2024 IL App (1st) 231530
FIRST DISTRICT SECOND DIVISION February 27, 2024
No. 1-23-1530
In re D.P., a Minor, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) No. 21 JA 959 v. ) ) B.P., ) ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Patrick T. Murphy, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Respondent, B.P., appeals the trial court’s order finding him to be unfit under section
1(D)(b), (m), and (n) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m), (n) (West 2020)) and
terminating his parental rights over D.P., his minor son. He argues that the trial court’s finding
was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State did not establish by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) he had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to D.P.’s welfare in violation of section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (id.
§ 1(D)(b)) and section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS
405/2-29 (West 2020)), (2) he had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that
were the basis for the removal of D.P. and reasonable progress toward the return of D.P. under No. 1-23-1530
section 1(D)(m) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2020)) and section 2-29 (705 ILCS 405/2-29
(West 2020)), and (3) he had demonstrated an intent to forego his parental rights by failing to
visit or communicate with D.P. or the agency under section 1(D)(n) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(n) (West
2020)) and section 2-29 (705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2020)).
¶2 Respondent is the natural father of the minor, D.P., born on January 18, 2020. 1 On
October 19, 2021, the State filed a petition for the adjudication of wardship of D.P. and named
both parents. The petition alleged that D.P. was neglected under the Juvenile Court Act because
he was not receiving the proper and necessary support for his well-being and due to an injurious
environment (id. § 2-3(1)(a), (b)) and abused under the Juvenile Court Act because his parents
created a substantial risk of physical injury to such minor by other than accidental means that
would be likely to cause death, disfigurement, impairment of emotional health, or loss or
impairment of any bodily function (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)). The supporting facts for both allegations
stated:
“Mother has one prior indicated report for substance misuse. Mother has four
other minors who were in DCFS custody in Winnebago County with findings
having been entered. Putative father is the parent of three of those minors. On or
about August 8, 2021 the family’s apartment was observed to be dirty with a
strong odor of urine and feces emitting from the home. The sofa cushions were
observed to be soaked with urine and there were bags of garbage in the floor
which contained dirty adult diapers. Maggots were observed in the corner of the
floor. On September 1, 2021 a safety plan was created and then subsequently
modified on two separate occasions after it was violated. Mother would return to
1 D.P.’s natural mother J.B. is not a party to this appeal. 2 No. 1-23-1530
the family’s apartment with this minor each time the safety plan was violated.
Putative father admits that earlier this year he overdosed after he had ingested
marijuana which had been laced with fentanyl. Putative father states that this
minor was present during this incident. Putative father refuses to participate in a
random drug test. Mother tested positive for cocaine on or about September 13,
2021. Mother denies using illegal substances. On October 11, 2021 putative father
was involved in a physical altercation with another adult. Mother attempted to
intervene in this altercation and was injured. This minor was present during this
altercation. On October 12, 2021 putative father was shot right outside the
family’s residence after he was involved in altercation with another adult. This
minor was present in the home when putative father was shot. Parents reside
together and paternity has not been established.”
¶3 On October 29, 2021, the court entered a paternity order finding that respondent is the
father of D.P. On February 22, 2022, the trial court entered an adjudication order and found D.P.
was abused or neglected based on an injurious environment because the “agency tried to assist
mother, agency did what they could do, mother and child not living with father, mother saw
father shot outside his abode, mother injured in other incident with father and minor.” On April
20, 2022, the court entered the disposition order adjudging D.P. a ward of the court and finding
both J.B. and respondent were unable for some reason other than financial circumstances alone
to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor. The Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) was named the guardian administrator. The permanency order entered on April
20, 2022, indicated that the permanency goal was return home within 12 months. The order also
noted that D.P. was “thriving in his current placement. Mother’s whereabouts have been
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unknown since December 2021. Father was recently released from jail (March 2022). The
agency will refer father to additional services. Father is currently visiting.”
