2025 IL App (4th) 250589-U NOTICE This Order was filed under NOS. 4-25-0589, 4-25-0590 cons. FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is December 8, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender IN THE APPELLATE COURT limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re D.M., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Winnebago County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 23JD54, v. ) 24JD69 D.M., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Donna R. Honzel, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GRISCHOW delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vancil and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the delinquency adjudication of a minor, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the minor’s motions to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of a misapprehension of law and (2) the failure to admonish the minor of his right to a jury trial was not reversible as plain error or ineffective assistance counsel. However, the court modified the minor’s adjudicatory and sentencing orders to vacate the finding of delinquency and sentence for unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle as violative of the one-act, one-crime rule.
¶2 Respondent, D.M., a minor, was adjudicated delinquent after he pleaded guilty to
charges of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2022)), theft
(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2022)), and criminal trespass to vehicles (id. § 21-2(a)). At the
time of respondent’s plea, an agreed order was entered designating the proceedings as an
extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ) proceeding pursuant to section 5-810 of the Juvenile Court
Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2024)). Pursuant to the guilty plea, the trial court sentenced respondent to juvenile probation. The court also sentenced respondent to
adult sentences of four years in prison on each of the unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle and
theft charges. The adult sentences were stayed on the condition that respondent not violate the
provisions of the juvenile sentence. Thereafter, respondent filed motions to withdraw his guilty
plea, which were denied by the court. Respondent appealed, arguing (1) the court abused its
discretion in denying his motions to withdraw his guilty plea due to a misapprehension of the
law; (2) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was never admonished of his
right to a trial by jury in the EJJ proceeding and, consequently, he never waived his right to a
trial by jury; and (3) adjudications of delinquency for both unlawful possession of a stolen
vehicle and theft violated the one-act, one-crime rule. We affirm respondent’s adjudications as a
delinquent minor for theft and criminal trespass to vehicles but modify the adjudicatory and
sentencing orders to vacate the adjudication of delinquency for the offense of unlawful
possession of a stolen vehicle.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State filed a delinquency petition in case No. 23-JD-54 on February 23, 2023,
pursuant to section 5-520 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-520 (West 2022)), alleging
the 16-year-old respondent was a delinquent minor. The petition alleged two counts: (1) unlawful
possession of a stolen vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2022)) and (2) theft (720 ILCS
5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2022)). The State filed another delinquency petition on April 2, 2024, in
case No. 23-JD-69, alleging respondent (now 17 years old) committed: (1) aggravated battery
(id. § 12-3.05(d)(4)); (2) criminal trespass to vehicles (id. § 21-2(a)); and (3) resisting a police
officer (id. § 31-1(a)). Respondent had additional delinquency charges pending in two other
cases.
-2- ¶5 On April 23, 2024, the parties agreed to designate case No. 23-JD-54 as an EJJ
proceeding and respondent pleaded guilty to the offenses of unlawful possession of a stolen
vehicle (case No. 23-JD-54), theft (case No. 23-JD-54), and criminal trespass to vehicles (case
No. 24-JD-69). The State agreed to dismiss the other charges in case No. 24-JD-69 and the
charges in two other cases pursuant to the guilty plea.
¶6 Prior to accepting the guilty plea, the trial court addressed respondent and
attempted to admonish him in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1,
2012), despite repeated interruptions by respondent. The court informed respondent of the nature
of the three charges to which he was pleading guilty, the minimum and maximum sentences
associated with each charge, and his right to plead not guilty. Respondent confirmed his
understanding of this information. The court informed respondent that he had “a right to have a
trial on every single count.” With respect to the EJJ designation, the court informed respondent
that he had a right to have a hearing before it was designated as an EJJ proceeding, and
respondent agreed no one forced him to agree to the designation. Respondent also indicated he
understood the consequences of an EJJ designation. Prior to hearing the factual basis for the plea
from the State, the court reminded respondent: “[Y]ou’re not going to have a trial, which you
have a right to have.” Then the following exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: Okay. And you understand that for both of these, you’re
not going to have a trial, which you have a right to have, instead, I will hear a
brief statement of facts from the State’s Attorney.
