846 S.E.2d 460, 465 (2020) (cleaned up). “Competent evidence is
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the finding.”
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In re J.M., 384 N.C. 584, 591, 887 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2023) (citation omitted).
Competent evidence from a permanency planning hearing may consist of “any
evidence, including hearsay evidence . . . or testimony or evidence from any person
that is not a party, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to
determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition.” Id.
(citation omitted). “Unchallenged findings of fact are deemed to be supported by the
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re P.L.E., 290 N.C. App. 176, 180, 891 S.E.2d
613, 616 (2023) (cleaned up).
A. Verification of Guardianship
Mother contends the trial court failed to properly verify Maternal
Grandmother’s financial resources before awarding her permanent guardianship of
the minor children. Mother argues that Maternal Grandmother is unemployed, has
no reliable transportation, and has no financial resources of her own.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(j) (2023) requires:
If the court determines that the juvenile shall be placed in the custody of an individual other than a parent or appoints an individual guardian of the person pursuant to G.S. 7B- 600, the court shall verify that the person receiving custody or being appointed as guardian of the juvenile understands the legal significance of the placement or appointment and will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile. The fact that the prospective custodian or guardian has provided a stable placement for the juvenile for at least six consecutive months is evidence that the person has adequate resources.
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Subsection 7B-906.1(j) “does not require the trial court to make any specific findings
in order to make the verification. However, . . . the record must show the trial court
received and considered reliable evidence that the guardian or custodian had
adequate resources and understood the legal significance of custody or guardianship.”
In re K.P., 383 N.C. 292, 306, 881 S.E.2d 250, 259 (2022) (quoting In re J.D.M.-J., 260
N.C. App. 56, 65, 817 S.E.2d 755, 761 (2018)).
The 11 December 2024 PPO found:
28. The children have been in care for a long time. It is time for permanence. [Maternal Grandmother] is now receiving state rate for the minor children and has the ability to care for the minor children. The Court notes that she was taking care of the children financially even before the financial funding became available. She demonstrated an understanding of what it means to care for the minor children as she had been doing so for years.
....
35. . . . . [Maternal Grandmother] understands the legal significance of the appointment, including rights and responsibilities as a guardian/custodian, and will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the child. The Court has received the testimony of guardians, and they have the ability to care for the child. [Maternal Grandmother] has provided adequate care for the children for an extended period of time. [Maternal Grandmother] has met DSS qualifications for being a licensed foster parent.
The permanency planning hearing included testimony from Maternal
Grandmother and a social worker supervisor. Maternal Grandmother testified, “I’m
not working but I still have a job.” She explained, “because, like, I’m still grieving for
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my husband, and the kids were supposed to not be left alone . . . But as I said the job
is still open, I’m just not there.” When asked whether she had any financial concerns
needing additional assistance that was not being supported by DSS, Maternal
Grandmother replied, “[n]o. I can work. I have a job. I can go out to work if I need to.
If you -- but right now, no.” As to the vehicle at her home, Maternal Grandmother
testified, “[i]t’s in my name. It’s my vehicle.” With respect to Maternal Grandmother’s
licensure and monthly stipend from the State, the social worker supervisor testified
Maternal Grandmother currently receives a total of $3,036 until the children reach
age thirteen.
DSS and GAL reports were also introduced as evidence during the permanency
planning hearing. The May DSS report stated: “the maternal grandmother meets the
children’s immediate needs,” and “[t]he physician reported both children were
gaining weight and progressing well.” The August DSS report stated: “[Maternal
Grandmother] has demonstrated the ability to provide consistent and adequate care
for her grandchildren. In her home they report feeling safe and getting their need[s]
met.” And further, “[the social worker] has no concerns with the children remaining
in the home with guardianship being given to their maternal grandmother[.]” The
GAL report stated: “[the minor children] continue to be placed at their maternal
grandmother’s house. They are all doing very well here and have been here for more
than four years.” As to available resources to meet the needs of the minor children,
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the GAL report provided: “[Maternal Grandmother] has obtained her licensure which
would allow her to receive a stipend which would help her financially.”