¶4 The next permanency order from September 2022 indicated a goal of return home
pending status hearing and that neither parent had made substantial progress. The reasons for this
goal stated, “The parents’ current whereabouts are unknown. The parents are not participating in
reunification services or visits. [D.P.] is placed in a home where he can achieve permanency.
[D.P.] is participating in developmental services and is thriving in placement.” The December
2022 permanency order changed the permanency goal to substitute care pending court
determination on termination of parental rights. The reasons for this goal stated that D.P. was
thriving in a preadoptive home and the parents were not involved in services or visitation with
their whereabouts unknown.
¶5 In February 2023, the State filed its petition for the termination of parental rights for both
parents and alleged they were unfit under grounds (a), (b), (c), (m), and (n) of the Adoption Act.
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(a), (b), (c), (m), and (n) (West 2020). The State also filed a pleading
specifying the nine-month time period for ground (m) under the Adoption Act was March 20,
2022, through December 20, 2022. Id. § 1(D)(m). On June 30, 2023, the court entered a default
order against J.B. for want of appearance.
¶6 On August 18, 2023, the trial court conducted the termination hearing with respondent
present in person and represented by counsel. The following evidence was adduced at the
hearing.
¶7 Maurquisha Williamson testified that she was employed as a caseworker with DCFS and
was assigned to D.P.’s case in September 2022. Respondent was referred for services, including
parenting capacity assessment, parent coaching, substance abuse treatment, domestic violence,
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and individual therapy. When she was first assigned to the case, respondent’s whereabouts were
unknown until she was informed in court that he was incarcerated. When asked if respondent had
participated in any of the referred services, Williamson responded not to her knowledge.
¶8 Prior to April 2023, respondent’s whereabouts were unknown and DCFS performed
diligent searches for him. Williamson was given two addresses, she went to both locations, and
both were abandoned. She was also given six different telephone numbers, and she tried calling
each number. She was aware that respondent had some visits with D.P., but prior to April 2023,
the last visit was in June or July 2022. Respondent had never been granted unsupervised
visitation, and no recommendation had been made to have unsupervised visitation because
respondent was not involved in services, visits were inconsistent, and communication with the
caseworker was also inconsistent. Prior to April 2023, Williamson testified that to the best of her
knowledge no cards, gifts, or letters were sent to D.P. by respondent. Williamson was unaware of
any reason preventing respondent from contacting the agency prior to April 2023.
¶9 Williamson’s last contact with respondent was a supervised virtual visit with D.P. on
August 7, 2023, which was the only virtual visit that occurred since April 2023. Once she had
contact with respondent, Williamson talked to him about efforts to comply with services and
visitation. He told her that he was active in a parenting class while incarcerated, but Williamson
had not received any documentation for this class. She was not aware that respondent engaged in
domestic violence classes, substance abuse classes, or anger management classes.
¶ 10 Williamson was aware that respondent was in the Cook County Department of
Corrections since at least April 2023. She attempted to reach out to respondent by calling the jail.
She was informed that in-person visitation with a child was not available due to COVID-19, but
she was told about the virtual visit option. She then staffed the virtual visit on August 7, 2023.
5 No. 1-23-1530
Since December 2022, the agency has not considered a request for a change in the permanency
goal to return home because respondent was not consistent in the case with both services and
visits.
¶ 11 Respondent testified that he had been incarcerated in the Cook County Department of
Corrections since March 16, 2023. While incarcerated, he had completed domestic violence,
anger management, parenting, and substance abuse classes.
¶ 12 When asked if he informed DCFS that he was incarcerated, respondent stated that he
“informed them through their officers to get a hold of my attorney and stuff.” He conceded that
he was not in contact with the agency prior to his incarceration because he had “concussions”
from being shot in the head and had anxiety. Respondent admitted that he was also incarcerated
when D.P.’s case first came to court and that respondent had been shot in the head prior to that
incarceration. He communicated with the agency then and did virtual visits and a couple of in-
person visits, but he disappeared in July 2022. Respondent testified that he did not know how to
contact the agency because J.B. was the one who got in touch with the caseworkers. He was not
in touch with J.B. and had not seen her since he was incarcerated.