[RESPONDENT]: I want you to know that the only reason I’m not going
to trial is because it’s under y’all, you see what I’m saying? Like, it’s up to y’all.
Y’all been doing me bogus.
-3- THE COURT: It is not. You have every right to go to a trial. I have got a
trial date set for you. If you want to have a trial date, I’m more than happy to give
you a trial date.
[RESPONDENT]: I’ll do that if you let me out on home confinement
today.
THE COURT: Okay. There’s no bargaining like that.
[RESPONDENT]: You see what I’m saying? Why can’t you just hear me
out though?
***
THE COURT: So [respondent], court is accusations. We call them
allegations, but they’re, they’re accusations, and they’re either true or not true.
And you either admit them or you don’t, and we go to trial, if you don’t. You
have that choice. And you’ve told me that you understand that and that you’re
willing to give up the right to a trial to have these taken care of as well as get the
majority of cases, I mean, you’re only pleading to three cases. The most of them, I
don’t know how many, at least eight are being dismissed. So, I mean, it’s not a
bad deal. It’s actually a pretty good deal, quite frankly. But, you know, it’s up to
you whether you want to take it or not. Is that what you want to do?
[RESPONDENT]: Yeah.”
¶7 The State presented the factual basis for the charges. Defense counsel agreed that
these would be the facts presented by the State, and if accepted by the trier of fact, they would
support findings of guilt. Respondent signed a “Plea of Guilty in Juvenile Court” in both cases. It
stated, “I, [D.M.], of my own free will, voluntarily waive and give up my right to trial by the
-4- Court and confrontation of witnesses and plead guilty” to the allegations in the two delinquency
petitions. Respondent also signed the agreed order to designate case No. 23-JD-54 as an EJJ
proceeding. The agreed upon order provided:
“Pursuant to 705 ILCS 405/5-810(6) if, upon a filing of a Petition to Revoke the
Stay of the Adult Sentence, and, after hearing, the Court finds by a preponderance
of the evidence that the minor has committed a new criminal offense of a Class C
misdemeanor or greater, the Court shall order the execution of the previously
stayed [adult sentence], or if, after hearing, the Court finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that the minor has violated the provisions of his [juvenile] sentence,
the Court may order execution of the previously stayed [adult sentence].”
¶8 Pursuant to the plea, the trial court adjudicated respondent delinquent for the
offenses of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle, theft, and criminal trespass to vehicles. The
court entered probation orders in both juvenile cases (case Nos. 23-JD-54 and 23-JD-69),
sentencing respondent to 24 months of juvenile probation in each case. The court also entered a
separate agreed order in case No. 23-JD-54, sentencing respondent to adult sentences of four
years in prison on each of the two felony charges in that case. The order notes that, pursuant to
the EJJ statute (705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii) (West 2024)), the adult sentences were stayed on the
condition that respondent not violate the provisions of the juvenile sentence. Pursuant to the
guilty plea, a number of other charges were dismissed. The court proceeded to admonish
respondent that any motion to withdraw his plea of guilty had to be filed within 30 days.
¶9 On May 22, 2024, respondent, through defense counsel, filed identical motions to
withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgments and dispositions in case Nos. 23-JD-54 and
24-JD-69. The motions alleged respondent’s guilty plea was not voluntary in that he felt
-5- compelled to enter a plea of guilty because it was the only way to be released from custody on
that day. Subsequently, after transcripts of the plea proceeding had been obtained, respondent’s
defense counsel filed amended motions to withdraw the guilty plea. The amended motions added
the allegation that respondent did not fully understand the consequences of his guilty plea and his
comments and questions at the time of the plea demonstrated his plea was not knowing and
voluntary. The motions asserted respondent had been improperly admonished by the court that
he could change his mind about his guilty plea within 30 days. Defense counsel filed a certificate
in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), certifying he had
consulted with respondent to ascertain respondent’s contentions of error, examined the records,
and made necessary amendments to adequately present respondent’s claims.