Mother contends the trial court made merely nominal findings that Maternal
Grandmother had adequate resources for guardianship, and that those findings are
unsupported. However, subsection 7B-906.1(j) only requires “the record must show
the trial court received and considered reliable evidence that the guardian or
custodian had adequate resources.” In re K.P., 383 N.C. at 306, 881 S.E.2d at 259
(citation omitted). Mother also points to what could be considered contradicting
evidence about Maternal Grandmother’s resources, but our role is not to weigh
evidence. See In re N.H., 255 N.C. App. 501, 507, 804 S.E.2d 841, 845 (2017) (“[O]ur
role on appeal is not to weigh and compare the evidence; our standard of review
merely asks if there was competent evidence, even hearsay evidence, at trial to
support the trial court’s findings.”).
The minor children were reportedly doing “very well” placed with Maternal
Grandmother “for more than four years.” The minor children’s stable placement with
Maternal Grandmother for at least six months is evidence of adequate resources.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(j) (“The fact that the prospective custodian or guardian
has provided a stable placement for the juvenile for at least six consecutive months
is evidence that the person has adequate resources.”). In addition to the minor
children’s lengthy and stable placement with Maternal Grandmother, the record
demonstrates that Maternal Grandmother had no financial concerns, received
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adequate financial resources from DSS, and was able to get her old job back if she
wanted. Contrary to Mother’s urging, the trial court’s findings are adequately
supported. For these reasons, we conclude the trial court “received and considered
reliable evidence” that Maternal Grandmother had adequate resources. In re K.P.,
383 N.C. at 306, 881 S.E.2d at 259 (citation omitted). The trial court did not err in
determining Maternal Grandmother had adequate resources to meet the minor
children’s needs.
B. Future Reviews
Mother contends the trial court erred in ceasing further review hearings.
Mother argues the trial court neither made all the required findings to waive future
reviews nor made any of those findings by clear and convincing evidence. When it is
argued the trial court failed to follow a statutory mandate, “the error is preserved and
is a question of law reviewed de novo.” In re E.M., 263 N.C. App. 476, 479, 823 S.E.2d
674, 676 (2019). “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and
freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” Id. (citation
omitted). Mother’s brief only challenged evidentiary support for the finding that
Maternal Grandmother had adequate resources under 7B-906.1(j). And any
unchallenged findings are presumed to be supported. In re J.S., 250 N.C. App. at
372, 792 S.E.2d at 863 (citation omitted).
Subsection 7B-906.1(n) provides:
Notwithstanding other provisions of this Article, the court
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may waive the holding of permanency planning hearings required by this section, may require written reports to the court by the agency or person holding custody in lieu of permanency planning hearings, or order that permanency planning hearings be held less often than every six months if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence each of the following:
(1) The juvenile has resided in the placement for a period of at least one year or the parties are in agreement and the court enters a consent order pursuant to G.S. 7B-801(b1).
(2) The placement is stable and continuation of the placement is in the juvenile’s best interests.
(3) Neither the juvenile’s best interests nor the rights of any party require that permanency planning hearings be held every six months.
(4) All parties are aware that the matter may be brought before the court for review at any time by the filing of a permanency planning or modification motion or on the court’s own motion.
(5) The court order has designated the relative or other suitable person as the juvenile’s permanent custodian or guardian of the person.
Id. § 7B-906.1(n)(1)–(5). “The trial court must make written findings of fact satisfying
each of the enumerated criteria listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(n), and its failure
to do so constitutes reversible error.” In re P.A., 241 N.C. App. 53, 66, 772 S.E.2d 240,
249 (2015) (citation omitted). Although the trial court’s order found “[t]his hearing is
being held pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 906.1 and 906.2,” the trial court did not
specify in its written order or in open court that its findings were supported by clear
and convincing evidence.
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The first statutory mandate under subsection 7B-906.1(n) is for the trial court
to make findings supported by clear and convincing evidence. Precedent generally
compels the trial court to state the standard of proof either in its written order, or in
open court. In re E.M., 249 N.C. App. 44, 56, 790 S.E.2d 863, 873 (2016). But failure
to state the standard of proof used to make its findings is not “prejudicial error” if the
“‘record when viewed in its entirety clearly reveals that the court applied the proper
evidentiary standard’ or where the appellant does not challenge those factual findings
as lacking evidentiary support.” Id. (quoting In re M.D., 200 N.C. App. 35, 39, 682
S.E.2d 780, 783 (2009)). “[T]o obtain relief on appeal, an appellant must not only
show error, but that . . . the error was material and prejudicial, amounting to denial
of a substantial right that will likely affect the outcome of an action.” In re L.E.W.,