¶ 13 The parties stipulated to the admission of several exhibits, including the service plan, the
integrated assessment, and the referral forms. The DCFS referral form described how the case
came to its attention as follows:
“[J.B.], [respondent], and their 1-year-old son [D.P.] came to the attention of
DCFS on 8/9/21 due to reports of unsanitary environmental conditions in their
home. It was also reported that [D.P.] had witnessed his father, [respondent’s],
overdose on substances and that [J.B.] subsequently tested positive for substances
during the pursuant investigation. It was reported that [J.B.] and [D.P.] relocated
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to 2 different homes of [respondent’s] relatives under a safety plan, due to the
household environmental conditions. It was reported that both relatives refused to
continue offering shelter to [J.B. and D.P.], leaving them without housing. Per this
document, the Child Protection Investigator had been unable to establish contact
with [J.B.] for several days in early October 2021. It was later reported that on
10/11/21, [D.P.] witnessed [J.B.] become injured when she intervened in a
physical altercation between [respondent] and another individual. It was reported
that the following morning, this individual wounded [respondent] by a gunshot in
the front entrance of the family’s home while [D.P.] was present in the home. Due
to these escalating safety concerns, [D.P.] was taken into Protective Custody ***
on 10/14/18 [sic] and Temporary Custody was granted on l0/18/21. [D.P.] was
placed in a traditional foster home.”
¶ 14 Respondent’s integrated assessment disclosed that he and J.B. had been in a relationship
for approximately 20 years and they began dating when she was 14 and he was 19. They had
three other children, the oldest was born in 2006 when J.B. was 17 and respondent was 22. A
case opened with DCFS concerning the other children in 2012. Respondent denied a history of
domestic violence. However, a 2013 partner abuse assessment reported respondent had engaged
in recurring emotional, physical, and sexual abuse of J.B. The 2013 assessment stated that
respondent’s abuse of J.B. “consisted of suicide threats, strangulation, stalking, sexual abuse and
head trauma leading to loss of consciousness.” Respondent was in detention when the third child
was born in 2009. The parental rights for respondent and J.B. were terminated for these children
in January 2016.
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¶ 15 Respondent and J.B. resided together with his mother throughout D.P.’s life. J.B.
reported that respondent and his mother frequently fought. A Law Enforcement Agencies Data
System (LEADS) report from November 2021 disclosed respondent had seven convictions for
burglary, three convictions for dangerous drugs, three convictions for larceny, and three
convictions for traffic offenses. He also had several charges for other offenses that did not result
in convictions. Respondent reported that five months prior to the assessment he had smoked a
“poisoned” marijuana cigarette. It had been reported that respondent had overdosed on a prior
occasion when he smoked a marijuana cigarette tainted with fentanyl. Respondent has a history
of seizures and used marijuana to alleviate his symptoms. He also reported memory loss
following his gunshot wound to the head from October 2021.
¶ 16 Respondent reported that he participated in the daily care of D.P. and D.P. was attached
to him. D.P. was never abused. A case note stated that D.P. had missed two well-child visits and
the foster parent had reported that D.P. had tooth decay. The case came to DCFS because of
reports regarding the living conditions. The home environment had mold and maggot infestation
and furniture soiled by urination caused by respondent’s mother’s illness. D.P. entered DCFS
custody when it was reported that D.P. was in the home at the time respondent was shot.
¶ 17 The following services were recommended for respondent: parenting capacity
assessment, adhere to all terms of his legal involvement, individual therapy, substance
assessment/treatment, domestic violence assessment/treatment, parenting education, and
consistent, supervised visitation and communication with D.P.
¶ 18 The April 2022 service plan reviewed the progress from October 2021 to April 2022.
Since the prior review, respondent had been released from prison in March 2022. He was not in
services but was working with the caseworker to get into services. The plan stated that
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respondent received multiple referrals for his services. The progress toward the goal of return
home was unsatisfactory. The October 2022 service plan reviewed the period from April 2022 to
October 22. The plan observed that the whereabouts of both J.B. and respondent were unknown.
