In re Dreyfus

73 F.2d 931, 22 C.C.P.A. 830, 1934 CCPA LEXIS 283
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals·Decided December 24, 1934·No. No. 3361·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Lenroot, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, affirming a decision of the examiner and rejecting, in view of the prior art, claims 1 to 34, inclusive, of appellant’s application. It appears that two claims of the application have been allowed. Appellant has moved to dismiss the appeal as to claims 4, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34, and it will be so ordered. The remaining claims before us are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 25, 26, 27 and 28.

Claim 1 is illustrative of the claims here involved and reads as follows:

1. Process for the manufacture of alkyl ethers of cellulose which in no stage of etherification are soluble in hot or cold water nor have the property of being precipitated from alcoholic solution by alcoholic solutions of alkali, said process comprising treating a cellulosic body not soluble in alkali, with an aliphatic etherifying agent in presence of alkali, whilst restricting the water present, disregarding that formed in the etherification itself, to an amount not greater than from about the natural humidity content of the cellulosic body up to about four times the weight of the cellulosic body, the total alkali used in the etherification process being at lease equal in weight to said restricted quantity of water, disregarding water formed in the etherification.

There is but one reference cited, Lilienfeld, 1,188,376, June 20, 1916.

Appellant’s alleged invention is aptly described in the statement of the examiner as follows:

[831] The present invention relates to the manufacture of cellulose ethers, and more particularly to the manufacture of alkyl ethers of cellulose not soluble in hot or cold water.
The process comprises the usual steps of first treating the cellulose, in the form of cotton for instance, with a solution of caustic soda, and after said caustic soda solution has been thoroughly incorporated into the cellulose, the; etherification agent, di-methyl or di-ethyl sulfate in this case, with or without additional caustic soda is reacted with the caustic soda-cellulose product first formed. A practically theoretical, quantitative yield of the corresponding ether is claimed for the process.
The alleged inventive features of the process reside in the proportions of reactants employed, especial emphasis being placed on the water content which may range from a quantity corresponding to the natural humidity content of the cellulose used, to 400% relative to the weight of the cellulose, which is taken as 100%, i. e., a range of from about 8 to 400% of H2O per 100% of cellulose. The quantity of caustic soda used varies from 1 to 19 times the weight of water, corresponding to a 50-95% caustic soda solution'.
The use of inert solvents is suggested as a reaction media, and the process is carried out at- a temperature not exceeding 80° O.

The patent to Lilienfeld relates to alkyl ethers of cellulose and! process of making the same. The provisions of said patent material! here are briefly and, we think, correctly summarized in the brief of the Solicitor for the Patent Office, as follows:

* * * The essential steps consist in the treatment of a cellulosic material with an aqueous solution of caustic soda and subsequent reacting the resulting product with an etherifying agent such as diethyl sulfate to form the corresponding ether of cellulose. A wide variety of cellulosic materials are disclosed as suitable starting materials, and a caustic solution ranging from 10 to over 40% is used. Lilienfeld also teaches the desirability of using an organic solvent as a reaction media * * * and indicates that the reaction should be carried out at moderate temperatures. The ethers obtained are described as varying from soluble to insoluble forms, depending of course upon the relative proportions of ingredients employed.

The claims were found by both tribunals of the Patent Office to-be unpatentable in view of the Lilienfeld reference.

Appellant’s counsel in his brief and upon oral argument asserted’ that all of the claims here involved were at one time allowed by the' examiner, and that he reversed himself only after a decision of the-Board of Appeals in a certain interference proceeding involving-appellant’s present application, holding certain claims not here involved unpatentable, the examiner being of the opinion that the reasons given by the Board of Appeals for holding the claims involved in said interference unpatentable were applicable to- the-claims involved in this appeal.

An examination of the record discloses that the examiner,-, om February 9, 1922, held that claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9, of the claims-here being considered, were allowable. On July 23, 193Í, the; examiner rejected all of the claims here upon appeal, and in his letter of rejection he stated, referring to the decision of the B'oard' of [832] Appeals in the interference proceeding hereinabove referred to, as follows:

The Board of Appeals in holding claims 84 1» 87 (which were the issues of Interference No. 51209) to be unpatentable stated:
“ In the present, case, as we see it, the specifications of the parties do not clearly point out what is the invention over the prior art; they refer to a lot of percentages of the ingredients which are within the prior artgive a lot of examples with widely varying percentages with no statement as to whether one is better than another or whether any of them give a different result from the prior art. The claims will read on some of the examples and not on others but there is nothing in the specification to indicate that there is any material ^difference in results obtained.” * * *
■“In our opinion the specific limitations of the claims do not define anything 'of an inventive character as required by Section 4888, Revised Statutes,, and are therefore unpatentable.”
This ground of rejection is considered to apply to claims 1 to 34 inclusive as -well, and they are accordingly rejected as being devoid of invention over the prior art such as Lilienfeld 1,188,376.

On July 21, 1932, this rejection was made final in the following letter:

Responsive to letter filed July 8, 1932.
Claims 1 to 34 were-rejected in the office action of July 23, 1931, as being-unpatentable over Lilienfeld, #1,188,376, and on the grounds advanced by the Board of Appeals in holding claims 84 to 87 unpatentable. Claims 1 to 34 were again, and finally, rejected in the office action of February 10, 1932, not 'on different grounds, but upon the original grounds amplified for the sake of clarity and in view of applicant’s response to the office action of July 23, 1931. There has been no variance, therefore, and the final rejection is proper and not contrary to the office rules in that regard.
The fact that this application has been pending before the office for twelve years further justifies the examiner’s position.
Claims 1 to 34 accordingly stand finally rejected under the office action of February 10, 1932, and the six months run from that date.

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In re Dreyfus, 73 F.2d 931, 22 C.C.P.A. 830, 1934 CCPA LEXIS 283 (ccpa 1934).

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