¶ 10 The trial court denied the motions to withdraw the guilty plea, finding that, in
light of the entire transcript of the plea proceedings, respondent was properly admonished and
his plea was voluntary. Respondent filed notices of appeal in both cases. The appeals were
consolidated before this court on respondent’s motion.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 In this consolidated appeal, respondent challenges the trial court’s denial of his
motions to withdraw his guilty plea, the resulting adjudications for possession of a stolen vehicle,
theft, and criminal trespass to vehicles, and the resulting sentences. Respondent raises three
issues on appeal. First, respondent argues the court abused its discretion in denying his motions
to withdraw his guilty plea. Second, respondent argues his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary because he was never admonished of his right to a trial by jury. Lastly, if this court
declines to allow respondent the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, respondent contends
that the adjudications based upon delinquency for unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle and
-6- theft violated the one-act, one-crime rule, so the less-serious offense must be vacated.
¶ 13 A. Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea
¶ 14 Respondent contends his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he
entered the plea under the mistaken impression he could withdraw his plea for any reason within
30 days after the plea. This argument was raised in respondent’s motions to withdraw his guilty
plea and rejected by the trial court. As the decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, such a decision is reviewed for an
abuse of that discretion. People v. Millsap, 2022 IL App (4th) 210192, ¶ 18.
¶ 15 “A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.’ ” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005)
(quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). A defendant, though, does not have
an absolute right to change his mind and withdraw his plea. People v. Burge, 2021 IL 125642,
¶ 37. Rather, the defendant must establish, under the facts of the case, that the plea process
caused a manifest injustice. Id. “A guilty plea may be withdrawn where it was entered through a
misapprehension of the facts or law or where there is doubt as to the guilt of the accused and
justice would be better served by conducting a trial.” Id. “Absent substantial objective proof that
a defendant’s mistaken impressions were reasonably justified, a defendant’s subjective
impressions are insufficient grounds on which to withdraw a guilty plea.” People v. Ferral-
Mujica, 2017 IL App (2d) 160240, ¶ 22.
¶ 16 Respondent contends he entered his guilty plea under a misapprehension of the
law based upon the trial court’s statement: “You also understand that you have 30 days to change
your mind about what you just did.” Respondent argues this statement misled him into thinking
-7- he had the absolute right to change his mind and his misapprehension of the law was objectively
reasonable.
¶ 17 Our review of the record reveals respondent has failed to show his plea was not
voluntary or knowing or that the granting of his motions to withdraw his plea was necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. Prior to accepting respondent’s guilty plea, amidst interruptions from
respondent, the trial court admonished respondent of his appeal rights and the necessity to first
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). The court
informed respondent that the motion would need to state one of three things: (1) he wanted to
“take back” or “withdraw” his plea, (2) “there should have been something done that was not,”
or (3) “everything was done but something was done improperly” at the plea proceedings.
Respondent was admonished he would “have to put in all the whys, and they have to be reasons
as to why you’ve chosen one of those three things.” Respondent was also admonished that, if the
motion to withdraw was properly filed, and if it was granted, all of the charges against him could
be reinstated and the matters would be set for trial. Respondent indicated he understood. In
denying respondent’s motions to withdraw his guilty plea, the court found its explanation made it
clear that withdrawal of respondent’s guilty plea was not automatic. In addition, respondent’s
allegation his plea was based on a misapprehension of law was not objectively reasonable under
the facts. As respondent has not identified a valid defense, demonstrated manifest injustice, or
offered an objective basis for his alleged misunderstanding, we hold the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying respondent’s motions to withdraw the plea. See People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill.
2d 507, 519 (2009) (“An abuse of discretion will be found only where the court’s ruling is
arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
trial court.”).
-8- ¶ 18 B. Right to Trial by Jury
¶ 19 Respondent argues his guilty plea was also not knowing and voluntary because he
was never admonished of his right to a trial by jury. Respondent acknowledges his motions to
withdraw his guilty plea did not assert this claim. However, he urges this court to consider the
issue as plain error or, alternatively, as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State
contends, by virtue of the guilty plea, respondent waived rather than forfeited any challenge to
the plea, so plain-error review is not applicable.