D.P. had not seen either of his parents since July 2022. Williamson had been assigned as the
caseworker and she had not been able to communicate with respondent to discuss his progress
with his services. The progress toward the permanency goal was unsatisfactory.
¶ 19 The April 2023 service plan reviewed the progress from October 2022 to April 2023. The
plan pointed out that Williamson, the caseworker, “still has not had any contact with either birth
parent since [she] was assigned to the case.” She went to two possible addresses for respondent,
but respondent did not appear to live at either residence and the addresses “seemed vacant.” The
plan also indicated that neither parent had been involved in the case and had not seen D.P. since
July 2022. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory in complying with services. The permanency
goal had been changed in December 2022 to the termination of parental rights.
¶ 20 After the parties presented their arguments, the trial court found by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent was unfit under grounds (b), (m), and (n) of the Adoption Act. Id.
§ 1(D)(b), (m), (n). The court made the following findings on the record.
“This case came in in [sic] October of ’21. Almost two years ago. And neither
parent has been involved here. It came in when the child was about a year and a
half. Well, almost. Three months short of [2] years. Right now, he is several
months short of 4 years. He spent more than half of his life in foster care.
Neither parent has made any significant effort I find by clear and
convincing evidence. The father did get involved after he was incarcerated in
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March. But, you know, by then the horse has already escaped the barn and it was
too late to close the barn door.
I assume he did complete all the services and I do accept his testimony. It
was after the case was in the system for 18 months. And he showed no reasonable
degree of responsibility here. You know, he knew his child was in care. It wasn’t
as if he rolled over one day and said, hey, I wonder what happened to little [D.P.]
He knew the child was in care.
And so frequently here parents basically take the position well, the agency
didn’t do what it had to do to get in touch with me. You know, the parent as
Ground B points out, you have to have responsibility toward your own children.
For whatever reason, I understand in many cases, parents have problems.
But, in this case, I find Ground N as in Nancy, B as in boy, M as in
Michael by clear and convincing evidence that both parents are unfit.”
¶ 21 The court then proceeded to the best interest portion of the hearing. Williamson testified
to the best interest of D.P. At the time of the hearing, D.P. was 3 years old and had been in his
current placement since the case opened after a placement with paternal relatives did not last.
The foster family consisted of a mother, father, and their two children. Williamson completed
her background review on all adults in the home, and her last home visit was on August 7, 2023.
Williamson found the placement safe and appropriate with no signs of abuse, neglect, or
excessive corporal punishment. She did not have any other concerns or any unusual incident
reports. Williamson observed D.P. interact with his foster parents. He calls the foster parents
“mama” and “daddy.” He has a close relationship with the two biological children and feels
comfortable in the home. The foster family has included D.P. in family gatherings and family
10 No. 1-23-1530
vacations. Both foster parents pick him up or take him to day care. D.P. goes to the events of the
biological children, like the ballet. D.P. does not have any special needs and does not need
services. Williamson had visited D.P. at daycare and spoke with the staff about his interaction
with his peers. If the foster parents were unavailable to take care of D.P., they have relatives to
care for him. The foster parents are willing to provide commitment to D.P. and have signed a
permanency commitment. In her observations, Williamson found the foster parents provide a
safe and nurturing environment, including giving hugs and kisses, and providing meals and
snacks. Williamson also talked to other relatives, and all were pleasant. D.P. is integrated into the
extended family.
¶ 22 Williamson testified that, after meeting with her supervisor, DCFS found it was in the
best interest of D.P. that parental right be terminated and D.P. be provided a “forever home.” The
basis of this recommendation was due to inconsistent communication and inconsistent services
by the parents.
¶ 23 The foster parents appeared via Zoom and informed the court that they want to adopt
D.P. The foster mother said she believed they were asked if they wanted to adopt D.P. within a
couple of weeks of meeting him and they said yes then as well. D.P. “has just been a part of our
family since the day he came. We love him and our daughters love him. And he just you know
fits right in with our family.” The foster family was in Michigan at an extended family gathering
with grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. D.P. was running around with his cousins. She
said the family was “really excited to make that permanent.”
