In re Dow

213 F. 355, 1914 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 958
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. South Carolina
DecidedApril 15, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 213 F. 355 (In re Dow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Dow, 213 F. 355, 1914 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 958 (southcarolinaed 1914).

Opinion

SMITH, District Judge.

At the instance of the applicant and other Syrians interested, a rehearing was granted in this case, which has been had, and argument has been heard -on behalf of the applicant himself as well .as from counsel appearing on behalf of the Syrian American Associations of the country.

'Deep feeling has been manifested on the part of the Syrian immigrants because of what has been termed by them the humiliation inflicted upon, and mortification suffered by, Syrians in America by the previous decree in this matter which they construe as deciding that they do not (as they term it) belong to the “white race.”

* In the first place, such was not the decision of this court. The decision of the court in this case was that a modern Syrian was an Asiatic, and was thus not included in the term “white persons” as contained in section 2169 of the U. S. Revised Statutes as amended in 1875, and first used in the Statute of 1790. In the second place, there was no justifiable reason for either humiliation or mortification. The grant of the privilege of citizenship is purely discretionary with the people of the country. It is entirely distinct from the admitting to entry and residence. It carries with it great powers of good and evil in the exercise of the ballot and great responsibilities in the duties of the jury box. The immigrant such as the present applicant is freely admitted here. He comes from a land where he deems himself oppressed, to a free country where he is allowed to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in as full democratic measure as the citizens of the country themselves. That he should further be allowed to take part in the government as a voter and exercise the weighty judicial powers of a juror is an entirely different matter. That this should be refused to him is no real ground for humiliation. Congress has admittedly seen fit to exclude from that privilege Chinese, Japanese, Malays, Mongols generally, and American Indians. It is no more a humiliation for a Syrian to be excluded from a privilege (not a right) than it is to an educated and cultivated person from China, Japan, or the Malay Peninsula.

The true ground of this supposed humiliation is that the applicant and his associates conceive the refusal of this privilege to mean that they do not belong to a white race, but to a colored and what they consider an inferior race. The inconsistency of this attitude is apparent. The statute does admit to citizenship the very race they term inferior. It admits persons of “African nativity and African descent.” [357]*357So that if the applicant and his associates did belong to the race they so deem inferior, they could be admitted to that very privilege the refusal of which so humiliates them. The admitting a black African and excluding a brown Asiatic may be arbitrary and unreasonable, but it cannot be said to be humiliating, and at any rate it is certainly a matter wholly for Congress in its pure discretion.

It may be that in 1870 when Congress enlarged the provisions of the statute as to aliens who scould be naturalized by extending the privilege to persons of'African nativity, and African'descent,, it considered that the immigration of that character would be inconsiderable, whereas if it opened the privilege to persons of Asiatic nativity and Asiatic descent it might be overwhelming; but that conclusion cannot be said to involve any humiliation to the Asiatic.

The previous decision in this case was that the term “white persons,” as used in the statute, meant persons of European nativity or European descent. The applicant was excluded because he was an Asiatic and not an European. Whether he belonged to a white face or not was not decided as not pertinent to the issue.

The applicant and his associates now seek to have that decision reconsidered and reversed upon the following grounds:

(1) That the term “white persons” in the statute means persons of the “Caucasian race,” and not persons white in color.v

(2) That he is a Semite or a member of one of the Semitic nations.

(3) That the Semitic nations are all members of the “Caucasian” or white race.

(4) ' That the matter has been settled in their favor as the European Jews have been admitted without question since the passage of the statute and that the Jews are one of the Semitic peoples.

(5) That the history and position of the Syrians, their connection through all time with the peoples to whom the Jewish and Christian peoples owe their religion, make it inconceivable that the statute could have intended to exclude them.

The judge upon an application for naturalization is called upon to pass upon the question whether the applicant is entitled under the terms of the statute. The present applicant denies that he is a person of African nativity or African descent. He asserts that he is a person of Asiatic nativity and of Asiatic descent. The question is then presented to the court whether such an Asiatic is a white person as intended by the statute.

At first reading the term “white” denotes color. Construed literally the statute might be interpreted to mean such a person as under the ocular inspection of the court seemed to be white in color. What standard of “white” is the judge to adopt? The clear white of a Scandinavian, or the swarthy olive or brown of a person from the south of Portugal ?

Disease and other causes sometimes cloud and darken the fairest skin and lighten the darkest. It. is manifest that it would be absolutely impossible for a judge to determine whether an applicant is a white person by ocular inspection. Again, out of the multitude of [358]*358judges in this country, how could there be any uniform rule under such a test? No two judges would agree upon the same standard or grade of colorization. The spectacle would be presented of one judge excluding and another admitting persons of the same grade of complexion. For these and other similar reasons the strict “color test” as the test under the statute has been repudiated by the courts of the country.

As a substitute for this test, some courts have followed in a way what may be termed the test of race. In other words, the words “white persons” have been construed as meaning persons of the “white race,” and it has been held that if a person belonged to a so-called white race he was entitled to naturalization, no matter what his complexion. What is the white race? Or what was known as the white race in 1790? Most of the courts in this country that have attempted to deal with the question have referred to the white race as the “Caucasian” race, and said that a member of the Caucasian race was entitled to be naturalized without regard to complexion. Very few agree as to what peoples are members of the Caucasian race, and the term “Caucasian”, received its wide currency in the United States largely from the fact that for 70 years after the statute of 1790 a large number of persons of a black complexioned race were held as slaves, and one of the justifications advanced was that they did not belong to the superior race which was styled Caucasian supposing that term referred to white. The term “Caucasian” in its application to race originated with one Blumenbach, who in 1781 published in German a work attempting to classify the races of mankind in which he classed as “Caucasian” the inhabitants of Europe and of the Caucasus and of.Asia Minor, Western Asia including Syria, and of Northern Africa.'

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Bluebook (online)
213 F. 355, 1914 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 958, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-dow-southcarolinaed-1914.