¶ 20 Generally, any issue not raised in a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, even a claim of a constitutional violation, is waived on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff.
Apr. 15, 2024); People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 26. Waiver, however, “is never inadvertent
because it is an intentional relinquishment of a right.” Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 26. Here,
respondent contends he was not aware of his statutory right to a jury trial, and he was not
properly admonished regarding that right before entering his guilty plea. Thus, he did not
intentionally relinquish a known right but rather forfeited the claim of error for failing to a make
a timely assertion of an unknown right. Cf. id. ¶ 24 (finding defendant, properly admonished
under Rule 402(a), informed of his right to counsel and confirmed he wished to waive that right,
and who never argued his plea was not knowing and voluntary, waived by virtue of his guilty
plea any claim of earlier improper Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. Jul. 1, 1984)
admonishments). We may consider forfeited errors under the plain-error doctrine. See Ill. S. Ct.
R. 615(a) (eff. Jan.1, 1967) (“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.”); People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d
308, 322-23 (2002); see also In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 430 (2009) (holding forfeiture
principles that apply in criminal proceedings apply in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act).
-9- ¶ 21 The plain error doctrine allows review of a forfeited error in two instances:
“(1) when a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely
balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the
defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) when a clear or
obvious error occurred and that error is so serious it affected the fairness of the
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of
the closeness of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.
Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48.
The defendant bears the burden of persuasion under either prong to show the underlying
forfeiture should be excused. People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832, ¶ 26. Whether a forfeited
claim is reviewable as plain error is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id. Under either
prong, the first step is to determine whether a clear or obvious error occurred. Id. ¶ 49.
¶ 22 “In the adult criminal context, the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.” In re M.P., 2020 IL App (4th) 190814, ¶ 47. A
waiver of that right must be knowing and voluntary. Id. While a trial court is not required to give
any specific admonitions before accepting a jury trial waiver, it must ensure “that a defendant
waives the right to a jury trial expressly and understandingly.” Id. (quoting People v. Bannister,
232 Ill. 2d 52, 66 (2008)). The validity of a jury waiver must be analyzed and determined in the
context of the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Id.
¶ 23 Here, respondent was a juvenile at the time of the offenses, and the charges
against him were brought pursuant to a delinquency petition. Jury trials are not required for
juveniles as a matter of due process. In re Destiny P., 2017 IL 120796, ¶ 26. Juveniles who are
subject to prosecutions that have been designated as an EJJ prosecution, however, have a
- 10 - statutory right to a jury trial. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(3) (West 2024). This reflects the fact that such
proceedings involve severe deprivations of liberty that are analogous to the deprivations imposed
in adult criminal proceedings. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 205 (2009); see
M.P., 2020 IL App (4th) 190814, ¶ 55 (finding habitual juvenile offender proceedings are more
like criminal proceedings). A juvenile offender found guilty in an EJJ prosecution receives both
a juvenile sentence and a stayed adult criminal sentence. The criminal sentence is only stayed,
though, on the condition that the juvenile offender complies with the juvenile sentence. 705
ILCS 405/5-810(4) (West 2024).
¶ 24 After reviewing the record, we conclude respondent did not expressly and
understandingly waive his right to a jury trial. There is no written jury waiver in either case
record. There is no record of any discussion of respondent’s right to a jury trial in the record of
proceedings. While the trial court admonished respondent regarding his right to a trial, there is
no mention of his right to a jury trial anywhere in the record. Thus, the record is, at best, silent
concerning respondent’s waiver of his right to a jury trial, and we do not presume respondent’s
silence constituted a valid waiver. See In re R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d 358, 368 (2001), abrogated on
other grounds by Destiny P. (finding it could not presume a minor’s silence constituted a valid
waiver of his right to a jury trial when he was never informed of the right in open court and he
had not been eligible for a jury trial in his prior delinquency proceedings). Having concluded a
clear and obvious error occurred, we must determine if the forfeited error amounted to a plain
error so as to excuse respondent’s forfeiture.