¶ 24 The foster father also addressed the court. When they first signed up to become foster
parents, he “never imagined that you could love and care for a child that you didn’t give birth to
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the same way you do your other kids. And it’s just been an eye opening experience. He is such a
wonderful child. He is such a loving and caring child.”
¶ 25 Following arguments, the court found it was D.P.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s
parental rights.
¶ 26 This appeal followed. Respondent timely filed a notice of appeal on August 28, 2023,
listing the order terminating his parental rights for D.P. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 27 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence: (1) his failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, or responsibility as to D.P.’s welfare pursuant to ground (b) of the Adoption Act (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)); (2) his failure to make reasonable efforts or progress toward
reunification from March 20, 2022, through December 20, 2022, pursuant to ground (m) of the
Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)); and (3) his demonstrated intent to forego his parental rights by
failing to visit or communicate with D.P. or the agency pursuant to ground (n) of the Adoption
Act (id. § 1(D)(n)).
¶ 28 Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s best interest finding at the termination
hearing. Accordingly, respondent has forfeited any argument that the trial court’s best interest
ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we will not discuss that finding any
further. See In re M.R., 2020 IL App (1st) 191716, ¶ 26; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct.
1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral
argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).
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¶ 29 “ ‘In Illinois, the authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights is purely statutory
and the scope of the court’s authority is defined by the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption
Act.’ ” In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 19 (quoting In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 463 (2008)).
“Illinois policy ‘favors parents’ superior right to the custody of their own children.’ ” Id.
(quoting In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d at 464).
¶ 30 The termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is “unfit” as defined by section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020); 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020). “Parental
unfitness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Adoption of K.B.D., 2012 IL
App (1st) 121558, ¶ 196. “A parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground
for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340,
349 (2005). Second, “[a]ssuming the parent is found unfit, the circuit court must then consider
whether it is in the best interests of the children to terminate parental rights.” In re J.B., 2014 IL
App (1st) 140773, ¶ 49. “ ‘When ruling on parental unfitness, a court is not to consider the
child’s “best interests.” ’ ” In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20 (quoting In re Adoption of Syck, 138
Ill. 2d 255, 276 (1990)). Each case concerning parental unfitness is considered sui generis and is
decided on its own facts and circumstances presented. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d at 354. “A
court may not terminate a parent’s rights on grounds not charged in the petition. At the same
time, however, the State is not required to prove every ground it has alleged for finding a parent
unfit.” Id. at 349. “A trial court’s finding of unfitness will stand if supported by any one of the
statutory grounds set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act.” In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st)
190467, ¶ 47 (citing In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006)).
¶ 31 This court will not disturb a finding of unfitness unless it is contrary to the manifest
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weight of the evidence and the record clearly demonstrates that the opposite result was proper.
In re Faith S., 2019 IL App (1st) 182290, ¶ 78. We give great deference to the trial court’s
finding of unfitness, defer to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility assessments, and
will not reweigh the evidence anew on appeal. Id. This court will only find the trial court’s ruling
to be against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident
from a review of the evidence presented. In re Nicholas C., 2017 IL App (1st) 162101, ¶ 25.
¶ 32 The termination petition for D.P. alleged that respondent was unfit under multiple
sections of the Adoption Act, including section 1(D)(b), (m), and (n). 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m),
(n) (West 2020). After the unfitness hearing, the trial court found respondent unfit under those
three grounds.