375 N.C. at 128, 846 S.E.2d at 464–65 (cleaned up).
Although Mother’s brief “does not challenge those factual findings as lacking
evidentiary support,” the PPO does not address all of the enumerated criteria. In re
E.M., 249 N.C. at 56, 790 S.E.2d at 873. Among them, there an absence of findings
addressing the criteria stated under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(n)(2)–(4). Further,
“the best practice is for a court to affirmatively state the standard of proof that it
applied in making factual determinations,” and the court should do so when making
the appropriate findings on remand. See In re E.M., 249 N.C. at 56, 790 S.E.2d at
873. As to the issue of waiving future review, since the record contains sufficient
evidence from which the trial court could make the appropriate findings under the
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statute, we need not vacate the PPO. Accordingly, as to this issue, the PPO is
remanded.
C. Findings for Juveniles Fourteen Years of Age and Older
Mother next contends the trial court erred by failing to make findings required
for fourteen-year-old Denise.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-912(a)(1)–(3) (2023) requires:
In addition to the permanency planning requirements under G.S. 7B-906.1, at every permanency planning hearing for a juvenile in the custody of a county department of social services who has attained the age of 14 years, the court shall inquire and make written findings regarding each of the following:
(1) The services provided to assist the juvenile in making a transition to adulthood.
(2) The steps the county department of social services is taking to ensure that the foster family or other licensed placement provider follows the reasonable and prudent parent standard as provided in G.S. 131D-10.2A.
(3) Whether the juvenile has regular opportunities to engage in age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate activities.
Subsection 131D-10.2A(a) (2023) sets out the reasonable and prudent parent
standard as:
[C]haracterized by careful and sensible parental decisions that are reasonably intended to maintain the health,
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safety, and best interests of the child while at the same time encouraging the emotional and developmental growth of the child that a caregiver shall use when determining whether to allow a child in foster care under the responsibility of the State to participate in extracurricular, enrichment, cultural, and social activities.
Our review leads us to conclude the record contains sufficient evidence to
support the first required finding “services provided to assist the juvenile in making
a transition to adulthood,” but does not make an adequate finding in accordance with
subsection § 7B-912(a)(1). The trial court noted Denise was provided treatment and
services from a pediatrician, dentist, and therapist. The trial court observed that
Denise was discharged from the therapist for nonparticipation, due to “not [being]
interested in any therapy.” The trial court also found Denise “recently participated
in the school athletics and dance team.” These findings show the services provided
for Denise’s physical health, mental health, and social development but do not speak
directly to assisting her “transition into adulthood.” Id. § 7B-912(a)(1).
The trial court also addressed the “steps the county department of social
services” took to ensure Maternal Grandmother followed the “reasonable and prudent
parent standard.” Id. § 7B-912(a)(2). The trial court found that DSS had “monitored
and visited the juveniles’ placement, assisted the placement with completing the
requirements to obtain her foster care license, held a guardianship conference with
the placement, ensured the juveniles were receiving services, ensured visitation
occurred.” The steps taken by DSS proved successful as the trial court found
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Maternal Grandmother “has provided adequate care for the children for an extended
period of time,” and “has met DSS qualifications for being a licensed foster parent.”
Again, although the record contains sufficient evidence to support such findings, the
trial court did not make adequate findings that DSS took steps to ensure Maternal
Grandmother made “careful and sensible parental decisions” in accordance with
section 131D-10.2A’s reasonable and prudent parent standard. Id. § 7B-912(a)(2).
Finally, despite the record containing sufficient evidence to enter findings
under subsection 7B-912(a)(3), the trial court did not adequately address whether
Denise “has regular opportunities to engage in age-appropriate or developmentally
appropriate activities.” Id. § 7B-912(a)(3). While the trial court found Denise had
opportunities to engage in activities including “the school athletics and dance team,”
and therapy, the trial court did not indicate whether it found these activities were
“age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate.” Id.
In sum, although the trial court made some findings pertaining to the
requirements of subsection 7B-912(a)(1)–(3), the trial court did not adequately
address each required finding under the statute. Since sufficient evidence exists in
the record to support each statutory finding, the PPO need not be vacated, but merely
remanded to the trial court to make the required findings.
D. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in awarding
custody of the minor children to Maternal Grandmother since it made the requisite
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verification under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(j). Further, we remand the PPO to the
trial court to make the requisite findings under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(n).
Finally, we remand the PPO to the trial court to make requisite findings regarding
Denise under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-912(a).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART.
Judges STROUD and FREEMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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