¶ 25 As noted above, the plain-error doctrine has two prongs. Respondent primarily
argues second-prong plain error, but, in his reply brief to this court, he also argues first-prong
plain error. However, first-prong plain error requires a finding that the evidence was closely
- 11 - balanced, and respondent does not make any argument regarding the evidence. See People v.
Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (holding the first prong of the plain--error doctrine allows a
reviewing court to consider an unpreserved error when defendant shows that “the evidence was
so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against
him”). Accordingly, we conclude respondent cannot prevail under the first prong of the plain-
error doctrine.
¶ 26 To prevail under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine, a defendant must
show the “error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged
the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 187. Under second-prong jurisprudence, regardless of
the strength of the evidence, “[p]rejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance
of the right involved.” Id. In describing the serious error necessary for second-prong plain error,
our supreme court has equated it with structural error, which is a very limited class of errors.
People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 28. Structural errors are those errors that affect the entire
trial’s framework, “rather than mere errors in the trial process itself,” and “include a complete
denial of counsel, denial of self-representation at trial, trial before a biased judge, denial of a
public trial, racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, and a defective reasonable
doubt instruction.” Id. ¶ 29. While this list of structural errors is not comprehensive, we look to
the types of errors that have been determined to be structural to determine whether the claimed
error is comparable. Id. ¶ 30.
¶ 27 Here, respondent contends the absence of proper admonitions regarding his right
to a jury trial and the acceptance of his guilty plea, which was made without knowing he was
entitled to a jury trial under the EJJ statute, rendered his guilty plea invalid. While
acknowledging his right to a jury trial was statutory, not constitutional, respondent argues his
- 12 - invalid jury waiver was a structural error that can be reviewed as second-prong plain error.
¶ 28 The supreme court has held, in the adult criminal context, the deprivation of the
fundamental right to a trial by jury is a structural error. People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 192-
93 (2009). However, a juvenile’s right to a trial by jury is statutory, rather than constitutional,
and it is not a fundamental right. Destiny P., 2017 IL 120796, ¶ 14 n.1. As an error that does not
involve a fundamental right or a constitutional protection, it is subject to harmless-error analysis.
See Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 194 (holding that the violation of a supreme court rule was harmless
error). Here, as the failure to admonish respondent of his statutory right to a jury trial was not the
denial of a fundamental or constitutional right, it is subject to harmless-error analysis, so his
forfeiture cannot not be excused as second-prong plain error. See United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) (describing structural errors as those that defy harmless error
standards); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (2010) (“Structural errors are not subject
to harmless-error review.”).
¶ 29 As we find respondent’s forfeiture cannot be excused under the plain-error
doctrine, we address respondent’s claim that we should reach the forfeited error in the context of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent contends his counsel was ineffective for allowing
him to unknowingly waive his right to a trial by jury and for failing to preserve the jury waiver
issue in the motions to withdraw his guilty plea. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
governed by the familiar two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must show his counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient
performance. Id. at 688, 692. We find the prejudice prong to be determinative, so we will assume
without deciding that counsel’s performance was deficient and proceed to the prejudice analysis.
- 13 - See People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 24 (holding a defendant must establish both prongs of
the Strickland test to prevail, and the failure to establish either prong precludes a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel).
¶ 30 To show prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant “ ‘must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” People v. Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 26 (quoting
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). To show such prejudice, it is not sufficient for the
defendant to make a conclusory allegation he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
demanded a trial. Id. In other words, the defendant “ ‘must convince the court that a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.’ ” People v. Valdez,
2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).