¶ 33 We first review the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit pursuant to section
1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act, for his failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to D.P.’s welfare. Id. § 1(D)(b). Because the language of section 1(D)(b) is in
the disjunctive, any of the three elements may be considered on its own as a sufficient basis for
unfitness. In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 49. A finding of unfitness under ground (b) is
based on a subjective analysis. In re Nicholas C., 2017 IL App (1st) 162101, ¶ 24. This ground
does not focus on the parent’s success but, rather, the reasonableness of his or her efforts and
takes into account the parent’s difficulties and circumstances. Id. However, simply because a
parent demonstrates some interest or affection toward his or her child does not render his or her
fit under this ground; rather, his or her interest, concern, and/or responsibility must be
reasonable. Id. “ ‘[N]oncompliance with an imposed service plan, a continued addiction to drugs,
a repeated failure to obtain treatment for an addiction, and infrequent or irregular visitation with
the child have all been held to be sufficient evidence warranting a finding of unfitness under
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[ground] (b).’ ” Id. (quoting In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 259 (2004)). Unlike ground
(m), ground (b) has no time constraint that limits our consideration of respondent’s fitness. In re
Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 50.
¶ 34 Respondent argues that the record established that he was an active caretaker for D.P.
prior to the DCFS case and continued visitation from November 2021 until June or July 2022.
He contends that he disappeared from DCFS’s “radar” from July 2022 to April 2023 due to
depression, J.B. being missing, and the aftereffects of being shot in the head. He sought contact
with DCFS after he was incarcerated again in March 2023 and then began working on the
recommended services in April 2023.
¶ 35 Contrary to respondent’s contentions, the record below overwhelmingly supports the trial
court’s finding that respondent was unfit to be a parent on the basis of his failure to “maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility” as to his son’s welfare. 750 ILCS
50/1(D)(b) (West 2020). Specifically, the evidence presented at the unfitness hearing
demonstrated that respondent disappeared for nine months with no contact to DCFS or D.P., he
was repeatedly incarcerated, he had, at best, sporadic visitation with D.P., and he failed to
participate in any of the services for the nearly two years the case was ongoing. Since the case
was opened, the only period in which respondent was both out of jail and in contact with D.P.
was the three to four months from March 2022 to June or July 2022. “It is well established that a
failure to comply with an imposed service plan and infrequent or irregular visitation with the
child may support a finding of unfitness under both sections (b) and (m).” In re Jeanette L., 2017
IL App (1st) 161944, ¶ 18.
¶ 36 DCFS opened this case in October 2021 when D.P. was approximately 20 months old,
after the minor was present when respondent first got into an altercation with an individual and
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later when that individual returned and shot respondent in the head. Respondent, who had been
on parole, was taken back into custody and remained incarcerated until March 2022. Upon his
release, respondent received multiple referrals in accordance with the service plan and engaged
in some supervised visitation with D.P. Significantly, a few months later, respondent disappeared
and his whereabouts were unknown from June or July 2022 until March 2023 when respondent
was again incarcerated. It was only after he was in custody that respondent asked to be put in
contact with DCFS. While in custody, respondent testified that he began to take some of the
required classes that he had been recommended in 2021, such as, domestic violence, anger
management, parenting, and substance abuse classes. He had not previously started any of the
required services. Respondent did not report these classes to Williamson in their August 2023
phone conversation, nor did he provide any documentation to DCFS verifying his completion of
any class. He had one video visitation with D.P. in August 2023, the first visitation in more than
a year. Respondent was still in custody at the time of the termination proceedings. No evidence
was presented that respondent called, sent cards, or made any other attempted contact with D.P.
during the pendency of the case. None of the service plans had found that respondent had been
satisfactory in his efforts to comply with the recommended services to work towards regaining
custody of D.P.
¶ 37 While respondent has expressed his care for D.P. at the unfitness hearing, the record
repeatedly shows that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of concern and responsibility
toward D.P.
“[T]he plain meaning of the phrase ‘[f]ailure to maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern or responsibility as to the child’s welfare’ in subsection (b)
includes all situations in which a parent’s attempts at maintaining a reasonable
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degree of interest, concern, or responsibility are inadequate, regardless of whether
that inadequacy seems to stem from unwillingness or an inability to comply.”
In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 26.
“Subsection (b) contains no state of mind requirement, nor does it carve out an exception for
faultless failure.” Id.
¶ 38 While respondent asserts that the multiple issues in his life caused him to “disappear”
from DCFS’s “radar,” the record shows that he consistently failed to meaningfully participate in
the service plan, engage in regular visitation with D.P., and remain in active communication with
DCFS to correct the problems that brought D.P. into the system. Instead, for all but a few
months, respondent was either incarcerated or his whereabouts were unknown during the
pendency of this case. He only sought to reach out to DCFS once he was again in jail. He failed
to attend any of the permanency hearings that were conducted when he was not in custody.
Although respondent expressed some care and interest in D.P., the State proved by clear and
convincing evidence that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of concern and responsibility
for D.P.’s welfare. Based upon our thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial
court’s decision finding respondent unfit under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 39 However, even if this finding was in error, which we do not find, the trial court also
found respondent unfit under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. Id. § 1(D)(m).
¶ 40 Under section 1(D)(m), the petition alleged that respondent failed:
“to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the
removal of the child from them and/or have failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child to them within 9 months after the adjudication of
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neglect or abuse under the Juvenile Court Act, or after an adjudication of
dependency under the Juvenile Court Act, and/or within any 9 month period after
said finding.”
See id.
¶ 41 The grounds for unfitness set forth in section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act are phrased in
the disjunctive. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 210 (2001). “Thus, section 1(D)(m) provides two
independent bases for a finding of unfitness: (1) the failure by a parent to make
reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child, or
(2) the failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child.” (Emphasis in
original.) Id. at 210-11.
¶ 42 Reasonable efforts relate to the goal of correcting the conditions that caused the removal
of the child from the parent. In re L.J.S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180218, ¶ 24. “The reasonable efforts
inquiry is a subjective one, focusing on the efforts of the parent that would be reasonable for that
parent under the circumstances.” In re J.O., 2021 IL App (3d) 210248, ¶ 51. “The inquiry is
narrow, as it considers only the correction of those conditions originally providing the basis for
removal of the children.” Id.
¶ 43 “Whether a parent has made reasonable progress ‘is judged by an objective standard
based upon the amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody
was taken from the parent.’ ” In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 62 (quoting In re
Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067). Progress is considered in light of both the circumstances
that gave rise to the original loss of custody as well as any other conditions that later become
known. In re J.O., 2021 IL App (3d) 210248, ¶ 57. At minimum, reasonable progress
necessitates measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification. In re Je. A.,
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2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 62. Reasonable progress exists when the trial court can conclude
that it will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future. Id.
¶ 44 Termination under section 1(D)(m) contains a time frame limitation (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m) (West 2020)), and thus in this section, we narrow our examination of respondent’s
progress towards reunification, including aspects such as his service plan and regularity of
visitation, within the nine-month periods set forth by the State. Here, the basis for termination
under ground (m) was during the nine-month period of March 20, 2022, through December 20,
2022. This period began after respondent was released from his initial incarceration and he was
not in custody at any time during this nine-month period.
¶ 45 The reasonable efforts and reasonable progress grounds are based on respondent’s actions
to correct the conditions that led to the removal of D.P. from his care. Contrary to his argument,
the record does not show that he made a reasonable effort or progress to reunify with D.P.
Respondent does not address the reasonable efforts clause under section 1(D)(m)(i) (id.
§ 1(D)(m)(i)) in his opening brief and the State argues that respondent forfeited any challenge to
the unfitness finding on this basis. In his reply brief, respondent contends that the State’s
evidence under ground (m) related only to the second prong of reasonable progress. The trial
court’s finding did not differentiate between the two prongs of ground (m) and referred to the
lack of “significant effort” by either parent. Thus, to the extent that the court’s found unfitness
under section 1(D)(m)(i), respondent has forfeited any argument. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.
Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral
¶ 46 However, even if respondent was correct that the State did not present sufficient evidence
for the reasonable efforts prong, we find the State did present clear and convincing evidence to
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support the unfitness finding for failure to make reasonable progress under section 1(D)(m)(ii)
(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)).