¶ 31 Respondent contends he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known he had a
right to a jury trial. He argues the record supports this contention when he said, “[T]he only
reason I’m not going to trial is because it’s under y’all.” Our careful review of the record,
however, undermines respondent’s claim he would have demanded a trial if he knew he was
entitled to a jury trial. Rather, the record indicates respondent’s overriding interest was to be
released from custody that day. During the colloquy with the trial court regarding the plea, the
court explained respondent did not have to plead guilty and could demand a trial. However,
when the court informed respondent he would not be released on home confinement if he
demanded a trial, respondent clearly chose to plead guilty so he could walk out of court that day.
As respondent has not shown a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and insisted upon a jury trial, while remaining in custody, he has not shown
the prejudice necessary to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
- 14 - ¶ 32 C. One-Act, One-Crime
¶ 33 Respondent contends his delinquency adjudication in case No. 23-JD-54 was
based upon his guilty plea to two offenses, unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle and theft, that
were based upon the same physical act of possessing a single vehicle. Respondent contends this
violates the one-act, one-crime rule and this court should vacate one of the delinquency findings.
Respondent does not challenge his separate adjudication as delinquent for the offense of criminal
trespass to vehicles (case No. 23-JD-69), which was based on a different act on a different date.
Respondent admits he did not preserve the error but contends it is reviewable as plain error.
¶ 34 Violations of the one-act, one-crime rule are reviewable as second-prong plain-
error. See People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 10 (“[O]ne-act, one-crime violations fall within
the second prong of the plain-error doctrine as an obvious error so serious that it challenges the
integrity of the judicial process.”); see also In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 378-79 (2009)
(“[I]t is well established that a one-act, one-crime violation affects the integrity of the judicial
process, thus satisfying the second prong of the plain-error test.”). Under the one-act, one-crime
rule, a criminal defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses when those offenses are all
based on precisely the same physical act. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 11. The one-act, one-crime
rule applies to juvenile delinquency adjudications. Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 375. Whether a
violation of the one-act, one-crime rule has occurred is a question of law, which is reviewed
de novo. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12.
¶ 35 The State concedes, and we agree, the adjudication in case No. 23-JD-54, finding
respondent delinquent for the offenses of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle and theft,
violates the one-act, one-crime rule. Thus, the sentence should be imposed on the more serious
offense and the less serious offense should be vacated. People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 170
- 15 - (2009). In determining which offense is more serious, a reviewing court compares the relative
punishments as dictated by statute. Id. As charged, the crime of unlawful possession of a stolen
vehicle is a Class 2 felony under the Illinois Vehicle Code and requires proof that a person who
is not entitled to possession of a vehicle possessed the vehicle, knowing it was stolen. 625 ILCS
5/4-103(a)(1), (b) (West 2022). Theft, as charged in this case, is a Class 2 felony under the
Criminal Code of 2012 and requires proof that a person knowingly obtained or exerted
unauthorized control over the property of another, intending to deprive the owner permanently of
the use of the property. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A), (b)(5) (West 2022). As both are Class 2
felonies, with identical punishments, we consider which offense has the more culpable mental
state. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35 (West 2024); Artis, 232 Ill. 2d at 170 (holding that when offenses
have identical classifications, the court may determine the more serious offense is the one with
the more culpable mental state). The State contends theft, which requires knowledge and intent,
is the more serious offense when compared to unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle, which
requires knowledge the vehicle was stolen. Respondent accepts that assessment.
¶ 36 We find respondent satisfied his burden to show that plain error occurred in this
case. The trial court violated the one-act, one-crime rule when it adjudicated respondent
delinquent of both offenses and sentenced him on both offenses. See Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at
378 (finding the trial court violated the one-act, one-crime rule by failing to merge two findings
of guilt for aggravated battery based on the same conduct). Accordingly, we modify respondent’s
adjudicatory and sentencing orders to vacate the adjudication of delinquency and associated
sentence for unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle in case No. 23-JD-54. See People v. Price,
221 Ill. 2d 182 194-5 (2006) (vacating the conviction and sentence for one of two equal offenses
on the suggestion of the State when defendant expressed no preference).
- 16 - ¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we modify respondent’s adjudicatory and sentencing
orders in case No. 23-JD-54 and otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 39 Affirmed as modified.
- 17 -