¶ 47 As stated above, the relevant nine-month period is from March 20, 2022, through
December 20, 2022. The service plans during this time period found respondent was
“unsatisfactory” in his compliance with the plan. According to the April 2022 service plan,
respondent was not engaged in any service upon his release from prison but was obtaining
referrals to the required services. The exhibits presented at the hearing show that respondent
received referrals for parenting classes, a substance abuse assessment, parent coaching, domestic
violence, and individual therapy. However, the October 2022 service plan disclosed that
respondent failed to engage in any of these recommended services and was again rated
unsatisfactory. At that time, respondent’s whereabouts were unknown. His last supervised
visitation with D.P. had occurred in June or July 2022. Williamson was assigned the case in
September 2022, and she went to multiple addresses and called several phone numbers in her
attempts to locate respondent, but she was unsuccessful.
¶ 48 The April 2023 service plan, which included respondent’s participation in services within
the relevant time frame, continued to rate respondent as unsatisfactory in his compliance with the
service plan. His whereabouts remained unknown and no visitation, calls, or contact with D.P. or
the agency occurred. On December 20, 2022, the permanency goal was changed to the
termination of parental rights.
¶ 49 As stated above, at minimum, reasonable progress necessitates measurable or
demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification. In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467,
¶ 62. The evidence overwhelmingly established that respondent failed to make any progress
toward reunification with D.P. While he received referrals, he failed to follow up and engage in
20 No. 1-23-1530
any of the recommended services within that nine-month period. Moreover, he disappeared and
was unable to be located for approximately six months of this time period.
¶ 50 Respondent asserts that he “was in no position to perform the services recommended by
the Agency, let alone make progress in reunifying with his child by performing the same until
such date as the Agency had referred him to assigned service providers in June and July 2022.”
However, the record does not support this assertion. The DCFS referral form for parent training
for respondent shows the requested start date of April 5, 2022, and was signed by the caseworker
on April 5, 2022, and the supervisor on April 6, 2022. A referral form for a substance abuse
assessment for respondent shows a requested start date of April 20, 2022, and was signed by the
caseworker and the supervisor on April 20, 2022. A parent training/coaching referral form was
made for respondent to begin April 26, 2022, and was signed by the caseworker and the
supervisor on April 26, 2022. As demonstrated, respondent did receive referrals within a month
of his release from custody, but he failed to engage in those services. Further, reasonable
progress is an objective standard. “That respondent’s personal circumstances prevented him from
making reasonable progress is irrelevant to the ‘ “objective standard.” ’ ” Id. ¶ 73 (quoting In re
F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 89, quoting In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991)).
¶ 51 Because respondent failed to make any progress toward the goal of reunification with
D.P. during the relevant nine-month period between May 20, 2022, through December 20, 2022,
we conclude that the trial court’s finding of unfitness under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption
Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 52 Additionally, having thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal, we would also find that
the trial court’s finding of unfitness under ground (n) was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence because the State presented clear and convincing evidence of respondent’s intent to
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forgo his parental rights manifested by his failure for a period of 12 months: “(i) to visit the
child, (ii) to communicate with the child or agency, although able to do so and not prevented
from doing so by an agency or by court order, or (iii) to maintain contact with or plan for the
future of the child, although physically able to do so.” Id. § 1(D)(n). Accordingly, we would also
affirm on that basis.
¶ 53 Since we have concluded that the trial court’s findings of unfitness under grounds (b),
(m), and (n) were supported by clear and convincing evidence, and respondent has not
challenged the court’s best interest finding, the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s
parental right to D.P. was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 54 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook
County.
¶ 55 Affirmed.
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In re D.P., 2024 IL App (1st) 231530
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 21-JA-959; the Hon. Patrick T. Murphy, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Jeffrey W. Gunn, of Tapia-Ruano & Gunn P.C., of Chicago, for for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique for Abraham, Gina DiVito, and Marina C. Para, Assistant State’s Appellee: Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Charles P. Golbert, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Kass A. Plain and Aaron J. Weiss, of counsel), guardian ad litem.